All of lore.kernel.org
 help / color / mirror / Atom feed
From: dominick.grift@gmail.com (Dominick Grift)
To: refpolicy@oss.tresys.com
Subject: [refpolicy] RFC: direct_init_entry breaks direct_initrc
Date: Wed, 11 Dec 2013 09:56:37 +0100	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <1386752197.18689.88.camel@d30> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20131211083339.GA5997@siphos.be>

On Wed, 2013-12-11 at 09:33 +0100, Sven Vermeulen wrote:
> 
> What we do is we have the following set:
> 
> seutil_init_script_run_runinit(sysadm_t, sysadm_r)
> . seutil_init_script_domtrans_runinit(sysadm_t)
> . . init_script_file_domtrans(sysadm_t, run_init_t)
> . . . domain_auto_trans(sysadm_t, initrc_exec_t, run_init_t)
> 
> This ensures that, if sysadm_t executes an initrc_exec_t script, the script
> is launched in the run_init_t context. Then, our init system (OpenRC) calls
> a shared library we provide (linked with libselinux) which sets the next
> execution context to system_u:system_r:initrc_t (using setexeccon) and
> re-executes the script.
> 

Thanks. Do the *_admin() interfaces work in Gentoo?

The role transition in the *_admin() interfaces happen on the init
scripts, So if they work in Gentoo then i think we can be pretty certain
that the change i am suggesting in my patch will not break the SELinux
policy openrc solution.

It's a bit harder to verify init related stuff now though because
gentoo, debian and fedora each use a different init systems now

I believe we need to make sure to role transition on the init scripts
only because if we role transition on the daemon executable files
themselves then we get conflicts with executable files that can be run
both as a system service as well as a sessions service.

  reply	other threads:[~2013-12-11  8:56 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 18+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2013-12-11  8:33 [refpolicy] RFC: direct_init_entry breaks direct_initrc Sven Vermeulen
2013-12-11  8:56 ` Dominick Grift [this message]
2013-12-11  9:52   ` Sven Vermeulen
2013-12-11 10:31     ` Dominick Grift
  -- strict thread matches above, loose matches on Subject: below --
2013-12-10 15:57 Dominick Grift
2013-12-10 16:00 ` Dominick Grift
2014-01-14 13:56 ` Christopher J. PeBenito
2014-01-14 14:02   ` Dominick Grift
2014-01-14 14:10     ` Christopher J. PeBenito
2014-01-14 14:48       ` Daniel J Walsh
2014-01-14 18:30       ` Dominick Grift
2014-01-14 20:44         ` Christopher J. PeBenito
2014-01-14 22:23           ` Dominick Grift
2014-01-15 13:01             ` Dominick Grift
2014-01-15 13:51             ` Christopher J. PeBenito
2014-01-15 15:44               ` Dominick Grift
2014-01-15 17:01                 ` Daniel J Walsh
2014-01-16 21:12                 ` Christopher J. PeBenito

Reply instructions:

You may reply publicly to this message via plain-text email
using any one of the following methods:

* Save the following mbox file, import it into your mail client,
  and reply-to-all from there: mbox

  Avoid top-posting and favor interleaved quoting:
  https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Posting_style#Interleaved_style

* Reply using the --to, --cc, and --in-reply-to
  switches of git-send-email(1):

  git send-email \
    --in-reply-to=1386752197.18689.88.camel@d30 \
    --to=dominick.grift@gmail.com \
    --cc=refpolicy@oss.tresys.com \
    /path/to/YOUR_REPLY

  https://kernel.org/pub/software/scm/git/docs/git-send-email.html

* If your mail client supports setting the In-Reply-To header
  via mailto: links, try the mailto: link
Be sure your reply has a Subject: header at the top and a blank line before the message body.
This is an external index of several public inboxes,
see mirroring instructions on how to clone and mirror
all data and code used by this external index.