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From: Kees Cook <kees@kernel.org>
To: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp>,
	Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Cc: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>,
	"Serge E. Hallyn" <serge@hallyn.com>,
	linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org,
	John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>,
	Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Subject: Re: [PATCH 04/10] CaitSith: Add header file.
Date: Wed, 09 Nov 2022 18:22:05 -0800	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <7CED07F5-A6FC-46AD-8F9D-ECFC28FE23C9@kernel.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <82e46552-54da-6df5-c451-485991dcb5c3@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp>

On November 9, 2022 3:57:06 PM PST, Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp> wrote:
>On 2022/11/09 23:48, Paul Moore wrote:
>>                                             If there is a significant
>> change, e.g. the overall kernel policy towards out-of-tree code, we
>> can reconsider this policy but as of right now only upstream LSMs will
>> have LSM ID tokens assigned to them; in-development LSMs are free to
>> temporarily assign themselves an ID token (which may change when the
>> LSM is merged upstream), and out-of-tree LSMs are free to do whatever
>> they like with respect to their code, just as they do now.
>
>If in-development LSMs and out-of-tree LSMs cannot get a stable ID token,
>developers cannot write and publish userspace tools which make use of ID
>token. If ID collision happens by use of temporarily ID token, this token
>is no longer an identifier. That is a pointless and needless constraint
>for getting LSM modules created / tested / used.

You have to let this go. You aren't hearing us: this ID reservation process is not a problem for anyone but you. It is the same for all the syscalls that get added, and all the prctls, etc etc. This isn't a problem for userspace tools using those, and there won't be a problem here either.

We will not support out of tree code, so needing ID stability for out-of-tree LSMs isn't a valid argument.

Additionally, not having an LSM built into a distro kernel is a distro kernel problem. Open a bug with them and get it fixed. E.g. Ubuntu has no problem with multiple LSMs:

$ grep 'CONFIG_SECURITY_[^_]*[ =]' /boot/config-$(
uname -r)
...
CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX=y
CONFIG_SECURITY_SMACK=y
CONFIG_SECURITY_TOMOYO=y
CONFIG_SECURITY_APPARMOR=y
# CONFIG_SECURITY_LOADPIN is not set
CONFIG_SECURITY_YAMA=y
CONFIG_SECURITY_SAFESETID=y
CONFIG_SECURITY_LANDLOCK=y

And they just leave the "exclusive"s disabled at runtime:
CONFIG_LSM="landlock,lockdown,yama,integrity,apparmor"

-Kees


-- 
Kees Cook

  reply	other threads:[~2022-11-10  2:22 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 28+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2022-11-02 17:10 [PATCH 01/10] security: Export security_hook_heads Tetsuo Handa
2022-11-02 17:10 ` [PATCH 02/10] mm: Export copy_to_kernel_nofault() Tetsuo Handa
2022-11-02 17:10 ` [PATCH 03/10] fs,kernel: Export d_absolute_path()/find_task_by_pid_ns()/find_task_by_vpid() Tetsuo Handa
2022-11-05 23:51   ` Serge E. Hallyn
2022-11-02 17:10 ` [PATCH 04/10] CaitSith: Add header file Tetsuo Handa
2022-11-02 17:57   ` Casey Schaufler
2022-11-05  2:43     ` Serge E. Hallyn
2022-11-05  4:05       ` Tetsuo Handa
2022-11-05 23:46         ` Serge E. Hallyn
2022-11-06  0:56           ` Tetsuo Handa
2022-11-07 18:59             ` Casey Schaufler
2022-11-08 10:18               ` Tetsuo Handa
2022-11-09  2:20                 ` Paul Moore
2022-11-09 10:13                   ` Tetsuo Handa
2022-11-09 14:48                     ` Paul Moore
2022-11-09 23:57                       ` Tetsuo Handa
2022-11-10  2:22                         ` Kees Cook [this message]
2022-11-10  4:10                           ` Tetsuo Handa
2022-11-10  4:45                             ` Paul Moore
2022-11-07 19:22         ` Paul Moore
2022-11-02 17:10 ` [PATCH 05/10] CaitSith: Add LSM interface management file Tetsuo Handa
2022-11-02 19:05   ` Kees Cook
2022-11-02 17:10 ` [PATCH 07/10] CaitSith: Add permission checking functions Tetsuo Handa
2022-11-02 17:10 ` [PATCH 08/10] CaitSith: Add pathname calculation functions Tetsuo Handa
2022-11-02 17:10 ` [PATCH 09/10] CaitSith: Add garbage collector functions Tetsuo Handa
2022-11-02 17:10 ` [PATCH 10/10] CaitSith: Add Kconfig and Makefile files Tetsuo Handa
     [not found] ` <20221102171025.126961-6-penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp>
2022-11-02 17:29   ` [PATCH 6a/10] CaitSith: Add policy management functions Tetsuo Handa
2022-11-02 17:29   ` [PATCH 6b/10] " Tetsuo Handa

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