From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Return-Path: Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S1752864AbcD1TEk (ORCPT ); Thu, 28 Apr 2016 15:04:40 -0400 Received: from mail-wm0-f65.google.com ([74.125.82.65]:36175 "EHLO mail-wm0-f65.google.com" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S1752714AbcD1TEh (ORCPT ); Thu, 28 Apr 2016 15:04:37 -0400 From: Mathias Krause To: Andrew Morton Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, Mathias Krause , Emese Revfy , Pax Team , Al Viro , Mateusz Guzik , Alexey Dobriyan , Cyrill Gorcunov , Jarod Wilson Subject: [PATCH] proc: prevent accessing /proc//environ until it's ready Date: Thu, 28 Apr 2016 21:04:18 +0200 Message-Id: <1461870258-17970-1-git-send-email-minipli@googlemail.com> X-Mailer: git-send-email 1.7.10.4 Sender: linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org If /proc//environ gets read before the envp[] array is fully set up in create_{aout,elf,elf_fdpic,flat}_tables(), we might end up trying to read more bytes than are actually written, as env_start will already be set but env_end will still be zero, making the range calculation underflow, allowing to read beyond the end of what has been written. Fix this as it is done for /proc//cmdline by testing env_end for zero. It is, apparently, intentionally set last in create_*_tables(). This bug was found by the PaX size_overflow plugin that detected the arithmetic underflow of 'this_len = env_end - (env_start + src)' when env_end is still zero. Reported-at: https://forums.grsecurity.net/viewtopic.php?f=3&t=4363 Bugzilla: https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=116461 Signed-off-by: Mathias Krause Cc: Emese Revfy Cc: Pax Team Cc: Al Viro Cc: Mateusz Guzik Cc: Alexey Dobriyan Cc: Cyrill Gorcunov Cc: Jarod Wilson --- fs/proc/base.c | 3 ++- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/fs/proc/base.c b/fs/proc/base.c index 4f764c2ac1a5..45f2162e55b2 100644 --- a/fs/proc/base.c +++ b/fs/proc/base.c @@ -955,7 +955,8 @@ static ssize_t environ_read(struct file *file, char __user *buf, struct mm_struct *mm = file->private_data; unsigned long env_start, env_end; - if (!mm) + /* Ensure the process spawned far enough to have an environment. */ + if (!mm || !mm->env_end) return 0; page = (char *)__get_free_page(GFP_TEMPORARY); -- 1.7.10.4