From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Return-Path: X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.4.0 (2014-02-07) on aws-us-west-2-korg-lkml-1.web.codeaurora.org Received: from vger.kernel.org (vger.kernel.org [23.128.96.18]) by smtp.lore.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id CBABAC6FA99 for ; Sun, 12 Mar 2023 18:07:17 +0000 (UTC) Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S231966AbjCLSHQ (ORCPT ); Sun, 12 Mar 2023 14:07:16 -0400 Received: from lindbergh.monkeyblade.net ([23.128.96.19]:48552 "EHLO lindbergh.monkeyblade.net" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S232316AbjCLSFf (ORCPT ); Sun, 12 Mar 2023 14:05:35 -0400 Received: from mga12.intel.com (mga12.intel.com [192.55.52.136]) by lindbergh.monkeyblade.net (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 32401521CC; Sun, 12 Mar 2023 11:01:19 -0700 (PDT) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/simple; d=intel.com; i=@intel.com; q=dns/txt; s=Intel; t=1678644080; x=1710180080; h=from:to:cc:subject:date:message-id:in-reply-to: references:mime-version:content-transfer-encoding; bh=VIPx1RHWDVqaqcc5r1WiXZcpi7D/sWrbLLs3e0/kfIA=; b=YxHvdFkIqFqITkw8qewrJfklj+fmEWqW37wcFwnDEkcoY+PcVPgJuqXA hFGK4Rs7xA7MJSinvq6FMtOyThfQqXP/ZtzaoGQeO8CVGGrpqXMd7sl4k ZBEh9uCv8hWCjuYc+ujYtOWXG84O1hBAoA7OuJDGzvd6C24qNR1rMxoLW G9fCn15o5g15CHDFknYyCX1+jCapZkStGMbap3DBh4FjGJjs6Lnno1OgP 6S0xxLxHNYNuxNZ5DfLD4K0FDw473P0zRYfXVNjtKiz2RMyCGa6OvaQXE N6rhg3n9xd3bejiLA2ed7OsPPaa0wJjHDqkUHzXThrg2aYrkC8T2XDWf7 A==; X-IronPort-AV: E=McAfee;i="6500,9779,10647"; a="316660152" X-IronPort-AV: E=Sophos;i="5.98,254,1673942400"; d="scan'208";a="316660152" Received: from fmsmga008.fm.intel.com ([10.253.24.58]) by fmsmga106.fm.intel.com with ESMTP/TLS/ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384; 12 Mar 2023 10:58:19 -0700 X-ExtLoop1: 1 X-IronPort-AV: E=McAfee;i="6500,9779,10647"; a="742596875" X-IronPort-AV: E=Sophos;i="5.98,254,1673942400"; d="scan'208";a="742596875" Received: from ls.sc.intel.com (HELO localhost) ([143.183.96.54]) by fmsmga008-auth.fm.intel.com with ESMTP/TLS/ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384; 12 Mar 2023 10:58:18 -0700 From: isaku.yamahata@intel.com To: kvm@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Cc: isaku.yamahata@intel.com, isaku.yamahata@gmail.com, Paolo Bonzini , erdemaktas@google.com, Sean Christopherson , Sagi Shahar , David Matlack , Kai Huang , Zhi Wang Subject: [PATCH v13 112/113] RFC: KVM: TDX: Make busy with S-EPT on entry bug Date: Sun, 12 Mar 2023 10:57:16 -0700 Message-Id: <13a767dcac55d2df9a8b747be178452399d5d3b4.1678643052.git.isaku.yamahata@intel.com> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.25.1 In-Reply-To: References: MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org From: Isaku Yamahata TDX module has mitigation against zero-step attacks or single-step attacks. When the TDX module finds repeated EPT violations on the same guest RIP, i.e. no advance in guest, it starts to suspect the attack. The mitigation logic on the next entry tries to take the lock of S-EPT. It may result in an error of TDX_OPERAND_BUSY | TDX_OPERAND_ID_SEPT. As KVM shouldn't spuriously zap private S-EPT so that guest can make progress, KVM shouldn't cause the TDX module to trigger the mitigation. Make (TDX_OPERAND_BUSY | TDX_OPERAND_ID_SEPT) on entry KVM bug. Suggested-by: Sean Christopherson Signed-off-by: Isaku Yamahata --- - This patch is RFC because this is only lightly tested and stress test isn't done. --- arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.c | 16 ++++++++++++++-- 1 file changed, 14 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.c b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.c index 8e392bc3330b..b668f06bbb64 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.c +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.c @@ -1670,8 +1670,20 @@ int tdx_handle_exit(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, fastpath_t fastpath) { union tdx_exit_reason exit_reason = to_tdx(vcpu)->exit_reason; - /* See the comment of tdh_sept_seamcall(). */ - if (unlikely(exit_reason.full == (TDX_OPERAND_BUSY | TDX_OPERAND_ID_SEPT))) + /* + * See the comment of tdh_sept_seamcall(). + * TDX module has mitigation against zero-step attacks or single-step + * attacks. When the TDX module finds repeated EPT violations on the + * same guest RIP, i.e. no advance in guest, it starts to suspect the + * attack. The mitigation logic on the next entry tries to take the + * lock of S-EPT. It may result in an error of (TDX_OPERAND_BUSY | + * TDX_OPERAND_ID_SEPT). As KVM shouldn't spuriously zap private S-EPT + * so that guest can make progress, KVM shouldn't cause the TDX module + * to trigger the mitigation. Make (TDX_OPERAND_BUSY | + * TDX_OPERAND_ID_SEPT) on entry KVM bug. + */ + if (KVM_BUG_ON(exit_reason.full == (TDX_OPERAND_BUSY | TDX_OPERAND_ID_SEPT), + vcpu->kvm)) return 1; if (unlikely(exit_reason.full == TDX_SEAMCALL_UD)) { -- 2.25.1