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From: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
To: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Cc: linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org, keyrings@vger.kernel.org,
	linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [RFC PATCH 12/12] IMA: Use the the system trusted keyrings instead of .ima_mok [ver #3]
Date: Thu, 31 Mar 2016 08:21:28 -0400	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <1459426888.2657.26.camel@linux.vnet.ibm.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <12767.1459354776@warthog.procyon.org.uk>

On Wed, 2016-03-30 at 17:19 +0100, David Howells wrote:
> Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com> wrote:
> 
> > > +choice
> > > +	prompt "Allow keys to be added to the ima keyrings by userspace?"
> > > +	depends on IMA_APPRAISE
> > > +	depends on INTEGRITY_ASYMMETRIC_KEYS
> > > +	default IMA_NO_ADD_TO_IMA_KEYRINGS
> > 
> > In this patch, the choice should be between checking just the builtin
> > trusted keys or both the builtin trusted and secondary keys.
> 
> The third option I've added is that you can't add to .ima at all.  You only
> get what's included at build time.  You don't want that option?

Adding keys directly to the IMA keyring is a new feature.  There's
enough changes as it is, that this patch should be limited to
replicating existing usage, not adding new features.

> > if IMA is enabled, I'm not sure what IMA_NO_ADD_TO_IMA_KEYRINGS means.
> 
> Oops.  that should be IMA_KEYRINGS_COMPILE_LOAD_ONLY.

The default should be to validate keys against the builtin trusted keys,
like it is currently.

> "IMA_NO_ADD_TO_IMA_KEYRINGS" seemed to be phrased too clunkily, but the
> Kconfig parser warn you about the undefined symbol.
> 
> > > +config IMA_KEYRINGS_COMPILE_LOAD_ONLY
> > > +	bool "No runtime key addition"
> > ...
> > This could be useful for namespacing IMA. 
> 
> You said you didn't want this option above (to quote: In this patch, the
> choice should be between checking just the builtin trusted keys or both the
> builtin trusted and secondary keys.)

Does the ability of adding builtin X.509 certificates directly to the
IMA keyring already exist or is it something that still needs to be
done?   Assuming the latter, this option would be added with the ability
of adding X.509 certificates directly to the IMA keyring.

Mimi

  reply	other threads:[~2016-03-31 12:22 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 28+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2016-03-09 11:18 [RFC PATCH 00/12] KEYS: Restrict additions to 'trusted' keyrings [ver #3] David Howells
2016-03-09 11:18 ` [RFC PATCH 01/12] KEYS: Generalise system_verify_data() to provide access to internal content " David Howells
2016-03-09 11:18 ` [RFC PATCH 02/12] PKCS#7: Make trust determination dependent on contents of trust keyring " David Howells
2016-03-09 11:18 ` [RFC PATCH 03/12] KEYS: Add a facility to restrict new links into a " David Howells
2016-03-09 11:18 ` [RFC PATCH 04/12] KEYS: Move x509_request_asymmetric_key() to asymmetric_type.c " David Howells
2016-03-09 11:18 ` [RFC PATCH 05/12] KEYS: Generalise x509_request_asymmetric_key() " David Howells
2016-03-09 11:18 ` [RFC PATCH 06/12] X.509: Use verify_signature() if we have a struct key * to use " David Howells
2016-03-09 11:19 ` [RFC PATCH 07/12] X.509: Move the trust validation code out to its own file " David Howells
2016-03-09 11:19 ` [RFC PATCH 08/12] KEYS: Make the system trusted keyring depend on the asymmetric key type " David Howells
2016-03-09 11:19 ` [RFC PATCH 09/12] KEYS: Move the point of trust determination to __key_link() " David Howells
2016-03-09 11:19 ` [RFC PATCH 10/12] KEYS: Remove KEY_FLAG_TRUSTED and KEY_ALLOC_TRUSTED " David Howells
2016-03-09 11:19 ` [RFC PATCH 11/12] certs: Add a secondary system keyring that can be added to dynamically " David Howells
2016-04-06  0:37   ` Mimi Zohar
2016-04-06 16:12   ` David Howells
2016-03-09 11:19 ` [RFC PATCH 12/12] IMA: Use the the system trusted keyrings instead of .ima_mok " David Howells
2016-03-28 11:59   ` Mimi Zohar
2016-03-30 16:19   ` David Howells
2016-03-31 12:21     ` Mimi Zohar [this message]
2016-03-31 15:18     ` David Howells
2016-03-31 15:55       ` Mimi Zohar
2016-03-31 22:18         ` Mimi Zohar
2016-04-01 14:33         ` David Howells
2016-04-01 16:49           ` Mimi Zohar
2016-04-01 14:06     ` David Howells
2016-04-01 17:07       ` Mimi Zohar
2016-04-05 20:48   ` Mimi Zohar
2016-04-06 16:13   ` David Howells
2016-04-06 16:47     ` Mimi Zohar

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