From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 From: Heinrich Schuchardt Date: Thu, 13 May 2021 08:55:17 +0200 Subject: [PATCH 1/4] tools: mkeficapsule: add firmwware image signing In-Reply-To: <20210513065054.GF16848@laputa> References: <20210512045753.62288-1-takahiro.akashi@linaro.org> <20210512045753.62288-2-takahiro.akashi@linaro.org> <20210513030839.GC16848@laputa> <6876a081-8f16-e747-6036-471b48f60318@gmx.de> <20210513065054.GF16848@laputa> Message-ID: <0686AB79-8431-43A2-8EF6-7853DD29524B@gmx.de> List-Id: MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii" Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit To: u-boot@lists.denx.de Am 13. Mai 2021 08:50:54 MESZ schrieb AKASHI Takahiro : >On Thu, May 13, 2021 at 07:50:52AM +0200, Heinrich Schuchardt wrote: >> On 5/13/21 7:12 AM, Masami Hiramatsu wrote: >> > Hi Heinrich, >> > >> > 2021?5?13?(?) 13:22 Heinrich Schuchardt : >> > > >> > > On 5/13/21 5:08 AM, AKASHI Takahiro wrote: >> > > > On Wed, May 12, 2021 at 10:56:41AM +0200, Heinrich Schuchardt >wrote: >> > > > > On 12.05.21 06:57, AKASHI Takahiro wrote: >> > > > > > With this enhancement, mkeficapsule will be able to create >a capsule >> > > > > > file with a signature which will be verified later by FMP's >SetImage(). >> > > > > > >> > > > > > We will have to specify addtional command parameters: >> > > > > > -monotonic-cout : monotonic count >> > > > > > -private-key : private key file >> > > > > > -certificate : certificate file >> > > > > > Only when those parameters are given, a signature will be >added >> > > > > > to a capsule file. >> > > > > > >> > > > > > Users are expected to maintain the monotonic count for each >firmware >> > > > > > image. >> > > > > > >> > > > > > Signed-off-by: AKASHI Takahiro >> > > > > > --- >> > > > > > tools/Makefile | 4 + >> > > > > > tools/mkeficapsule.c | 324 >+++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++---- >> > > > > > 2 files changed, 303 insertions(+), 25 deletions(-) >> > > > > > >> > > > > > diff --git a/tools/Makefile b/tools/Makefile >> > > > > > index d020c55d6644..02eae0286e20 100644 >> > > > > > --- a/tools/Makefile >> > > > > > +++ b/tools/Makefile >> > > > > > @@ -231,6 +231,10 @@ hostprogs-$(CONFIG_MIPS) += >mips-relocs >> > > > > > hostprogs-$(CONFIG_ASN1_COMPILER) += asn1_compiler >> > > > > > HOSTCFLAGS_asn1_compiler.o = -idirafter >$(srctree)/include >> > > > > > >> > > > > > +ifneq ($(CONFIG_EFI_CAPSULE_AUTHENTICATE),) >> > > > > > +HOSTLDLIBS_mkeficapsule += \ >> > > > > > + $(shell pkg-config --libs libssl libcrypto 2> /dev/null >|| echo "-lssl -lcrypto") >> > > > > >> > > > > I don't expect any user wants to install two tool versions in >parallel. >> > > > > >> > > > > The tool should always be able to add a signature. >> > > > > Adding a signature must be optional. >> > > > >> > > > It seems to me that those two statements mutually contradict. >> > > > Or do you intend to say that we should have a separate kconfig >> > > > option to enable/disable signing feature in mkeficapsule? >> > > > >> > > > If so, I can agree. >> > > > >> > > > In either way, we should have an option to turn on/off this >functionality >> > > > as not all users use signed capsules. >> > > >> > > I want to have a single binary to distribute with Linux distros >(e.g. >> > > Debian/Ubuntu package u-boot-tools). >> > >> > I couldn't catch your point. If so, the distros can build u-boot >with >> > CONFIG_EFI_CAPSULE_AUTHENTICATE=y... >> >> Why should the tool depend on board configuration? >> Who would want capsule updates without authentication? > >I believe that there are bunch of users who don't need authentication >on their own systems. > They should think again. >> > >> > BTW, IMHO, if u-boot.bin can not find the ESL in the device tree, >> > it should skip authentication too. >> >> In this case the capsule should be rejected (if >> CONFIG_EFI_CAPSULE_AUTHENTICATE=y). > >That's basically right. >But as I mentioned in my comment against Sughosh's patch, >the authentication process will be enforced only if the capsule has >an attribute, IMAGE_ATTRIBUTE_AUTHENTICATION_REQUIRED. > That would be a security desaster. Best regards Heinrich >I believe that this flag should be able to be specified and managed >outside U-Boot configuration. >So there can be a case where FW update is performed even if >the key/certificate is not found in the device tree. > >> > >> > Then, user can choose whether enabling capsule authentication or >not >> > by embedding ESL into their devicetree. > >Same comment above. > >-Takahiro Akashi > >> The user shall not be able to decide anything that might hamper >> security. The U-Boot binary must dictate if a capsule is safe. >> >> Best regards >> >> Heinrich >> >> > >> > Thank you >> > >> > > >> > > This should allow both >> > > >> > > - create signed capsules >> > > - create unsigned capsules >> > > >> > > The user shall select signing via command line parameters. >> > > >> > > Support for signing via the tool shall not depend on board >Kconfig >> > > parameters. >> > > >> > > Best regards >> > > >> > > Heinrich >> > > >> > > > >> > > > > > +endif >> > > > > > mkeficapsule-objs := mkeficapsule.o $(LIBFDT_OBJS) >> > > > > > hostprogs-$(CONFIG_EFI_HAVE_CAPSULE_SUPPORT) += >mkeficapsule >> > > > > > >> > > > > > diff --git a/tools/mkeficapsule.c b/tools/mkeficapsule.c >> > > > > > index de0a62898886..34ff1bdd82eb 100644 >> > > > > > --- a/tools/mkeficapsule.c >> > > > > > +++ b/tools/mkeficapsule.c >> > > > > > @@ -18,7 +18,17 @@ >> > > > > > #include >> > > > > > #include >> > > > > > >> > > > > > -#include "fdt_host.h" >> > > > > > +#include >> > > > > > +#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_EFI_CAPSULE_AUTHENTICATE) >> > > > > >> > > > > see above >> > > > > >> > > > > > +#include >> > > > > > +#include >> > > > > > +#include >> > > > > > +#include >> > > > > > +#include >> > > > > > +#include >> > > > > > +#endif >> > > > > > + >> > > > > > +#include >> > > > > > >> > > > > > typedef __u8 u8; >> > > > > > typedef __u16 u16; >> > > > > > @@ -46,6 +56,13 @@ efi_guid_t efi_guid_image_type_uboot_fit >= >> > > > > > EFI_FIRMWARE_IMAGE_TYPE_UBOOT_FIT_GUID; >> > > > > > efi_guid_t efi_guid_image_type_uboot_raw = >> > > > > > EFI_FIRMWARE_IMAGE_TYPE_UBOOT_RAW_GUID; >> > > > > > +efi_guid_t efi_guid_cert_type_pkcs7 = >EFI_CERT_TYPE_PKCS7_GUID; >> > > > > > + >> > > > > > +#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_EFI_CAPSULE_AUTHENTICATE) >> > > > > >> > > > > see above >> > > > > >> > > > > > +static const char *opts_short = "f:r:i:I:v:D:K:P:C:m:dOh"; >> > > > > > +#else >> > > > > > +static const char *opts_short = "f:r:i:I:v:D:K:Oh"; >> > > > > > +#endif >> > > > > > >> > > > > > static struct option options[] = { >> > > > > > {"fit", required_argument, NULL, 'f'}, >> > > > > > @@ -54,6 +71,12 @@ static struct option options[] = { >> > > > > > {"instance", required_argument, NULL, 'I'}, >> > > > > > {"dtb", required_argument, NULL, 'D'}, >> > > > > > {"public key", required_argument, NULL, 'K'}, >> > > > > > +#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_EFI_CAPSULE_AUTHENTICATE) >> > > > > > + {"private-key", required_argument, NULL, 'P'}, >> > > > > > + {"certificate", required_argument, NULL, 'C'}, >> > > > > > + {"monotonic-count", required_argument, NULL, 'm'}, >> > > > > >> > > > > These options should not be required. >> > > > >> > > > I don't get you. What do you mean? >> > > > >> > > > > > + {"dump-sig", no_argument, NULL, 'd'}, >> > > > > > +#endif >> > > > > > {"overlay", no_argument, NULL, 'O'}, >> > > > > > {"help", no_argument, NULL, 'h'}, >> > > > > > {NULL, 0, NULL, 0}, >> > > > > > @@ -70,6 +93,12 @@ static void print_usage(void) >> > > > > > "\t-I, --instance update hardware >instance\n" >> > > > > > "\t-K, --public-key public key esl >file\n" >> > > > > > "\t-D, --dtb dtb file\n" >> > > > > > +#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_EFI_CAPSULE_AUTHENTICATE) >> > > > > >> > > > > see above >> > > > > >> > > > > > + "\t-P, --private-key private key >file\n" >> > > > > > + "\t-C, --certificate signer's >certificate file\n" >> > > > > > + "\t-m, --monotonic-count monotonic >count\n" >> > > > > > + "\t-d, --dump_sig dump signature >(*.p7)\n" >> > > > > > +#endif >> > > > > > "\t-O, --overlay the dtb file is >an overlay\n" >> > > > > > "\t-h, --help print a help >message\n", >> > > > > > tool_name); >> > > > > > @@ -249,12 +278,167 @@ err: >> > > > > > return ret; >> > > > > > } >> > > > > > >> > > > > > +struct auth_context { >> > > > > > + char *key_file; >> > > > > > + char *cert_file; >> > > > > > + u8 *image_data; >> > > > > > + size_t image_size; >> > > > > > + struct efi_firmware_image_authentication auth; >> > > > > > + u8 *sig_data; >> > > > > > + size_t sig_size; >> > > > > > +}; >> > > > > > + >> > > > > > +static int dump_sig; >> > > > > > + >> > > > > > +#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_EFI_CAPSULE_AUTHENTICATE) >> > > > > >> > > > > see above >> > > > > >> > > > > > +static EVP_PKEY *fileio_read_pkey(const char *filename) >> > > > > > +{ >> > > > > > + EVP_PKEY *key = NULL; >> > > > > > + BIO *bio; >> > > > > > + >> > > > > > + bio = BIO_new_file(filename, "r"); >> > > > > > + if (!bio) >> > > > > > + goto out; >> > > > > > + >> > > > > > + key = PEM_read_bio_PrivateKey(bio, NULL, NULL, NULL); >> > > > > > + >> > > > > > +out: >> > > > > > + BIO_free_all(bio); >> > > > > > + if (!key) { >> > > > > > + printf("Can't load key from file '%s'\n", >filename); >> > > > > >> > > > > Please, you use fprintf(stderr,) for error messages. >> > > > > >> > > > > > + ERR_print_errors_fp(stderr); >> > > > > > + } >> > > > > > + >> > > > > > + return key; >> > > > > > +} >> > > > > > + >> > > > > > +static X509 *fileio_read_cert(const char *filename) >> > > > > > +{ >> > > > > > + X509 *cert = NULL; >> > > > > > + BIO *bio; >> > > > > > + >> > > > > > + bio = BIO_new_file(filename, "r"); >> > > > > > + if (!bio) >> > > > > > + goto out; >> > > > > > + >> > > > > > + cert = PEM_read_bio_X509(bio, NULL, NULL, NULL); >> > > > > > + >> > > > > > +out: >> > > > > > + BIO_free_all(bio); >> > > > > > + if (!cert) { >> > > > > > + printf("Can't load certificate from file >'%s'\n", filename); >> > > > > >> > > > > fprintf(stderr,) >> > > > > >> > > > > > + ERR_print_errors_fp(stderr); >> > > > > > + } >> > > > > > + >> > > > > > + return cert; >> > > > > > +} >> > > > > > + >> > > > > > +static int create_auth_data(struct auth_context *ctx) >> > > > > > +{ >> > > > > > + EVP_PKEY *key = NULL; >> > > > > > + X509 *cert = NULL; >> > > > > > + BIO *data_bio = NULL; >> > > > > > + const EVP_MD *md; >> > > > > > + PKCS7 *p7; >> > > > > > + int flags, ret = -1; >> > > > > > + >> > > > > > + OpenSSL_add_all_digests(); >> > > > > > + OpenSSL_add_all_ciphers(); >> > > > > > + ERR_load_crypto_strings(); >> > > > > > + >> > > > > > + key = fileio_read_pkey(ctx->key_file); >> > > > > > + if (!key) >> > > > > > + goto err; >> > > > > > + cert = fileio_read_cert(ctx->cert_file); >> > > > > > + if (!cert) >> > > > > > + goto err; >> > > > > > + >> > > > > > + /* >> > > > > > + * create a BIO, containing: >> > > > > > + * * firmware image >> > > > > > + * * monotonic count >> > > > > > + * in this order! >> > > > > > + * See EDK2's FmpAuthenticatedHandlerRsa2048Sha256() >> > > > > > + */ >> > > > > > + data_bio = BIO_new(BIO_s_mem()); >> > > > > > + BIO_write(data_bio, ctx->image_data, ctx->image_size); >> > > > > > + BIO_write(data_bio, &ctx->auth.monotonic_count, >> > > > > > + sizeof(ctx->auth.monotonic_count)); >> > > > > > + >> > > > > > + md = EVP_get_digestbyname("SHA256"); >> > > > > > + if (!md) >> > > > > > + goto err; >> > > > > > + >> > > > > > + /* create signature */ >> > > > > > + /* TODO: maybe add PKCS7_NOATTR and PKCS7_NOSMIMECAP */ >> > > > > >> > > > > PKCS7_NOATTR is a value without any documentation in the >code. >> > > > >> > > > Nak. >> > > > Those macros are part of openssl library. See openssl/pkcs7.h. >> > > > >> > > > > Please, replace variable names by a long text describing what >it missing. >> > > > > >> > > > > > + flags = PKCS7_BINARY | PKCS7_DETACHED; >> > > > > >> > > > > Those constants lack documentation in the code. >> > > > >> > > > Nak again. >> > > > >> > > > > > + p7 = PKCS7_sign(NULL, NULL, NULL, data_bio, flags | >PKCS7_PARTIAL); >> > > > > > + if (!p7) >> > > > > > + goto err; >> > > > > > + if (!PKCS7_sign_add_signer(p7, cert, key, md, flags)) >> > > > > > + goto err; >> > > > > > + if (!PKCS7_final(p7, data_bio, flags)) >> > > > > > + goto err; >> > > > > > + >> > > > > > + /* convert pkcs7 into DER */ >> > > > > > + ctx->sig_data = NULL; >> > > > > > + ctx->sig_size = ASN1_item_i2d((ASN1_VALUE *)p7, >&ctx->sig_data, >> > > > > > + ASN1_ITEM_rptr(PKCS7)); >> > > > > > + if (!ctx->sig_size) >> > > > > > + goto err; >> > > > > > + >> > > > > > + /* fill auth_info */ >> > > > > > + ctx->auth.auth_info.hdr.dwLength = >sizeof(ctx->auth.auth_info) >> > > > > > + + >ctx->sig_size; >> > > > > > + ctx->auth.auth_info.hdr.wRevision = >WIN_CERT_REVISION_2_0; >> > > > > > + ctx->auth.auth_info.hdr.wCertificateType = >WIN_CERT_TYPE_EFI_GUID; >> > > > > > + memcpy(&ctx->auth.auth_info.cert_type, >&efi_guid_cert_type_pkcs7, >> > > > > > + sizeof(efi_guid_cert_type_pkcs7)); >> > > > > > + >> > > > > > + ret = 0; >> > > > > > +err: >> > > > > > + BIO_free_all(data_bio); >> > > > > > + EVP_PKEY_free(key); >> > > > > > + X509_free(cert); >> > > > > > + >> > > > > > + return ret; >> > > > > > +} >> > > > > > + >> > > > > > +static int dump_signature(const char *path, u8 *signature, >size_t sig_size) >> > > > > > +{ >> > > > > > + char *sig_path; >> > > > > > + FILE *f; >> > > > > > + size_t size; >> > > > > > + int ret = -1; >> > > > > > + >> > > > > > + sig_path = malloc(strlen(path) + 3 + 1); >> > > > > > + if (!sig_path) >> > > > > > + return ret; >> > > > > > + >> > > > > > + sprintf(sig_path, "%s.p7", path); >> > > > > > + f = fopen(sig_path, "w"); >> > > > > > + if (!f) >> > > > > > + goto err; >> > > > > > + >> > > > > > + size = fwrite(signature, 1, sig_size, f); >> > > > > > + if (size == sig_size) >> > > > > > + ret = 0; >> > > > > > + >> > > > > > + fclose(f); >> > > > > > +err: >> > > > > > + free(sig_path); >> > > > > > + return ret; >> > > > > > +} >> > > > > > +#endif >> > > > > > + >> > > > > > static int create_fwbin(char *path, char *bin, >efi_guid_t *guid, >> > > > > > - unsigned long index, unsigned long >instance) >> > > > > > + unsigned long index, unsigned long >instance, >> > > > > > + uint64_t mcount, char *privkey_file, >char *cert_file) >> > > > > > { >> > > > > > struct efi_capsule_header header; >> > > > > > struct efi_firmware_management_capsule_header capsule; >> > > > > > struct efi_firmware_management_capsule_image_header >image; >> > > > > > + struct auth_context auth_context; >> > > > > > FILE *f, *g; >> > > > > > struct stat bin_stat; >> > > > > > u8 *data; >> > > > > > @@ -266,6 +450,7 @@ static int create_fwbin(char *path, >char *bin, efi_guid_t *guid, >> > > > > > printf("\tbin: %s\n\ttype: %pUl\n", bin, guid); >> > > > > > printf("\tindex: %ld\n\tinstance: %ld\n", index, >instance); >> > > > > > #endif >> > > > > > + auth_context.sig_size = 0; >> > > > > > >> > > > > > g = fopen(bin, "r"); >> > > > > > if (!g) { >> > > > > > @@ -281,11 +466,36 @@ static int create_fwbin(char *path, >char *bin, efi_guid_t *guid, >> > > > > > printf("cannot allocate memory: %zx\n", >(size_t)bin_stat.st_size); >> > > > > > goto err_1; >> > > > > > } >> > > > > > - f = fopen(path, "w"); >> > > > > > - if (!f) { >> > > > > > - printf("cannot open %s\n", path); >> > > > > > + >> > > > > > + size = fread(data, 1, bin_stat.st_size, g); >> > > > > > + if (size < bin_stat.st_size) { >> > > > > > + printf("read failed (%zx)\n", size); >> > > > > > goto err_2; >> > > > > > } >> > > > > > + >> > > > > > + /* first, calculate signature to determine its size */ >> > > > > > +#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_EFI_CAPSULE_AUTHENTICATE) >> > > > > >> > > > > see above >> > > > > >> > > > > > + if (privkey_file && cert_file) { >> > > > > > + auth_context.key_file = privkey_file; >> > > > > > + auth_context.cert_file = cert_file; >> > > > > > + auth_context.auth.monotonic_count = mcount; >> > > > > > + auth_context.image_data = data; >> > > > > > + auth_context.image_size = bin_stat.st_size; >> > > > > > + >> > > > > > + if (create_auth_data(&auth_context)) { >> > > > > > + printf("Signing firmware image >failed\n"); >> > > > > > + goto err_3; >> > > > > > + } >> > > > > > + >> > > > > > + if (dump_sig && >> > > > > > + dump_signature(path, auth_context.sig_data, >> > > > > > + auth_context.sig_size)) {