From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Return-Path: Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S932989AbbIDNYW (ORCPT ); Fri, 4 Sep 2015 09:24:22 -0400 Received: from youngberry.canonical.com ([91.189.89.112]:50249 "EHLO youngberry.canonical.com" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S933010AbbIDNKB (ORCPT ); Fri, 4 Sep 2015 09:10:01 -0400 From: Luis Henriques To: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, stable@vger.kernel.org, kernel-team@lists.ubuntu.com Cc: Mimi Zohar , "Dr. Greg Wettstein" , Luis Henriques Subject: [PATCH 3.16.y-ckt 085/130] ima: add support for new "euid" policy condition Date: Fri, 4 Sep 2015 14:07:53 +0100 Message-Id: <1441372118-5933-86-git-send-email-luis.henriques@canonical.com> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.1.4 In-Reply-To: <1441372118-5933-1-git-send-email-luis.henriques@canonical.com> References: <1441372118-5933-1-git-send-email-luis.henriques@canonical.com> X-Extended-Stable: 3.16 Sender: linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org 3.16.7-ckt17 -stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know. ------------------ From: Mimi Zohar commit 139069eff7388407f19794384c42a534d618ccd7 upstream. The new "euid" policy condition measures files with the specified effective uid (euid). In addition, for CAP_SETUID files it measures files with the specified uid or suid. Changelog: - fixed checkpatch.pl warnings - fixed avc denied {setuid} messages - based on Roberto's feedback Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar Signed-off-by: Dr. Greg Wettstein Signed-off-by: Luis Henriques --- Documentation/ABI/testing/ima_policy | 3 ++- security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c | 27 +++++++++++++++++++++++---- 2 files changed, 25 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-) diff --git a/Documentation/ABI/testing/ima_policy b/Documentation/ABI/testing/ima_policy index 4c3efe434806..84c6a9c1c531 100644 --- a/Documentation/ABI/testing/ima_policy +++ b/Documentation/ABI/testing/ima_policy @@ -20,7 +20,7 @@ Description: action: measure | dont_measure | appraise | dont_appraise | audit condition:= base | lsm [option] base: [[func=] [mask=] [fsmagic=] [fsuuid=] [uid=] - [fowner]] + [euid=] [fowner=]] lsm: [[subj_user=] [subj_role=] [subj_type=] [obj_user=] [obj_role=] [obj_type=]] option: [[appraise_type=]] [permit_directio] @@ -30,6 +30,7 @@ Description: fsmagic:= hex value fsuuid:= file system UUID (e.g 8bcbe394-4f13-4144-be8e-5aa9ea2ce2f6) uid:= decimal value + euid:= decimal value fowner:=decimal value lsm: are LSM specific option: appraise_type:= [imasig] diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c index 40a7488f6721..3ccd68e78012 100644 --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c @@ -27,6 +27,7 @@ #define IMA_UID 0x0008 #define IMA_FOWNER 0x0010 #define IMA_FSUUID 0x0020 +#define IMA_EUID 0x0080 #define UNKNOWN 0 #define MEASURE 0x0001 /* same as IMA_MEASURE */ @@ -181,6 +182,16 @@ static bool ima_match_rules(struct ima_rule_entry *rule, return false; if ((rule->flags & IMA_UID) && !uid_eq(rule->uid, cred->uid)) return false; + if (rule->flags & IMA_EUID) { + if (has_capability_noaudit(current, CAP_SETUID)) { + if (!uid_eq(rule->uid, cred->euid) + && !uid_eq(rule->uid, cred->suid) + && !uid_eq(rule->uid, cred->uid)) + return false; + } else if (!uid_eq(rule->uid, cred->euid)) + return false; + } + if ((rule->flags & IMA_FOWNER) && !uid_eq(rule->fowner, inode->i_uid)) return false; for (i = 0; i < MAX_LSM_RULES; i++) { @@ -352,7 +363,8 @@ enum { Opt_audit, Opt_obj_user, Opt_obj_role, Opt_obj_type, Opt_subj_user, Opt_subj_role, Opt_subj_type, - Opt_func, Opt_mask, Opt_fsmagic, Opt_uid, Opt_fowner, + Opt_func, Opt_mask, Opt_fsmagic, + Opt_uid, Opt_euid, Opt_fowner, Opt_appraise_type, Opt_fsuuid, Opt_permit_directio }; @@ -373,6 +385,7 @@ static match_table_t policy_tokens = { {Opt_fsmagic, "fsmagic=%s"}, {Opt_fsuuid, "fsuuid=%s"}, {Opt_uid, "uid=%s"}, + {Opt_euid, "euid=%s"}, {Opt_fowner, "fowner=%s"}, {Opt_appraise_type, "appraise_type=%s"}, {Opt_permit_directio, "permit_directio"}, @@ -543,6 +556,9 @@ static int ima_parse_rule(char *rule, struct ima_rule_entry *entry) break; case Opt_uid: ima_log_string(ab, "uid", args[0].from); + case Opt_euid: + if (token == Opt_euid) + ima_log_string(ab, "euid", args[0].from); if (uid_valid(entry->uid)) { result = -EINVAL; @@ -551,11 +567,14 @@ static int ima_parse_rule(char *rule, struct ima_rule_entry *entry) result = kstrtoul(args[0].from, 10, &lnum); if (!result) { - entry->uid = make_kuid(current_user_ns(), (uid_t)lnum); - if (!uid_valid(entry->uid) || (((uid_t)lnum) != lnum)) + entry->uid = make_kuid(current_user_ns(), + (uid_t) lnum); + if (!uid_valid(entry->uid) || + (uid_t)lnum != lnum) result = -EINVAL; else - entry->flags |= IMA_UID; + entry->flags |= (token == Opt_uid) + ? IMA_UID : IMA_EUID; } break; case Opt_fowner: