All of lore.kernel.org
 help / color / mirror / Atom feed
From: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
To: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: casey.schaufler@intel.com, jmorris@namei.org,
	linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org, selinux@vger.kernel.org,
	john.johansen@canonical.com, penguin-kernel@i-love.sakura.ne.jp,
	paul@paul-moore.com, sds@tycho.nsa.gov
Subject: Re: [PATCH v7 22/28] SELinux: Verify LSM display sanity in binder
Date: Thu, 8 Aug 2019 17:56:31 -0700	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <3ab05d95-b60e-a915-ede5-68af9cf37b31@schaufler-ca.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <201908081454.FF7420D8D@keescook>

On 8/8/2019 2:55 PM, Kees Cook wrote:
> On Wed, Aug 07, 2019 at 12:44:04PM -0700, Casey Schaufler wrote:
>> Verify that the tasks on the ends of a binder transaction
>> use LSM display values that don't cause SELinux contexts
>> to be interpreted by another LSM or another LSM's context
>> to be interpreted by SELinux. No judgement is made in cases
>> that where SELinux contexts are not used in the binder
>> transaction.
>>
>> Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
>> ---
>>  security/selinux/hooks.c | 34 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
>>  1 file changed, 34 insertions(+)
>>
>> diff --git a/security/selinux/hooks.c b/security/selinux/hooks.c
>> index 352be16a887d..fcad2e3432d2 100644
>> --- a/security/selinux/hooks.c
>> +++ b/security/selinux/hooks.c
>> @@ -2009,6 +2009,28 @@ static inline u32 open_file_to_av(struct file *file)
>>  	return av;
>>  }
>>  
>> +/*
>> + * Verify that if the "display" LSM is SELinux for either task
>> + * that it is for both tasks.
>> + */
>> +static inline bool compatible_task_displays(struct task_struct *here,
>> +					    struct task_struct *there)
>> +{
>> +	int h = lsm_task_display(here);
>> +	int t = lsm_task_display(there);
>> +
>> +	if (h == t)
>> +		return true;
>> +
>> +	/* unspecified is only ok if SELinux isn't going to be involved */
>> +	if (selinux_lsmid.slot == 0)
>> +		return ((h == 0 && t == LSMBLOB_INVALID) ||
>> +			(t == 0 && h == LSMBLOB_INVALID));
> What is "0" here? Doesn't that just mean the first LSM. I though only -1
> had a special meaning (and had a #define name for it).

I try not to write obscure code, but I seem to have done so here.

The lsm in slot 0 (the first registered "display" lsm) will
get used if the display value is LSMBLOB_INVALID. We've already
checked to see if the display values are the same, and they're not.

If selinux is in slot 0, one of the display values is 0 and the
other is LSMBLOB_INVALID, the displays are compatible. Otherwise,
they're not. If selinux is not in slot 0 and either of the displays
slots is selinux's slot, it's not compatible.

Simple, no?

I'll have a go at making the code more obvious or, failing
that, better documented.

>
> -Kees
>
>> +
>> +	/* it's ok only if neither display is SELinux */
>> +	return (h != selinux_lsmid.slot && t != selinux_lsmid.slot);
>> +}
>> +
>>  /* Hook functions begin here. */
>>  
>>  static int selinux_binder_set_context_mgr(struct task_struct *mgr)
>> @@ -2016,6 +2038,9 @@ static int selinux_binder_set_context_mgr(struct task_struct *mgr)
>>  	u32 mysid = current_sid();
>>  	u32 mgrsid = task_sid(mgr);
>>  
>> +	if (!compatible_task_displays(current, mgr))
>> +		return -EINVAL;
>> +
>>  	return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
>>  			    mysid, mgrsid, SECCLASS_BINDER,
>>  			    BINDER__SET_CONTEXT_MGR, NULL);
>> @@ -2029,6 +2054,9 @@ static int selinux_binder_transaction(struct task_struct *from,
>>  	u32 tosid = task_sid(to);
>>  	int rc;
>>  
>> +	if (!compatible_task_displays(from, to))
>> +		return -EINVAL;
>> +
>>  	if (mysid != fromsid) {
>>  		rc = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
>>  				  mysid, fromsid, SECCLASS_BINDER,
>> @@ -2048,6 +2076,9 @@ static int selinux_binder_transfer_binder(struct task_struct *from,
>>  	u32 fromsid = task_sid(from);
>>  	u32 tosid = task_sid(to);
>>  
>> +	if (!compatible_task_displays(from, to))
>> +		return -EINVAL;
>> +
>>  	return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
>>  			    fromsid, tosid, SECCLASS_BINDER, BINDER__TRANSFER,
>>  			    NULL);
>> @@ -2064,6 +2095,9 @@ static int selinux_binder_transfer_file(struct task_struct *from,
>>  	struct common_audit_data ad;
>>  	int rc;
>>  
>> +	if (!compatible_task_displays(from, to))
>> +		return -EINVAL;
>> +
>>  	ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_PATH;
>>  	ad.u.path = file->f_path;
>>  
>> -- 
>> 2.20.1
>>


  reply	other threads:[~2019-08-09  0:56 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 37+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2019-08-07 19:43 [PATCH v7 00/28] LSM: Module stacking for AppArmor Casey Schaufler
2019-08-07 19:43 ` [PATCH v7 01/28] LSM: Infrastructure management of the superblock Casey Schaufler
2019-08-07 19:43 ` [PATCH v7 02/28] LSM: Infrastructure management of the sock security Casey Schaufler
2019-08-07 19:43 ` [PATCH v7 03/28] LSM: Infrastructure management of the key blob Casey Schaufler
2019-08-07 19:43 ` [PATCH v7 04/28] LSM: Create and manage the lsmblob data structure Casey Schaufler
2019-08-07 19:43 ` [PATCH v7 05/28] LSM: Use lsmblob in security_audit_rule_match Casey Schaufler
2019-08-07 19:43 ` [PATCH v7 06/28] LSM: Use lsmblob in security_kernel_act_as Casey Schaufler
2019-08-07 19:43 ` [PATCH v7 07/28] net: Prepare UDS for security module stacking Casey Schaufler
2019-08-07 19:43 ` [PATCH v7 08/28] LSM: Use lsmblob in security_secctx_to_secid Casey Schaufler
2019-08-07 19:43 ` [PATCH v7 09/28] LSM: Use lsmblob in security_secid_to_secctx Casey Schaufler
2019-08-07 19:43 ` [PATCH v7 10/28] LSM: Use lsmblob in security_ipc_getsecid Casey Schaufler
2019-08-07 19:43 ` [PATCH v7 11/28] LSM: Use lsmblob in security_task_getsecid Casey Schaufler
2019-08-07 19:43 ` [PATCH v7 12/28] LSM: Use lsmblob in security_inode_getsecid Casey Schaufler
2019-08-07 19:43 ` [PATCH v7 13/28] LSM: Use lsmblob in security_cred_getsecid Casey Schaufler
2019-08-07 19:43 ` [PATCH v7 14/28] IMA: Change internal interfaces to use lsmblobs Casey Schaufler
2019-08-07 19:43 ` [PATCH v7 15/28] LSM: Specify which LSM to display Casey Schaufler
2019-08-08 21:39   ` Kees Cook
2019-08-08 23:38     ` Casey Schaufler
2019-08-07 19:43 ` [PATCH v7 16/28] LSM: Ensure the correct LSM context releaser Casey Schaufler
2019-08-07 19:43 ` [PATCH v7 17/28] LSM: Use lsmcontext in security_secid_to_secctx Casey Schaufler
2019-08-07 19:44 ` [PATCH v7 18/28] LSM: Use lsmcontext in security_dentry_init_security Casey Schaufler
2019-08-07 19:44 ` [PATCH v7 19/28] LSM: Use lsmcontext in security_inode_getsecctx Casey Schaufler
2019-08-07 19:44 ` [PATCH v7 20/28] LSM: security_secid_to_secctx in netlink netfilter Casey Schaufler
2019-08-07 19:44 ` [PATCH v7 21/28] NET: Store LSM netlabel data in a lsmblob Casey Schaufler
2019-08-07 19:44 ` [PATCH v7 22/28] SELinux: Verify LSM display sanity in binder Casey Schaufler
2019-08-08 21:55   ` Kees Cook
2019-08-09  0:56     ` Casey Schaufler [this message]
2019-08-07 19:44 ` [PATCH v7 23/28] Audit: Add subj_LSM fields when necessary Casey Schaufler
2019-08-07 19:44 ` [PATCH v7 24/28] Audit: Include object data for all security modules Casey Schaufler
2019-08-07 19:44 ` [PATCH v7 25/28] LSM: Provide an user space interface for the default display Casey Schaufler
2019-08-07 19:44 ` [PATCH v7 26/28] NET: Add SO_PEERCONTEXT for multiple LSMs Casey Schaufler
2019-08-08 22:21   ` Kees Cook
2019-08-09  0:18     ` Casey Schaufler
2019-08-07 19:44 ` [PATCH v7 27/28] LSM: Add /proc attr entry for full LSM context Casey Schaufler
2019-08-08 22:22   ` Kees Cook
2019-08-09  0:23     ` Casey Schaufler
2019-08-07 19:44 ` [PATCH v7 28/28] AppArmor: Remove the exclusive flag Casey Schaufler

Reply instructions:

You may reply publicly to this message via plain-text email
using any one of the following methods:

* Save the following mbox file, import it into your mail client,
  and reply-to-all from there: mbox

  Avoid top-posting and favor interleaved quoting:
  https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Posting_style#Interleaved_style

* Reply using the --to, --cc, and --in-reply-to
  switches of git-send-email(1):

  git send-email \
    --in-reply-to=3ab05d95-b60e-a915-ede5-68af9cf37b31@schaufler-ca.com \
    --to=casey@schaufler-ca.com \
    --cc=casey.schaufler@intel.com \
    --cc=jmorris@namei.org \
    --cc=john.johansen@canonical.com \
    --cc=keescook@chromium.org \
    --cc=linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org \
    --cc=paul@paul-moore.com \
    --cc=penguin-kernel@i-love.sakura.ne.jp \
    --cc=sds@tycho.nsa.gov \
    --cc=selinux@vger.kernel.org \
    /path/to/YOUR_REPLY

  https://kernel.org/pub/software/scm/git/docs/git-send-email.html

* If your mail client supports setting the In-Reply-To header
  via mailto: links, try the mailto: link
Be sure your reply has a Subject: header at the top and a blank line before the message body.
This is an external index of several public inboxes,
see mirroring instructions on how to clone and mirror
all data and code used by this external index.