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From: Daniel Micay <danielmicay@gmail.com>
To: Florian Weimer <fw@deneb.enyo.de>, Jann Horn <jann@thejh.net>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>,
	kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com,
	Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>,
	Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.com>, Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>,
	Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>,
	LKML <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>
Subject: Re: [kernel-hardening] Re: [PATCH] fork: make whole stack_canary random
Date: Mon, 31 Oct 2016 17:01:14 -0400	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <1477947674.8761.4.camel@gmail.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <1477947388.8761.3.camel@gmail.com>

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> It makes a lot of sense on x86_64 where it means the canary is still
> 56
> bits. Also, you want -fstack-check for protecting again stack
> overflows
> rather than stack *buffer* overflow. SSP won't really help you in that
> regard. Sadly, while -fstack-check now works well in GCC 6 with little
> performance cost, it's not really a complete feature (and Clang impls
> it
> as a no-op!).

Note: talking about userspace after the entropy bit. The kernel doesn't
really -fstack-check, at least in even slightly sane code...

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  reply	other threads:[~2016-10-31 21:01 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 18+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2016-10-31 14:04 [PATCH] fork: make whole stack_canary random Jann Horn
2016-10-31 14:04 ` [kernel-hardening] " Jann Horn
2016-10-31 16:04 ` Kees Cook
2016-10-31 16:04   ` [kernel-hardening] " Kees Cook
2016-10-31 16:29   ` Jann Horn
2016-10-31 16:29     ` Jann Horn
2016-10-31 20:45     ` Florian Weimer
2016-10-31 20:55       ` Jann Horn
2016-10-31 20:56       ` Daniel Micay
2016-10-31 21:01         ` Daniel Micay [this message]
2016-10-31 21:10           ` Florian Weimer
2016-10-31 21:21             ` Daniel Micay
2016-10-31 21:38               ` Florian Weimer
2016-10-31 22:02                 ` Daniel Micay
2016-10-31 22:11                   ` Florian Weimer
2016-10-31 21:22             ` Jann Horn
2016-10-31 21:26               ` Daniel Micay
2016-10-31 21:26               ` Florian Weimer

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