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From: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
To: Henry Wang <Henry.Wang@arm.com>
Cc: "xen-devel@lists.xenproject.org" <xen-devel@lists.xenproject.org>,
	"Andrew Cooper" <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>,
	"Wei Liu" <wl@xen.org>, "Tim Deegan" <tim@xen.org>,
	"George Dunlap" <george.dunlap@citrix.com>,
	"Roger Pau Monné" <roger.pau@citrix.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH][4.17] x86/shadow: drop (replace) bogus assertions
Date: Mon, 24 Oct 2022 15:36:42 +0200	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <a49e42d4-90e0-8f8f-f0fa-f199d39c171d@suse.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <Y0k6RSI0VJhTVmEi@Air-de-Roger>

On 14.10.2022 12:30, Roger Pau Monné wrote:
> On Fri, Oct 14, 2022 at 10:49:55AM +0200, Jan Beulich wrote:
>> The addition of a call to shadow_blow_tables() from shadow_teardown()
>> has resulted in the "no vcpus" related assertion becoming triggerable:
>> If domain_create() fails with at least one page successfully allocated
>> in the course of shadow_enable(), or if domain_create() succeeds and
>> the domain is then killed without ever invoking XEN_DOMCTL_max_vcpus.
>>
>> The assertion's comment was bogus anyway: Shadow mode has been getting
>> enabled before allocation of vCPU-s for quite some time. Convert the
>> assertion to a conditional: As long as there are no vCPU-s, there's
>> nothing to blow away.
>>
>> Fixes: e7aa55c0aab3 ("x86/p2m: free the paging memory pool preemptively")
>> Reported-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
>>
>> A similar assertion/comment pair exists in _shadow_prealloc(); the
>> comment is similarly bogus, and the assertion could in principle trigger
>> e.g. when shadow_alloc_p2m_page() is called early enough. Replace those
>> at the same time by a similar early return, here indicating failure to
>> the caller (which will generally lead to the domain being crashed in
>> shadow_prealloc()).
> 
> It's my understanding we do care about this because a control domain
> could try to populate the p2m before calling XEN_DOMCTL_max_vcpus, and
> hence could trigger the ASSERT, as otherwise asserting would be fine.
> 
>> Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
> 
> Acked-by: Roger Pau Monné <roger.pau@citrix.com>

In a discussion amongst maintainers we've settled Andrew's reservations.
May I please ask for a release-ack for this change, so it can go in (as
a bug fix on top of the recent batch of XSAs)?

Thanks, Jan


  parent reply	other threads:[~2022-10-24 13:37 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 7+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2022-10-14  8:49 [PATCH][4.17] x86/shadow: drop (replace) bogus assertions Jan Beulich
2022-10-14 10:02 ` Andrew Cooper
2022-10-14 10:43   ` Jan Beulich
2022-10-14 10:30 ` Roger Pau Monné
2022-10-14 10:50   ` Jan Beulich
2022-10-24 13:36   ` Jan Beulich [this message]
2022-10-24 13:40     ` Henry Wang

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