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From: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
To: Xen-devel <xen-devel@lists.xen.org>
Cc: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>,
	Jan Beulich <JBeulich@suse.com>
Subject: [PATCH 6/8] xen/x86: Calculate PV CR4 masks at boot
Date: Wed, 24 Jun 2015 17:31:38 +0100	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <1435163500-10589-7-git-send-email-andrew.cooper3@citrix.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <1435163500-10589-1-git-send-email-andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>

... rather than on every time a guest sets CR4.

Signed-off-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
CC: Jan Beulich <JBeulich@suse.com>
---
 xen/arch/x86/domain.c |   41 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++---------
 1 file changed, 32 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-)

diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/domain.c b/xen/arch/x86/domain.c
index ba28f38..f805724 100644
--- a/xen/arch/x86/domain.c
+++ b/xen/arch/x86/domain.c
@@ -682,24 +682,47 @@ void arch_domain_unpause(struct domain *d)
         viridian_time_ref_count_thaw(d);
 }
 
-unsigned long pv_guest_cr4_fixup(const struct vcpu *v, unsigned long guest_cr4)
+/*
+ * These are the masks of CR4 bits (subject to hardware availability) which a
+ * PV guest may not legitimiately attempt to modify.
+ */
+static unsigned long __read_mostly pv_cr4_mask, compat_pv_cr4_mask;
+
+static int __init init_pv_cr4_masks(void)
 {
-    unsigned long hv_cr4_mask, hv_cr4 = real_cr4_to_pv_guest_cr4(read_cr4());
+    unsigned long common_mask = ~X86_CR4_TSD;
 
-    hv_cr4_mask = ~X86_CR4_TSD;
+    /*
+     * All PV guests may attempt to modify TSD, DE and OSXSAVE.
+     */
     if ( cpu_has_de )
-        hv_cr4_mask &= ~X86_CR4_DE;
-    if ( cpu_has_fsgsbase && !is_pv_32bit_domain(v->domain) )
-        hv_cr4_mask &= ~X86_CR4_FSGSBASE;
+        common_mask &= ~X86_CR4_DE;
     if ( cpu_has_xsave )
-        hv_cr4_mask &= ~X86_CR4_OSXSAVE;
+        common_mask &= ~X86_CR4_OSXSAVE;
+
+    pv_cr4_mask = compat_pv_cr4_mask = common_mask;
+
+    /*
+     * 64bit PV guests may attempt to modify FSGSBASE.
+     */
+    if ( cpu_has_fsgsbase )
+        pv_cr4_mask &= ~X86_CR4_FSGSBASE;
+
+    return 0;
+}
+__initcall(init_pv_cr4_masks);
+
+unsigned long pv_guest_cr4_fixup(const struct vcpu *v, unsigned long guest_cr4)
+{
+    unsigned long hv_cr4 = real_cr4_to_pv_guest_cr4(read_cr4());
+    unsigned long mask = is_pv_32bit_vcpu(v) ? compat_pv_cr4_mask : pv_cr4_mask;
 
-    if ( (guest_cr4 & hv_cr4_mask) != (hv_cr4 & hv_cr4_mask) )
+    if ( (guest_cr4 & mask) != (hv_cr4 & mask) )
         printk(XENLOG_G_WARNING
                "d%d attempted to change %pv's CR4 flags %08lx -> %08lx\n",
                current->domain->domain_id, v, hv_cr4, guest_cr4);
 
-    return (hv_cr4 & hv_cr4_mask) | (guest_cr4 & ~hv_cr4_mask);
+    return (hv_cr4 & mask) | (guest_cr4 & ~mask);
 }
 
 #define xen_vcpu_guest_context vcpu_guest_context
-- 
1.7.10.4

  parent reply	other threads:[~2015-06-24 16:31 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 23+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2015-06-24 16:31 [PATCH 0/8] [RFC] SMAP handling improvements for 32bit PV guests on Andrew Cooper
2015-06-24 16:31 ` [PATCH 1/8] common/vsprintf: Special-case DOMID_IDLE handling for %pv Andrew Cooper
2015-06-24 16:31 ` [PATCH 2/8] x86/traps: Avoid using current too early on boot Andrew Cooper
2015-06-24 16:31 ` [PATCH 3/8] x86/setup: Initialise CR4 before creating idle_vcpu[0] Andrew Cooper
2015-06-24 16:31 ` [PATCH 4/8] xen/x86: Clean up CR4 definitions Andrew Cooper
2015-06-24 16:31 ` [PATCH 5/8] xen/x86: Drop PSE from XEN_MINIMAL_CR4 Andrew Cooper
2015-06-24 16:31 ` Andrew Cooper [this message]
2015-06-25 13:08   ` [PATCH 6/8] xen/x86: Calculate PV CR4 masks at boot Jan Beulich
2015-06-25 13:31     ` Andrew Cooper
2015-06-25 13:40       ` Jan Beulich
2015-06-25 13:43         ` Andrew Cooper
2015-06-24 16:31 ` [PATCH 7/8] xen/x86: Rework CR4 handling for PV guests Andrew Cooper
2015-06-25 14:41   ` Jan Beulich
2015-06-25 16:22     ` Andrew Cooper
2015-06-26  6:22       ` Jan Beulich
2015-06-26  8:10         ` Andrew Cooper
2015-06-26  8:50           ` Jan Beulich
2015-06-24 16:31 ` [PATCH 8/8] xen/x86: Additional SMAP modes to work around buggy 32bit " Andrew Cooper
2015-06-25 11:18   ` David Vrabel
2015-06-25 11:53     ` Andrew Cooper
2015-06-25 15:12   ` Jan Beulich
2015-06-25 16:31     ` Andrew Cooper
2015-06-26  6:33   ` Jan Beulich

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