From: Jann Horn <jann@thejh.net>
To: Alexander Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>,
Roland McGrath <roland@hack.frob.com>,
Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>,
John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>,
James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>,
"Serge E. Hallyn" <serge@hallyn.com>,
Paul Moore <aul@paul-moore.com>,
Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>,
Eric Paris <eparis@parisplace.org>,
Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>,
Kees Cook <eescook@chromium.org>,
Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>,
Janis Danisevskis <jdanis@google.com>,
Seth Forshee <seth.forshee@canonical.com>,
"Eric . Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>,
Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>,
Benjamin LaHaise <bcrl@kvack.org>
Cc: linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org,
linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org, security@kernel.org
Subject: [PATCH 0/9] Various fixes related to ptrace_may_access()
Date: Sun, 18 Sep 2016 17:05:08 +0200 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <1474211117-16674-1-git-send-email-jann@thejh.net> (raw)
This series has a bunch of loosely-related fixes for minor security bugs. Since
the bugs are minor and the patches aren't trivial, I'm sending it publicly.
The reason I'm bundling these patches up as a series instead of sending patches
one by one is that e.g. patch 2 creates some common infrastructure that multiple
other patches depend on.
For specific information about what the purpose of this series is, please see
the individual commits - but the general theme is:
- get rid of races that can leak things like userspace addresses during setuid
execve()
- get rid of procfs files that cause unexpected behavior when passed around
- add warnings to keep developers from creating more issues like this
- document access checks
I hope I split the patches up sufficiently?
(To people on the security ML: This is a reworked version of my old ptrace fixes
series.)
Jann Horn (9):
exec: introduce cred_guard_light
exec: turn self_exec_id into self_privunit_id
proc: use open()-time creds for ptrace checks
futex: don't leak robust_list pointer
proc: lock properly in ptrace_may_access callers
ptrace: warn on ptrace_may_access without proper locking
ptrace: forbid ptrace checks against current_cred() from VFS context
fs/proc: fix attr access check
Documentation: add security/ptrace_checks.txt
Documentation/security/ptrace_checks.txt | 229 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
fs/aio.c | 2 +
fs/exec.c | 36 ++++-
fs/proc/array.c | 10 +-
fs/proc/base.c | 204 ++++++++++++++++++++-------
fs/proc/internal.h | 14 ++
fs/proc/namespaces.c | 14 ++
fs/read_write.c | 12 ++
fs/splice.c | 12 +-
include/linux/binfmts.h | 1 +
include/linux/init_task.h | 1 +
include/linux/lsm_hooks.h | 3 +-
include/linux/ptrace.h | 5 +
include/linux/sched.h | 18 ++-
include/linux/security.h | 10 +-
kernel/fork.c | 6 +-
kernel/futex.c | 31 +++--
kernel/futex_compat.c | 31 +++--
kernel/ptrace.c | 60 ++++++--
kernel/signal.c | 2 +-
security/apparmor/include/ipc.h | 2 +-
security/apparmor/ipc.c | 4 +-
security/apparmor/lsm.c | 14 +-
security/commoncap.c | 8 +-
security/security.c | 5 +-
security/selinux/hooks.c | 4 +-
security/smack/smack_lsm.c | 18 ++-
security/yama/yama_lsm.c | 9 +-
28 files changed, 646 insertions(+), 119 deletions(-)
create mode 100644 Documentation/security/ptrace_checks.txt
--
2.1.4
next reply other threads:[~2016-09-18 15:05 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 28+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2016-09-18 15:05 Jann Horn [this message]
2016-09-18 15:05 ` [PATCH 1/9] exec: introduce cred_guard_light Jann Horn
2016-09-18 15:05 ` [PATCH 2/9] exec: turn self_exec_id into self_privunit_id Jann Horn
2016-09-18 18:13 ` Ben Hutchings
2016-09-18 18:31 ` Jann Horn
2016-09-18 18:45 ` Ben Hutchings
2016-09-18 19:08 ` Jann Horn
2016-09-18 19:57 ` Andy Lutomirski
2016-09-19 15:31 ` Jann Horn
2016-09-18 15:05 ` [PATCH 3/9] proc: use open()-time creds for ptrace checks Jann Horn
2016-09-19 13:01 ` Stephen Smalley
2016-09-19 14:32 ` Jann Horn
2016-09-19 14:45 ` Stephen Smalley
2016-09-18 15:05 ` [PATCH 4/9] futex: don't leak robust_list pointer Jann Horn
2016-09-18 18:28 ` Ben Hutchings
2016-09-18 18:33 ` Jann Horn
2016-09-18 15:05 ` [PATCH 5/9] proc: lock properly in ptrace_may_access callers Jann Horn
2016-09-18 19:15 ` Jann Horn
2016-09-18 15:05 ` [PATCH 6/9] ptrace: warn on ptrace_may_access without proper locking Jann Horn
2016-09-18 15:05 ` [PATCH 7/9] ptrace: forbid ptrace checks against current_cred() from VFS context Jann Horn
2016-09-18 18:38 ` Ben Hutchings
2016-09-18 18:40 ` Jann Horn
2016-09-18 19:57 ` Andy Lutomirski
2016-09-18 20:38 ` Jann Horn
2016-09-18 20:18 ` Linus Torvalds
2016-09-18 20:52 ` Jann Horn
2016-09-18 15:05 ` [PATCH 8/9] fs/proc: fix attr access check Jann Horn
2016-09-18 15:05 ` [PATCH 9/9] Documentation: add security/ptrace_checks.txt Jann Horn
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