From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Return-Path: X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.4.0 (2014-02-07) on aws-us-west-2-korg-lkml-1.web.codeaurora.org X-Spam-Level: X-Spam-Status: No, score=-8.2 required=3.0 tests=HEADER_FROM_DIFFERENT_DOMAINS, INCLUDES_PATCH,MAILING_LIST_MULTI,SIGNED_OFF_BY,SPF_HELO_NONE,SPF_PASS, USER_AGENT_SANE_1 autolearn=unavailable autolearn_force=no version=3.4.0 Received: from mail.kernel.org (mail.kernel.org [198.145.29.99]) by smtp.lore.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id ADC13C2D0CE for ; Tue, 21 Jan 2020 17:31:13 +0000 (UTC) Received: from vger.kernel.org (vger.kernel.org [209.132.180.67]) by mail.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 905D921569 for ; Tue, 21 Jan 2020 17:31:13 +0000 (UTC) Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S1729113AbgAURbK (ORCPT ); Tue, 21 Jan 2020 12:31:10 -0500 Received: from mga05.intel.com ([192.55.52.43]:26746 "EHLO mga05.intel.com" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S1728186AbgAURbK (ORCPT ); Tue, 21 Jan 2020 12:31:10 -0500 X-Amp-Result: SKIPPED(no attachment in message) X-Amp-File-Uploaded: False Received: from fmsmga008.fm.intel.com ([10.253.24.58]) by fmsmga105.fm.intel.com with ESMTP/TLS/DHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384; 21 Jan 2020 09:31:08 -0800 X-ExtLoop1: 1 X-IronPort-AV: E=Sophos;i="5.70,346,1574150400"; d="scan'208";a="221768046" Received: from linux.intel.com ([10.54.29.200]) by fmsmga008.fm.intel.com with ESMTP; 21 Jan 2020 09:31:04 -0800 Received: from [10.252.13.111] (iganakov-mobl1.ger.corp.intel.com [10.252.13.111]) by linux.intel.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 874B25803C5; Tue, 21 Jan 2020 09:30:55 -0800 (PST) Subject: Re: [PATCH v5 01/10] capabilities: introduce CAP_PERFMON to kernel and user space To: Stephen Smalley , Peter Zijlstra , Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo , Ingo Molnar , "jani.nikula@linux.intel.com" , "joonas.lahtinen@linux.intel.com" , "rodrigo.vivi@intel.com" , "benh@kernel.crashing.org" , Paul Mackerras , Michael Ellerman , "james.bottomley@hansenpartnership.com" , Serge Hallyn , James Morris , Will Deacon , Mark Rutland , Robert Richter , Alexei Starovoitov Cc: Jiri Olsa , Andi Kleen , Stephane Eranian , Igor Lubashev , Alexander Shishkin , Namhyung Kim , Song Liu , Lionel Landwerlin , Thomas Gleixner , linux-kernel , "linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org" , "selinux@vger.kernel.org" , "intel-gfx@lists.freedesktop.org" , "linux-parisc@vger.kernel.org" , "linuxppc-dev@lists.ozlabs.org" , linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org, "linux-perf-users@vger.kernel.org" , oprofile-list@lists.sf.net References: <0548c832-7f4b-dc4c-8883-3f2b6d351a08@linux.intel.com> <9b77124b-675d-5ac7-3741-edec575bd425@linux.intel.com> <64cab472-806e-38c4-fb26-0ffbee485367@tycho.nsa.gov> From: Alexey Budankov Organization: Intel Corp. Message-ID: <05297eff-8e14-ccdf-55a4-870c64516de8@linux.intel.com> Date: Tue, 21 Jan 2020 20:30:54 +0300 User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; WOW64; rv:68.0) Gecko/20100101 Thunderbird/68.4.1 MIME-Version: 1.0 In-Reply-To: <64cab472-806e-38c4-fb26-0ffbee485367@tycho.nsa.gov> Content-Type: text/plain; charset=utf-8 Content-Language: en-US Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit Sender: linux-parisc-owner@vger.kernel.org Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-parisc@vger.kernel.org On 21.01.2020 17:43, Stephen Smalley wrote: > On 1/20/20 6:23 AM, Alexey Budankov wrote: >> >> Introduce CAP_PERFMON capability designed to secure system performance >> monitoring and observability operations so that CAP_PERFMON would assist >> CAP_SYS_ADMIN capability in its governing role for perf_events, i915_perf >> and other performance monitoring and observability subsystems. >> >> CAP_PERFMON intends to harden system security and integrity during system >> performance monitoring and observability operations by decreasing attack >> surface that is available to a CAP_SYS_ADMIN privileged process [1]. >> Providing access to system performance monitoring and observability >> operations under CAP_PERFMON capability singly, without the rest of >> CAP_SYS_ADMIN credentials, excludes chances to misuse the credentials and >> makes operation more secure. >> >> CAP_PERFMON intends to take over CAP_SYS_ADMIN credentials related to >> system performance monitoring and observability operations and balance >> amount of CAP_SYS_ADMIN credentials following the recommendations in the >> capabilities man page [1] for CAP_SYS_ADMIN: "Note: this capability is >> overloaded; see Notes to kernel developers, below." >> >> Although the software running under CAP_PERFMON can not ensure avoidance >> of related hardware issues, the software can still mitigate these issues >> following the official embargoed hardware issues mitigation procedure [2]. >> The bugs in the software itself could be fixed following the standard >> kernel development process [3] to maintain and harden security of system >> performance monitoring and observability operations. >> >> [1] http://man7.org/linux/man-pages/man7/capabilities.7.html >> [2] https://www.kernel.org/doc/html/latest/process/embargoed-hardware-issues.html >> [3] https://www.kernel.org/doc/html/latest/admin-guide/security-bugs.html >> >> Signed-off-by: Alexey Budankov >> --- >>   include/linux/capability.h          | 12 ++++++++++++ >>   include/uapi/linux/capability.h     |  8 +++++++- >>   security/selinux/include/classmap.h |  4 ++-- >>   3 files changed, 21 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) >> >> diff --git a/include/linux/capability.h b/include/linux/capability.h >> index ecce0f43c73a..8784969d91e1 100644 >> --- a/include/linux/capability.h >> +++ b/include/linux/capability.h >> @@ -251,6 +251,18 @@ extern bool privileged_wrt_inode_uidgid(struct user_namespace *ns, const struct >>   extern bool capable_wrt_inode_uidgid(const struct inode *inode, int cap); >>   extern bool file_ns_capable(const struct file *file, struct user_namespace *ns, int cap); >>   extern bool ptracer_capable(struct task_struct *tsk, struct user_namespace *ns); >> +static inline bool perfmon_capable(void) >> +{ >> +    struct user_namespace *ns = &init_user_ns; >> + >> +    if (ns_capable_noaudit(ns, CAP_PERFMON)) >> +        return ns_capable(ns, CAP_PERFMON); >> + >> +    if (ns_capable_noaudit(ns, CAP_SYS_ADMIN)) >> +        return ns_capable(ns, CAP_SYS_ADMIN); >> + >> +    return false; >> +} > > Why _noaudit()?  Normally only used when a permission failure is non-fatal to the operation.  Otherwise, we want the audit message. Some of ideas from v4 review. Well, on the second sight, it defenitly should be logged for CAP_SYS_ADMIN. Probably it is not so fatal for CAP_PERFMON, but personally I would unconditionally log it for CAP_PERFMON as well. Good catch, thank you. ~Alexey From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 From: Alexey Budankov Subject: Re: [PATCH v5 01/10] capabilities: introduce CAP_PERFMON to kernel and user space Date: Tue, 21 Jan 2020 20:30:54 +0300 Message-ID: <05297eff-8e14-ccdf-55a4-870c64516de8@linux.intel.com> References: <0548c832-7f4b-dc4c-8883-3f2b6d351a08@linux.intel.com> <9b77124b-675d-5ac7-3741-edec575bd425@linux.intel.com> <64cab472-806e-38c4-fb26-0ffbee485367@tycho.nsa.gov> Mime-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=utf-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit Return-path: In-Reply-To: <64cab472-806e-38c4-fb26-0ffbee485367@tycho.nsa.gov> Content-Language: en-US Sender: owner-linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org To: Stephen Smalley , Peter Zijlstra , Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo , Ingo Molnar , "jani.nikula@linux.intel.com" , "joonas.lahtinen@linux.intel.com" , "rodrigo.vivi@intel.com" , "benh@kernel.crashing.org" , Paul Mackerras , Michael Ellerman , "james.bottomley@hansenpartnership.com" , Serge Hallyn , James Morris , Will Deacon , Mark Rutland , Robert Richter , Alexei Starovoitov Cc: Jiri Olsa , Andi Kleen , Stephane Eranian , Igor Lubashev , Alexander Shishkin , Namhyung Kim , Song Liu , Lionel Landwerlin , Thomas Gleixner , linux-kernel , "linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org" , "selinux@vger.kernel.org" , "intel-gfx@lists.freedesktop.org" , "linux-parisc@vger.kernel.org" , "linuxppc-dev@lists.ozlabs.org" , linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org List-Id: linux-perf-users.vger.kernel.org On 21.01.2020 17:43, Stephen Smalley wrote: > On 1/20/20 6:23 AM, Alexey Budankov wrote: >> >> Introduce CAP_PERFMON capability designed to secure system performance >> monitoring and observability operations so that CAP_PERFMON would assist >> CAP_SYS_ADMIN capability in its governing role for perf_events, i915_perf >> and other performance monitoring and observability subsystems. >> >> CAP_PERFMON intends to harden system security and integrity during system >> performance monitoring and observability operations by decreasing attack >> surface that is available to a CAP_SYS_ADMIN privileged process [1]. >> Providing access to system performance monitoring and observability >> operations under CAP_PERFMON capability singly, without the rest of >> CAP_SYS_ADMIN credentials, excludes chances to misuse the credentials and >> makes operation more secure. >> >> CAP_PERFMON intends to take over CAP_SYS_ADMIN credentials related to >> system performance monitoring and observability operations and balance >> amount of CAP_SYS_ADMIN credentials following the recommendations in the >> capabilities man page [1] for CAP_SYS_ADMIN: "Note: this capability is >> overloaded; see Notes to kernel developers, below." >> >> Although the software running under CAP_PERFMON can not ensure avoidance >> of related hardware issues, the software can still mitigate these issues >> following the official embargoed hardware issues mitigation procedure [2]. >> The bugs in the software itself could be fixed following the standard >> kernel development process [3] to maintain and harden security of system >> performance monitoring and observability operations. >> >> [1] http://man7.org/linux/man-pages/man7/capabilities.7.html >> [2] https://www.kernel.org/doc/html/latest/process/embargoed-hardware-issues.html >> [3] https://www.kernel.org/doc/html/latest/admin-guide/security-bugs.html >> >> Signed-off-by: Alexey Budankov >> --- >>   include/linux/capability.h          | 12 ++++++++++++ >>   include/uapi/linux/capability.h     |  8 +++++++- >>   security/selinux/include/classmap.h |  4 ++-- >>   3 files changed, 21 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) >> >> diff --git a/include/linux/capability.h b/include/linux/capability.h >> index ecce0f43c73a..8784969d91e1 100644 >> --- a/include/linux/capability.h >> +++ b/include/linux/capability.h >> @@ -251,6 +251,18 @@ extern bool privileged_wrt_inode_uidgid(struct user_namespace *ns, const struct >>   extern bool capable_wrt_inode_uidgid(const struct inode *inode, int cap); >>   extern bool file_ns_capable(const struct file *file, struct user_namespace *ns, int cap); >>   extern bool ptracer_capable(struct task_struct *tsk, struct user_namespace *ns); >> +static inline bool perfmon_capable(void) >> +{ >> +    struct user_namespace *ns = &init_user_ns; >> + >> +    if (ns_capable_noaudit(ns, CAP_PERFMON)) >> +        return ns_capable(ns, CAP_PERFMON); >> + >> +    if (ns_capable_noaudit(ns, CAP_SYS_ADMIN)) >> +        return ns_capable(ns, CAP_SYS_ADMIN); >> + >> +    return false; >> +} > > Why _noaudit()?  Normally only used when a permission failure is non-fatal to the operation.  Otherwise, we want the audit message. Some of ideas from v4 review. Well, on the second sight, it defenitly should be logged for CAP_SYS_ADMIN. Probably it is not so fatal for CAP_PERFMON, but personally I would unconditionally log it for CAP_PERFMON as well. Good catch, thank you. ~Alexey From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Return-Path: X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.4.0 (2014-02-07) on aws-us-west-2-korg-lkml-1.web.codeaurora.org X-Spam-Level: X-Spam-Status: No, score=-8.2 required=3.0 tests=HEADER_FROM_DIFFERENT_DOMAINS, INCLUDES_PATCH,MAILING_LIST_MULTI,SIGNED_OFF_BY,SPF_HELO_NONE,SPF_PASS, USER_AGENT_SANE_1 autolearn=unavailable autolearn_force=no version=3.4.0 Received: from mail.kernel.org (mail.kernel.org [198.145.29.99]) by smtp.lore.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 3D927C2D0CE for ; Tue, 21 Jan 2020 17:32:59 +0000 (UTC) Received: from lists.ozlabs.org (lists.ozlabs.org [203.11.71.2]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by mail.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id CB46A206A2 for ; Tue, 21 Jan 2020 17:32:58 +0000 (UTC) DMARC-Filter: OpenDMARC Filter v1.3.2 mail.kernel.org CB46A206A2 Authentication-Results: mail.kernel.org; dmarc=fail (p=none dis=none) header.from=linux.intel.com Authentication-Results: mail.kernel.org; spf=pass smtp.mailfrom=linuxppc-dev-bounces+linuxppc-dev=archiver.kernel.org@lists.ozlabs.org Received: from lists.ozlabs.org (lists.ozlabs.org [IPv6:2401:3900:2:1::3]) by lists.ozlabs.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 482Fx431mWzDqY0 for ; Wed, 22 Jan 2020 04:32:56 +1100 (AEDT) Authentication-Results: lists.ozlabs.org; spf=none (no SPF record) smtp.mailfrom=linux.intel.com (client-ip=134.134.136.100; helo=mga07.intel.com; envelope-from=alexey.budankov@linux.intel.com; receiver=) Authentication-Results: lists.ozlabs.org; dmarc=none (p=none dis=none) header.from=linux.intel.com Received: from mga07.intel.com (mga07.intel.com [134.134.136.100]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by lists.ozlabs.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 482Fv647CzzDq9C for ; Wed, 22 Jan 2020 04:31:13 +1100 (AEDT) X-Amp-Result: SKIPPED(no attachment in message) X-Amp-File-Uploaded: False Received: from fmsmga008.fm.intel.com ([10.253.24.58]) by orsmga105.jf.intel.com with ESMTP/TLS/DHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384; 21 Jan 2020 09:31:09 -0800 X-ExtLoop1: 1 X-IronPort-AV: E=Sophos;i="5.70,346,1574150400"; d="scan'208";a="221768046" Received: from linux.intel.com ([10.54.29.200]) by fmsmga008.fm.intel.com with ESMTP; 21 Jan 2020 09:31:04 -0800 Received: from [10.252.13.111] (iganakov-mobl1.ger.corp.intel.com [10.252.13.111]) by linux.intel.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 874B25803C5; Tue, 21 Jan 2020 09:30:55 -0800 (PST) Subject: Re: [PATCH v5 01/10] capabilities: introduce CAP_PERFMON to kernel and user space To: Stephen Smalley , Peter Zijlstra , Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo , Ingo Molnar , "jani.nikula@linux.intel.com" , "joonas.lahtinen@linux.intel.com" , "rodrigo.vivi@intel.com" , "benh@kernel.crashing.org" , Paul Mackerras , Michael Ellerman , "james.bottomley@hansenpartnership.com" , Serge Hallyn , James Morris , Will Deacon , Mark Rutland , Robert Richter , Alexei Starovoitov References: <0548c832-7f4b-dc4c-8883-3f2b6d351a08@linux.intel.com> <9b77124b-675d-5ac7-3741-edec575bd425@linux.intel.com> <64cab472-806e-38c4-fb26-0ffbee485367@tycho.nsa.gov> From: Alexey Budankov Organization: Intel Corp. Message-ID: <05297eff-8e14-ccdf-55a4-870c64516de8@linux.intel.com> Date: Tue, 21 Jan 2020 20:30:54 +0300 User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; WOW64; rv:68.0) Gecko/20100101 Thunderbird/68.4.1 MIME-Version: 1.0 In-Reply-To: <64cab472-806e-38c4-fb26-0ffbee485367@tycho.nsa.gov> Content-Type: text/plain; charset=utf-8 Content-Language: en-US Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit X-BeenThere: linuxppc-dev@lists.ozlabs.org X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.29 Precedence: list List-Id: Linux on PowerPC Developers Mail List List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , Cc: Song Liu , Andi Kleen , "linux-parisc@vger.kernel.org" , Alexander Shishkin , "linuxppc-dev@lists.ozlabs.org" , "intel-gfx@lists.freedesktop.org" , Igor Lubashev , linux-kernel , Stephane Eranian , "linux-perf-users@vger.kernel.org" , "selinux@vger.kernel.org" , "linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org" , oprofile-list@lists.sf.net, Lionel Landwerlin , Namhyung Kim , Thomas Gleixner , Jiri Olsa , linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org Errors-To: linuxppc-dev-bounces+linuxppc-dev=archiver.kernel.org@lists.ozlabs.org Sender: "Linuxppc-dev" On 21.01.2020 17:43, Stephen Smalley wrote: > On 1/20/20 6:23 AM, Alexey Budankov wrote: >> >> Introduce CAP_PERFMON capability designed to secure system performance >> monitoring and observability operations so that CAP_PERFMON would assist >> CAP_SYS_ADMIN capability in its governing role for perf_events, i915_perf >> and other performance monitoring and observability subsystems. >> >> CAP_PERFMON intends to harden system security and integrity during system >> performance monitoring and observability operations by decreasing attack >> surface that is available to a CAP_SYS_ADMIN privileged process [1]. >> Providing access to system performance monitoring and observability >> operations under CAP_PERFMON capability singly, without the rest of >> CAP_SYS_ADMIN credentials, excludes chances to misuse the credentials and >> makes operation more secure. >> >> CAP_PERFMON intends to take over CAP_SYS_ADMIN credentials related to >> system performance monitoring and observability operations and balance >> amount of CAP_SYS_ADMIN credentials following the recommendations in the >> capabilities man page [1] for CAP_SYS_ADMIN: "Note: this capability is >> overloaded; see Notes to kernel developers, below." >> >> Although the software running under CAP_PERFMON can not ensure avoidance >> of related hardware issues, the software can still mitigate these issues >> following the official embargoed hardware issues mitigation procedure [2]. >> The bugs in the software itself could be fixed following the standard >> kernel development process [3] to maintain and harden security of system >> performance monitoring and observability operations. >> >> [1] http://man7.org/linux/man-pages/man7/capabilities.7.html >> [2] https://www.kernel.org/doc/html/latest/process/embargoed-hardware-issues.html >> [3] https://www.kernel.org/doc/html/latest/admin-guide/security-bugs.html >> >> Signed-off-by: Alexey Budankov >> --- >>   include/linux/capability.h          | 12 ++++++++++++ >>   include/uapi/linux/capability.h     |  8 +++++++- >>   security/selinux/include/classmap.h |  4 ++-- >>   3 files changed, 21 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) >> >> diff --git a/include/linux/capability.h b/include/linux/capability.h >> index ecce0f43c73a..8784969d91e1 100644 >> --- a/include/linux/capability.h >> +++ b/include/linux/capability.h >> @@ -251,6 +251,18 @@ extern bool privileged_wrt_inode_uidgid(struct user_namespace *ns, const struct >>   extern bool capable_wrt_inode_uidgid(const struct inode *inode, int cap); >>   extern bool file_ns_capable(const struct file *file, struct user_namespace *ns, int cap); >>   extern bool ptracer_capable(struct task_struct *tsk, struct user_namespace *ns); >> +static inline bool perfmon_capable(void) >> +{ >> +    struct user_namespace *ns = &init_user_ns; >> + >> +    if (ns_capable_noaudit(ns, CAP_PERFMON)) >> +        return ns_capable(ns, CAP_PERFMON); >> + >> +    if (ns_capable_noaudit(ns, CAP_SYS_ADMIN)) >> +        return ns_capable(ns, CAP_SYS_ADMIN); >> + >> +    return false; >> +} > > Why _noaudit()?  Normally only used when a permission failure is non-fatal to the operation.  Otherwise, we want the audit message. Some of ideas from v4 review. Well, on the second sight, it defenitly should be logged for CAP_SYS_ADMIN. Probably it is not so fatal for CAP_PERFMON, but personally I would unconditionally log it for CAP_PERFMON as well. Good catch, thank you. ~Alexey From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Return-Path: X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.4.0 (2014-02-07) on aws-us-west-2-korg-lkml-1.web.codeaurora.org X-Spam-Level: X-Spam-Status: No, score=-8.3 required=3.0 tests=DKIMWL_WL_HIGH,DKIM_SIGNED, DKIM_VALID,HEADER_FROM_DIFFERENT_DOMAINS,INCLUDES_PATCH,MAILING_LIST_MULTI, SIGNED_OFF_BY,SPF_HELO_NONE,SPF_PASS,USER_AGENT_SANE_1 autolearn=unavailable autolearn_force=no version=3.4.0 Received: from mail.kernel.org (mail.kernel.org [198.145.29.99]) by smtp.lore.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 4BCB3C2D0CE for ; Tue, 21 Jan 2020 17:31:16 +0000 (UTC) Received: from bombadil.infradead.org (bombadil.infradead.org [198.137.202.133]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by mail.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 153FD21569 for ; Tue, 21 Jan 2020 17:31:16 +0000 (UTC) Authentication-Results: mail.kernel.org; dkim=pass (2048-bit key) header.d=lists.infradead.org header.i=@lists.infradead.org header.b="pZjSVodc" DMARC-Filter: OpenDMARC Filter v1.3.2 mail.kernel.org 153FD21569 Authentication-Results: mail.kernel.org; dmarc=fail (p=none dis=none) header.from=linux.intel.com Authentication-Results: mail.kernel.org; spf=none smtp.mailfrom=linux-arm-kernel-bounces+infradead-linux-arm-kernel=archiver.kernel.org@lists.infradead.org DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; q=dns/txt; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=lists.infradead.org; s=bombadil.20170209; h=Sender: Content-Transfer-Encoding:Content-Type:Cc:List-Subscribe:List-Help:List-Post: List-Archive:List-Unsubscribe:List-Id:In-Reply-To:MIME-Version:Date: Message-ID:From:References:To:Subject:Reply-To:Content-ID:Content-Description :Resent-Date:Resent-From:Resent-Sender:Resent-To:Resent-Cc:Resent-Message-ID: List-Owner; bh=JxJz/QKkMV1NdeNv1BXSr10it/rHtS24dWa9YpMeqgY=; b=pZjSVodcD8z55s lYtSWWlIkIAkT/OAIKQY5DPeZWwEMRsFoPJgmS/6CZkcxo/OLQvFRG5NOPpWZPrmhKBLn97Fyylr6 t3cmcU81BApgzCyMh1Q8Z2gnX5cQpDJD3r0VDDqHB40ZEz9LqWGB0mNM1YyJ9sqedxhQcrMrgo/9V LQl8gRDDdN00TCskQEiC3GaJ1cftO2O2tyLw0J4wzj6ILI1yKiuh7xmEcylHIusTbbFgu5gUXsFBo d5vfGffIayOmVItqZspdTNrf5vwKnQNC8F9elvvmUhuD3YOek9dVMTouA/eX3iZT7NVdt7C7JKYYe SjNFVsO72/OUFA427dxQ==; Received: from localhost ([127.0.0.1] helo=bombadil.infradead.org) by bombadil.infradead.org with esmtp (Exim 4.92.3 #3 (Red Hat Linux)) id 1itxMx-0007nD-FL; Tue, 21 Jan 2020 17:31:15 +0000 Received: from mga03.intel.com ([134.134.136.65]) by bombadil.infradead.org with esmtps (Exim 4.92.3 #3 (Red Hat Linux)) id 1itxMs-0007m8-DH for linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org; Tue, 21 Jan 2020 17:31:14 +0000 X-Amp-Result: SKIPPED(no attachment in message) X-Amp-File-Uploaded: False Received: from fmsmga008.fm.intel.com ([10.253.24.58]) by orsmga103.jf.intel.com with ESMTP/TLS/DHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384; 21 Jan 2020 09:31:09 -0800 X-ExtLoop1: 1 X-IronPort-AV: E=Sophos;i="5.70,346,1574150400"; d="scan'208";a="221768046" Received: from linux.intel.com ([10.54.29.200]) by fmsmga008.fm.intel.com with ESMTP; 21 Jan 2020 09:31:04 -0800 Received: from [10.252.13.111] (iganakov-mobl1.ger.corp.intel.com [10.252.13.111]) by linux.intel.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 874B25803C5; Tue, 21 Jan 2020 09:30:55 -0800 (PST) Subject: Re: [PATCH v5 01/10] capabilities: introduce CAP_PERFMON to kernel and user space To: Stephen Smalley , Peter Zijlstra , Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo , Ingo Molnar , "jani.nikula@linux.intel.com" , "joonas.lahtinen@linux.intel.com" , "rodrigo.vivi@intel.com" , "benh@kernel.crashing.org" , Paul Mackerras , Michael Ellerman , "james.bottomley@hansenpartnership.com" , Serge Hallyn , James Morris , Will Deacon , Mark Rutland , Robert Richter , Alexei Starovoitov References: <0548c832-7f4b-dc4c-8883-3f2b6d351a08@linux.intel.com> <9b77124b-675d-5ac7-3741-edec575bd425@linux.intel.com> <64cab472-806e-38c4-fb26-0ffbee485367@tycho.nsa.gov> From: Alexey Budankov Organization: Intel Corp. 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E=Sophos;i="5.70,346,1574150400"; d="scan'208";a="221768046" Received: from linux.intel.com ([10.54.29.200]) by fmsmga008.fm.intel.com with ESMTP; 21 Jan 2020 09:31:04 -0800 Received: from [10.252.13.111] (iganakov-mobl1.ger.corp.intel.com [10.252.13.111]) by linux.intel.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 874B25803C5; Tue, 21 Jan 2020 09:30:55 -0800 (PST) To: Stephen Smalley , Peter Zijlstra , Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo , Ingo Molnar , "jani.nikula@linux.intel.com" , "joonas.lahtinen@linux.intel.com" , "rodrigo.vivi@intel.com" , "benh@kernel.crashing.org" , Paul Mackerras , Michael Ellerman , "james.bottomley@hansenpartnership.com" , Serge Hallyn , James Morris , Will Deacon , Mark Rutland , Robert Richter , Alexei Starovoitov References: <0548c832-7f4b-dc4c-8883-3f2b6d351a08@linux.intel.com> <9b77124b-675d-5ac7-3741-edec575bd425@linux.intel.com> <64cab472-806e-38c4-fb26-0ffbee485367@tycho.nsa.gov> From: Alexey Budankov Organization: Intel Corp. Message-ID: <05297eff-8e14-ccdf-55a4-870c64516de8@linux.intel.com> Date: Tue, 21 Jan 2020 20:30:54 +0300 User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; WOW64; rv:68.0) Gecko/20100101 Thunderbird/68.4.1 MIME-Version: 1.0 In-Reply-To: <64cab472-806e-38c4-fb26-0ffbee485367@tycho.nsa.gov> Content-Language: en-US Subject: Re: [Intel-gfx] [PATCH v5 01/10] capabilities: introduce CAP_PERFMON to kernel and user space X-BeenThere: intel-gfx@lists.freedesktop.org X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.29 Precedence: list List-Id: Intel graphics driver community testing & development List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , Cc: Song Liu , Andi Kleen , "linux-parisc@vger.kernel.org" , Alexander Shishkin , "linuxppc-dev@lists.ozlabs.org" , "intel-gfx@lists.freedesktop.org" , Igor Lubashev , linux-kernel , Stephane Eranian , "linux-perf-users@vger.kernel.org" , "selinux@vger.kernel.org" , "linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org" , oprofile-list@lists.sf.net, Namhyung Kim , Thomas Gleixner , Jiri Olsa , linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8" Content-Transfer-Encoding: base64 Errors-To: intel-gfx-bounces@lists.freedesktop.org Sender: "Intel-gfx" Ck9uIDIxLjAxLjIwMjAgMTc6NDMsIFN0ZXBoZW4gU21hbGxleSB3cm90ZToKPiBPbiAxLzIwLzIw IDY6MjMgQU0sIEFsZXhleSBCdWRhbmtvdiB3cm90ZToKPj4KPj4gSW50cm9kdWNlIENBUF9QRVJG TU9OIGNhcGFiaWxpdHkgZGVzaWduZWQgdG8gc2VjdXJlIHN5c3RlbSBwZXJmb3JtYW5jZQo+PiBt b25pdG9yaW5nIGFuZCBvYnNlcnZhYmlsaXR5IG9wZXJhdGlvbnMgc28gdGhhdCBDQVBfUEVSRk1P TiB3b3VsZCBhc3Npc3QKPj4gQ0FQX1NZU19BRE1JTiBjYXBhYmlsaXR5IGluIGl0cyBnb3Zlcm5p bmcgcm9sZSBmb3IgcGVyZl9ldmVudHMsIGk5MTVfcGVyZgo+PiBhbmQgb3RoZXIgcGVyZm9ybWFu Y2UgbW9uaXRvcmluZyBhbmQgb2JzZXJ2YWJpbGl0eSBzdWJzeXN0ZW1zLgo+Pgo+PiBDQVBfUEVS Rk1PTiBpbnRlbmRzIHRvIGhhcmRlbiBzeXN0ZW0gc2VjdXJpdHkgYW5kIGludGVncml0eSBkdXJp bmcgc3lzdGVtCj4+IHBlcmZvcm1hbmNlIG1vbml0b3JpbmcgYW5kIG9ic2VydmFiaWxpdHkgb3Bl cmF0aW9ucyBieSBkZWNyZWFzaW5nIGF0dGFjawo+PiBzdXJmYWNlIHRoYXQgaXMgYXZhaWxhYmxl 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