From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Return-Path: From: johan.hedberg@gmail.com To: linux-bluetooth@vger.kernel.org Subject: [PATCH 2/6] Bluetooth: Fix ignoring unknown SMP authentication requirement bits Date: Wed, 10 Sep 2014 17:37:42 -0700 Message-Id: <1410395866-24301-3-git-send-email-johan.hedberg@gmail.com> In-Reply-To: <1410395866-24301-1-git-send-email-johan.hedberg@gmail.com> References: <1410395866-24301-1-git-send-email-johan.hedberg@gmail.com> Sender: linux-bluetooth-owner@vger.kernel.org List-ID: From: Johan Hedberg The SMP specification states that we should ignore any unknown bits from the authentication requirement. We already have a define for masking out unknown bits but we haven't used it in all places so far. This patch adds usage of the AUTH_REQ_MASK to all places that need it and ensures that we don't pass unknown bits onward to other functions. Signed-off-by: Johan Hedberg --- net/bluetooth/smp.c | 22 +++++++++++++--------- 1 file changed, 13 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-) diff --git a/net/bluetooth/smp.c b/net/bluetooth/smp.c index dbd17a07dc2e..ef8f96d2c059 100644 --- a/net/bluetooth/smp.c +++ b/net/bluetooth/smp.c @@ -949,8 +949,11 @@ static u8 smp_cmd_pairing_req(struct l2cap_conn *conn, struct sk_buff *skb) if (!smp) return SMP_UNSPECIFIED; + /* We didn't start the pairing, so match remote */ + auth = req->auth_req & AUTH_REQ_MASK; + if (!test_bit(HCI_BONDABLE, &hdev->dev_flags) && - (req->auth_req & SMP_AUTH_BONDING)) + (auth & SMP_AUTH_BONDING)) return SMP_PAIRING_NOTSUPP; SMP_DISALLOW_CMD(smp, SMP_CMD_PAIRING_REQ); @@ -959,9 +962,6 @@ static u8 smp_cmd_pairing_req(struct l2cap_conn *conn, struct sk_buff *skb) memcpy(&smp->preq[1], req, sizeof(*req)); skb_pull(skb, sizeof(*req)); - /* We didn't start the pairing, so match remote */ - auth = req->auth_req; - sec_level = authreq_to_seclevel(auth); if (sec_level > conn->hcon->pending_sec_level) conn->hcon->pending_sec_level = sec_level; @@ -1024,6 +1024,8 @@ static u8 smp_cmd_pairing_rsp(struct l2cap_conn *conn, struct sk_buff *skb) if (check_enc_key_size(conn, key_size)) return SMP_ENC_KEY_SIZE; + auth = rsp->auth_req & AUTH_REQ_MASK; + /* If we need MITM check that it can be acheived */ if (conn->hcon->pending_sec_level >= BT_SECURITY_HIGH) { u8 method; @@ -1044,7 +1046,7 @@ static u8 smp_cmd_pairing_rsp(struct l2cap_conn *conn, struct sk_buff *skb) */ smp->remote_key_dist &= rsp->resp_key_dist; - auth = (req->auth_req | rsp->auth_req); + auth |= req->auth_req; ret = tk_request(conn, 0, auth, req->io_capability, rsp->io_capability); if (ret) @@ -1160,7 +1162,7 @@ static u8 smp_cmd_security_req(struct l2cap_conn *conn, struct sk_buff *skb) struct smp_cmd_pairing cp; struct hci_conn *hcon = conn->hcon; struct smp_chan *smp; - u8 sec_level; + u8 sec_level, auth; BT_DBG("conn %p", conn); @@ -1170,7 +1172,9 @@ static u8 smp_cmd_security_req(struct l2cap_conn *conn, struct sk_buff *skb) if (hcon->role != HCI_ROLE_MASTER) return SMP_CMD_NOTSUPP; - sec_level = authreq_to_seclevel(rp->auth_req); + auth = rp->auth_req & AUTH_REQ_MASK; + + sec_level = authreq_to_seclevel(auth); if (smp_sufficient_security(hcon, sec_level)) return 0; @@ -1185,13 +1189,13 @@ static u8 smp_cmd_security_req(struct l2cap_conn *conn, struct sk_buff *skb) return SMP_UNSPECIFIED; if (!test_bit(HCI_BONDABLE, &hcon->hdev->dev_flags) && - (rp->auth_req & SMP_AUTH_BONDING)) + (auth & SMP_AUTH_BONDING)) return SMP_PAIRING_NOTSUPP; skb_pull(skb, sizeof(*rp)); memset(&cp, 0, sizeof(cp)); - build_pairing_cmd(conn, &cp, NULL, rp->auth_req); + build_pairing_cmd(conn, &cp, NULL, auth); smp->preq[0] = SMP_CMD_PAIRING_REQ; memcpy(&smp->preq[1], &cp, sizeof(cp)); -- 1.9.3