From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Return-Path: Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S1755788AbcAXWEa (ORCPT ); Sun, 24 Jan 2016 17:04:30 -0500 Received: from youngberry.canonical.com ([91.189.89.112]:60863 "EHLO youngberry.canonical.com" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S1755667AbcAXWEU (ORCPT ); Sun, 24 Jan 2016 17:04:20 -0500 From: Luis Henriques To: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, stable@vger.kernel.org, kernel-team@lists.ubuntu.com Cc: Jan Beulich , David Vrabel , Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk , Luis Henriques Subject: [PATCH 3.16.y-ckt 078/128] xen/pciback: Save xen_pci_op commands before processing it Date: Sun, 24 Jan 2016 22:00:33 +0000 Message-Id: <1453672883-2708-79-git-send-email-luis.henriques@canonical.com> In-Reply-To: <1453672883-2708-1-git-send-email-luis.henriques@canonical.com> References: <1453672883-2708-1-git-send-email-luis.henriques@canonical.com> X-Extended-Stable: 3.16 Sender: linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org 3.16.7-ckt23 -stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know. ---8<------------------------------------------------------------ From: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk commit 8135cf8b092723dbfcc611fe6fdcb3a36c9951c5 upstream. Double fetch vulnerabilities that happen when a variable is fetched twice from shared memory but a security check is only performed the first time. The xen_pcibk_do_op function performs a switch statements on the op->cmd value which is stored in shared memory. Interestingly this can result in a double fetch vulnerability depending on the performed compiler optimization. This patch fixes it by saving the xen_pci_op command before processing it. We also use 'barrier' to make sure that the compiler does not perform any optimization. This is part of XSA155. Reviewed-by: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich Signed-off-by: David Vrabel Signed-off-by: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk Signed-off-by: Luis Henriques --- drivers/xen/xen-pciback/pciback.h | 1 + drivers/xen/xen-pciback/pciback_ops.c | 15 ++++++++++++++- 2 files changed, 15 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/drivers/xen/xen-pciback/pciback.h b/drivers/xen/xen-pciback/pciback.h index f72af87640e0..560b3ecbcba8 100644 --- a/drivers/xen/xen-pciback/pciback.h +++ b/drivers/xen/xen-pciback/pciback.h @@ -37,6 +37,7 @@ struct xen_pcibk_device { struct xen_pci_sharedinfo *sh_info; unsigned long flags; struct work_struct op_work; + struct xen_pci_op op; }; struct xen_pcibk_dev_data { diff --git a/drivers/xen/xen-pciback/pciback_ops.c b/drivers/xen/xen-pciback/pciback_ops.c index c4a0666de6f5..a0e0e3ed4905 100644 --- a/drivers/xen/xen-pciback/pciback_ops.c +++ b/drivers/xen/xen-pciback/pciback_ops.c @@ -298,9 +298,11 @@ void xen_pcibk_do_op(struct work_struct *data) container_of(data, struct xen_pcibk_device, op_work); struct pci_dev *dev; struct xen_pcibk_dev_data *dev_data = NULL; - struct xen_pci_op *op = &pdev->sh_info->op; + struct xen_pci_op *op = &pdev->op; int test_intx = 0; + *op = pdev->sh_info->op; + barrier(); dev = xen_pcibk_get_pci_dev(pdev, op->domain, op->bus, op->devfn); if (dev == NULL) @@ -342,6 +344,17 @@ void xen_pcibk_do_op(struct work_struct *data) if ((dev_data->enable_intx != test_intx)) xen_pcibk_control_isr(dev, 0 /* no reset */); } + pdev->sh_info->op.err = op->err; + pdev->sh_info->op.value = op->value; +#ifdef CONFIG_PCI_MSI + if (op->cmd == XEN_PCI_OP_enable_msix && op->err == 0) { + unsigned int i; + + for (i = 0; i < op->value; i++) + pdev->sh_info->op.msix_entries[i].vector = + op->msix_entries[i].vector; + } +#endif /* Tell the driver domain that we're done. */ wmb(); clear_bit(_XEN_PCIF_active, (unsigned long *)&pdev->sh_info->flags);