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From: Taylor Blau <me@ttaylorr.com>
To: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
Cc: Glen Choo <chooglen@google.com>,
	git@vger.kernel.org, Emily Shaffer <emilyshaffer@google.com>,
	justin@justinsteven.com, martinvonz@google.com,
	"brian m. carlson" <sandals@crustytoothpaste.net>
Subject: Re: Bare repositories in the working tree are a security risk
Date: Fri, 15 Apr 2022 20:52:16 -0400	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <YloTQH35r2xVdPm1@nand.local> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <xmqqk0bqat4d.fsf@gitster.g>

On Fri, Apr 15, 2022 at 03:17:54PM -0700, Junio C Hamano wrote:
> What worries me more is the effect on _other_ people's server
> implementations ("server", because that is one major class of use
> case of bare repositories).  Essentially they need to identify the
> places where they depend on the current behaviour (i.e. going to the
> bare repository is enough to use it) and export GIT_DIR=. when they
> invoke "git" there.  The actual change that is necessary might be
> small, but identifying the places that need such changes may be
> added burden to them.

I'm definitely biased here, but I think that this is probably too big of
a burden to place on forge administrators.

Every repository on GitHub (and I suspect GitLab, too) is written as a
bare repository on disk, and so having to inject `GIT_DIR=.` into every
git invocation, while doable, seems like an unnecessary pain to impose.

I suppose you could hide this behavior behind an opt-in configuration
setting, e.g., `core.bareDiscovery` which determines whether or not we
will try to discover bare repositories without `GIT_DIR` in the
environment. That setting could default to true to avoid breaking
existing use-cases.

But I think that's just masking the overall pain that this approach
would incur, without providing much protection, so I wouldn't be unhappy
to see us pursue a different approach here.

Thanks,
Taylor

  reply	other threads:[~2022-04-16  2:06 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 50+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2022-04-06 22:43 Bare repositories in the working tree are a security risk Glen Choo
2022-04-06 23:22 ` [PATCH] fsck: detect bare repos in trees and warn Glen Choo
2022-04-07 12:42   ` Johannes Schindelin
2022-04-07 13:21     ` Derrick Stolee
2022-04-07 14:14       ` Ævar Arnfjörð Bjarmason
2022-04-14 20:02         ` Glen Choo
2022-04-15 12:46           ` Ævar Arnfjörð Bjarmason
2022-04-07 15:11       ` Junio C Hamano
2022-04-13 22:24       ` Glen Choo
2022-04-07 13:12   ` Ævar Arnfjörð Bjarmason
2022-04-07 15:20   ` Junio C Hamano
2022-04-07 18:38 ` Bare repositories in the working tree are a security risk John Cai
2022-04-07 21:24 ` brian m. carlson
2022-04-07 21:53   ` Justin Steven
2022-04-07 22:10     ` brian m. carlson
2022-04-07 22:40       ` rsbecker
2022-04-08  5:54       ` Junio C Hamano
2022-04-14  0:03         ` Junio C Hamano
2022-04-14  0:04         ` Glen Choo
2022-04-13 23:44       ` Glen Choo
2022-04-13 20:37 ` Glen Choo
2022-04-13 23:36   ` Junio C Hamano
2022-04-14 16:41     ` Glen Choo
2022-04-14 17:35       ` Junio C Hamano
2022-04-14 18:19         ` Junio C Hamano
2022-04-15 21:33         ` Glen Choo
2022-04-15 22:17           ` Junio C Hamano
2022-04-16  0:52             ` Taylor Blau [this message]
2022-04-15 22:43           ` Glen Choo
2022-04-15 20:13       ` Junio C Hamano
2022-04-15 23:45         ` Glen Choo
2022-04-15 23:59           ` Glen Choo
2022-04-16  1:00           ` Taylor Blau
2022-04-16  1:18             ` Junio C Hamano
2022-04-16  1:30               ` Taylor Blau
2022-04-16  0:34 ` Glen Choo
2022-04-16  0:41 ` Glen Choo
2022-04-16  1:28   ` Taylor Blau
2022-04-21 18:25     ` Emily Shaffer
2022-04-21 18:29       ` Emily Shaffer
2022-04-21 18:47         ` Junio C Hamano
2022-04-21 18:54           ` Taylor Blau
2022-04-21 19:09       ` Taylor Blau
2022-04-21 21:01         ` Emily Shaffer
2022-04-21 21:22           ` Taylor Blau
2022-04-29 23:57     ` Glen Choo
2022-04-30  1:14       ` Taylor Blau
2022-05-02 19:39         ` Glen Choo
2022-05-02 14:05       ` Philip Oakley
2022-05-02 18:50         ` Junio C Hamano

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