Re: [PATCH 0/2] Introduce security_create_user_ns()

From: KP Singh <kpsingh@kernel.org>
To: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Cc: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>,
	Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org>,
	Frederick Lawler <fred@cloudflare.com>,
	Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>,
	revest@chromium.org, jackmanb@chromium.org, ast@kernel.org,
	andrii@kernel.org, kafai@fb.com, songliubraving@fb.com,
	yhs@fb.com, john.fastabend@gmail.com, jmorris@namei.org,
	serge@hallyn.com, bpf@vger.kernel.org,
	linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org, netdev@vger.kernel.org,
	linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, kernel-team@cloudflare.com
Subject: Re: [PATCH 0/2] Introduce security_create_user_ns()
Date: Tue, 28 Jun 2022 00:27:40 +0200	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <CACYkzJ5CfBmc8th0t5_URvr0eKcx7_knqyi6GoCpvSJfXdv6cQ@mail.gmail.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <6a8fba0a-c9c9-61ba-793a-c2e0c2924f88@iogearbox.net>

On Tue, Jun 28, 2022 at 12:15 AM Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> wrote:
>
> On 6/27/22 11:56 PM, Paul Moore wrote:
> > On Mon, Jun 27, 2022 at 8:11 AM Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org> wrote:
> >> On Thu, Jun 23, 2022 at 11:21:37PM -0400, Paul Moore wrote:
> >
> > ...
> >
> >>> This is one of the reasons why I usually like to see at least one LSM
> >>> implementation to go along with every new/modified hook.  The
> >>> implementation forces you to think about what information is necessary
> >>> to perform a basic access control decision; sometimes it isn't always
> >>> obvious until you have to write the access control :)
> >>
> >> I spoke to Frederick at length during LSS and as I've been given to
> >> understand there's a eBPF program that would immediately use this new
> >> hook. Now I don't want to get into the whole "Is the eBPF LSM hook
> >> infrastructure an LSM" but I think we can let this count as a legitimate
> >> first user of this hook/code.
> >
> > Yes, for the most part I don't really worry about the "is a BPF LSM a
> > LSM?" question, it's generally not important for most discussions.
> > However, there is an issue unique to the BPF LSMs which I think is
> > relevant here: there is no hook implementation code living under
> > security/.  While I talked about a hook implementation being helpful
> > to verify the hook prototype, it is also helpful in providing an
> > in-tree example for other LSMs; unfortunately we don't get that same
> > example value when the initial hook implementation is a BPF LSM.
>
> I would argue that such a patch series must come together with a BPF
> selftest which then i) contains an in-tree usage example, ii) adds BPF
> CI test coverage. Shipping with a BPF selftest at least would be the
> usual expectation.

+1 I would also recommend that this comes with a BPF selftest as
suggested by Daniel.

>
> Thanks,
> Daniel