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From: Paolo Bonzini <bonzini@gnu.org>
To: tglx@linutronix.de, dave.hansen@linux.intel.com
Cc: yang.zhong@intel.com, ravi.v.shankar@intel.com, mingo@redhat.com,
	"Chang S. Bae" <chang.seok.bae@intel.com>,
	bp@alien8.de, x86@kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
	KVM list <kvm@vger.kernel.org>
Subject: ping Re: [PATCH v4 0/2] x86: Fix ARCH_REQ_XCOMP_PERM and update the test
Date: Wed, 23 Mar 2022 12:04:20 +0100	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <a0bded7d-5bc0-12b9-2aca-c1c92d958293@gnu.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20220129173647.27981-1-chang.seok.bae@intel.com>

Thomas, Dave,

can this series be included in 5.18 and CCed to stable?

The bug makes the __state_perm field completely wrong.  As a result, 
arch_prctl(ARCH_GET_XCOMP_PERM) only returns the features that were 
requested last, forgetting what was already in __state_perm (the 
"permitted" argument to __xstate_request_perm).

In KVM, it is a bit worse.  It affects 
arch_prctl(ARCH_GET_XCOMP_GUEST_PERM) in the same way and also 
ioctl(KVM_GET_SUPPORTED_CPUID), but the bug can also make KVM return the 
wrong xsave state size to userspace.  It's likely to go unnoticed by 
userspace until Intel adds non-dynamic states above a dynamic one, but 
potentially userspace could allocate a buffer that is too small.

Paolo

On 1/29/22 18:36, Chang S. Bae wrote:
> Changes from V3:
> * Rebased onto 5.17-rc1.
> 
> V3: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20211110003209.21666-1-chang.seok.bae@intel.com/
> 
> ---
> 
> The recent x86 dynamic state support incorporates the arch_prctl option to
> request permission before using a dynamic state.
> 
> It was designed to add the requested feature in the group leader's
> permission bitmask so that every thread can reference this master bitmask.
> The group leader is assumed to be unchanged here. The mainline is the case
> as a group leader is identified at fork() or exec() time only.
> 
> This master bitmask should include non-dynamic features always, as they
> are permitted by default. Users may check them via ARCH_GET_XCOMP_PERM.
> 
> But, in hindsight, the implementation does overwrite the bitmask with the
> requested bit only, instead of adding the bit to the existing one. This
> overwrite effectively revokes the permission that is granted already.
> 
> Fix the code and also update the selftest to disclose the issue if there
> is.
> 
> Chang S. Bae (1):
>    selftests/x86/amx: Update the ARCH_REQ_XCOMP_PERM test
> 
> Yang Zhong (1):
>    x86/arch_prctl: Fix the ARCH_REQ_XCOMP_PERM implementation
> 
>   arch/x86/kernel/fpu/xstate.c      |  2 +-
>   tools/testing/selftests/x86/amx.c | 16 ++++++++++++++--
>   2 files changed, 15 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
> 
> 
> base-commit: e783362eb54cd99b2cac8b3a9aeac942e6f6ac07


  parent reply	other threads:[~2022-03-23 11:04 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 16+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2022-01-29 17:36 [PATCH v4 0/2] x86: Fix ARCH_REQ_XCOMP_PERM and update the test Chang S. Bae
2022-01-29 17:36 ` [PATCH v4 1/2] x86/arch_prctl: Fix the ARCH_REQ_XCOMP_PERM implementation Chang S. Bae
2022-03-07 12:20   ` Hao Xiang
2022-03-07 18:53     ` Chang S. Bae
2022-03-08  8:36       ` Hao Xiang
2022-03-23 23:31   ` [tip: x86/urgent] x86/fpu/xstate: " tip-bot2 for Yang Zhong
2022-01-29 17:36 ` [PATCH v4 2/2] selftests/x86/amx: Update the ARCH_REQ_XCOMP_PERM test Chang S. Bae
2022-03-23 16:44   ` Thomas Gleixner
2022-03-23 21:27     ` Chang S. Bae
2022-03-23 23:31   ` [tip: x86/urgent] " tip-bot2 for Chang S. Bae
2022-03-23 11:04 ` Paolo Bonzini [this message]
2022-03-23 12:27   ` ping Re: [PATCH v4 0/2] x86: Fix ARCH_REQ_XCOMP_PERM and update the test Thomas Gleixner
2022-03-23 12:55     ` Thomas Gleixner
2022-03-23 14:24       ` Paolo Bonzini
2022-03-23 17:07         ` Thomas Gleixner
2022-03-23 17:20           ` Thomas Gleixner

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