All of lore.kernel.org
 help / color / mirror / Atom feed
From: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
To: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>, selinux@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH v2] selinux: deprecate disabling SELinux and runtime
Date: Tue, 7 Jan 2020 09:35:15 -0500	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <43f27f76-f3ca-7ea2-7820-da56bb53fd0e@tycho.nsa.gov> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <157836784986.560897.13893922675143903084.stgit@chester>

On 1/6/20 10:30 PM, Paul Moore wrote:
> Deprecate the CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_DISABLE functionality.  The
> code was originally developed to make it easier for Linux
> distributions to support architectures where adding parameters to the
> kernel command line was difficult.  Unfortunately, supporting runtime
> disable meant we had to make some security trade-offs when it came to
> the LSM hooks, as documented in the Kconfig help text:
> 
>    NOTE: selecting this option will disable the '__ro_after_init'
>    kernel hardening feature for security hooks.   Please consider
>    using the selinux=0 boot parameter instead of enabling this
>    option.
> 
> Fortunately it looks as if that the original motivation for the
> runtime disable functionality is gone, and Fedora/RHEL appears to be
> the only major distribution enabling this capability at build time
> so we are now taking steps to remove it entirely from the kernel.
> The first step is to mark the functionality as deprecated and print
> an error when it is used (what this patch is doing).  As Fedora/RHEL
> makes progress in transitioning the distribution away from runtime
> disable, we will introduce follow-up patches over several kernel
> releases which will block for increasing periods of time when the
> runtime disable is used.  Finally we will remove the option entirely
> once we believe all users have moved to the kernel cmdline approach.
> 
> Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
> Acked-by: Ondrej Mosnacek <omosnace@redhat.com>
> Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>

checkpatch.pl has two warnings on this patch, one about the new 
Documentation/ABI/obsolete/sysfs-selinux-disable file not being listed 
in MAINTAINERS (looks like others are) and one about the comment block 
style being wrong.  Also not entirely sure if the file should be 
sysfs-selinux-disable or selinuxfs-disable; it gets mounted under sysfs 
but isn't part of it per se.  Otherwise, LGTM.

> ---
>   Documentation/ABI/obsolete/sysfs-selinux-disable |   26 ++++++++++++++++++++++
>   security/selinux/Kconfig                         |    3 +++
>   security/selinux/selinuxfs.c                     |    6 +++++
>   3 files changed, 35 insertions(+)
>   create mode 100644 Documentation/ABI/obsolete/sysfs-selinux-disable
> 
> diff --git a/Documentation/ABI/obsolete/sysfs-selinux-disable b/Documentation/ABI/obsolete/sysfs-selinux-disable
> new file mode 100644
> index 000000000000..c340278e3cf8
> --- /dev/null
> +++ b/Documentation/ABI/obsolete/sysfs-selinux-disable
> @@ -0,0 +1,26 @@
> +What:		/sys/fs/selinux/disable
> +Date:		April 2005 (predates git)
> +KernelVersion:	2.6.12-rc2 (predates git)
> +Contact:	selinux@vger.kernel.org
> +Description:
> +
> +	The selinuxfs "disable" node allows SELinux to be disabled at runtime
> +	prior to a policy being loaded into the kernel.  If disabled via this
> +	mechanism, SELinux will remain disabled until the system is rebooted.
> +
> +	The preferred method of disabling SELinux is via the "selinux=0" boot
> +	parameter, but the selinuxfs "disable" node was created to make it
> +	easier for systems with primitive bootloaders that did not allow for
> +	easy modification of the kernel command line.  Unfortunately, allowing
> +	for SELinux to be disabled at runtime makes it difficult to secure the
> +	kernel's LSM hooks using the "__ro_after_init" feature.
> +
> +	Thankfully, the need for the SELinux runtime disable appears to be
> +	gone, the default Kconfig configuration disables this selinuxfs node,
> +	and only one of the major distributions, Fedora, supports disabling
> +	SELinux at runtime.  Fedora is in the process of removing the
> +	selinuxfs "disable" node and once that is complete we will start the
> +	slow process of removing this code from the kernel.
> +
> +	More information on /sys/fs/selinux/disable can be found under the
> +	CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_DISABLE Kconfig option.
> diff --git a/security/selinux/Kconfig b/security/selinux/Kconfig
> index 996d35d950f7..580ac24c7aa1 100644
> --- a/security/selinux/Kconfig
> +++ b/security/selinux/Kconfig
> @@ -42,6 +42,9 @@ config SECURITY_SELINUX_DISABLE
>   	  using the selinux=0 boot parameter instead of enabling this
>   	  option.
>   
> +	  WARNING: this option is deprecated and will be removed in a future
> +	  kernel release.
> +
>   	  If you are unsure how to answer this question, answer N.
>   
>   config SECURITY_SELINUX_DEVELOP
> diff --git a/security/selinux/selinuxfs.c b/security/selinux/selinuxfs.c
> index 278417e67b4c..adbe2dd35202 100644
> --- a/security/selinux/selinuxfs.c
> +++ b/security/selinux/selinuxfs.c
> @@ -281,6 +281,12 @@ static ssize_t sel_write_disable(struct file *file, const char __user *buf,
>   	int new_value;
>   	int enforcing;
>   
> +	/* NOTE: we are now officially considering runtime disable as
> +	 *       deprecated, and using it will become increasingly painful
> +	 *       (e.g. sleeping/blocking) as we progress through future
> +	 *       kernel releases until eventually it is removed */
> +	pr_err("SELinux:  Runtime disable is deprecated, use selinux=0 on the kernel cmdline.\n");
> +
>   	if (count >= PAGE_SIZE)
>   		return -ENOMEM;
>   
> 


  reply	other threads:[~2020-01-07 14:34 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 3+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2020-01-07  3:30 [PATCH v2] selinux: deprecate disabling SELinux and runtime Paul Moore
2020-01-07 14:35 ` Stephen Smalley [this message]
2020-01-07 15:28   ` Paul Moore

Reply instructions:

You may reply publicly to this message via plain-text email
using any one of the following methods:

* Save the following mbox file, import it into your mail client,
  and reply-to-all from there: mbox

  Avoid top-posting and favor interleaved quoting:
  https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Posting_style#Interleaved_style

* Reply using the --to, --cc, and --in-reply-to
  switches of git-send-email(1):

  git send-email \
    --in-reply-to=43f27f76-f3ca-7ea2-7820-da56bb53fd0e@tycho.nsa.gov \
    --to=sds@tycho.nsa.gov \
    --cc=linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org \
    --cc=paul@paul-moore.com \
    --cc=selinux@vger.kernel.org \
    /path/to/YOUR_REPLY

  https://kernel.org/pub/software/scm/git/docs/git-send-email.html

* If your mail client supports setting the In-Reply-To header
  via mailto: links, try the mailto: link
Be sure your reply has a Subject: header at the top and a blank line before the message body.
This is an external index of several public inboxes,
see mirroring instructions on how to clone and mirror
all data and code used by this external index.