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From: Alexey Budankov <alexey.budankov@linux.intel.com>
To: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>,
	Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@kernel.org>,
	Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>,
	"jani.nikula@linux.intel.com" <jani.nikula@linux.intel.com>,
	"joonas.lahtinen@linux.intel.com"
	<joonas.lahtinen@linux.intel.com>,
	"rodrigo.vivi@intel.com" <rodrigo.vivi@intel.com>,
	"benh@kernel.crashing.org" <benh@kernel.crashing.org>,
	Paul Mackerras <paulus@samba.org>,
	Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>,
	"james.bottomley@hansenpartnership.com" 
	<james.bottomley@hansenpartnership.com>,
	Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com>, James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>,
	Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>,
	Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>,
	Robert Richter <rric@kernel.org>,
	Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Cc: Jiri Olsa <jolsa@redhat.com>, Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com>,
	Stephane Eranian <eranian@google.com>,
	Igor Lubashev <ilubashe@akamai.com>,
	Alexander Shishkin <alexander.shishkin@linux.intel.com>,
	Namhyung Kim <namhyung@kernel.org>,
	Song Liu <songliubraving@fb.com>,
	Lionel Landwerlin <lionel.g.landwerlin@intel.com>,
	Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>,
	linux-kernel <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>,
	"linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org" 
	<linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org>,
	"selinux@vger.kernel.org" <selinux@vger.kernel.org>,
	"intel-gfx@lists.freedesktop.org"
	<intel-gfx@lists.freedesktop.org>,
	"linux-parisc@vger.kernel.org" <linux-parisc@vger.kernel.org>,
	"linuxppc-dev@lists.ozlabs.org" <linuxppc-dev@lists.ozlabs.org>,
	linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org,
	"linux-perf-users@vger.kernel.org"
	<linux-perf-users@vger.kernel.org>,
	oprofile-list@lists.sf.net
Subject: [PATCH v5 02/10] perf/core: open access to the core for CAP_PERFMON privileged process
Date: Mon, 20 Jan 2020 14:24:39 +0300	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <11240db3-a8a0-f925-e905-bfc9dc544646@linux.intel.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <0548c832-7f4b-dc4c-8883-3f2b6d351a08@linux.intel.com>


Open access to monitoring of kernel code, system, tracepoints and namespaces
data for a CAP_PERFMON privileged process. For backward compatibility
reasons access to perf_events subsystem remains open for CAP_SYS_ADMIN
privileged processes but CAP_SYS_ADMIN usage for secure perf_events
monitoring is discouraged with respect to CAP_PERFMON capability.
Providing the access under CAP_PERFMON capability singly, without the rest
of CAP_SYS_ADMIN credentials, excludes chances to misuse the credentials
and makes operation more secure.

Signed-off-by: Alexey Budankov <alexey.budankov@linux.intel.com>
---
 include/linux/perf_event.h | 6 +++---
 kernel/events/core.c       | 2 +-
 2 files changed, 4 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)

diff --git a/include/linux/perf_event.h b/include/linux/perf_event.h
index 6d4c22aee384..730469babcc2 100644
--- a/include/linux/perf_event.h
+++ b/include/linux/perf_event.h
@@ -1285,7 +1285,7 @@ static inline int perf_is_paranoid(void)
 
 static inline int perf_allow_kernel(struct perf_event_attr *attr)
 {
-	if (sysctl_perf_event_paranoid > 1 && !capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN))
+	if (sysctl_perf_event_paranoid > 1 && !perfmon_capable())
 		return -EACCES;
 
 	return security_perf_event_open(attr, PERF_SECURITY_KERNEL);
@@ -1293,7 +1293,7 @@ static inline int perf_allow_kernel(struct perf_event_attr *attr)
 
 static inline int perf_allow_cpu(struct perf_event_attr *attr)
 {
-	if (sysctl_perf_event_paranoid > 0 && !capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN))
+	if (sysctl_perf_event_paranoid > 0 && !perfmon_capable())
 		return -EACCES;
 
 	return security_perf_event_open(attr, PERF_SECURITY_CPU);
@@ -1301,7 +1301,7 @@ static inline int perf_allow_cpu(struct perf_event_attr *attr)
 
 static inline int perf_allow_tracepoint(struct perf_event_attr *attr)
 {
-	if (sysctl_perf_event_paranoid > -1 && !capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN))
+	if (sysctl_perf_event_paranoid > -1 && !perfmon_capable())
 		return -EPERM;
 
 	return security_perf_event_open(attr, PERF_SECURITY_TRACEPOINT);
diff --git a/kernel/events/core.c b/kernel/events/core.c
index a1f8bde19b56..b1fcbbe24849 100644
--- a/kernel/events/core.c
+++ b/kernel/events/core.c
@@ -11186,7 +11186,7 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE5(perf_event_open,
 	}
 
 	if (attr.namespaces) {
-		if (!capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN))
+		if (!perfmon_capable())
 			return -EACCES;
 	}
 
-- 
2.20.1


WARNING: multiple messages have this Message-ID (diff)
From: Alexey Budankov <alexey.budankov@linux.intel.com>
To: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>,
	Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@kernel.org>,
	Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>,
	"jani.nikula@linux.intel.com" <jani.nikula@linux.intel.com>,
	"joonas.lahtinen@linux.intel.com"
	<joonas.lahtinen@linux.intel.com>,
	"rodrigo.vivi@intel.com" <rodrigo.vivi@intel.com>,
	"benh@kernel.crashing.org" <benh@kernel.crashing.org>,
	Paul Mackerras <paulus@samba.org>,
	Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>,
	"james.bottomley@hansenpartnership.com"
	<james.bottomley@hansenpartnership.com>,
	Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com>, James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>,
	Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>,
	Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>,
	Robert Richter <rric@kernel.org>,
	Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Cc: Jiri Olsa <jolsa@redhat.com>, Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com>,
	Stephane Eranian <eranian@google.com>,
	Igor Lubashev <ilubashe@akamai.com>,
	Alexander Shishkin <alexander.shishkin@linux.intel.com>,
	Namhyung Kim <namhyung@kernel.org>,
	Song Liu <songliubraving@fb.com>,
	Lionel Landwerlin <lionel.g.landwerlin@intel.com>,
	Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>,
	linux-kernel <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>,
	"linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org"
	<linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org>,
	"selinux@vger.kernel.org" <selinux@vger.kernel.org>,
	"intel-gfx@lists.freedesktop.org"
	<intel-gfx@lists.freedesktop.org>,
	"linux-parisc@vger.kernel.org" <linux-parisc@vger.kernel.org>,
	"linuxppc-dev@lists.ozlabs.org" <linuxppc-dev@lists.ozlabs.org>,
	linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org
Subject: [PATCH v5 02/10] perf/core: open access to the core for CAP_PERFMON privileged process
Date: Mon, 20 Jan 2020 14:24:39 +0300	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <11240db3-a8a0-f925-e905-bfc9dc544646@linux.intel.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <0548c832-7f4b-dc4c-8883-3f2b6d351a08@linux.intel.com>


Open access to monitoring of kernel code, system, tracepoints and namespaces
data for a CAP_PERFMON privileged process. For backward compatibility
reasons access to perf_events subsystem remains open for CAP_SYS_ADMIN
privileged processes but CAP_SYS_ADMIN usage for secure perf_events
monitoring is discouraged with respect to CAP_PERFMON capability.
Providing the access under CAP_PERFMON capability singly, without the rest
of CAP_SYS_ADMIN credentials, excludes chances to misuse the credentials
and makes operation more secure.

Signed-off-by: Alexey Budankov <alexey.budankov@linux.intel.com>
---
 include/linux/perf_event.h | 6 +++---
 kernel/events/core.c       | 2 +-
 2 files changed, 4 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)

diff --git a/include/linux/perf_event.h b/include/linux/perf_event.h
index 6d4c22aee384..730469babcc2 100644
--- a/include/linux/perf_event.h
+++ b/include/linux/perf_event.h
@@ -1285,7 +1285,7 @@ static inline int perf_is_paranoid(void)
 
 static inline int perf_allow_kernel(struct perf_event_attr *attr)
 {
-	if (sysctl_perf_event_paranoid > 1 && !capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN))
+	if (sysctl_perf_event_paranoid > 1 && !perfmon_capable())
 		return -EACCES;
 
 	return security_perf_event_open(attr, PERF_SECURITY_KERNEL);
@@ -1293,7 +1293,7 @@ static inline int perf_allow_kernel(struct perf_event_attr *attr)
 
 static inline int perf_allow_cpu(struct perf_event_attr *attr)
 {
-	if (sysctl_perf_event_paranoid > 0 && !capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN))
+	if (sysctl_perf_event_paranoid > 0 && !perfmon_capable())
 		return -EACCES;
 
 	return security_perf_event_open(attr, PERF_SECURITY_CPU);
@@ -1301,7 +1301,7 @@ static inline int perf_allow_cpu(struct perf_event_attr *attr)
 
 static inline int perf_allow_tracepoint(struct perf_event_attr *attr)
 {
-	if (sysctl_perf_event_paranoid > -1 && !capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN))
+	if (sysctl_perf_event_paranoid > -1 && !perfmon_capable())
 		return -EPERM;
 
 	return security_perf_event_open(attr, PERF_SECURITY_TRACEPOINT);
diff --git a/kernel/events/core.c b/kernel/events/core.c
index a1f8bde19b56..b1fcbbe24849 100644
--- a/kernel/events/core.c
+++ b/kernel/events/core.c
@@ -11186,7 +11186,7 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE5(perf_event_open,
 	}
 
 	if (attr.namespaces) {
-		if (!capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN))
+		if (!perfmon_capable())
 			return -EACCES;
 	}
 
-- 
2.20.1

WARNING: multiple messages have this Message-ID (diff)
From: Alexey Budankov <alexey.budankov@linux.intel.com>
To: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>,
	Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@kernel.org>,
	Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>,
	"jani.nikula@linux.intel.com" <jani.nikula@linux.intel.com>,
	"joonas.lahtinen@linux.intel.com"
	<joonas.lahtinen@linux.intel.com>,
	"rodrigo.vivi@intel.com" <rodrigo.vivi@intel.com>,
	"benh@kernel.crashing.org" <benh@kernel.crashing.org>,
	Paul Mackerras <paulus@samba.org>,
	Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>,
	"james.bottomley@hansenpartnership.com"
	<james.bottomley@hansenpartnership.com>,
	Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com>, James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>,
	Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>,
	Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>,
	Robert Richter <rric@kernel.org>,
	Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Cc: Song Liu <songliubraving@fb.com>, Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com>,
	"linux-parisc@vger.kernel.org" <linux-parisc@vger.kernel.org>,
	Alexander Shishkin <alexander.shishkin@linux.intel.com>,
	"linuxppc-dev@lists.ozlabs.org" <linuxppc-dev@lists.ozlabs.org>,
	"intel-gfx@lists.freedesktop.org"
	<intel-gfx@lists.freedesktop.org>,
	Igor Lubashev <ilubashe@akamai.com>,
	linux-kernel <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>,
	Stephane Eranian <eranian@google.com>,
	"linux-perf-users@vger.kernel.org"
	<linux-perf-users@vger.kernel.org>,
	"selinux@vger.kernel.org" <selinux@vger.kernel.org>,
	"linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org"
	<linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org>,
	oprofile-list@lists.sf.net,
	Lionel Landwerlin <lionel.g.landwerlin@intel.com>,
	Namhyung Kim <namhyung@kernel.org>,
	Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>,
	Jiri Olsa <jolsa@redhat.com>,
	linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org
Subject: [PATCH v5 02/10] perf/core: open access to the core for CAP_PERFMON privileged process
Date: Mon, 20 Jan 2020 14:24:39 +0300	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <11240db3-a8a0-f925-e905-bfc9dc544646@linux.intel.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <0548c832-7f4b-dc4c-8883-3f2b6d351a08@linux.intel.com>


Open access to monitoring of kernel code, system, tracepoints and namespaces
data for a CAP_PERFMON privileged process. For backward compatibility
reasons access to perf_events subsystem remains open for CAP_SYS_ADMIN
privileged processes but CAP_SYS_ADMIN usage for secure perf_events
monitoring is discouraged with respect to CAP_PERFMON capability.
Providing the access under CAP_PERFMON capability singly, without the rest
of CAP_SYS_ADMIN credentials, excludes chances to misuse the credentials
and makes operation more secure.

Signed-off-by: Alexey Budankov <alexey.budankov@linux.intel.com>
---
 include/linux/perf_event.h | 6 +++---
 kernel/events/core.c       | 2 +-
 2 files changed, 4 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)

diff --git a/include/linux/perf_event.h b/include/linux/perf_event.h
index 6d4c22aee384..730469babcc2 100644
--- a/include/linux/perf_event.h
+++ b/include/linux/perf_event.h
@@ -1285,7 +1285,7 @@ static inline int perf_is_paranoid(void)
 
 static inline int perf_allow_kernel(struct perf_event_attr *attr)
 {
-	if (sysctl_perf_event_paranoid > 1 && !capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN))
+	if (sysctl_perf_event_paranoid > 1 && !perfmon_capable())
 		return -EACCES;
 
 	return security_perf_event_open(attr, PERF_SECURITY_KERNEL);
@@ -1293,7 +1293,7 @@ static inline int perf_allow_kernel(struct perf_event_attr *attr)
 
 static inline int perf_allow_cpu(struct perf_event_attr *attr)
 {
-	if (sysctl_perf_event_paranoid > 0 && !capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN))
+	if (sysctl_perf_event_paranoid > 0 && !perfmon_capable())
 		return -EACCES;
 
 	return security_perf_event_open(attr, PERF_SECURITY_CPU);
@@ -1301,7 +1301,7 @@ static inline int perf_allow_cpu(struct perf_event_attr *attr)
 
 static inline int perf_allow_tracepoint(struct perf_event_attr *attr)
 {
-	if (sysctl_perf_event_paranoid > -1 && !capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN))
+	if (sysctl_perf_event_paranoid > -1 && !perfmon_capable())
 		return -EPERM;
 
 	return security_perf_event_open(attr, PERF_SECURITY_TRACEPOINT);
diff --git a/kernel/events/core.c b/kernel/events/core.c
index a1f8bde19b56..b1fcbbe24849 100644
--- a/kernel/events/core.c
+++ b/kernel/events/core.c
@@ -11186,7 +11186,7 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE5(perf_event_open,
 	}
 
 	if (attr.namespaces) {
-		if (!capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN))
+		if (!perfmon_capable())
 			return -EACCES;
 	}
 
-- 
2.20.1


WARNING: multiple messages have this Message-ID (diff)
From: Alexey Budankov <alexey.budankov@linux.intel.com>
To: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>,
	Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@kernel.org>,
	Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>,
	"jani.nikula@linux.intel.com" <jani.nikula@linux.intel.com>,
	"joonas.lahtinen@linux.intel.com"
	<joonas.lahtinen@linux.intel.com>,
	"rodrigo.vivi@intel.com" <rodrigo.vivi@intel.com>,
	"benh@kernel.crashing.org" <benh@kernel.crashing.org>,
	Paul Mackerras <paulus@samba.org>,
	Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>,
	"james.bottomley@hansenpartnership.com"
	<james.bottomley@hansenpartnership.com>,
	Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com>, James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>,
	Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>,
	Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>,
	Robert Richter <rric@kernel.org>,
	Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Cc: Song Liu <songliubraving@fb.com>, Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com>,
	"linux-parisc@vger.kernel.org" <linux-parisc@vger.kernel.org>,
	Alexander Shishkin <alexander.shishkin@linux.intel.com>,
	"linuxppc-dev@lists.ozlabs.org" <linuxppc-dev@lists.ozlabs.org>,
	"intel-gfx@lists.freedesktop.org"
	<intel-gfx@lists.freedesktop.org>,
	Igor Lubashev <ilubashe@akamai.com>,
	linux-kernel <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>,
	Stephane Eranian <eranian@google.com>,
	"linux-perf-users@vger.kernel.org"
	<linux-perf-users@vger.kernel.org>,
	"selinux@vger.kernel.org" <selinux@vger.kernel.org>,
	"linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org"
	<linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org>,
	oprofile-list@lists.sf.net,
	Lionel Landwerlin <lionel.g.landwerlin@intel.com>,
	Namhyung Kim <namhyung@kernel.org>,
	Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>,
	Jiri Olsa <jolsa@redhat.com>,
	linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org
Subject: [PATCH v5 02/10] perf/core: open access to the core for CAP_PERFMON privileged process
Date: Mon, 20 Jan 2020 14:24:39 +0300	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <11240db3-a8a0-f925-e905-bfc9dc544646@linux.intel.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <0548c832-7f4b-dc4c-8883-3f2b6d351a08@linux.intel.com>


Open access to monitoring of kernel code, system, tracepoints and namespaces
data for a CAP_PERFMON privileged process. For backward compatibility
reasons access to perf_events subsystem remains open for CAP_SYS_ADMIN
privileged processes but CAP_SYS_ADMIN usage for secure perf_events
monitoring is discouraged with respect to CAP_PERFMON capability.
Providing the access under CAP_PERFMON capability singly, without the rest
of CAP_SYS_ADMIN credentials, excludes chances to misuse the credentials
and makes operation more secure.

Signed-off-by: Alexey Budankov <alexey.budankov@linux.intel.com>
---
 include/linux/perf_event.h | 6 +++---
 kernel/events/core.c       | 2 +-
 2 files changed, 4 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)

diff --git a/include/linux/perf_event.h b/include/linux/perf_event.h
index 6d4c22aee384..730469babcc2 100644
--- a/include/linux/perf_event.h
+++ b/include/linux/perf_event.h
@@ -1285,7 +1285,7 @@ static inline int perf_is_paranoid(void)
 
 static inline int perf_allow_kernel(struct perf_event_attr *attr)
 {
-	if (sysctl_perf_event_paranoid > 1 && !capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN))
+	if (sysctl_perf_event_paranoid > 1 && !perfmon_capable())
 		return -EACCES;
 
 	return security_perf_event_open(attr, PERF_SECURITY_KERNEL);
@@ -1293,7 +1293,7 @@ static inline int perf_allow_kernel(struct perf_event_attr *attr)
 
 static inline int perf_allow_cpu(struct perf_event_attr *attr)
 {
-	if (sysctl_perf_event_paranoid > 0 && !capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN))
+	if (sysctl_perf_event_paranoid > 0 && !perfmon_capable())
 		return -EACCES;
 
 	return security_perf_event_open(attr, PERF_SECURITY_CPU);
@@ -1301,7 +1301,7 @@ static inline int perf_allow_cpu(struct perf_event_attr *attr)
 
 static inline int perf_allow_tracepoint(struct perf_event_attr *attr)
 {
-	if (sysctl_perf_event_paranoid > -1 && !capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN))
+	if (sysctl_perf_event_paranoid > -1 && !perfmon_capable())
 		return -EPERM;
 
 	return security_perf_event_open(attr, PERF_SECURITY_TRACEPOINT);
diff --git a/kernel/events/core.c b/kernel/events/core.c
index a1f8bde19b56..b1fcbbe24849 100644
--- a/kernel/events/core.c
+++ b/kernel/events/core.c
@@ -11186,7 +11186,7 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE5(perf_event_open,
 	}
 
 	if (attr.namespaces) {
-		if (!capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN))
+		if (!perfmon_capable())
 			return -EACCES;
 	}
 
-- 
2.20.1


_______________________________________________
linux-arm-kernel mailing list
linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org
http://lists.infradead.org/mailman/listinfo/linux-arm-kernel

WARNING: multiple messages have this Message-ID (diff)
From: Alexey Budankov <alexey.budankov@linux.intel.com>
To: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>,
	Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@kernel.org>,
	Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>,
	"jani.nikula@linux.intel.com" <jani.nikula@linux.intel.com>,
	"joonas.lahtinen@linux.intel.com"
	<joonas.lahtinen@linux.intel.com>,
	"rodrigo.vivi@intel.com" <rodrigo.vivi@intel.com>,
	"benh@kernel.crashing.org" <benh@kernel.crashing.org>,
	Paul Mackerras <paulus@samba.org>,
	Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>,
	"james.bottomley@hansenpartnership.com"
	<james.bottomley@hansenpartnership.com>,
	Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com>, James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>,
	Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>,
	Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>,
	Robert Richter <rric@kernel.org>,
	Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Cc: Song Liu <songliubraving@fb.com>, Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com>,
	"linux-parisc@vger.kernel.org" <linux-parisc@vger.kernel.org>,
	Alexander Shishkin <alexander.shishkin@linux.intel.com>,
	"linuxppc-dev@lists.ozlabs.org" <linuxppc-dev@lists.ozlabs.org>,
	"intel-gfx@lists.freedesktop.org"
	<intel-gfx@lists.freedesktop.org>,
	Igor Lubashev <ilubashe@akamai.com>,
	linux-kernel <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>,
	Stephane Eranian <eranian@google.com>,
	"linux-perf-users@vger.kernel.org"
	<linux-perf-users@vger.kernel.org>,
	"selinux@vger.kernel.org" <selinux@vger.kernel.org>,
	"linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org"
	<linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org>,
	oprofile-list@lists.sf.net, Namhyung Kim <namhyung@kernel.org>,
	Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>,
	Jiri Olsa <jolsa@redhat.com>,
	linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org
Subject: [Intel-gfx] [PATCH v5 02/10] perf/core: open access to the core for CAP_PERFMON privileged process
Date: Mon, 20 Jan 2020 14:24:39 +0300	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <11240db3-a8a0-f925-e905-bfc9dc544646@linux.intel.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <0548c832-7f4b-dc4c-8883-3f2b6d351a08@linux.intel.com>


Open access to monitoring of kernel code, system, tracepoints and namespaces
data for a CAP_PERFMON privileged process. For backward compatibility
reasons access to perf_events subsystem remains open for CAP_SYS_ADMIN
privileged processes but CAP_SYS_ADMIN usage for secure perf_events
monitoring is discouraged with respect to CAP_PERFMON capability.
Providing the access under CAP_PERFMON capability singly, without the rest
of CAP_SYS_ADMIN credentials, excludes chances to misuse the credentials
and makes operation more secure.

Signed-off-by: Alexey Budankov <alexey.budankov@linux.intel.com>
---
 include/linux/perf_event.h | 6 +++---
 kernel/events/core.c       | 2 +-
 2 files changed, 4 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)

diff --git a/include/linux/perf_event.h b/include/linux/perf_event.h
index 6d4c22aee384..730469babcc2 100644
--- a/include/linux/perf_event.h
+++ b/include/linux/perf_event.h
@@ -1285,7 +1285,7 @@ static inline int perf_is_paranoid(void)
 
 static inline int perf_allow_kernel(struct perf_event_attr *attr)
 {
-	if (sysctl_perf_event_paranoid > 1 && !capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN))
+	if (sysctl_perf_event_paranoid > 1 && !perfmon_capable())
 		return -EACCES;
 
 	return security_perf_event_open(attr, PERF_SECURITY_KERNEL);
@@ -1293,7 +1293,7 @@ static inline int perf_allow_kernel(struct perf_event_attr *attr)
 
 static inline int perf_allow_cpu(struct perf_event_attr *attr)
 {
-	if (sysctl_perf_event_paranoid > 0 && !capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN))
+	if (sysctl_perf_event_paranoid > 0 && !perfmon_capable())
 		return -EACCES;
 
 	return security_perf_event_open(attr, PERF_SECURITY_CPU);
@@ -1301,7 +1301,7 @@ static inline int perf_allow_cpu(struct perf_event_attr *attr)
 
 static inline int perf_allow_tracepoint(struct perf_event_attr *attr)
 {
-	if (sysctl_perf_event_paranoid > -1 && !capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN))
+	if (sysctl_perf_event_paranoid > -1 && !perfmon_capable())
 		return -EPERM;
 
 	return security_perf_event_open(attr, PERF_SECURITY_TRACEPOINT);
diff --git a/kernel/events/core.c b/kernel/events/core.c
index a1f8bde19b56..b1fcbbe24849 100644
--- a/kernel/events/core.c
+++ b/kernel/events/core.c
@@ -11186,7 +11186,7 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE5(perf_event_open,
 	}
 
 	if (attr.namespaces) {
-		if (!capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN))
+		if (!perfmon_capable())
 			return -EACCES;
 	}
 
-- 
2.20.1

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  parent reply	other threads:[~2020-01-20 11:24 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 163+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2020-01-20 11:18 [PATCH v5 0/10] Introduce CAP_PERFMON to secure system performance monitoring and observability Alexey Budankov
2020-01-20 11:18 ` [Intel-gfx] " Alexey Budankov
2020-01-20 11:18 ` Alexey Budankov
2020-01-20 11:18 ` Alexey Budankov
2020-01-20 11:18 ` Alexey Budankov
2020-01-20 11:23 ` [PATCH v5 01/10] capabilities: introduce CAP_PERFMON to kernel and user space Alexey Budankov
2020-01-20 11:23   ` [Intel-gfx] " Alexey Budankov
2020-01-20 11:23   ` Alexey Budankov
2020-01-20 11:23   ` Alexey Budankov
2020-01-20 11:23   ` Alexey Budankov
2020-01-21 14:43   ` Stephen Smalley
2020-01-21 14:43     ` [Intel-gfx] " Stephen Smalley
2020-01-21 14:43     ` Stephen Smalley
2020-01-21 14:43     ` Stephen Smalley
2020-01-21 14:43     ` Stephen Smalley
2020-01-21 17:30     ` Alexey Budankov
2020-01-21 17:30       ` [Intel-gfx] " Alexey Budankov
2020-01-21 17:30       ` Alexey Budankov
2020-01-21 17:30       ` Alexey Budankov
2020-01-21 17:30       ` Alexey Budankov
2020-01-21 17:55       ` Alexei Starovoitov
2020-01-21 17:55         ` [Intel-gfx] " Alexei Starovoitov
2020-01-21 17:55         ` Alexei Starovoitov
2020-01-21 17:55         ` Alexei Starovoitov
2020-01-21 17:55         ` Alexei Starovoitov
2020-01-21 18:27         ` Alexey Budankov
2020-01-21 18:27           ` [Intel-gfx] " Alexey Budankov
2020-01-21 18:27           ` Alexey Budankov
2020-01-21 18:27           ` Alexey Budankov
2020-01-21 18:27           ` Alexey Budankov
2020-01-22 10:45           ` Alexey Budankov
2020-01-22 10:45             ` [Intel-gfx] " Alexey Budankov
2020-01-22 10:45             ` Alexey Budankov
2020-01-22 10:45             ` Alexey Budankov
2020-01-22 10:45             ` Alexey Budankov
2020-01-22 14:07             ` Stephen Smalley
2020-01-22 14:07               ` [Intel-gfx] " Stephen Smalley
2020-01-22 14:07               ` Stephen Smalley
2020-01-22 14:07               ` Stephen Smalley
2020-01-22 14:07               ` Stephen Smalley
2020-01-22 14:25               ` Alexey Budankov
2020-01-22 14:25                 ` [Intel-gfx] " Alexey Budankov
2020-01-22 14:25                 ` Alexey Budankov
2020-01-22 14:25                 ` Alexey Budankov
2020-01-22 14:25                 ` Alexey Budankov
2020-02-06 18:03                 ` Alexey Budankov
2020-02-06 18:03                   ` [Intel-gfx] " Alexey Budankov
2020-02-06 18:03                   ` Alexey Budankov
2020-02-06 18:03                   ` Alexey Budankov
2020-02-06 18:03                   ` Alexey Budankov
2020-02-07 11:38                   ` Thomas Gleixner
2020-02-07 11:38                     ` [Intel-gfx] " Thomas Gleixner
2020-02-07 11:38                     ` Thomas Gleixner
2020-02-07 11:38                     ` Thomas Gleixner
2020-02-07 11:38                     ` Thomas Gleixner
2020-02-07 13:39                     ` Alexey Budankov
2020-02-07 13:39                       ` [Intel-gfx] " Alexey Budankov
2020-02-07 13:39                       ` Alexey Budankov
2020-02-07 13:39                       ` Alexey Budankov
2020-02-07 13:39                       ` Alexey Budankov
2020-02-20 13:05                       ` Alexey Budankov
2020-02-20 13:05                         ` [Intel-gfx] " Alexey Budankov
2020-02-20 13:05                         ` Alexey Budankov
2020-02-20 13:05                         ` Alexey Budankov
2020-02-20 13:05                         ` Alexey Budankov
2020-02-12  8:53               ` Alexey Budankov
2020-02-12  8:53                 ` [Intel-gfx] " Alexey Budankov
2020-02-12  8:53                 ` Alexey Budankov
2020-02-12  8:53                 ` Alexey Budankov
2020-02-12  8:53                 ` Alexey Budankov
2020-02-12 13:32                 ` Stephen Smalley
2020-02-12 13:32                   ` [Intel-gfx] " Stephen Smalley
2020-02-12 13:32                   ` Stephen Smalley
2020-02-12 13:32                   ` Stephen Smalley
2020-02-12 13:32                   ` Stephen Smalley
2020-02-12 13:53                   ` Alexey Budankov
2020-02-12 13:53                     ` [Intel-gfx] " Alexey Budankov
2020-02-12 13:53                     ` Alexey Budankov
2020-02-12 13:53                     ` Alexey Budankov
2020-02-12 13:53                     ` Alexey Budankov
2020-02-12 15:21                     ` Stephen Smalley
2020-02-12 15:21                       ` [Intel-gfx] " Stephen Smalley
2020-02-12 15:21                       ` Stephen Smalley
2020-02-12 15:21                       ` Stephen Smalley
2020-02-12 15:21                       ` Stephen Smalley
2020-02-12 15:45                       ` Stephen Smalley
2020-02-12 15:45                         ` [Intel-gfx] " Stephen Smalley
2020-02-12 15:45                         ` Stephen Smalley
2020-02-12 15:45                         ` Stephen Smalley
2020-02-12 15:45                         ` Stephen Smalley
2020-02-12 16:56                         ` Alexey Budankov
2020-02-12 16:56                           ` [Intel-gfx] " Alexey Budankov
2020-02-12 16:56                           ` Alexey Budankov
2020-02-12 16:56                           ` Alexey Budankov
2020-02-12 16:56                           ` Alexey Budankov
2020-02-12 17:09                           ` Stephen Smalley
2020-02-12 17:09                             ` [Intel-gfx] " Stephen Smalley
2020-02-12 17:09                             ` Stephen Smalley
2020-02-12 17:09                             ` Stephen Smalley
2020-02-12 17:09                             ` Stephen Smalley
2020-02-13  9:05                             ` Alexey Budankov
2020-02-13  9:05                               ` [Intel-gfx] " Alexey Budankov
2020-02-13  9:05                               ` Alexey Budankov
2020-02-13  9:05                               ` Alexey Budankov
2020-02-13  9:05                               ` Alexey Budankov
2020-02-12 16:16                       ` Alexey Budankov
2020-02-12 16:16                         ` [Intel-gfx] " Alexey Budankov
2020-02-12 16:16                         ` Alexey Budankov
2020-02-12 16:16                         ` Alexey Budankov
2020-02-12 16:16                         ` Alexey Budankov
2020-01-20 11:24 ` Alexey Budankov [this message]
2020-01-20 11:24   ` [Intel-gfx] [PATCH v5 02/10] perf/core: open access to the core for CAP_PERFMON privileged process Alexey Budankov
2020-01-20 11:24   ` Alexey Budankov
2020-01-20 11:24   ` Alexey Budankov
2020-01-20 11:24   ` Alexey Budankov
2020-01-20 11:26 ` [PATCH v5 03/10] perf/core: open access to anon probes " Alexey Budankov
2020-01-20 11:26   ` [Intel-gfx] " Alexey Budankov
2020-01-20 11:26   ` Alexey Budankov
2020-01-20 11:26   ` Alexey Budankov
2020-01-20 11:26   ` Alexey Budankov
2020-01-20 11:27 ` [PATCH v5 04/10] perf tool: extend Perf tool with CAP_PERFMON capability support Alexey Budankov
2020-01-20 11:27   ` [Intel-gfx] " Alexey Budankov
2020-01-20 11:27   ` Alexey Budankov
2020-01-20 11:27   ` Alexey Budankov
2020-01-20 11:27   ` Alexey Budankov
2020-01-20 11:28 ` [PATCH v5 05/10] drm/i915/perf: open access for CAP_PERFMON privileged process Alexey Budankov
2020-01-20 11:28   ` [Intel-gfx] " Alexey Budankov
2020-01-20 11:28   ` Alexey Budankov
2020-01-20 11:28   ` Alexey Budankov
2020-01-20 11:28   ` Alexey Budankov
2020-01-20 11:29 ` [PATCH v5 06/10] trace/bpf_trace: " Alexey Budankov
2020-01-20 11:29   ` [Intel-gfx] " Alexey Budankov
2020-01-20 11:29   ` Alexey Budankov
2020-01-20 11:29   ` Alexey Budankov
2020-01-20 11:29   ` Alexey Budankov
2020-01-20 11:30 ` [PATCH v5 07/10] powerpc/perf: " Alexey Budankov
2020-01-20 11:30   ` [Intel-gfx] " Alexey Budankov
2020-01-20 11:30   ` Alexey Budankov
2020-01-20 11:30   ` Alexey Budankov
2020-01-20 11:30   ` Alexey Budankov
2020-01-22 11:02   ` Anju T Sudhakar
2020-01-22 11:02     ` [Intel-gfx] " Anju T Sudhakar
2020-01-22 11:02     ` Anju T Sudhakar
2020-01-22 11:02     ` Anju T Sudhakar
2020-01-22 11:02     ` Anju T Sudhakar
2020-01-20 11:31 ` [PATCH v5 08/10] parisc/perf: " Alexey Budankov
2020-01-20 11:31   ` [Intel-gfx] " Alexey Budankov
2020-01-20 11:31   ` Alexey Budankov
2020-01-20 11:31   ` Alexey Budankov
2020-01-20 11:31   ` Alexey Budankov
2020-01-20 11:32 ` [PATCH v5 09/10] drivers/perf: " Alexey Budankov
2020-01-20 11:32   ` [Intel-gfx] " Alexey Budankov
2020-01-20 11:32   ` Alexey Budankov
2020-01-20 11:32   ` Alexey Budankov
2020-01-20 11:32   ` Alexey Budankov
2020-01-20 11:33 ` [PATCH v5 10/10] drivers/oprofile: " Alexey Budankov
2020-01-20 11:33   ` [Intel-gfx] " Alexey Budankov
2020-01-20 11:33   ` Alexey Budankov
2020-01-20 11:33   ` Alexey Budankov
2020-01-20 11:33   ` Alexey Budankov
2020-01-20 16:50 ` [Intel-gfx] ✗ Fi.CI.CHECKPATCH: warning for Introduce CAP_PERFMON to secure system performance monitoring and observability Patchwork
2020-01-21  0:15 ` [Intel-gfx] ✓ Fi.CI.BAT: success " Patchwork
2020-01-21 11:00 ` [Intel-gfx] ✓ Fi.CI.IGT: " Patchwork

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