From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 From: Daniel De Graaf Subject: [PATCH 6/7] xen: Allow hardare domain != dom0 Date: Thu, 27 Mar 2014 07:52:07 -0400 Message-ID: <1395921128-7086-7-git-send-email-dgdegra@tycho.nsa.gov> References: <1395921128-7086-1-git-send-email-dgdegra@tycho.nsa.gov> Mime-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii" Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit Return-path: In-Reply-To: <1395921128-7086-1-git-send-email-dgdegra@tycho.nsa.gov> List-Unsubscribe: , List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , Sender: xen-devel-bounces@lists.xen.org Errors-To: xen-devel-bounces@lists.xen.org To: xen-devel@lists.xen.org Cc: dgdegra@tycho.nsa.gov, Keir Fraser List-Id: xen-devel@lists.xenproject.org This adds a hypervisor command line option "hardware_dom=" which takes a domain ID. When the domain with this ID is created, it will be used as the hardware domain. This is intended to be used when domain 0 is a dedicated stub domain for domain building, allowing the hardware domain to be de-privileged and act only as a driver domain. Signed-off-by: Daniel De Graaf Reviewed-by: Jan Beulich Cc: Keir Fraser --- xen/arch/x86/domain_build.c | 4 +++- xen/arch/x86/setup.c | 2 ++ xen/common/domain.c | 1 + xen/common/domctl.c | 41 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ xen/common/rangeset.c | 40 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ xen/include/xen/rangeset.h | 3 +++ xen/include/xen/sched.h | 3 ++- xen/include/xsm/dummy.h | 6 ++++++ xen/include/xsm/xsm.h | 6 ++++++ xen/xsm/dummy.c | 2 ++ xen/xsm/flask/hooks.c | 6 ++++++ xen/xsm/flask/policy/access_vectors | 2 ++ 12 files changed, 114 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/domain_build.c b/xen/arch/x86/domain_build.c index f75f6e7..a554d3b 100644 --- a/xen/arch/x86/domain_build.c +++ b/xen/arch/x86/domain_build.c @@ -1150,7 +1150,9 @@ int __init construct_dom0( printk(" Xen warning: dom0 kernel broken ELF: %s\n", elf_check_broken(&elf)); - iommu_hwdom_init(hardware_domain); + if ( is_hardware_domain(d) ) + iommu_hwdom_init(d); + return 0; out: diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/setup.c b/xen/arch/x86/setup.c index 75cf212..f246ac3 100644 --- a/xen/arch/x86/setup.c +++ b/xen/arch/x86/setup.c @@ -84,6 +84,8 @@ unsigned long __initdata highmem_start; size_param("highmem-start", highmem_start); #endif +integer_param("hardware_dom", hardware_domid); + cpumask_t __read_mostly cpu_present_map; unsigned long __read_mostly xen_phys_start; diff --git a/xen/common/domain.c b/xen/common/domain.c index 6a282a2..a77f8af 100644 --- a/xen/common/domain.c +++ b/xen/common/domain.c @@ -60,6 +60,7 @@ static struct domain *domain_hash[DOMAIN_HASH_SIZE]; struct domain *domain_list; struct domain *hardware_domain __read_mostly; +domid_t hardware_domid __read_mostly; struct vcpu *idle_vcpu[NR_CPUS] __read_mostly; diff --git a/xen/common/domctl.c b/xen/common/domctl.c index eebeee7..57bb026 100644 --- a/xen/common/domctl.c +++ b/xen/common/domctl.c @@ -472,6 +472,47 @@ long do_domctl(XEN_GUEST_HANDLE_PARAM(xen_domctl_t) u_domctl) break; } +#ifdef CONFIG_LATE_HWDOM + if ( is_hardware_domain(d) ) + { + struct domain *dom0 = hardware_domain; + ASSERT(dom0->domain_id == 0); + + ret = xsm_init_hardware_domain(XSM_HOOK, d); + if ( ret ) + { + domain_kill(d); + d = NULL; + break; + } + + printk("Initialising hardware domain %d\n", hardware_domid); + hardware_domain = d; + + /* + * Hardware resource ranges for domain 0 have been set up from + * various sources intended to restrict the hardware domain's + * access. Apply these ranges to the actual hardware domain. + * + * Because the lists are being swapped, a side effect of this + * operation is that Domain 0's rangesets are cleared. Since + * domain 0 should not be accessing the hardware when it constructs + * a hardware domain, this should not be a problem. Both lists + * may be modified after this hypercall returns if a more complex + * device model is desired. + * + * Since late hardware domain initialization is only supported on + * x86, the reference to arch.ioport_caps does not need its own + * preprocessor conditional. + */ + rangeset_swap(d->irq_caps, dom0->irq_caps); + rangeset_swap(d->iomem_caps, dom0->iomem_caps); + rangeset_swap(d->arch.ioport_caps, dom0->arch.ioport_caps); + + iommu_hwdom_init(d); + } +#endif + ret = 0; memcpy(d->handle, op->u.createdomain.handle, diff --git a/xen/common/rangeset.c b/xen/common/rangeset.c index f09c0c4..52fae1f 100644 --- a/xen/common/rangeset.c +++ b/xen/common/rangeset.c @@ -438,3 +438,43 @@ void rangeset_domain_printk( spin_unlock(&d->rangesets_lock); } + +void rangeset_swap(struct rangeset *a, struct rangeset *b) +{ + struct list_head tmp; + if (&a < &b) + { + spin_lock(&a->lock); + spin_lock(&b->lock); + } + else + { + spin_lock(&b->lock); + spin_lock(&a->lock); + } + memcpy(&tmp, &a->range_list, sizeof(tmp)); + memcpy(&a->range_list, &b->range_list, sizeof(tmp)); + memcpy(&b->range_list, &tmp, sizeof(tmp)); + if ( a->range_list.next == &b->range_list ) + { + a->range_list.next = &a->range_list; + a->range_list.prev = &a->range_list; + } + else + { + a->range_list.next->prev = &a->range_list; + a->range_list.prev->next = &a->range_list; + } + if ( b->range_list.next == &a->range_list ) + { + b->range_list.next = &b->range_list; + b->range_list.prev = &b->range_list; + } + else + { + b->range_list.next->prev = &b->range_list; + b->range_list.prev->next = &b->range_list; + } + spin_unlock(&a->lock); + spin_unlock(&b->lock); +} diff --git a/xen/include/xen/rangeset.h b/xen/include/xen/rangeset.h index 1e16a6b..805ebde 100644 --- a/xen/include/xen/rangeset.h +++ b/xen/include/xen/rangeset.h @@ -73,4 +73,7 @@ void rangeset_printk( void rangeset_domain_printk( struct domain *d); +/* swap contents */ +void rangeset_swap(struct rangeset *a, struct rangeset *b); + #endif /* __XEN_RANGESET_H__ */ diff --git a/xen/include/xen/sched.h b/xen/include/xen/sched.h index 91adc8c..8b28f79 100644 --- a/xen/include/xen/sched.h +++ b/xen/include/xen/sched.h @@ -45,6 +45,7 @@ DEFINE_XEN_GUEST_HANDLE(vcpu_runstate_info_compat_t); /* A global pointer to the hardware domain (usually DOM0). */ extern struct domain *hardware_domain; +extern domid_t hardware_domid; #ifndef CONFIG_COMPAT #define BITS_PER_EVTCHN_WORD(d) BITS_PER_XEN_ULONG @@ -794,7 +795,7 @@ void watchdog_domain_destroy(struct domain *d); * (that is, this would not be suitable for a driver domain) * - There is never a reason to deny dom0 access to this */ -#define is_hardware_domain(_d) ((_d)->domain_id == 0) +#define is_hardware_domain(d) ((d)->domain_id == hardware_domid) /* This check is for functionality specific to a control domain */ #define is_control_domain(_d) ((_d)->is_privileged) diff --git a/xen/include/xsm/dummy.h b/xen/include/xsm/dummy.h index e722155..8ca1117 100644 --- a/xen/include/xsm/dummy.h +++ b/xen/include/xsm/dummy.h @@ -299,6 +299,12 @@ static XSM_INLINE char *xsm_show_security_evtchn(struct domain *d, const struct return NULL; } +static XSM_INLINE int xsm_init_hardware_domain(XSM_DEFAULT_ARG struct domain *d) +{ + XSM_ASSERT_ACTION(XSM_HOOK); + return xsm_default_action(action, current->domain, d); +} + static XSM_INLINE int xsm_get_pod_target(XSM_DEFAULT_ARG struct domain *d) { XSM_ASSERT_ACTION(XSM_PRIV); diff --git a/xen/include/xsm/xsm.h b/xen/include/xsm/xsm.h index 15acb3b..bff0574 100644 --- a/xen/include/xsm/xsm.h +++ b/xen/include/xsm/xsm.h @@ -82,6 +82,7 @@ struct xsm_operations { int (*alloc_security_evtchn) (struct evtchn *chn); void (*free_security_evtchn) (struct evtchn *chn); char *(*show_security_evtchn) (struct domain *d, const struct evtchn *chn); + int (*init_hardware_domain) (struct domain *d); int (*get_pod_target) (struct domain *d); int (*set_pod_target) (struct domain *d); @@ -311,6 +312,11 @@ static inline char *xsm_show_security_evtchn (struct domain *d, const struct evt return xsm_ops->show_security_evtchn(d, chn); } +static inline int xsm_init_hardware_domain (xsm_default_t def, struct domain *d) +{ + return xsm_ops->init_hardware_domain(d); +} + static inline int xsm_get_pod_target (xsm_default_t def, struct domain *d) { return xsm_ops->get_pod_target(d); diff --git a/xen/xsm/dummy.c b/xen/xsm/dummy.c index b79e10f..c2804f2 100644 --- a/xen/xsm/dummy.c +++ b/xen/xsm/dummy.c @@ -58,6 +58,8 @@ void xsm_fixup_ops (struct xsm_operations *ops) set_to_dummy_if_null(ops, alloc_security_evtchn); set_to_dummy_if_null(ops, free_security_evtchn); set_to_dummy_if_null(ops, show_security_evtchn); + set_to_dummy_if_null(ops, init_hardware_domain); + set_to_dummy_if_null(ops, get_pod_target); set_to_dummy_if_null(ops, set_pod_target); diff --git a/xen/xsm/flask/hooks.c b/xen/xsm/flask/hooks.c index 4ce31c9..f1a4a2d 100644 --- a/xen/xsm/flask/hooks.c +++ b/xen/xsm/flask/hooks.c @@ -327,6 +327,11 @@ static char *flask_show_security_evtchn(struct domain *d, const struct evtchn *c return ctx; } +static int flask_init_hardware_domain(struct domain *d) +{ + return current_has_perm(d, SECCLASS_DOMAIN2, DOMAIN2__CREATE_HARDWARE_DOMAIN); +} + static int flask_grant_mapref(struct domain *d1, struct domain *d2, uint32_t flags) { @@ -1500,6 +1505,7 @@ static struct xsm_operations flask_ops = { .alloc_security_evtchn = flask_alloc_security_evtchn, .free_security_evtchn = flask_free_security_evtchn, .show_security_evtchn = flask_show_security_evtchn, + .init_hardware_domain = flask_init_hardware_domain, .get_pod_target = flask_get_pod_target, .set_pod_target = flask_set_pod_target, diff --git a/xen/xsm/flask/policy/access_vectors b/xen/xsm/flask/policy/access_vectors index a0ed13d..32371a9 100644 --- a/xen/xsm/flask/policy/access_vectors +++ b/xen/xsm/flask/policy/access_vectors @@ -198,6 +198,8 @@ class domain2 set_max_evtchn # XEN_DOMCTL_cacheflush cacheflush +# Creation of the hardware domain when it is not dom0 + create_hardware_domain } # Similar to class domain, but primarily contains domctls related to HVM domains -- 1.8.5.3