From: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
To: "Perla, Enrico" <enrico.perla@intel.com>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>,
"Reshetova, Elena" <elena.reshetova@intel.com>,
Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>, Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>,
Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>,
"kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com"
<kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com>,
"tglx@linutronix.de" <tglx@linutronix.de>,
"mingo@redhat.com" <mingo@redhat.com>,
"bp@alien8.de" <bp@alien8.de>, "tytso@mit.edu" <tytso@mit.edu>
Subject: Re: [RFC PATCH] x86/entry/64: randomize kernel stack offset upon system call
Date: Thu, 21 Feb 2019 15:29:39 -0800 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <CAGXu5jL=uPyP=eG296oTixkto83LqVyasvo9qaNEn2P6bAtufQ@mail.gmail.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <CAGXu5j+833Rv5dnsNth522WGirAjysipPo2gecSX2HC5y-MkUg@mail.gmail.com>
On Wed, Feb 20, 2019 at 2:53 PM Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> wrote:
> BTW, the attack that inspired grsecurity's RANDKSTACK is described in
> these slides (lots of steps, see slide 79):
> https://www.slideshare.net/scovetta/stackjacking
Sorry, as PaX Team reminded me, I misremembered this. RANDKSTACK
already existed. It was STACKLEAK that was created in response to this
particular attack. I still think this attack is worth understanding to
see what hoops must be jumped through when dealing with stack
randomization (and other defenses).
--
Kees Cook
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2019-02-21 23:29 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 34+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2019-02-08 12:15 [RFC PATCH] Early version of thread stack randomization Elena Reshetova
2019-02-08 12:15 ` [RFC PATCH] x86/entry/64: randomize kernel stack offset upon system call Elena Reshetova
2019-02-08 13:05 ` Peter Zijlstra
2019-02-08 13:20 ` Reshetova, Elena
2019-02-08 14:26 ` Peter Zijlstra
2019-02-09 11:13 ` Reshetova, Elena
2019-02-09 18:25 ` Andy Lutomirski
2019-02-11 6:39 ` Reshetova, Elena
2019-02-11 15:54 ` Andy Lutomirski
2019-02-12 10:16 ` Perla, Enrico
2019-02-14 7:52 ` Reshetova, Elena
2019-02-19 14:47 ` Jann Horn
2019-02-20 22:20 ` Kees Cook
2019-02-21 6:37 ` Andy Lutomirski
2019-02-21 13:20 ` Jann Horn
2019-02-21 15:49 ` Andy Lutomirski
2019-02-20 22:15 ` Kees Cook
2019-02-20 22:53 ` Kees Cook
2019-02-21 23:29 ` Kees Cook [this message]
2019-02-27 11:03 ` Reshetova, Elena
2019-02-21 9:35 ` Perla, Enrico
2019-02-21 17:23 ` Kees Cook
2019-02-21 17:48 ` Perla, Enrico
2019-02-21 19:18 ` Kees Cook
2019-02-20 21:51 ` Kees Cook
2019-02-08 15:15 ` Peter Zijlstra
2019-02-09 11:38 ` Reshetova, Elena
2019-02-09 12:09 ` Greg KH
2019-02-11 6:05 ` Reshetova, Elena
2019-02-08 16:34 ` Andy Lutomirski
2019-02-20 22:03 ` Kees Cook
2019-02-08 21:28 ` Kees Cook
2019-02-11 12:47 ` Reshetova, Elena
2019-02-20 22:04 ` Kees Cook
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