Re: [PATCH 3/7] Add a UFFD_SECURE flag to the userfaultfd API.

From: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
To: Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>, Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>,
	Daniel Colascione <dancol@google.com>,
	Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>,
	Pavel Emelyanov <xemul@virtuozzo.com>,
	Lokesh Gidra <lokeshgidra@google.com>,
	Nick Kralevich <nnk@google.com>, Nosh Minwalla <nosh@google.com>,
	Tim Murray <timmurray@google.com>,
	Mike Rapoport <rppt@linux.vnet.ibm.com>,
	Linux API <linux-api@vger.kernel.org>,
	LKML <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>,
	"Dr. David Alan Gilbert" <dgilbert@redhat.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH 3/7] Add a UFFD_SECURE flag to the userfaultfd API.
Date: Wed, 23 Oct 2019 14:25:35 -0700	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <CALCETrVS_Ym9wpvTP-ys-OBKCgg7QQjPdhJZe5YXJ6e8JQkNQQ@mail.gmail.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20191023211645.GC9902@redhat.com>

On Wed, Oct 23, 2019 at 2:16 PM Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com> wrote:
>
> On Wed, Oct 23, 2019 at 12:21:18PM -0700, Andy Lutomirski wrote:
> > There are two things going on here.
> >
> > 1. Daniel wants to add LSM labels to userfaultfd objects.  This seems
> > reasonable to me.  The question, as I understand it, is: who is the
> > subject that creates a uffd referring to a forked child?  I'm sure
> > this is solvable in any number of straightforward ways, but I think
> > it's less important than:
>
> The new uffd created during fork would definitely need to be accounted
> on the criu monitor, nor to the parent nor the child, so it'd need to
> be accounted to the process/context that has the fd in its file
> descriptors array. But since this is less important let's ignore this
> for a second.
>
> > 2. The existing ABI is busted independently of #1.  Suppose you call
> > userfaultfd to get a userfaultfd and enable UFFD_FEATURE_EVENT_FORK.
> > Then you do:
> >
> > $ sudo <&[userfaultfd number]
> >
> > Sudo will read it and get a new fd unexpectedly added to its fd table.
> > It's worse if SCM_RIGHTS is involved.
>
> So the problem is just that a new fd is created. So for this to turn
> out to a practical issue, it requires finding a reckless suid that
> won't even bother checking the return value of the open/socket
> syscalls or some equivalent fd number related side effect. All right
> that makes more sense now and of course I agree it needs fixing.

Or it requires a long-lived daemon that receives fds over SCM_RIGHTS
and reads from them.

>
> > So I think we either need to declare that UFFD_FEATURE_EVENT_FORK is
> > only usable by global root or we need to remove it and maybe re-add it
> > in some other form.
>
> If I had a time machine, I'd rather prefer to do the below:
>
> diff --git a/fs/userfaultfd.c b/fs/userfaultfd.c
> index fe6d804a38dc..574062051678 100644
> --- a/fs/userfaultfd.c
> +++ b/fs/userfaultfd.c
> @@ -1958,7 +1958,7 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE1(userfaultfd, int, flags)
>                 return -ENOMEM;
>
>         refcount_set(&ctx->refcount, 1);
> -       ctx->flags = flags;
> +       ctx->flags = flags | UFFD_CLOEXEC;

That doesn't solve the problem.  With your time machine, you should
instead use ioctl() or recvmsg().

>
> 4) enforce the global root permission check when creating the uffd only if
>    UFFD_FEATURE_EVENT_FORK is set.

This could work, but we should also add a better way to do
UFFD_FEATURE_EVENT_FORK and get CRIU to start using it.  If CRIU is
the only user, we can probably drop the old ABI after a couple of
releases, since as far as I know, CRIU users need to upgrade their
CRIU more or less in sync with the kernel so that new kernel features
get checkpointed and restored.