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From: Nathan Chancellor <nathan@kernel.org>
To: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@kernel.org>
Cc: linux-hardening@vger.kernel.org,
	Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>,
	Bill Wendling <morbo@google.com>,
	llvm@lists.linux.dev, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
	stable@vger.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH] randstruct: disable Clang 15 support
Date: Wed, 8 Feb 2023 07:32:43 -0700	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <Y+Oyi1eZqKtqbL40@dev-arch.thelio-3990X> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20230208065133.220589-1-ebiggers@kernel.org>

On Tue, Feb 07, 2023 at 10:51:33PM -0800, Eric Biggers wrote:
> From: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
> 
> The randstruct support released in Clang 15 is unsafe to use due to a
> bug that can cause miscompilations: "-frandomize-layout-seed
> inconsistently randomizes all-function-pointers structs"
> (https://github.com/llvm/llvm-project/issues/60349).  It has been fixed
> on the Clang 16 release branch, so add a Clang version check.
> 
> Fixes: 035f7f87b729 ("randstruct: Enable Clang support")
> Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
> Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>

Reviewed-by: Nathan Chancellor <nathan@kernel.org>

> ---
>  security/Kconfig.hardening | 3 +++
>  1 file changed, 3 insertions(+)
> 
> diff --git a/security/Kconfig.hardening b/security/Kconfig.hardening
> index 53baa95cb644f..0f295961e7736 100644
> --- a/security/Kconfig.hardening
> +++ b/security/Kconfig.hardening
> @@ -281,6 +281,9 @@ endmenu
>  
>  config CC_HAS_RANDSTRUCT
>  	def_bool $(cc-option,-frandomize-layout-seed-file=/dev/null)
> +	# Randstruct was first added in Clang 15, but it isn't safe to use until
> +	# Clang 16 due to https://github.com/llvm/llvm-project/issues/60349
> +	depends on !CC_IS_CLANG || CLANG_VERSION >= 160000
>  
>  choice
>  	prompt "Randomize layout of sensitive kernel structures"
> 
> base-commit: 4ec5183ec48656cec489c49f989c508b68b518e3
> -- 
> 2.39.1
> 
> 

  reply	other threads:[~2023-02-08 14:32 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 5+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2023-02-08  6:51 [PATCH] randstruct: disable Clang 15 support Eric Biggers
2023-02-08 14:32 ` Nathan Chancellor [this message]
2023-02-08 18:04   ` Bill Wendling
2023-02-08 18:53 ` Nick Desaulniers
2023-02-08 18:58 ` Kees Cook

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