On Fri, 2014-03-14 at 22:31 +0000, One Thousand Gnomes wrote: > On Fri, 14 Mar 2014 22:15:45 +0000 > Matthew Garrett wrote: > > The general problem includes having to support this even without an > > selinux policy. > > Yes. No dispute about that. But equally the general solution should allow > for it. Well, sure. The current implementation doesn't conflict with selinux in any way. > > some other way. ChromeOS will load unmeasured kernel modules provided it > > can attest to the trustworthyness of the filesystem containing them. > > See "How to Bypass Verified Boot Security in Chromium OS" 8) > > And it attests the trustworthiness of the filesystem by measuring it. If > you have a measurement of object X that states it is unchanged then you > have a valid measurement of any subset of object X for which the same > assertion is proven. In this case since you know all the bits in the root > fs are as before, so you know all the bits in the module are as before You may attest to the trustworthiness of a filesystem by measuring it, but you may also attest to it via some other means - for instance, it's read-only and stored on media that requires physical presence to modify. -- Matthew Garrett {.n++%ݶw{.n+{G{ayʇڙ,jfhz_(階ݢj"mG?&~iOzv^m ?I