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From: "Jan Beulich" <JBeulich@suse.com>
To: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
Cc: xen-devel <xen-devel@lists.xenproject.org>
Subject: Re: Ping#2: Re: [PATCH 2/2] x86: don't allow clearing of TF_kernel_mode for other than 64-bit PV
Date: Mon, 04 Dec 2017 10:05:49 -0700	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <5A258E7D0200007800194817@prv-mh.provo.novell.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <ac0f8f71-0bc2-1462-cf43-cb2919fbc4f9@citrix.com>

>>> On 04.12.17 at 16:11, <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com> wrote:
> On 04/12/17 10:15, Jan Beulich wrote:
>>>>> On 03.07.17 at 16:56,  wrote:
>>>>>> On 31.05.17 at 13:54,  wrote:
>>>>>>> On 31.05.17 at 13:08, <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com> wrote:
>>>>> On 31/05/17 08:15, Jan Beulich wrote:
>>>>>> The flag is really only meant for those, both HVM and 32-bit PV tell
>>>>>> kernel from user mode based on CPL/RPL. Remove the all-question-marks
>>>>>> comment and let's be on the safe side here and also suppress clearing
>>>>>> for 32-bit PV (this isn't a fast path after all).
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
>>>>> Wouldn't it just be safer to disallow starting a 64bit PV guest in user
>>>>> mode?
>>>>>
>>>>> No real kernel would do such a thing, and keeping the corner case around
>>>>> is bad from an attack-surface point of view.
>>>> If it really was "starting a guest", I would probably agree. But we're
>>>> talking about starting a vCPU, and I could see uses for this (not the
>>>> least in XTF). After all the operation allows for enough state to be
>>>> set up such that further initialization inside the guest may not be
>>>> necessary.
>>> Any opinion here, or change of opinion on the original patch?
>> I'd really like to get this off my list.
> 
> My opinion is unchanged.  This isn't a useful piece of functionality,
> and it definitely doesn't warrant the attack surface it brings.

Very strange - you therefore prefer the current, even more
permissive code over the one the patch switches to just because
you think it should be even more tight (which I gave reasons why
I disagree with, and which then you would also be free to submit
a patch to further adjust, with suitable justification)?

Jan


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      reply	other threads:[~2017-12-04 17:05 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 12+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2017-05-31  7:04 [PATCH 0/2] x86: XSA_214 follow-up Jan Beulich
2017-05-31  7:14 ` [PATCH 1/2] x86: limit page type width Jan Beulich
2017-05-31 10:01   ` Andrew Cooper
2017-05-31 10:09     ` Jan Beulich
2017-06-06  8:26   ` Jan Beulich
2017-05-31  7:15 ` [PATCH 2/2] x86: don't allow clearing of TF_kernel_mode for other than 64-bit PV Jan Beulich
2017-05-31 11:08   ` Andrew Cooper
2017-05-31 11:54     ` Jan Beulich
2017-07-03 14:56     ` Ping: " Jan Beulich
2017-12-04 10:15     ` Ping#2: " Jan Beulich
2017-12-04 15:11       ` Andrew Cooper
2017-12-04 17:05         ` Jan Beulich [this message]

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