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From: James Bottomley <James.Bottomley@HansenPartnership.com>
To: Stephan Mueller <smueller@chronox.de>,
	Nicolai Stange <nstange@suse.de>,
	Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Cc: "David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net>,
	Hannes Reinecke <hare@suse.de>, Torsten Duwe <duwe@suse.de>,
	Zaibo Xu <xuzaibo@huawei.com>,
	Giovanni Cabiddu <giovanni.cabiddu@intel.com>,
	David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>,
	Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>,
	linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
	qat-linux@intel.com, keyrings@vger.kernel.org, simo@redhat.com,
	Eric Biggers <ebiggers@kernel.org>, Petr Vorel <pvorel@suse.cz>
Subject: Re: [v2 PATCH] crypto: api - Disallow sha1 in FIPS-mode while allowing hmac(sha1)
Date: Fri, 14 Jan 2022 07:54:23 -0500	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <9153507bd837a774ac76dafc23ca9a56451ef91e.camel@HansenPartnership.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <1765621.jvH33SIsIh@tauon.chronox.de>

On Fri, 2022-01-14 at 13:35 +0100, Stephan Mueller wrote:
> Am Freitag, 14. Januar 2022, 11:55:26 CET schrieb Herbert Xu:
> 
> Hi Herbert,
> 
> > > On an unrelated note, this will break trusted_key_tpm_ops->init() 
> > > in FIPS mode, because trusted_shash_alloc() would fail to get a
> > > hold of sha1. AFAICT, this could potentially make the
> > > init_trusted() module_init to fail, and, as encrypted-keys.ko
> > > imports key_type_trusted, prevent the loading of that one as
> > > well. Not sure that's desired...
> > 
> > Well if sha1 is supposed to be forbidden in FIPS mode why should
> 
> SHA-1 is approved in all use cases except signatures.

Actually, even that's not quite true: you can't use it in a FIPS
compliant system to *generate* signatures, but you can still use it in
a FIPS compliant system to verify legacy signatures (signatures created
before sha-1 was deprecated).  It's still also completely acceptable as
a hash for HMAC.

The supporting document is this one:

https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/NIST.SP.800-131Ar1.pdf

The bottom line is removing SHA-1 to achieve "FIPS compliance" is the
wrong approach.  You just have to make sure you can never use it to
generate signatures.

James



  reply	other threads:[~2022-01-14 12:54 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 53+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2021-12-09  9:03 [PATCH v2 00/18] crypto: dh - infrastructure for NVM in-band auth and FIPS conformance Nicolai Stange
2021-12-09  9:03 ` [PATCH v2 01/18] crypto: dh - remove struct dh's ->q member Nicolai Stange
2021-12-09  9:03 ` [PATCH v2 02/18] crypto: dh - constify struct dh's pointer members Nicolai Stange
2021-12-09  9:03 ` [PATCH v2 03/18] crypto: dh - optimize domain parameter serialization for well-known groups Nicolai Stange
2021-12-10 11:33   ` Hannes Reinecke
2021-12-13 10:06     ` Nicolai Stange
2021-12-13 10:10       ` Hannes Reinecke
2021-12-17  5:52   ` Herbert Xu
2021-12-20 15:27     ` Nicolai Stange
2021-12-29  2:14       ` Herbert Xu
2022-01-06 14:30         ` Stephan Mueller
2022-01-07  2:44           ` Herbert Xu
2022-01-07  6:37             ` Nicolai Stange
2022-01-11  6:13             ` [PATCH] crypto: api - Disallow sha1 in FIPS-mode while allowing hmac(sha1) Herbert Xu
2022-01-11  7:50               ` Nicolai Stange
2022-01-11 10:34                 ` Herbert Xu
2022-01-14  6:16                   ` [v2 PATCH] " Herbert Xu
2022-01-14  9:09                     ` Nicolai Stange
2022-01-14 10:55                       ` Herbert Xu
2022-01-14 12:34                         ` Nicolai Stange
2022-01-14 12:35                         ` Stephan Mueller
2022-01-14 12:54                           ` James Bottomley [this message]
2022-01-26  9:01                         ` Stephan Mueller
2022-01-28 14:14                         ` Nicolai Stange
2022-01-28 15:49                           ` Stephan Mueller
2022-02-02 10:09                             ` Nicolai Stange
2022-01-07  7:01         ` [PATCH v2 03/18] crypto: dh - optimize domain parameter serialization for well-known groups Nicolai Stange
2021-12-09  9:03 ` [PATCH v2 04/18] crypto: dh - introduce RFC 7919 safe-prime groups Nicolai Stange
2021-12-10 11:34   ` Hannes Reinecke
2021-12-09  9:03 ` [PATCH v2 05/18] crypto: testmgr - add DH RFC 7919 ffdhe3072 test vector Nicolai Stange
2021-12-10 11:34   ` Hannes Reinecke
2021-12-09  9:03 ` [PATCH v2 06/18] crypto: dh - introduce RFC 3526 safe-prime groups Nicolai Stange
2021-12-10 11:35   ` Hannes Reinecke
2021-12-09  9:03 ` [PATCH v2 07/18] crypto: testmgr - add DH RFC 3526 modp2048 test vector Nicolai Stange
2021-12-09  9:03 ` [PATCH v2 08/18] crypto: testmgr - run only subset of DH vectors based on config Nicolai Stange
2021-12-10 11:36   ` Hannes Reinecke
2021-12-09  9:03 ` [PATCH v2 09/18] crypto: dh - implement private key generation primitive Nicolai Stange
2021-12-09  9:03 ` [PATCH v2 10/18] crypto: dh - introduce support for ephemeral key generation to dh-generic Nicolai Stange
2021-12-09  9:03 ` [PATCH v2 11/18] crypto: dh - introduce support for ephemeral key generation to hpre driver Nicolai Stange
2021-12-09  9:03 ` [PATCH v2 12/18] crypto: dh - introduce support for ephemeral key generation to qat driver Nicolai Stange
2021-12-15 21:54   ` Giovanni Cabiddu
2021-12-09  9:03 ` [PATCH v2 13/18] crypto: testmgr - add DH test vectors for key generation Nicolai Stange
2021-12-10 11:37   ` Hannes Reinecke
2021-12-09  9:03 ` [PATCH v2 14/18] lib/mpi: export mpi_rshift Nicolai Stange
2021-12-09  9:03 ` [PATCH v2 15/18] crypto: dh - store group id in dh-generic's dh_ctx Nicolai Stange
2021-12-09  9:03 ` [PATCH v2 16/18] crypto: dh - calculate Q from P for the full public key verification Nicolai Stange
2021-12-09  9:03 ` [PATCH v2 17/18] crypto: dh - try to match domain parameters to a known safe-prime group Nicolai Stange
2021-12-09  9:03 ` [PATCH v2 18/18] crypto: dh - accept only approved safe-prime groups in FIPS mode Nicolai Stange
2021-12-10 11:37   ` Hannes Reinecke
2021-12-10  7:56 ` [PATCH v2 00/18] crypto: dh - infrastructure for NVM in-band auth and FIPS conformance Stephan Mueller
2021-12-10 10:00   ` Nicolai Stange
2021-12-10 11:38 ` Hannes Reinecke
2021-12-13 10:12   ` Nicolai Stange

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