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From: Eric Snowberg <eric.snowberg@oracle.com>
To: Nayna <nayna@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Cc: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>,
	dwmw2@infradead.org, Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>,
	James.Bottomley@HansenPartnership.com, masahiroy@kernel.org,
	michal.lkml@markovi.net, jmorris@namei.org, serge@hallyn.com,
	ardb@kernel.org, zohar@linux.ibm.com, lszubowi@redhat.com,
	javierm@redhat.com, keyrings@vger.kernel.org,
	linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, linux-kbuild@vger.kernel.org,
	linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH v5 1/4] certs: Add EFI_CERT_X509_GUID support for dbx entries
Date: Wed, 27 Jan 2021 21:11:22 -0700	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <13EE0575-2F90-4C49-AF5D-365B63D2CB64@oracle.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <399024a1-59fb-12b8-9ea9-9bbee843dbc8@linux.vnet.ibm.com>


> On Jan 27, 2021, at 8:54 PM, Nayna <nayna@linux.vnet.ibm.com> wrote:
> 
> 
> On 1/22/21 1:10 PM, Eric Snowberg wrote:
>> This fixes CVE-2020-26541.
>> 
>> The Secure Boot Forbidden Signature Database, dbx, contains a list of now
>> revoked signatures and keys previously approved to boot with UEFI Secure
>> Boot enabled.  The dbx is capable of containing any number of
>> EFI_CERT_X509_SHA256_GUID, EFI_CERT_SHA256_GUID, and EFI_CERT_X509_GUID
>> entries.
>> 
>> Currently when EFI_CERT_X509_GUID are contained in the dbx, the entries are
>> skipped.
>> 
>> Add support for EFI_CERT_X509_GUID dbx entries. When a EFI_CERT_X509_GUID
>> is found, it is added as an asymmetrical key to the .blacklist keyring.
>> Anytime the .platform keyring is used, the keys in the .blacklist keyring
>> are referenced, if a matching key is found, the key will be rejected.
>> 
>> Signed-off-by: Eric Snowberg <eric.snowberg@oracle.com>
>> Reviewed-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com>
>> Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
>> ---
>> v5: Function name changes done by David Howells
>> ---
>>  certs/blacklist.c                             | 32 +++++++++++++++++++
>>  certs/blacklist.h                             | 12 +++++++
>>  certs/system_keyring.c                        |  6 ++++
>>  include/keys/system_keyring.h                 | 11 +++++++
>>  .../platform_certs/keyring_handler.c          | 11 +++++++
>>  5 files changed, 72 insertions(+)
>> 
>> diff --git a/certs/blacklist.c b/certs/blacklist.c
>> index 6514f9ebc943..a7f021878a4b 100644
>> --- a/certs/blacklist.c
>> +++ b/certs/blacklist.c
>> @@ -100,6 +100,38 @@ int mark_hash_blacklisted(const char *hash)
>>  	return 0;
>>  }
>> 
>> +int add_key_to_revocation_list(const char *data, size_t size)
>> +{
>> +	key_ref_t key;
>> +
>> +	key = key_create_or_update(make_key_ref(blacklist_keyring, true),
>> +				   "asymmetric",
>> +				   NULL,
>> +				   data,
>> +				   size,
>> +				   ((KEY_POS_ALL & ~KEY_POS_SETATTR) | KEY_USR_VIEW),
>> +				   KEY_ALLOC_NOT_IN_QUOTA | KEY_ALLOC_BUILT_IN);
>> +
>> +	if (IS_ERR(key)) {
>> +		pr_err("Problem with revocation key (%ld)\n", PTR_ERR(key));
>> +		return PTR_ERR(key);
>> +	}
>> +
>> +	return 0;
>> +}
>> +
>> +int is_key_on_revocation_list(struct pkcs7_message *pkcs7)
>> +{
>> +	int ret;
>> +
>> +	ret = validate_trust(pkcs7, blacklist_keyring);
>> +
>> +	if (ret == 0)
>> +		return -EKEYREJECTED;
>> +
>> +	return -ENOKEY;
>> +}
>> +
>>  /**
>>   * is_hash_blacklisted - Determine if a hash is blacklisted
>>   * @hash: The hash to be checked as a binary blob
>> diff --git a/certs/blacklist.h b/certs/blacklist.h
>> index 1efd6fa0dc60..420bb7c86e07 100644
>> --- a/certs/blacklist.h
>> +++ b/certs/blacklist.h
>> @@ -1,3 +1,15 @@
>>  #include <linux/kernel.h>
>> +#include <linux/errno.h>
>> +#include <crypto/pkcs7.h>
>> 
>>  extern const char __initconst *const blacklist_hashes[];
>> +
>> +#ifdef CONFIG_INTEGRITY_PLATFORM_KEYRING
>> +#define validate_trust pkcs7_validate_trust
>> +#else
>> +static inline int validate_trust(struct pkcs7_message *pkcs7,
>> +				 struct key *trust_keyring)
>> +{
>> +	return -ENOKEY;
>> +}
>> +#endif
>> diff --git a/certs/system_keyring.c b/certs/system_keyring.c
>> index 798291177186..cc165b359ea3 100644
>> --- a/certs/system_keyring.c
>> +++ b/certs/system_keyring.c
>> @@ -241,6 +241,12 @@ int verify_pkcs7_message_sig(const void *data, size_t len,
>>  			pr_devel("PKCS#7 platform keyring is not available\n");
>>  			goto error;
>>  		}
>> +
>> +		ret = is_key_on_revocation_list(pkcs7);
>> +		if (ret != -ENOKEY) {
>> +			pr_devel("PKCS#7 platform key is on revocation list\n");
>> +			goto error;
>> +		}
>>  	}
>>  	ret = pkcs7_validate_trust(pkcs7, trusted_keys);
>>  	if (ret < 0) {
>> diff --git a/include/keys/system_keyring.h b/include/keys/system_keyring.h
>> index fb8b07daa9d1..61f98739e8b1 100644
>> --- a/include/keys/system_keyring.h
>> +++ b/include/keys/system_keyring.h
>> @@ -31,11 +31,14 @@ extern int restrict_link_by_builtin_and_secondary_trusted(
>>  #define restrict_link_by_builtin_and_secondary_trusted restrict_link_by_builtin_trusted
>>  #endif
>> 
>> +extern struct pkcs7_message *pkcs7;
>>  #ifdef CONFIG_SYSTEM_BLACKLIST_KEYRING
>>  extern int mark_hash_blacklisted(const char *hash);
>> +extern int add_key_to_revocation_list(const char *data, size_t size);
>>  extern int is_hash_blacklisted(const u8 *hash, size_t hash_len,
>>  			       const char *type);
>>  extern int is_binary_blacklisted(const u8 *hash, size_t hash_len);
>> +extern int is_key_on_revocation_list(struct pkcs7_message *pkcs7);
>>  #else
>>  static inline int is_hash_blacklisted(const u8 *hash, size_t hash_len,
>>  				      const char *type)
>> @@ -47,6 +50,14 @@ static inline int is_binary_blacklisted(const u8 *hash, size_t hash_len)
>>  {
>>  	return 0;
>>  }
>> +static inline int add_key_to_revocation_list(const char *data, size_t size)
>> +{
>> +	return 0;
>> +}
>> +static inline int is_key_on_revocation_list(struct pkcs7_message *pkcs7)
>> +{
>> +	return -ENOKEY;
>> +}
>>  #endif
>> 
>>  #ifdef CONFIG_IMA_BLACKLIST_KEYRING
>> diff --git a/security/integrity/platform_certs/keyring_handler.c b/security/integrity/platform_certs/keyring_handler.c
>> index c5ba695c10e3..5604bd57c990 100644
>> --- a/security/integrity/platform_certs/keyring_handler.c
>> +++ b/security/integrity/platform_certs/keyring_handler.c
>> @@ -55,6 +55,15 @@ static __init void uefi_blacklist_binary(const char *source,
>>  	uefi_blacklist_hash(source, data, len, "bin:", 4);
>>  }
>> 
>> +/*
>> + * Add an X509 cert to the revocation list.
>> + */
>> +static __init void uefi_revocation_list_x509(const char *source,
>> +					     const void *data, size_t len)
>> +{
>> +	add_key_to_revocation_list(data, len);
>> +}
> 
> In keeping the naming convention with other functions that blacklist hashes, why can't we call these functions:
> 
> * uefi_revocation_list_x509() -> uefi_blacklist_x509_cert()
> * add_key_to_revocation_list() -> uefi_blacklist_cert()
> * is_key_on_revocation_list() -> is_cert_blacklisted()

The word revocation was used do to the updated Linux coding style:

https://lkml.org/lkml/2020/7/4/229



  reply	other threads:[~2021-01-28  4:12 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 30+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2021-01-22 18:10 [PATCH v5 0/4] Add EFI_CERT_X509_GUID support for dbx/mokx entries Eric Snowberg
2021-01-22 18:10 ` [PATCH v5 1/4] certs: Add EFI_CERT_X509_GUID support for dbx entries Eric Snowberg
2021-01-28  3:54   ` Nayna
2021-01-28  4:11     ` Eric Snowberg [this message]
2021-01-28 15:35       ` Nayna
2021-01-28 15:58       ` David Howells
2021-01-29  1:56         ` Eric Snowberg
2021-01-22 18:10 ` [PATCH v5 2/4] certs: Move load_system_certificate_list to a common function Eric Snowberg
2021-01-22 18:10 ` [PATCH v5 3/4] certs: Add ability to preload revocation certs Eric Snowberg
2021-01-22 18:10 ` [PATCH v5 4/4] integrity: Load mokx variables into the blacklist keyring Eric Snowberg
2021-01-28 15:16 ` [PATCH v5 0/4] Add EFI_CERT_X509_GUID support for dbx/mokx entries David Howells
2021-01-28 15:27   ` Mimi Zohar
2021-01-28 15:29     ` Mimi Zohar
2021-01-28 15:41   ` Eric Snowberg
2021-02-03 16:26 ` Conflict with Mickaël Salaün's blacklist patches [was [PATCH v5 0/4] Add EFI_CERT_X509_GUID support for dbx/mokx entries] David Howells
2021-02-03 18:49   ` Mickaël Salaün
2021-02-04  3:53     ` Eric Snowberg
2021-02-04  8:26       ` Mickaël Salaün
2021-02-05  0:24         ` Eric Snowberg
2021-02-05 10:27           ` Mickaël Salaün
2021-02-06  1:14             ` Eric Snowberg
2021-02-06 18:30               ` Mickaël Salaün
2021-02-08 23:05                 ` Eric Snowberg
2021-02-09 21:53                   ` Mickaël Salaün
2021-02-10 12:07                     ` Mickaël Salaün
2021-02-09 13:14                 ` David Howells
2021-02-09 13:59                   ` Mickaël Salaün
2021-02-09 16:46                   ` David Howells
2021-02-12 11:49                   ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2021-02-04  9:11     ` David Howells

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