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From: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com>
To: <simon.guinot@sequanux.org>, <linux-efi@vger.kernel.org>,
	<brijesh.singh@amd.com>, <kvm@vger.kernel.org>,
	<rkrcmar@redhat.com>, <matt@codeblueprint.co.uk>,
	<linus.walleij@linaro.org>, <linux-mm@kvack.org>,
	<paul.gortmaker@windriver.com>, <hpa@zytor.com>,
	<dan.j.williams@intel.com>, <aarcange@redhat.com>,
	<sfr@canb.auug.org.au>, <andriy.shevchenko@linux.intel.com>,
	<herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>, <bhe@redhat.com>,
	<xemul@parallels.com>, <joro@8bytes.org>, <x86@kernel.org>,
	<mingo@redhat.com>, <msalter@redhat.com>,
	<ross.zwisler@linux.intel.com>, <bp@suse.de>, <dyoung@redhat.com>,
	<thomas.lendacky@amd.com>, <jroedel@suse.de>,
	<keescook@chromium.org>, <toshi.kani@hpe.com>,
	<mathieu.desnoyers@efficios.com>, <devel@linuxdriverproject.org>,
	<tglx@linutronix.de>,
	<mchehab@kernel.or
Subject: [RFC PATCH v1 21/28] KVM: introduce KVM_SEV_ISSUE_CMD ioctl
Date: Mon, 22 Aug 2016 19:28:17 -0400	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <147190849706.9523.17127624683768628621.stgit__2461.02315509251$1471908548$gmane$org@brijesh-build-machine> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <147190820782.9523.4967724730957229273.stgit@brijesh-build-machine>

The ioctl will be used by qemu to issue the Secure Encrypted
Virtualization (SEV) guest commands to transition a guest into
into SEV-enabled mode.

a typical usage:

struct kvm_sev_launch_start start;
struct kvm_sev_issue_cmd data;

data.cmd = KVM_SEV_LAUNCH_START;
data.opaque = &start;

ret = ioctl(fd, KVM_SEV_ISSUE_CMD, &data);

On SEV command failure, data.ret_code will contain the firmware error code.

Signed-off-by: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com>
---
 arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h |    3 +
 arch/x86/kvm/x86.c              |   13 ++++
 include/uapi/linux/kvm.h        |  125 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 3 files changed, 141 insertions(+)

diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h
index 9b885fc..a94e37d 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h
@@ -1040,6 +1040,9 @@ struct kvm_x86_ops {
 	void (*cancel_hv_timer)(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu);
 
 	void (*setup_mce)(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu);
+
+	int (*sev_issue_cmd)(struct kvm *kvm,
+			     struct kvm_sev_issue_cmd __user *argp);
 };
 
 struct kvm_arch_async_pf {
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c b/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c
index d6f2f4b..0c0adad 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c
@@ -3820,6 +3820,15 @@ split_irqchip_unlock:
 	return r;
 }
 
+static int kvm_vm_ioctl_sev_issue_cmd(struct kvm *kvm,
+				      struct kvm_sev_issue_cmd __user *argp)
+{
+	if (kvm_x86_ops->sev_issue_cmd)
+		return kvm_x86_ops->sev_issue_cmd(kvm, argp);
+
+	return -ENOTTY;
+}
+
 long kvm_arch_vm_ioctl(struct file *filp,
 		       unsigned int ioctl, unsigned long arg)
 {
@@ -4085,6 +4094,10 @@ long kvm_arch_vm_ioctl(struct file *filp,
 		r = kvm_vm_ioctl_enable_cap(kvm, &cap);
 		break;
 	}
+	case KVM_SEV_ISSUE_CMD: {
+		r = kvm_vm_ioctl_sev_issue_cmd(kvm, argp);
+		break;
+	}
 	default:
 		r = kvm_vm_ioctl_assigned_device(kvm, ioctl, arg);
 	}
diff --git a/include/uapi/linux/kvm.h b/include/uapi/linux/kvm.h
index 300ef25..72c18c3 100644
--- a/include/uapi/linux/kvm.h
+++ b/include/uapi/linux/kvm.h
@@ -1274,6 +1274,131 @@ struct kvm_s390_ucas_mapping {
 /* Available with KVM_CAP_X86_SMM */
 #define KVM_SMI                   _IO(KVMIO,   0xb7)
 
+/* Secure Encrypted Virtualization mode */
+enum sev_cmd {
+	KVM_SEV_LAUNCH_START = 0,
+	KVM_SEV_LAUNCH_UPDATE,
+	KVM_SEV_LAUNCH_FINISH,
+	KVM_SEV_GUEST_STATUS,
+	KVM_SEV_DBG_DECRYPT,
+	KVM_SEV_DBG_ENCRYPT,
+	KVM_SEV_RECEIVE_START,
+	KVM_SEV_RECEIVE_UPDATE,
+	KVM_SEV_RECEIVE_FINISH,
+	KVM_SEV_SEND_START,
+	KVM_SEV_SEND_UPDATE,
+	KVM_SEV_SEND_FINISH,
+	KVM_SEV_API_VERSION,
+	KVM_SEV_NR_MAX,
+};
+
+struct kvm_sev_issue_cmd {
+	__u32 cmd;
+	__u64 opaque;
+	__u32 ret_code;
+};
+
+struct kvm_sev_launch_start {
+	__u32 handle;
+	__u32 flags;
+	__u32 policy;
+	__u8 nonce[16];
+	__u8 dh_pub_qx[32];
+	__u8 dh_pub_qy[32];
+};
+
+struct kvm_sev_launch_update {
+	__u64	address;
+	__u32	length;
+};
+
+struct kvm_sev_launch_finish {
+	__u32 vcpu_count;
+	__u32 vcpu_length;
+	__u64 vcpu_mask_addr;
+	__u32 vcpu_mask_length;
+	__u8  measurement[32];
+};
+
+struct kvm_sev_guest_status {
+	__u32 policy;
+	__u32 state;
+};
+
+struct kvm_sev_dbg_decrypt {
+	__u64 src_addr;
+	__u64 dst_addr;
+	__u32 length;
+};
+
+struct kvm_sev_dbg_encrypt {
+	__u64 src_addr;
+	__u64 dst_addr;
+	__u32 length;
+};
+
+struct kvm_sev_receive_start {
+	__u32 handle;
+	__u32 flags;
+	__u32 policy;
+	__u8 policy_meas[32];
+	__u8 wrapped_tek[24];
+	__u8 wrapped_tik[24];
+	__u8 ten[16];
+	__u8 dh_pub_qx[32];
+	__u8 dh_pub_qy[32];
+	__u8 nonce[16];
+};
+
+struct kvm_sev_receive_update {
+	__u8 iv[16];
+	__u64 address;
+	__u32 length;
+};
+
+struct kvm_sev_receive_finish {
+	__u8 measurement[32];
+};
+
+struct kvm_sev_send_start {
+	__u8 nonce[16];
+	__u32 policy;
+	__u8 policy_meas[32];
+	__u8 wrapped_tek[24];
+	__u8 wrapped_tik[24];
+	__u8 ten[16];
+	__u8 iv[16];
+	__u32 flags;
+	__u8 api_major;
+	__u8 api_minor;
+	__u32 serial;
+	__u8 dh_pub_qx[32];
+	__u8 dh_pub_qy[32];
+	__u8 pek_sig_r[32];
+	__u8 pek_sig_s[32];
+	__u8 cek_sig_r[32];
+	__u8 cek_sig_s[32];
+	__u8 cek_pub_qx[32];
+	__u8 cek_pub_qy[32];
+	__u8 ask_sig_r[32];
+	__u8 ask_sig_s[32];
+	__u32 ncerts;
+	__u32 cert_length;
+	__u64 certs_addr;
+};
+
+struct kvm_sev_send_update {
+	__u32 length;
+	__u64 src_addr;
+	__u64 dst_addr;
+};
+
+struct kvm_sev_send_finish {
+	__u8 measurement[32];
+};
+
+#define KVM_SEV_ISSUE_CMD	_IOWR(KVMIO, 0xb8, struct kvm_sev_issue_cmd)
+
 #define KVM_DEV_ASSIGN_ENABLE_IOMMU	(1 << 0)
 #define KVM_DEV_ASSIGN_PCI_2_3		(1 << 1)
 #define KVM_DEV_ASSIGN_MASK_INTX	(1 << 2)

  parent reply	other threads:[~2016-08-22 23:28 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 255+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2016-08-22 23:23 [RFC PATCH v1 00/28] x86: Secure Encrypted Virtualization (AMD) Brijesh Singh
2016-08-22 23:23 ` Brijesh Singh
2016-08-22 23:23 ` Brijesh Singh
2016-08-22 23:23 ` Brijesh Singh
2016-08-22 23:23 ` [RFC PATCH v1 01/28] kvm: svm: Add support for additional SVM NPF error codes Brijesh Singh
2016-08-22 23:23   ` Brijesh Singh
2016-08-22 23:23   ` Brijesh Singh
2016-08-22 23:23   ` Brijesh Singh
2016-09-13  9:56   ` Borislav Petkov
2016-09-13  9:56     ` Borislav Petkov
2016-09-13  9:56     ` Borislav Petkov
2016-08-22 23:23 ` Brijesh Singh
2016-08-22 23:23 ` [RFC PATCH v1 02/28] kvm: svm: Add kvm_fast_pio_in support Brijesh Singh
2016-08-22 23:23   ` Brijesh Singh
2016-08-22 23:23   ` Brijesh Singh
2016-08-22 23:23   ` Brijesh Singh
2016-09-21 10:58   ` Borislav Petkov
2016-09-21 10:58     ` Borislav Petkov
2016-09-21 10:58     ` Borislav Petkov
2016-08-22 23:23 ` Brijesh Singh
2016-08-22 23:24 ` [RFC PATCH v1 03/28] kvm: svm: Use the hardware provided GPA instead of page walk Brijesh Singh
2016-08-22 23:24   ` Brijesh Singh
2016-08-22 23:24   ` Brijesh Singh
2016-08-22 23:24   ` Brijesh Singh
2016-09-21 17:16   ` Borislav Petkov
2016-09-21 17:16     ` Borislav Petkov
2016-09-21 17:16     ` Borislav Petkov
2016-08-22 23:24 ` Brijesh Singh
2016-08-22 23:24 ` [RFC PATCH v1 04/28] x86: Secure Encrypted Virtualization (SEV) support Brijesh Singh
2016-08-22 23:24 ` Brijesh Singh
2016-08-22 23:24   ` Brijesh Singh
2016-08-22 23:24   ` Brijesh Singh
2016-08-22 23:24   ` Brijesh Singh
2016-09-22 15:00   ` Borislav Petkov
2016-09-22 15:00     ` Borislav Petkov
2016-09-22 15:00     ` Borislav Petkov
2016-08-22 23:24 ` [RFC PATCH v1 05/28] KVM: SVM: prepare for new bit definition in nested_ctl Brijesh Singh
2016-08-22 23:24   ` Brijesh Singh
2016-08-22 23:24   ` Brijesh Singh
2016-08-22 23:24   ` Brijesh Singh
2016-09-22 14:17   ` Borislav Petkov
2016-09-22 14:17     ` Borislav Petkov
2016-09-22 14:17     ` Borislav Petkov
2016-08-22 23:24 ` Brijesh Singh
2016-08-22 23:24 ` [RFC PATCH v1 06/28] KVM: SVM: Add SEV feature definitions to KVM Brijesh Singh
2016-08-22 23:24 ` Brijesh Singh
2016-08-22 23:24   ` Brijesh Singh
2016-08-22 23:24   ` Brijesh Singh
2016-08-22 23:24   ` Brijesh Singh
2016-08-22 23:24 ` [RFC PATCH v1 07/28] x86: Do not encrypt memory areas if SEV is enabled Brijesh Singh
2016-08-22 23:24   ` Brijesh Singh
2016-08-22 23:24   ` Brijesh Singh
2016-08-22 23:24   ` Brijesh Singh
2016-08-22 23:24 ` Brijesh Singh
2016-08-22 23:25 ` [RFC PATCH v1 08/28] Access BOOT related data encrypted with SEV active Brijesh Singh
2016-08-22 23:25   ` Brijesh Singh
2016-08-22 23:25   ` Brijesh Singh
2016-08-22 23:25   ` Brijesh Singh
2016-08-22 23:25 ` Brijesh Singh
2016-08-22 23:25 ` [RFC PATCH v1 09/28] x86/efi: Access EFI data as encrypted when SEV is active Brijesh Singh
2016-08-22 23:25   ` Brijesh Singh
2016-08-22 23:25   ` Brijesh Singh
2016-08-22 23:25   ` Brijesh Singh
2016-09-22 14:35   ` Borislav Petkov
2016-09-22 14:35     ` Borislav Petkov
2016-09-22 14:35     ` Borislav Petkov
2016-09-22 14:35     ` Borislav Petkov
2016-09-22 14:45     ` Paolo Bonzini
2016-09-22 14:45       ` Paolo Bonzini
2016-09-22 14:45       ` Paolo Bonzini
2016-09-22 14:59       ` Borislav Petkov
2016-09-22 14:59         ` Borislav Petkov
2016-09-22 14:59         ` Borislav Petkov
2016-09-22 14:59         ` Borislav Petkov
2016-09-22 15:05         ` Paolo Bonzini
2016-09-22 15:05           ` Paolo Bonzini
2016-09-22 15:05           ` Paolo Bonzini
2016-09-22 17:07           ` Borislav Petkov
2016-09-22 17:07             ` Borislav Petkov
2016-09-22 17:07             ` Borislav Petkov
2016-09-22 17:07             ` Borislav Petkov
2016-09-22 17:08             ` Paolo Bonzini
2016-09-22 17:08               ` Paolo Bonzini
2016-09-22 17:08               ` Paolo Bonzini
2016-09-22 17:08               ` Paolo Bonzini
2016-09-22 17:27               ` Borislav Petkov
2016-09-22 17:27                 ` Borislav Petkov
2016-09-22 17:27                 ` Borislav Petkov
2016-09-22 19:04             ` Tom Lendacky
2016-09-22 19:04               ` Tom Lendacky
2016-09-22 19:04               ` Tom Lendacky
2016-09-22 19:04               ` Tom Lendacky
2016-09-22 19:11               ` Borislav Petkov
2016-09-22 19:11                 ` Borislav Petkov
2016-09-22 19:11                 ` Borislav Petkov
2016-09-22 19:49                 ` Tom Lendacky
2016-09-22 19:49                   ` Tom Lendacky
2016-09-22 19:49                   ` Tom Lendacky
2016-09-22 19:49                   ` Tom Lendacky
2016-09-22 20:10                   ` Borislav Petkov
2016-09-22 20:10                     ` Borislav Petkov
2016-09-22 20:10                     ` Borislav Petkov
2016-09-22 18:59         ` Tom Lendacky
2016-09-22 18:59           ` Tom Lendacky
2016-09-22 18:59           ` Tom Lendacky
2016-09-22 18:59           ` Tom Lendacky
2016-09-22 18:47       ` Tom Lendacky
2016-09-22 18:47         ` Tom Lendacky
2016-09-22 18:47         ` Tom Lendacky
2016-09-22 18:47         ` Tom Lendacky
2016-09-22 18:50         ` Paolo Bonzini
2016-09-22 18:50           ` Paolo Bonzini
2016-09-22 18:50           ` Paolo Bonzini
2016-09-22 17:46     ` Tom Lendacky
2016-09-22 17:46       ` Tom Lendacky
2016-09-22 17:46       ` Tom Lendacky
2016-09-22 17:46       ` Tom Lendacky
2016-09-22 18:23       ` Paolo Bonzini
2016-09-22 18:23         ` Paolo Bonzini
2016-09-22 18:23         ` Paolo Bonzini
2016-09-22 18:37         ` Borislav Petkov
2016-09-22 18:37           ` Borislav Petkov
2016-09-22 18:37           ` Borislav Petkov
     [not found]           ` <20160922183759.7ahw2kbxit3epnzk-fF5Pk5pvG8Y@public.gmane.org>
2016-09-22 18:44             ` Paolo Bonzini
2016-09-22 18:44               ` Paolo Bonzini
2016-09-23  9:33           ` Kai Huang
2016-09-23  9:33             ` Kai Huang
2016-09-23  9:33             ` Kai Huang
2016-09-23  9:50             ` Borislav Petkov
2016-09-23  9:50               ` Borislav Petkov
2016-09-23  9:50               ` Borislav Petkov
2016-08-22 23:25 ` Brijesh Singh
2016-08-22 23:25 ` [RFC PATCH v1 10/28] x86: Change early_ioremap to early_memremap for BOOT data Brijesh Singh
2016-08-22 23:25   ` Brijesh Singh
2016-08-22 23:25   ` Brijesh Singh
2016-08-22 23:25   ` Brijesh Singh
2016-08-22 23:25 ` Brijesh Singh
2016-08-22 23:25 ` [RFC PATCH v1 11/28] x86: Don't decrypt trampoline area if SEV is active Brijesh Singh
2016-08-22 23:25 ` Brijesh Singh
2016-08-22 23:25   ` Brijesh Singh
2016-08-22 23:25   ` Brijesh Singh
2016-08-22 23:25   ` Brijesh Singh
2016-08-22 23:26 ` [RFC PATCH v1 12/28] x86: DMA support for SEV memory encryption Brijesh Singh
2016-08-22 23:26   ` Brijesh Singh
2016-08-22 23:26   ` Brijesh Singh
2016-08-22 23:26   ` Brijesh Singh
2016-08-22 23:26 ` Brijesh Singh
2016-08-22 23:26 ` [RFC PATCH v1 13/28] iommu/amd: AMD IOMMU support for SEV Brijesh Singh
2016-08-22 23:26   ` Brijesh Singh
2016-08-22 23:26   ` Brijesh Singh
2016-08-22 23:26   ` Brijesh Singh
2016-08-22 23:26 ` Brijesh Singh
2016-08-22 23:26 ` [RFC PATCH v1 14/28] x86: Don't set the SME MSR bit when SEV is active Brijesh Singh
2016-08-22 23:26 ` Brijesh Singh
2016-08-22 23:26   ` Brijesh Singh
2016-08-22 23:26   ` Brijesh Singh
2016-08-22 23:26   ` Brijesh Singh
2016-08-22 23:26 ` [RFC PATCH v1 15/28] x86: Unroll string I/O " Brijesh Singh
2016-08-22 23:26 ` Brijesh Singh
2016-08-22 23:26   ` Brijesh Singh
2016-08-22 23:26   ` Brijesh Singh
2016-08-22 23:26   ` Brijesh Singh
2016-08-22 23:26 ` [RFC PATCH v1 16/28] x86: Add support to determine if running with SEV enabled Brijesh Singh
2016-08-22 23:26 ` Brijesh Singh
2016-08-22 23:26   ` Brijesh Singh
2016-08-22 23:26   ` Brijesh Singh
2016-08-22 23:26   ` Brijesh Singh
2016-08-22 23:27 ` [RFC PATCH v1 17/28] KVM: SVM: Enable SEV by setting the SEV_ENABLE cpu feature Brijesh Singh
2016-08-22 23:27 ` Brijesh Singh
2016-08-22 23:27   ` Brijesh Singh
2016-08-22 23:27   ` Brijesh Singh
2016-08-22 23:27   ` Brijesh Singh
2016-08-22 23:27 ` [RFC PATCH v1 18/28] crypto: add AMD Platform Security Processor driver Brijesh Singh
2016-08-22 23:27 ` Brijesh Singh
2016-08-22 23:27   ` Brijesh Singh
2016-08-22 23:27   ` Brijesh Singh
2016-08-22 23:27   ` Brijesh Singh
2016-08-23  7:14   ` Herbert Xu
2016-08-23  7:14     ` Herbert Xu
2016-08-23  7:14     ` Herbert Xu
2016-08-24 12:02     ` Tom Lendacky
2016-08-24 12:02       ` Tom Lendacky
2016-08-24 12:02       ` Tom Lendacky
2016-08-24 12:02       ` Tom Lendacky
2016-08-22 23:27 ` [RFC PATCH v1 19/28] KVM: SVM: prepare to reserve asid for SEV guest Brijesh Singh
2016-08-22 23:27 ` Brijesh Singh
2016-08-22 23:27   ` Brijesh Singh
2016-08-22 23:27   ` Brijesh Singh
2016-08-22 23:27   ` Brijesh Singh
2016-10-13 10:17   ` Paolo Bonzini
2016-10-13 10:17     ` Paolo Bonzini
2016-08-22 23:28 ` [RFC PATCH v1 20/28] KVM: SVM: prepare for SEV guest management API support Brijesh Singh
2016-08-22 23:28 ` Brijesh Singh
2016-08-22 23:28   ` Brijesh Singh
2016-08-22 23:28   ` Brijesh Singh
2016-08-22 23:28   ` Brijesh Singh
2016-10-13 10:41   ` Paolo Bonzini
2016-08-22 23:28 ` [RFC PATCH v1 21/28] KVM: introduce KVM_SEV_ISSUE_CMD ioctl Brijesh Singh
2016-08-22 23:28   ` Brijesh Singh
2016-08-22 23:28   ` Brijesh Singh
2016-08-22 23:28   ` Brijesh Singh
2016-10-13 10:45   ` Paolo Bonzini
2016-10-13 10:45     ` Paolo Bonzini
2016-10-17 17:57     ` Brijesh Singh
2016-10-17 17:57       ` Brijesh Singh
2016-10-17 17:57       ` Brijesh Singh
2016-10-17 20:14       ` Paolo Bonzini
2016-10-17 20:14         ` Paolo Bonzini
2016-10-17 20:14         ` Paolo Bonzini
2016-10-18 19:32         ` Brijesh Singh
2016-10-18 19:32           ` Brijesh Singh
2016-10-18 19:32           ` Brijesh Singh
2016-10-18 21:44           ` Paolo Bonzini
2016-10-18 21:44             ` Paolo Bonzini
2016-10-18 21:44             ` Paolo Bonzini
2016-08-22 23:28 ` Brijesh Singh [this message]
2016-08-22 23:28 ` [RFC PATCH v1 22/28] KVM: SVM: add SEV launch start command Brijesh Singh
2016-08-22 23:28   ` Brijesh Singh
2016-08-22 23:28   ` Brijesh Singh
2016-08-22 23:28   ` Brijesh Singh
2016-10-13 11:12   ` Paolo Bonzini
2016-08-22 23:28 ` Brijesh Singh
2016-08-22 23:28 ` [RFC PATCH v1 23/28] KVM: SVM: add SEV launch update command Brijesh Singh
2016-08-22 23:28   ` Brijesh Singh
2016-08-22 23:28   ` Brijesh Singh
2016-08-22 23:28   ` Brijesh Singh
2016-08-22 23:28 ` Brijesh Singh
2016-08-22 23:28 ` [RFC PATCH v1 24/28] KVM: SVM: add SEV_LAUNCH_FINISH command Brijesh Singh
2016-08-22 23:28 ` Brijesh Singh
2016-08-22 23:28   ` Brijesh Singh
2016-08-22 23:28   ` Brijesh Singh
2016-08-22 23:28   ` Brijesh Singh
2016-10-13 11:16   ` Paolo Bonzini
2016-08-22 23:29 ` [RFC PATCH v1 25/28] KVM: SVM: add KVM_SEV_GUEST_STATUS command Brijesh Singh
2016-08-22 23:29 ` Brijesh Singh
2016-08-22 23:29   ` Brijesh Singh
2016-08-22 23:29   ` Brijesh Singh
2016-08-22 23:29   ` Brijesh Singh
2016-08-22 23:29 ` [RFC PATCH v1 26/28] KVM: SVM: add KVM_SEV_DEBUG_DECRYPT command Brijesh Singh
2016-08-22 23:29 ` Brijesh Singh
2016-08-22 23:29   ` Brijesh Singh
2016-08-22 23:29   ` Brijesh Singh
2016-08-22 23:29   ` Brijesh Singh
2016-08-22 23:29 ` [RFC PATCH v1 27/28] KVM: SVM: add KVM_SEV_DEBUG_ENCRYPT command Brijesh Singh
2016-08-22 23:29   ` Brijesh Singh
2016-08-22 23:29   ` Brijesh Singh
2016-08-22 23:29   ` Brijesh Singh
2016-08-22 23:29 ` [RFC PATCH v1 28/28] KVM: SVM: add command to query SEV API version Brijesh Singh
2016-08-22 23:29   ` Brijesh Singh
2016-08-22 23:29   ` Brijesh Singh
2016-08-22 23:29   ` Brijesh Singh
2016-08-22 23:29 ` Brijesh Singh
2016-10-13 11:19 ` [RFC PATCH v1 00/28] x86: Secure Encrypted Virtualization (AMD) Paolo Bonzini
2016-10-17 13:51   ` Brijesh Singh
2016-10-17 13:51     ` Brijesh Singh

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    --in-reply-to='147190849706.9523.17127624683768628621.stgit__2461.02315509251$1471908548$gmane$org@brijesh-build-machine' \
    --to=brijesh.singh@amd.com \
    --cc=aarcange@redhat.com \
    --cc=andriy.shevchenko@linux.intel.com \
    --cc=bhe@redhat.com \
    --cc=bp@suse.de \
    --cc=dan.j.williams@intel.com \
    --cc=devel@linuxdriverproject.org \
    --cc=dyoung@redhat.com \
    --cc=herbert@gondor.apana.org.au \
    --cc=hpa@zytor.com \
    --cc=joro@8bytes.org \
    --cc=jroedel@suse.de \
    --cc=keescook@chromium.org \
    --cc=kvm@vger.kernel.org \
    --cc=linus.walleij@linaro.org \
    --cc=linux-efi@vger.kernel.org \
    --cc=linux-mm@kvack.org \
    --cc=mathieu.desnoyers@efficios.com \
    --cc=matt@codeblueprint.co.uk \
    --cc=mchehab@kernel.or \
    --cc=mingo@redhat.com \
    --cc=msalter@redhat.com \
    --cc=paul.gortmaker@windriver.com \
    --cc=rkrcmar@redhat.com \
    --cc=ross.zwisler@linux.intel.com \
    --cc=sfr@canb.auug.org.au \
    --cc=simon.guinot@sequanux.org \
    --cc=tglx@linutronix.de \
    --cc=thomas.lendacky@amd.com \
    --cc=toshi.kani@hpe.com \
    --cc=x86@kernel.org \
    --cc=xemul@parallels.com \
    /path/to/YOUR_REPLY

  https://kernel.org/pub/software/scm/git/docs/git-send-email.html

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