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From: syzbot <syzbot+5294a9e355351fddb4b2@syzkaller.appspotmail.com>
To: almaz.alexandrovich@paragon-software.com,
	linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,  llvm@lists.linux.dev,
	nathan@kernel.org, ndesaulniers@google.com,
	 ntfs3@lists.linux.dev, syzkaller-bugs@googlegroups.com,
	trix@redhat.com
Subject: [syzbot] WARNING: suspicious RCU usage in write_inode_now (2)
Date: Tue, 06 Dec 2022 23:00:48 -0800	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <000000000000ee924305ef377a61@google.com> (raw)

Hello,

syzbot found the following issue on:

HEAD commit:    a5541c0811a0 Merge branch 'for-next/core' into for-kernelci
git tree:       git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/arm64/linux.git for-kernelci
console output: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/x/log.txt?x=1080851d880000
kernel config:  https://syzkaller.appspot.com/x/.config?x=cbd4e584773e9397
dashboard link: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?extid=5294a9e355351fddb4b2
compiler:       Debian clang version 13.0.1-++20220126092033+75e33f71c2da-1~exp1~20220126212112.63, GNU ld (GNU Binutils for Debian) 2.35.2
userspace arch: arm64

Unfortunately, I don't have any reproducer for this issue yet.

Downloadable assets:
disk image: https://storage.googleapis.com/syzbot-assets/4b7702208fb9/disk-a5541c08.raw.xz
vmlinux: https://storage.googleapis.com/syzbot-assets/9ec0153ec051/vmlinux-a5541c08.xz
kernel image: https://storage.googleapis.com/syzbot-assets/6f8725ad290a/Image-a5541c08.gz.xz

IMPORTANT: if you fix the issue, please add the following tag to the commit:
Reported-by: syzbot+5294a9e355351fddb4b2@syzkaller.appspotmail.com

=============================
WARNING: suspicious RCU usage
6.1.0-rc8-syzkaller-33330-ga5541c0811a0 #0 Not tainted
-----------------------------
kernel/sched/core.c:9870 Illegal context switch in RCU-bh read-side critical section!

other info that might help us debug this:


rcu_scheduler_active = 2, debug_locks = 1
1 lock held by syz-executor.5/19612:
 #0: ffff0001428b30e0 (&type->s_umount_key#94/1){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: alloc_super+0xf8/0x430 fs/super.c:228

stack backtrace:
CPU: 0 PID: 19612 Comm: syz-executor.5 Not tainted 6.1.0-rc8-syzkaller-33330-ga5541c0811a0 #0
Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 09/30/2022
Call trace:
 dump_backtrace+0x1c4/0x1f0 arch/arm64/kernel/stacktrace.c:156
 show_stack+0x2c/0x3c arch/arm64/kernel/stacktrace.c:163
 __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:88 [inline]
 dump_stack_lvl+0x104/0x16c lib/dump_stack.c:106
 dump_stack+0x1c/0x58 lib/dump_stack.c:113
 lockdep_rcu_suspicious+0x138/0x154 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:6597
 __might_resched+0x6c/0x218 kernel/sched/core.c:9870
 __might_sleep+0x48/0x78 kernel/sched/core.c:9837
 write_inode_now+0xa4/0xdc fs/fs-writeback.c:2743
 iput_final fs/inode.c:1734 [inline]
 iput+0x1e4/0x324 fs/inode.c:1773
 ntfs_fill_super+0x1254/0x14a4 fs/ntfs3/super.c:1190
 get_tree_bdev+0x1e8/0x2a0 fs/super.c:1324
 ntfs_fs_get_tree+0x28/0x38 fs/ntfs3/super.c:1358
 vfs_get_tree+0x40/0x140 fs/super.c:1531
 do_new_mount+0x1dc/0x4e4 fs/namespace.c:3040
 path_mount+0x358/0x890 fs/namespace.c:3370
 do_mount fs/namespace.c:3383 [inline]
 __do_sys_mount fs/namespace.c:3591 [inline]
 __se_sys_mount fs/namespace.c:3568 [inline]
 __arm64_sys_mount+0x2c4/0x3c4 fs/namespace.c:3568
 __invoke_syscall arch/arm64/kernel/syscall.c:38 [inline]
 invoke_syscall arch/arm64/kernel/syscall.c:52 [inline]
 el0_svc_common+0x138/0x220 arch/arm64/kernel/syscall.c:142
 do_el0_svc+0x48/0x140 arch/arm64/kernel/syscall.c:197
 el0_svc+0x58/0x150 arch/arm64/kernel/entry-common.c:637
 el0t_64_sync_handler+0x84/0xf0 arch/arm64/kernel/entry-common.c:655
 el0t_64_sync+0x190/0x194 arch/arm64/kernel/entry.S:584


---
This report is generated by a bot. It may contain errors.
See https://goo.gl/tpsmEJ for more information about syzbot.
syzbot engineers can be reached at syzkaller@googlegroups.com.

syzbot will keep track of this issue. See:
https://goo.gl/tpsmEJ#status for how to communicate with syzbot.

                 reply	other threads:[~2022-12-07  7:00 UTC|newest]

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