From: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>
To: Matthew Garrett <matthewgarrett@google.com>
Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org,
linux-pm@vger.kernel.org, keyrings@vger.kernel.org,
zohar@linux.ibm.com, jejb@linux.ibm.com, corbet@lwn.net,
rjw@rjwysocki.net, Matthew Garrett <mjg59@google.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH 4/9] security: keys: trusted: Store the handle of a loaded key
Date: Sat, 20 Feb 2021 05:06:39 +0200 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <YDB8vwZ2MqQ8x1sj@kernel.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20210220013255.1083202-5-matthewgarrett@google.com>
On Sat, Feb 20, 2021 at 01:32:50AM +0000, Matthew Garrett wrote:
> Certain in-kernel operations using a trusted key (such as creation
> certification) require knowledge of the handle it's loaded at. Keep
> a copy of that in the payload.
>
> Signed-off-by: Matthew Garrett <mjg59@google.com>
This looks good to me as well *as a code change*.
/Jarkko
> ---
> include/keys/trusted-type.h | 1 +
> security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm2.c | 6 ++++--
> 2 files changed, 5 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
>
> diff --git a/include/keys/trusted-type.h b/include/keys/trusted-type.h
> index 020e01a99ea4..154d8a1769c3 100644
> --- a/include/keys/trusted-type.h
> +++ b/include/keys/trusted-type.h
> @@ -21,6 +21,7 @@
>
> struct trusted_key_payload {
> struct rcu_head rcu;
> + unsigned int blob_handle;
> unsigned int key_len;
> unsigned int blob_len;
> unsigned int creation_len;
> diff --git a/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm2.c b/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm2.c
> index 6357a51a24e9..a3673fffd834 100644
> --- a/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm2.c
> +++ b/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm2.c
> @@ -272,11 +272,13 @@ static int tpm2_load_cmd(struct tpm_chip *chip,
> }
>
> rc = tpm_send(chip, buf.data, tpm_buf_length(&buf));
> - if (!rc)
> + if (!rc) {
> *blob_handle = be32_to_cpup(
> (__be32 *) &buf.data[TPM_HEADER_SIZE]);
> - else
> + payload->blob_handle = *blob_handle;
> + } else {
> goto out;
> + }
>
> rc = tpm2_unpack_blob(payload);
> out:
> --
> 2.30.0.617.g56c4b15f3c-goog
>
>
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2021-02-20 3:07 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 29+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2021-02-20 1:32 [PATCH 0/9] Enable hibernation when Lockdown is enabled Matthew Garrett
2021-02-20 1:32 ` [PATCH 1/9] tpm: Add support for in-kernel resetting of PCRs Matthew Garrett
2021-02-20 2:52 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2021-02-20 1:32 ` [PATCH 2/9] tpm: Allow PCR 23 to be restricted to kernel-only use Matthew Garrett
2021-02-20 3:02 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2021-02-24 17:12 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2021-02-24 18:00 ` James Bottomley
2021-02-28 7:59 ` Matthew Garrett
2021-02-20 1:32 ` [PATCH 3/9] security: keys: trusted: Parse out individual components of the key blob Matthew Garrett
2021-02-20 3:05 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2021-02-22 7:36 ` Matthew Garrett
2021-02-24 17:22 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2021-02-20 1:32 ` [PATCH 4/9] security: keys: trusted: Store the handle of a loaded key Matthew Garrett
2021-02-20 3:06 ` Jarkko Sakkinen [this message]
2021-02-20 1:32 ` [PATCH 5/9] security: keys: trusted: Allow storage of PCR values in creation data Matthew Garrett
2021-02-20 3:09 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2021-02-21 19:44 ` Ben Boeckel
2021-02-22 7:41 ` Matthew Garrett
2021-02-20 1:32 ` [PATCH 6/9] pm: hibernate: Optionally store and verify a hash of the image Matthew Garrett
2021-05-05 18:18 ` Evan Green
2021-02-20 1:32 ` [PATCH 7/9] pm: hibernate: Optionally use TPM-backed keys to protect image integrity Matthew Garrett
2021-02-20 2:20 ` Randy Dunlap
2021-02-22 7:41 ` Matthew Garrett
2021-02-20 1:32 ` [PATCH 8/9] pm: hibernate: Verify the digest encryption key Matthew Garrett
2021-02-20 1:32 ` [PATCH 9/9] pm: hibernate: seal the encryption key with a PCR policy Matthew Garrett
2021-05-04 21:56 ` [PATCH 0/9] Enable hibernation when Lockdown is enabled Evan Green
2021-05-05 3:18 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2021-05-05 3:19 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2021-05-05 18:02 ` Evan Green
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