[PATCH] x86/asm/entry/64: better check for canonical address

[Denys Vlasenko <dvlasenk@redhat.com>]

This change makes the check exact (no more false positives
on kernel addresses).

It isn't really important to be fully correct here -
almost all addresses we'll ever see will be userspace ones,
but OTOH it looks to be cheap enough:
the new code uses two more ALU ops but preserves %rcx,
allowing to not reload it from pt_regs->cx again.
On disassembly level, the changes are:

cmp %rcx,0x80(%rsp) -> mov 0x80(%rsp),%r11; cmp %rcx,%r11
shr $0x2f,%rcx      -> shl $0x10,%rcx; sar $0x10,%rcx; cmp %rcx,%r11
mov 0x58(%rsp),%rcx -> (eliminated)

Signed-off-by: Denys Vlasenko <dvlasenk@redhat.com>
CC: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
CC: x86@kernel.org
CC: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
---

Andy, I'd undecided myself on the merits of doing this.
If you like it, feel free to take it in your tree.
I trimmed CC list to not bother too many people with this trivial
and quite possibly "useless churn"-class change.

 arch/x86/kernel/entry_64.S | 23 ++++++++++++-----------
 1 file changed, 12 insertions(+), 11 deletions(-)

diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/entry_64.S b/arch/x86/kernel/entry_64.S
index bf9afad..a36d04d 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/entry_64.S
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/entry_64.S
@@ -688,26 +688,27 @@ retint_swapgs:		/* return to user-space */
 	 * a completely clean 64-bit userspace context.
 	 */
 	movq RCX(%rsp),%rcx
-	cmpq %rcx,RIP(%rsp)		/* RCX == RIP */
+	movq RIP(%rsp),%r11
+	cmpq %rcx,%r11			/* RCX == RIP */
 	jne opportunistic_sysret_failed
 
 	/*
 	 * On Intel CPUs, sysret with non-canonical RCX/RIP will #GP
 	 * in kernel space.  This essentially lets the user take over
-	 * the kernel, since userspace controls RSP.  It's not worth
-	 * testing for canonicalness exactly -- this check detects any
-	 * of the 17 high bits set, which is true for non-canonical
-	 * or kernel addresses.  (This will pessimize vsyscall=native.
-	 * Big deal.)
+	 * the kernel, since userspace controls RSP.
 	 *
-	 * If virtual addresses ever become wider, this will need
+	 * If width of "canonical tail" ever become variable, this will need
 	 * to be updated to remain correct on both old and new CPUs.
 	 */
 	.ifne __VIRTUAL_MASK_SHIFT - 47
 	.error "virtual address width changed -- sysret checks need update"
 	.endif
-	shr $__VIRTUAL_MASK_SHIFT, %rcx
-	jnz opportunistic_sysret_failed
+	/* Change top 16 bits to be a sign-extension of the rest */
+	shl	$(64 - (__VIRTUAL_MASK_SHIFT+1)), %rcx
+	sar	$(64 - (__VIRTUAL_MASK_SHIFT+1)), %rcx
+	/* If this changed %rcx, it was not canonical */
+	cmpq	%rcx, %r11
+	jne	opportunistic_sysret_failed
 
 	cmpq $__USER_CS,CS(%rsp)	/* CS must match SYSRET */
 	jne opportunistic_sysret_failed
@@ -730,8 +731,8 @@ retint_swapgs:		/* return to user-space */
 	 */
 irq_return_via_sysret:
 	CFI_REMEMBER_STATE
-	/* r11 is already restored (see code above) */
-	RESTORE_C_REGS_EXCEPT_R11
+	/* rcx and r11 are already restored (see code above) */
+	RESTORE_C_REGS_EXCEPT_RCX_R11
 	movq RSP(%rsp),%rsp
 	USERGS_SYSRET64
 	CFI_RESTORE_STATE
-- 
1.8.1.4