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From: Rasmus Villemoes <linux@rasmusvillemoes.dk>
To: Justin He <Justin.He@arm.com>,
	Rasmus Villemoes <linux@rasmusvillemoes.dk>,
	Petr Mladek <pmladek@suse.com>,
	Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org>,
	Sergey Senozhatsky <senozhatsky@chromium.org>,
	Andy Shevchenko <andriy.shevchenko@linux.intel.com>,
	Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>,
	Alexander Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>,
	Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: "Peter Zijlstra (Intel)" <peterz@infradead.org>,
	Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>,
	"Ahmed S. Darwish" <a.darwish@linutronix.de>,
	"linux-doc@vger.kernel.org" <linux-doc@vger.kernel.org>,
	"linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org" <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>,
	"linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org" <linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org>
Subject: Re: [PATCH RFCv3 2/3] lib/vsprintf.c: make %pD print full path for file
Date: Tue, 15 Jun 2021 09:04:13 +0200	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <9c18bf38-b04b-b4b6-d5f4-ae95cd3c33ce@rasmusvillemoes.dk> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <AM6PR08MB4376F90B594C5134302A830AF7309@AM6PR08MB4376.eurprd08.prod.outlook.com>

On 15/06/2021 08.43, Justin He wrote:
> Hi Rasmus
> 
>> -----Original Message-----
>> From: Rasmus Villemoes <linux@rasmusvillemoes.dk>

>> Why the !buf check? The only way we can have that is the snprintf(NULL,
>> 0, ...) case of asking how much space we'd need to malloc, right? In
>> which case end would be NULL+0 == NULL, so buf >= end automatically,
>> regardless of how much have been "printed" before %pD.
> 
> My original purpose is to avoid any memory copy/move for kvasprintf->
> vsnprintf(NULL, 0,...). But as you said, this can be folded into the case
> buf >= end.
> Do you think whether following case should be forbidden?:
> vsnprintf(NULL, 8,...).

That is an obvious caller bug. The caller tells vsnprintf "here's a
buffer of size 8 at address 0x0". And checking buf for NULL in the guts
of %pD would anyway be completely pointless as it would crash for a fmt of

"x%pD"

or basically anything at all before %pD because those specifiers (or
literal parts) would cause a write to buf - and if that somehow
survived, the buf %pD would be given would now be (void*)1L.

>> Now you're passing p to string_truncate or string_nocheck, while p
>> points somewhere into buf itself. I can't convince myself that would be
>> safe. At the very least, it deserves a couple of comments.
> 
> When code goes here, the buffer space must be as follows:
> |.........|.........|
> buf       p         end
> 
> So string_nocheck is safe because essential it would byte-to-byte copy p to buf.
> 
> But I agree comments are needed here.

Yes, because no matter how string_nocheck happens to be implemented
today, some day somebody might throw in a memcpy() or do something else
that means overlapping "buf" and "s" arguments are suddenly broken in
some configurations or arches.

Rasmus

  reply	other threads:[~2021-06-15  7:04 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 22+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2021-06-11 15:59 [PATCH RFCv3 0/3] make '%pD' print full path for file Jia He
2021-06-11 15:59 ` [PATCH RFCv3 1/3] fs: introduce helper d_path_unsafe() Jia He
2021-06-11 15:59 ` [PATCH RFCv3 2/3] lib/vsprintf.c: make %pD print full path for file Jia He
2021-06-11 21:28   ` Rasmus Villemoes
2021-06-15  6:43     ` Justin He
2021-06-15  7:04       ` Rasmus Villemoes [this message]
2021-06-15  8:32     ` Justin He
2021-06-14 15:40   ` Petr Mladek
2021-06-15  6:48     ` Justin He
2021-06-15  7:14       ` Rasmus Villemoes
2021-06-15  7:18         ` Justin He
2021-06-15 14:48     ` Justin He
2021-06-11 15:59 ` [PATCH RFCv3 3/3] lib/test_printf: add test cases for '%pD' Jia He
2021-06-11 21:40   ` Rasmus Villemoes
2021-06-15  7:06     ` Justin He
2021-06-15  7:15       ` Justin He
2021-06-15  7:40       ` Rasmus Villemoes
2021-06-14 15:44   ` Petr Mladek
2021-06-15  7:07     ` Justin He
2021-06-15  7:47       ` Rasmus Villemoes
2021-06-15  7:56         ` Justin He
2021-06-15  8:19           ` Andy Shevchenko

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