From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 From: rgb@redhat.com (Richard Guy Briggs) Date: Wed, 23 Aug 2017 06:12:57 -0400 Subject: [PATCH V3 06/10] capabilities: move audit log decision to function In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <0ef18e4236773f4ccd55f9b47639adb6a992d104.1503459890.git.rgb@redhat.com> To: linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org List-Id: linux-security-module.vger.kernel.org Move the audit log decision logic to its own function to isolate the complexity in one place. Suggested-by: Serge Hallyn Signed-off-by: Richard Guy Briggs --- security/commoncap.c | 50 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-------------------- 1 files changed, 30 insertions(+), 20 deletions(-) diff --git a/security/commoncap.c b/security/commoncap.c index 1af7dec..5d81354 100644 --- a/security/commoncap.c +++ b/security/commoncap.c @@ -535,6 +535,32 @@ static inline bool is_setuid(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old) static inline bool is_setgid(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old) { return !gid_eq(new->egid, old->gid); } +/* + * Audit candidate if current->cap_effective is set + * + * We do not bother to audit if 3 things are true: + * 1) cap_effective has all caps + * 2) we are root + * 3) root is supposed to have all caps (SECURE_NOROOT) + * Since this is just a normal root execing a process. + * + * Number 1 above might fail if you don't have a full bset, but I think + * that is interesting information to audit. + */ +static inline bool nonroot_raised_pE(struct cred *cred, kuid_t root) +{ + bool ret = false; + + if (cap_grew(effective, ambient, cred)) { + if (!cap_full(effective, cred) || + !is_eff(root, cred) || !is_real(root, cred) || + !root_privileged()) { + ret = true; + } + } + return ret; +} + /** * cap_bprm_set_creds - Set up the proposed credentials for execve(). * @bprm: The execution parameters, including the proposed creds @@ -614,26 +640,10 @@ int cap_bprm_set_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm) bprm->cap_effective = effective; - /* - * Audit candidate if current->cap_effective is set - * - * We do not bother to audit if 3 things are true: - * 1) cap_effective has all caps - * 2) we are root - * 3) root is supposed to have all caps (SECURE_NOROOT) - * Since this is just a normal root execing a process. - * - * Number 1 above might fail if you don't have a full bset, but I think - * that is interesting information to audit. - */ - if (cap_grew(effective, ambient, new)) { - if (!cap_full(effective, new) || - !is_eff(root_uid, new) || !is_real(root_uid, new) || - !root_privileged()) { - ret = audit_log_bprm_fcaps(bprm, new, old); - if (ret < 0) - return ret; - } + if (nonroot_raised_pE(new, root_uid)) { + ret = audit_log_bprm_fcaps(bprm, new, old); + if (ret < 0) + return ret; } new->securebits &= ~issecure_mask(SECURE_KEEP_CAPS); -- 1.7.1 -- To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-security-module" in the body of a message to majordomo at vger.kernel.org More majordomo info at http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 From: Richard Guy Briggs Subject: [PATCH V3 06/10] capabilities: move audit log decision to function Date: Wed, 23 Aug 2017 06:12:57 -0400 Message-ID: <0ef18e4236773f4ccd55f9b47639adb6a992d104.1503459890.git.rgb@redhat.com> References: Return-path: In-Reply-To: In-Reply-To: References: Sender: owner-linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org To: linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org, linux-audit@redhat.com Cc: Richard Guy Briggs , Andy Lutomirski , "Serge E. Hallyn" , Kees Cook , James Morris , Eric Paris , Paul Moore , Steve Grubb List-Id: linux-audit@redhat.com Move the audit log decision logic to its own function to isolate the complexity in one place. Suggested-by: Serge Hallyn Signed-off-by: Richard Guy Briggs --- security/commoncap.c | 50 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-------------------- 1 files changed, 30 insertions(+), 20 deletions(-) diff --git a/security/commoncap.c b/security/commoncap.c index 1af7dec..5d81354 100644 --- a/security/commoncap.c +++ b/security/commoncap.c @@ -535,6 +535,32 @@ static inline bool is_setuid(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old) static inline bool is_setgid(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old) { return !gid_eq(new->egid, old->gid); } +/* + * Audit candidate if current->cap_effective is set + * + * We do not bother to audit if 3 things are true: + * 1) cap_effective has all caps + * 2) we are root + * 3) root is supposed to have all caps (SECURE_NOROOT) + * Since this is just a normal root execing a process. + * + * Number 1 above might fail if you don't have a full bset, but I think + * that is interesting information to audit. + */ +static inline bool nonroot_raised_pE(struct cred *cred, kuid_t root) +{ + bool ret = false; + + if (cap_grew(effective, ambient, cred)) { + if (!cap_full(effective, cred) || + !is_eff(root, cred) || !is_real(root, cred) || + !root_privileged()) { + ret = true; + } + } + return ret; +} + /** * cap_bprm_set_creds - Set up the proposed credentials for execve(). * @bprm: The execution parameters, including the proposed creds @@ -614,26 +640,10 @@ int cap_bprm_set_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm) bprm->cap_effective = effective; - /* - * Audit candidate if current->cap_effective is set - * - * We do not bother to audit if 3 things are true: - * 1) cap_effective has all caps - * 2) we are root - * 3) root is supposed to have all caps (SECURE_NOROOT) - * Since this is just a normal root execing a process. - * - * Number 1 above might fail if you don't have a full bset, but I think - * that is interesting information to audit. - */ - if (cap_grew(effective, ambient, new)) { - if (!cap_full(effective, new) || - !is_eff(root_uid, new) || !is_real(root_uid, new) || - !root_privileged()) { - ret = audit_log_bprm_fcaps(bprm, new, old); - if (ret < 0) - return ret; - } + if (nonroot_raised_pE(new, root_uid)) { + ret = audit_log_bprm_fcaps(bprm, new, old); + if (ret < 0) + return ret; } new->securebits &= ~issecure_mask(SECURE_KEEP_CAPS); -- 1.7.1