Re: [PATCH v4 00/21] AMX Support in KVM

From: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
To: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Cc: Yang Zhong <yang.zhong@intel.com>,
	x86@kernel.org, kvm@vger.kernel.org,
	linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, linux-doc@vger.kernel.org,
	linux-kselftest@vger.kernel.org, tglx@linutronix.de,
	mingo@redhat.com, bp@alien8.de, dave.hansen@linux.intel.com,
	corbet@lwn.net, shuah@kernel.org, jun.nakajima@intel.com,
	kevin.tian@intel.com, jing2.liu@linux.intel.com,
	jing2.liu@intel.com, guang.zeng@intel.com, wei.w.wang@intel.com
Subject: Re: [PATCH v4 00/21] AMX Support in KVM
Date: Tue, 4 Jan 2022 18:54:32 +0000	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <YdSX6NANtx0SXjfK@google.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <d43887b6-630c-446e-caee-dcbaa72f2466@redhat.com>

On Tue, Jan 04, 2022, Paolo Bonzini wrote:
> On 12/29/21 14:13, Yang Zhong wrote:
> > Highly appreciate for your review. This version mostly addressed the comments
> > from Sean. Most comments are adopted except three which are not closed and
> > need more discussions:
> > 
> >    - Move the entire xfd write emulation code to x86.c. Doing so requires
> >      introducing a new kvm_x86_ops callback to disable msr write bitmap.
> >      According to Paolo's earlier comment he prefers to handle it in vmx.c.
> 
> Yes, I do.

No objection, my comments were prior to seeing the patches that manipulated the
bitmap, e.g. in the earlier patches, having anything in vmx.c is unnecessary.

> >    - Directly check msr_bitmap in update_exception_bitmap() (for
> >      trapping #NM) and vcpu_enter_guest() (for syncing guest xfd after
> >      vm-exit) instead of introducing an extra flag in the last patch. However,
> >      doing so requires another new kvm_x86_ops callback for checking
> >      msr_bitmap since vcpu_enter_guest() is x86 common code. Having an
> >      extra flag sounds simpler here (at least for the initial AMX support).
> >      It does penalize nested guest with one xfd sync per exit, but it's not
> >      worse than a normal guest which initializes xfd but doesn't run
> >      AMX applications at all. Those could be improved afterwards.
> 
> The thing to do here would be to move
> MAX_POSSIBLE_PASSTHROUGH_MSRS/MAX_DIRECT_ACCESS_MSRS from VMX/SVM to core
> code.  For now we can keep the flag.
> 
> >    - Disable #NM trap for nested guest. This version still chooses to always
> >      trap #NM (regardless in L1 or L2) as long as xfd write interception is disabled.
> >      In reality #NM is rare if nested guest doesn't intend to run AMX applications
> >      and always-trap is safer than dynamic trap for the basic support in case
> >      of any oversight here.
> 
> Sean was justifying this with lack of support for nested AMX, but I'm not
> sure actually what is missing at all.  That is, an L1 hypervisor could
> expose AMX to L2, and then an L2->L0->L2 exit/reentry would have to trap
> #NM.  Otherwise it would miss an XFD_ERR update.

Ya, I was assuming there was something L0 needed to do to supported nested AMX,
but as Paolo pointed out there are no VMCS bits, so L0 just needs to correctly
handle #NM and MSR interceptions according to vmcs12.