* [PATCH net-next 0/5] bpf: verifier improvements
@ 2017-01-09 18:19 Alexei Starovoitov
2017-01-09 18:19 ` [PATCH net-next 1/5] bpf: split check_mem_access logic for map values Alexei Starovoitov
` (5 more replies)
0 siblings, 6 replies; 7+ messages in thread
From: Alexei Starovoitov @ 2017-01-09 18:19 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: David S . Miller; +Cc: Daniel Borkmann, Gianluca Borello, Josef Bacik, netdev
A number of bpf verifier improvements from Gianluca.
See individual patches for details.
Alexei Starovoitov (1):
bpf: rename ARG_PTR_TO_STACK
Gianluca Borello (4):
bpf: split check_mem_access logic for map values
bpf: allow helpers access to map element values
bpf: allow adjusted map element values to spill
bpf: allow helpers access to variable memory
include/linux/bpf.h | 12 +-
kernel/bpf/helpers.c | 4 +-
kernel/bpf/verifier.c | 212 +++++--
kernel/trace/bpf_trace.c | 20 +-
net/core/filter.c | 40 +-
tools/testing/selftests/bpf/test_verifier.c | 947 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
6 files changed, 1131 insertions(+), 104 deletions(-)
--
2.8.0
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 7+ messages in thread
* [PATCH net-next 1/5] bpf: split check_mem_access logic for map values
2017-01-09 18:19 [PATCH net-next 0/5] bpf: verifier improvements Alexei Starovoitov
@ 2017-01-09 18:19 ` Alexei Starovoitov
2017-01-09 18:19 ` [PATCH net-next 2/5] bpf: allow helpers access to map element values Alexei Starovoitov
` (4 subsequent siblings)
5 siblings, 0 replies; 7+ messages in thread
From: Alexei Starovoitov @ 2017-01-09 18:19 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: David S . Miller; +Cc: Daniel Borkmann, Gianluca Borello, Josef Bacik, netdev
From: Gianluca Borello <g.borello@gmail.com>
Move the logic to check memory accesses to a PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE_ADJ from
check_mem_access() to a separate helper check_map_access_adj(). This
enables to use those checks in other parts of the verifier as well,
where boundaries on PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE_ADJ might need to be checked, for
example when checking helper function arguments. The same thing is
already happening for other types such as PTR_TO_PACKET and its
check_packet_access() helper.
The code has been copied verbatim, with the only difference of removing
the "off += reg->max_value" statement and moving the sum into the call
statement to check_map_access(), as that was only needed due to the
earlier common check_map_access() call.
Signed-off-by: Gianluca Borello <g.borello@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
---
kernel/bpf/verifier.c | 88 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-----------------------
1 file changed, 49 insertions(+), 39 deletions(-)
diff --git a/kernel/bpf/verifier.c b/kernel/bpf/verifier.c
index 83ed2f8f6f22..8333fbcfbfe7 100644
--- a/kernel/bpf/verifier.c
+++ b/kernel/bpf/verifier.c
@@ -635,6 +635,51 @@ static int check_map_access(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, u32 regno, int off,
return 0;
}
+/* check read/write into an adjusted map element */
+static int check_map_access_adj(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, u32 regno,
+ int off, int size)
+{
+ struct bpf_verifier_state *state = &env->cur_state;
+ struct bpf_reg_state *reg = &state->regs[regno];
+ int err;
+
+ /* We adjusted the register to this map value, so we
+ * need to change off and size to min_value and max_value
+ * respectively to make sure our theoretical access will be
+ * safe.
+ */
+ if (log_level)
+ print_verifier_state(state);
+ env->varlen_map_value_access = true;
+ /* The minimum value is only important with signed
+ * comparisons where we can't assume the floor of a
+ * value is 0. If we are using signed variables for our
+ * index'es we need to make sure that whatever we use
+ * will have a set floor within our range.
+ */
+ if (reg->min_value < 0) {
+ verbose("R%d min value is negative, either use unsigned index or do a if (index >=0) check.\n",
+ regno);
+ return -EACCES;
+ }
+ err = check_map_access(env, regno, reg->min_value + off, size);
+ if (err) {
+ verbose("R%d min value is outside of the array range\n",
+ regno);
+ return err;
+ }
+
+ /* If we haven't set a max value then we need to bail
+ * since we can't be sure we won't do bad things.
+ */
+ if (reg->max_value == BPF_REGISTER_MAX_RANGE) {
+ verbose("R%d unbounded memory access, make sure to bounds check any array access into a map\n",
+ regno);
+ return -EACCES;
+ }
+ return check_map_access(env, regno, reg->max_value + off, size);
+}
+
#define MAX_PACKET_OFF 0xffff
static bool may_access_direct_pkt_data(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
@@ -775,45 +820,10 @@ static int check_mem_access(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, u32 regno, int off,
return -EACCES;
}
- /* If we adjusted the register to this map value at all then we
- * need to change off and size to min_value and max_value
- * respectively to make sure our theoretical access will be
- * safe.
- */
- if (reg->type == PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE_ADJ) {
- if (log_level)
- print_verifier_state(state);
- env->varlen_map_value_access = true;
- /* The minimum value is only important with signed
- * comparisons where we can't assume the floor of a
- * value is 0. If we are using signed variables for our
- * index'es we need to make sure that whatever we use
- * will have a set floor within our range.
- */
- if (reg->min_value < 0) {
- verbose("R%d min value is negative, either use unsigned index or do a if (index >=0) check.\n",
- regno);
- return -EACCES;
- }
- err = check_map_access(env, regno, reg->min_value + off,
- size);
- if (err) {
- verbose("R%d min value is outside of the array range\n",
- regno);
- return err;
- }
-
- /* If we haven't set a max value then we need to bail
- * since we can't be sure we won't do bad things.
- */
- if (reg->max_value == BPF_REGISTER_MAX_RANGE) {
- verbose("R%d unbounded memory access, make sure to bounds check any array access into a map\n",
- regno);
- return -EACCES;
- }
- off += reg->max_value;
- }
- err = check_map_access(env, regno, off, size);
+ if (reg->type == PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE_ADJ)
+ err = check_map_access_adj(env, regno, off, size);
+ else
+ err = check_map_access(env, regno, off, size);
if (!err && t == BPF_READ && value_regno >= 0)
mark_reg_unknown_value(state->regs, value_regno);
--
2.8.0
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 7+ messages in thread
* [PATCH net-next 2/5] bpf: allow helpers access to map element values
2017-01-09 18:19 [PATCH net-next 0/5] bpf: verifier improvements Alexei Starovoitov
2017-01-09 18:19 ` [PATCH net-next 1/5] bpf: split check_mem_access logic for map values Alexei Starovoitov
@ 2017-01-09 18:19 ` Alexei Starovoitov
2017-01-09 18:19 ` [PATCH net-next 3/5] bpf: allow adjusted map element values to spill Alexei Starovoitov
` (3 subsequent siblings)
5 siblings, 0 replies; 7+ messages in thread
From: Alexei Starovoitov @ 2017-01-09 18:19 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: David S . Miller; +Cc: Daniel Borkmann, Gianluca Borello, Josef Bacik, netdev
From: Gianluca Borello <g.borello@gmail.com>
Enable helpers to directly access a map element value by passing a
register type PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE (or PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE_ADJ) to helper
arguments ARG_PTR_TO_STACK or ARG_PTR_TO_RAW_STACK.
This enables several use cases. For example, a typical tracing program
might want to capture pathnames passed to sys_open() with:
struct trace_data {
char pathname[PATHLEN];
};
SEC("kprobe/sys_open")
void bpf_sys_open(struct pt_regs *ctx)
{
struct trace_data data;
bpf_probe_read(data.pathname, sizeof(data.pathname), ctx->di);
/* consume data.pathname, for example via
* bpf_trace_printk() or bpf_perf_event_output()
*/
}
Such a program could easily hit the stack limit in case PATHLEN needs to
be large or more local variables need to exist, both of which are quite
common scenarios. Allowing direct helper access to map element values,
one could do:
struct bpf_map_def SEC("maps") scratch_map = {
.type = BPF_MAP_TYPE_PERCPU_ARRAY,
.key_size = sizeof(u32),
.value_size = sizeof(struct trace_data),
.max_entries = 1,
};
SEC("kprobe/sys_open")
int bpf_sys_open(struct pt_regs *ctx)
{
int id = 0;
struct trace_data *p = bpf_map_lookup_elem(&scratch_map, &id);
if (!p)
return;
bpf_probe_read(p->pathname, sizeof(p->pathname), ctx->di);
/* consume p->pathname, for example via
* bpf_trace_printk() or bpf_perf_event_output()
*/
}
And wouldn't risk exhausting the stack.
Code changes are loosely modeled after commit 6841de8b0d03 ("bpf: allow
helpers access the packet directly"). Unlike with PTR_TO_PACKET, these
changes just work with ARG_PTR_TO_STACK and ARG_PTR_TO_RAW_STACK (not
ARG_PTR_TO_MAP_KEY, ARG_PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE, ...): adding those would be
trivial, but since there is not currently a use case for that, it's
reasonable to limit the set of changes.
Also, add new tests to make sure accesses to map element values from
helpers never go out of boundary, even when adjusted.
Signed-off-by: Gianluca Borello <g.borello@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
---
kernel/bpf/verifier.c | 9 +-
tools/testing/selftests/bpf/test_verifier.c | 491 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
2 files changed, 498 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
diff --git a/kernel/bpf/verifier.c b/kernel/bpf/verifier.c
index 8333fbcfbfe7..b7014606745b 100644
--- a/kernel/bpf/verifier.c
+++ b/kernel/bpf/verifier.c
@@ -627,7 +627,7 @@ static int check_map_access(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, u32 regno, int off,
{
struct bpf_map *map = env->cur_state.regs[regno].map_ptr;
- if (off < 0 || off + size > map->value_size) {
+ if (off < 0 || size <= 0 || off + size > map->value_size) {
verbose("invalid access to map value, value_size=%d off=%d size=%d\n",
map->value_size, off, size);
return -EACCES;
@@ -1025,7 +1025,8 @@ static int check_func_arg(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, u32 regno,
*/
if (type == CONST_IMM && reg->imm == 0)
/* final test in check_stack_boundary() */;
- else if (type != PTR_TO_PACKET && type != expected_type)
+ else if (type != PTR_TO_PACKET && type != PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE &&
+ type != PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE_ADJ && type != expected_type)
goto err_type;
meta->raw_mode = arg_type == ARG_PTR_TO_RAW_STACK;
} else {
@@ -1088,6 +1089,10 @@ static int check_func_arg(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, u32 regno,
}
if (regs[regno - 1].type == PTR_TO_PACKET)
err = check_packet_access(env, regno - 1, 0, reg->imm);
+ else if (regs[regno - 1].type == PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE)
+ err = check_map_access(env, regno - 1, 0, reg->imm);
+ else if (regs[regno - 1].type == PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE_ADJ)
+ err = check_map_access_adj(env, regno - 1, 0, reg->imm);
else
err = check_stack_boundary(env, regno - 1, reg->imm,
zero_size_allowed, meta);
diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/test_verifier.c b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/test_verifier.c
index 853d7e43434a..b7732e557bf9 100644
--- a/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/test_verifier.c
+++ b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/test_verifier.c
@@ -2905,6 +2905,497 @@ static struct bpf_test tests[] = {
.result = REJECT,
.errstr = "invalid bpf_context access",
},
+ {
+ "helper access to map: full range",
+ .insns = {
+ BPF_MOV64_REG(BPF_REG_2, BPF_REG_10),
+ BPF_ALU64_IMM(BPF_ADD, BPF_REG_2, -8),
+ BPF_ST_MEM(BPF_DW, BPF_REG_2, 0, 0),
+ BPF_LD_MAP_FD(BPF_REG_1, 0),
+ BPF_EMIT_CALL(BPF_FUNC_map_lookup_elem),
+ BPF_JMP_IMM(BPF_JEQ, BPF_REG_0, 0, 4),
+ BPF_MOV64_REG(BPF_REG_1, BPF_REG_0),
+ BPF_MOV64_IMM(BPF_REG_2, sizeof(struct test_val)),
+ BPF_MOV64_IMM(BPF_REG_3, 0),
+ BPF_EMIT_CALL(BPF_FUNC_probe_read),
+ BPF_EXIT_INSN(),
+ },
+ .fixup_map2 = { 3 },
+ .result = ACCEPT,
+ .prog_type = BPF_PROG_TYPE_TRACEPOINT,
+ },
+ {
+ "helper access to map: partial range",
+ .insns = {
+ BPF_MOV64_REG(BPF_REG_2, BPF_REG_10),
+ BPF_ALU64_IMM(BPF_ADD, BPF_REG_2, -8),
+ BPF_ST_MEM(BPF_DW, BPF_REG_2, 0, 0),
+ BPF_LD_MAP_FD(BPF_REG_1, 0),
+ BPF_EMIT_CALL(BPF_FUNC_map_lookup_elem),
+ BPF_JMP_IMM(BPF_JEQ, BPF_REG_0, 0, 4),
+ BPF_MOV64_REG(BPF_REG_1, BPF_REG_0),
+ BPF_MOV64_IMM(BPF_REG_2, 8),
+ BPF_MOV64_IMM(BPF_REG_3, 0),
+ BPF_EMIT_CALL(BPF_FUNC_probe_read),
+ BPF_EXIT_INSN(),
+ },
+ .fixup_map2 = { 3 },
+ .result = ACCEPT,
+ .prog_type = BPF_PROG_TYPE_TRACEPOINT,
+ },
+ {
+ "helper access to map: empty range",
+ .insns = {
+ BPF_MOV64_REG(BPF_REG_2, BPF_REG_10),
+ BPF_ALU64_IMM(BPF_ADD, BPF_REG_2, -8),
+ BPF_ST_MEM(BPF_DW, BPF_REG_2, 0, 0),
+ BPF_LD_MAP_FD(BPF_REG_1, 0),
+ BPF_EMIT_CALL(BPF_FUNC_map_lookup_elem),
+ BPF_JMP_IMM(BPF_JEQ, BPF_REG_0, 0, 4),
+ BPF_MOV64_REG(BPF_REG_1, BPF_REG_0),
+ BPF_MOV64_IMM(BPF_REG_2, 0),
+ BPF_MOV64_IMM(BPF_REG_3, 0),
+ BPF_EMIT_CALL(BPF_FUNC_probe_read),
+ BPF_EXIT_INSN(),
+ },
+ .fixup_map2 = { 3 },
+ .errstr = "invalid access to map value, value_size=48 off=0 size=0",
+ .result = REJECT,
+ .prog_type = BPF_PROG_TYPE_TRACEPOINT,
+ },
+ {
+ "helper access to map: out-of-bound range",
+ .insns = {
+ BPF_MOV64_REG(BPF_REG_2, BPF_REG_10),
+ BPF_ALU64_IMM(BPF_ADD, BPF_REG_2, -8),
+ BPF_ST_MEM(BPF_DW, BPF_REG_2, 0, 0),
+ BPF_LD_MAP_FD(BPF_REG_1, 0),
+ BPF_EMIT_CALL(BPF_FUNC_map_lookup_elem),
+ BPF_JMP_IMM(BPF_JEQ, BPF_REG_0, 0, 4),
+ BPF_MOV64_REG(BPF_REG_1, BPF_REG_0),
+ BPF_MOV64_IMM(BPF_REG_2, sizeof(struct test_val) + 8),
+ BPF_MOV64_IMM(BPF_REG_3, 0),
+ BPF_EMIT_CALL(BPF_FUNC_probe_read),
+ BPF_EXIT_INSN(),
+ },
+ .fixup_map2 = { 3 },
+ .errstr = "invalid access to map value, value_size=48 off=0 size=56",
+ .result = REJECT,
+ .prog_type = BPF_PROG_TYPE_TRACEPOINT,
+ },
+ {
+ "helper access to map: negative range",
+ .insns = {
+ BPF_MOV64_REG(BPF_REG_2, BPF_REG_10),
+ BPF_ALU64_IMM(BPF_ADD, BPF_REG_2, -8),
+ BPF_ST_MEM(BPF_DW, BPF_REG_2, 0, 0),
+ BPF_LD_MAP_FD(BPF_REG_1, 0),
+ BPF_EMIT_CALL(BPF_FUNC_map_lookup_elem),
+ BPF_JMP_IMM(BPF_JEQ, BPF_REG_0, 0, 4),
+ BPF_MOV64_REG(BPF_REG_1, BPF_REG_0),
+ BPF_MOV64_IMM(BPF_REG_2, -8),
+ BPF_MOV64_IMM(BPF_REG_3, 0),
+ BPF_EMIT_CALL(BPF_FUNC_probe_read),
+ BPF_EXIT_INSN(),
+ },
+ .fixup_map2 = { 3 },
+ .errstr = "invalid access to map value, value_size=48 off=0 size=-8",
+ .result = REJECT,
+ .prog_type = BPF_PROG_TYPE_TRACEPOINT,
+ },
+ {
+ "helper access to adjusted map (via const imm): full range",
+ .insns = {
+ BPF_MOV64_REG(BPF_REG_2, BPF_REG_10),
+ BPF_ALU64_IMM(BPF_ADD, BPF_REG_2, -8),
+ BPF_ST_MEM(BPF_DW, BPF_REG_2, 0, 0),
+ BPF_LD_MAP_FD(BPF_REG_1, 0),
+ BPF_EMIT_CALL(BPF_FUNC_map_lookup_elem),
+ BPF_JMP_IMM(BPF_JEQ, BPF_REG_0, 0, 5),
+ BPF_MOV64_REG(BPF_REG_1, BPF_REG_0),
+ BPF_ALU64_IMM(BPF_ADD, BPF_REG_1,
+ offsetof(struct test_val, foo)),
+ BPF_MOV64_IMM(BPF_REG_2,
+ sizeof(struct test_val) -
+ offsetof(struct test_val, foo)),
+ BPF_MOV64_IMM(BPF_REG_3, 0),
+ BPF_EMIT_CALL(BPF_FUNC_probe_read),
+ BPF_EXIT_INSN(),
+ },
+ .fixup_map2 = { 3 },
+ .result = ACCEPT,
+ .prog_type = BPF_PROG_TYPE_TRACEPOINT,
+ },
+ {
+ "helper access to adjusted map (via const imm): partial range",
+ .insns = {
+ BPF_MOV64_REG(BPF_REG_2, BPF_REG_10),
+ BPF_ALU64_IMM(BPF_ADD, BPF_REG_2, -8),
+ BPF_ST_MEM(BPF_DW, BPF_REG_2, 0, 0),
+ BPF_LD_MAP_FD(BPF_REG_1, 0),
+ BPF_EMIT_CALL(BPF_FUNC_map_lookup_elem),
+ BPF_JMP_IMM(BPF_JEQ, BPF_REG_0, 0, 5),
+ BPF_MOV64_REG(BPF_REG_1, BPF_REG_0),
+ BPF_ALU64_IMM(BPF_ADD, BPF_REG_1,
+ offsetof(struct test_val, foo)),
+ BPF_MOV64_IMM(BPF_REG_2, 8),
+ BPF_MOV64_IMM(BPF_REG_3, 0),
+ BPF_EMIT_CALL(BPF_FUNC_probe_read),
+ BPF_EXIT_INSN(),
+ },
+ .fixup_map2 = { 3 },
+ .result = ACCEPT,
+ .prog_type = BPF_PROG_TYPE_TRACEPOINT,
+ },
+ {
+ "helper access to adjusted map (via const imm): empty range",
+ .insns = {
+ BPF_MOV64_REG(BPF_REG_2, BPF_REG_10),
+ BPF_ALU64_IMM(BPF_ADD, BPF_REG_2, -8),
+ BPF_ST_MEM(BPF_DW, BPF_REG_2, 0, 0),
+ BPF_LD_MAP_FD(BPF_REG_1, 0),
+ BPF_EMIT_CALL(BPF_FUNC_map_lookup_elem),
+ BPF_JMP_IMM(BPF_JEQ, BPF_REG_0, 0, 5),
+ BPF_MOV64_REG(BPF_REG_1, BPF_REG_0),
+ BPF_ALU64_IMM(BPF_ADD, BPF_REG_1,
+ offsetof(struct test_val, foo)),
+ BPF_MOV64_IMM(BPF_REG_2, 0),
+ BPF_MOV64_IMM(BPF_REG_3, 0),
+ BPF_EMIT_CALL(BPF_FUNC_probe_read),
+ BPF_EXIT_INSN(),
+ },
+ .fixup_map2 = { 3 },
+ .errstr = "R1 min value is outside of the array range",
+ .result = REJECT,
+ .prog_type = BPF_PROG_TYPE_TRACEPOINT,
+ },
+ {
+ "helper access to adjusted map (via const imm): out-of-bound range",
+ .insns = {
+ BPF_MOV64_REG(BPF_REG_2, BPF_REG_10),
+ BPF_ALU64_IMM(BPF_ADD, BPF_REG_2, -8),
+ BPF_ST_MEM(BPF_DW, BPF_REG_2, 0, 0),
+ BPF_LD_MAP_FD(BPF_REG_1, 0),
+ BPF_EMIT_CALL(BPF_FUNC_map_lookup_elem),
+ BPF_JMP_IMM(BPF_JEQ, BPF_REG_0, 0, 5),
+ BPF_MOV64_REG(BPF_REG_1, BPF_REG_0),
+ BPF_ALU64_IMM(BPF_ADD, BPF_REG_1,
+ offsetof(struct test_val, foo)),
+ BPF_MOV64_IMM(BPF_REG_2,
+ sizeof(struct test_val) -
+ offsetof(struct test_val, foo) + 8),
+ BPF_MOV64_IMM(BPF_REG_3, 0),
+ BPF_EMIT_CALL(BPF_FUNC_probe_read),
+ BPF_EXIT_INSN(),
+ },
+ .fixup_map2 = { 3 },
+ .errstr = "invalid access to map value, value_size=48 off=4 size=52",
+ .result = REJECT,
+ .prog_type = BPF_PROG_TYPE_TRACEPOINT,
+ },
+ {
+ "helper access to adjusted map (via const imm): negative range (> adjustment)",
+ .insns = {
+ BPF_MOV64_REG(BPF_REG_2, BPF_REG_10),
+ BPF_ALU64_IMM(BPF_ADD, BPF_REG_2, -8),
+ BPF_ST_MEM(BPF_DW, BPF_REG_2, 0, 0),
+ BPF_LD_MAP_FD(BPF_REG_1, 0),
+ BPF_EMIT_CALL(BPF_FUNC_map_lookup_elem),
+ BPF_JMP_IMM(BPF_JEQ, BPF_REG_0, 0, 5),
+ BPF_MOV64_REG(BPF_REG_1, BPF_REG_0),
+ BPF_ALU64_IMM(BPF_ADD, BPF_REG_1,
+ offsetof(struct test_val, foo)),
+ BPF_MOV64_IMM(BPF_REG_2, -8),
+ BPF_MOV64_IMM(BPF_REG_3, 0),
+ BPF_EMIT_CALL(BPF_FUNC_probe_read),
+ BPF_EXIT_INSN(),
+ },
+ .fixup_map2 = { 3 },
+ .errstr = "invalid access to map value, value_size=48 off=4 size=-8",
+ .result = REJECT,
+ .prog_type = BPF_PROG_TYPE_TRACEPOINT,
+ },
+ {
+ "helper access to adjusted map (via const imm): negative range (< adjustment)",
+ .insns = {
+ BPF_MOV64_REG(BPF_REG_2, BPF_REG_10),
+ BPF_ALU64_IMM(BPF_ADD, BPF_REG_2, -8),
+ BPF_ST_MEM(BPF_DW, BPF_REG_2, 0, 0),
+ BPF_LD_MAP_FD(BPF_REG_1, 0),
+ BPF_EMIT_CALL(BPF_FUNC_map_lookup_elem),
+ BPF_JMP_IMM(BPF_JEQ, BPF_REG_0, 0, 5),
+ BPF_MOV64_REG(BPF_REG_1, BPF_REG_0),
+ BPF_ALU64_IMM(BPF_ADD, BPF_REG_1,
+ offsetof(struct test_val, foo)),
+ BPF_MOV64_IMM(BPF_REG_2, -1),
+ BPF_MOV64_IMM(BPF_REG_3, 0),
+ BPF_EMIT_CALL(BPF_FUNC_probe_read),
+ BPF_EXIT_INSN(),
+ },
+ .fixup_map2 = { 3 },
+ .errstr = "R1 min value is outside of the array range",
+ .result = REJECT,
+ .prog_type = BPF_PROG_TYPE_TRACEPOINT,
+ },
+ {
+ "helper access to adjusted map (via const reg): full range",
+ .insns = {
+ BPF_MOV64_REG(BPF_REG_2, BPF_REG_10),
+ BPF_ALU64_IMM(BPF_ADD, BPF_REG_2, -8),
+ BPF_ST_MEM(BPF_DW, BPF_REG_2, 0, 0),
+ BPF_LD_MAP_FD(BPF_REG_1, 0),
+ BPF_EMIT_CALL(BPF_FUNC_map_lookup_elem),
+ BPF_JMP_IMM(BPF_JEQ, BPF_REG_0, 0, 6),
+ BPF_MOV64_REG(BPF_REG_1, BPF_REG_0),
+ BPF_MOV64_IMM(BPF_REG_3,
+ offsetof(struct test_val, foo)),
+ BPF_ALU64_REG(BPF_ADD, BPF_REG_1, BPF_REG_3),
+ BPF_MOV64_IMM(BPF_REG_2,
+ sizeof(struct test_val) -
+ offsetof(struct test_val, foo)),
+ BPF_MOV64_IMM(BPF_REG_3, 0),
+ BPF_EMIT_CALL(BPF_FUNC_probe_read),
+ BPF_EXIT_INSN(),
+ },
+ .fixup_map2 = { 3 },
+ .result = ACCEPT,
+ .prog_type = BPF_PROG_TYPE_TRACEPOINT,
+ },
+ {
+ "helper access to adjusted map (via const reg): partial range",
+ .insns = {
+ BPF_MOV64_REG(BPF_REG_2, BPF_REG_10),
+ BPF_ALU64_IMM(BPF_ADD, BPF_REG_2, -8),
+ BPF_ST_MEM(BPF_DW, BPF_REG_2, 0, 0),
+ BPF_LD_MAP_FD(BPF_REG_1, 0),
+ BPF_EMIT_CALL(BPF_FUNC_map_lookup_elem),
+ BPF_JMP_IMM(BPF_JEQ, BPF_REG_0, 0, 6),
+ BPF_MOV64_REG(BPF_REG_1, BPF_REG_0),
+ BPF_MOV64_IMM(BPF_REG_3,
+ offsetof(struct test_val, foo)),
+ BPF_ALU64_REG(BPF_ADD, BPF_REG_1, BPF_REG_3),
+ BPF_MOV64_IMM(BPF_REG_2, 8),
+ BPF_MOV64_IMM(BPF_REG_3, 0),
+ BPF_EMIT_CALL(BPF_FUNC_probe_read),
+ BPF_EXIT_INSN(),
+ },
+ .fixup_map2 = { 3 },
+ .result = ACCEPT,
+ .prog_type = BPF_PROG_TYPE_TRACEPOINT,
+ },
+ {
+ "helper access to adjusted map (via const reg): empty range",
+ .insns = {
+ BPF_MOV64_REG(BPF_REG_2, BPF_REG_10),
+ BPF_ALU64_IMM(BPF_ADD, BPF_REG_2, -8),
+ BPF_ST_MEM(BPF_DW, BPF_REG_2, 0, 0),
+ BPF_LD_MAP_FD(BPF_REG_1, 0),
+ BPF_EMIT_CALL(BPF_FUNC_map_lookup_elem),
+ BPF_JMP_IMM(BPF_JEQ, BPF_REG_0, 0, 6),
+ BPF_MOV64_REG(BPF_REG_1, BPF_REG_0),
+ BPF_MOV64_IMM(BPF_REG_3, 0),
+ BPF_ALU64_REG(BPF_ADD, BPF_REG_1, BPF_REG_3),
+ BPF_MOV64_IMM(BPF_REG_2, 0),
+ BPF_MOV64_IMM(BPF_REG_3, 0),
+ BPF_EMIT_CALL(BPF_FUNC_probe_read),
+ BPF_EXIT_INSN(),
+ },
+ .fixup_map2 = { 3 },
+ .errstr = "R1 min value is outside of the array range",
+ .result = REJECT,
+ .prog_type = BPF_PROG_TYPE_TRACEPOINT,
+ },
+ {
+ "helper access to adjusted map (via const reg): out-of-bound range",
+ .insns = {
+ BPF_MOV64_REG(BPF_REG_2, BPF_REG_10),
+ BPF_ALU64_IMM(BPF_ADD, BPF_REG_2, -8),
+ BPF_ST_MEM(BPF_DW, BPF_REG_2, 0, 0),
+ BPF_LD_MAP_FD(BPF_REG_1, 0),
+ BPF_EMIT_CALL(BPF_FUNC_map_lookup_elem),
+ BPF_JMP_IMM(BPF_JEQ, BPF_REG_0, 0, 6),
+ BPF_MOV64_REG(BPF_REG_1, BPF_REG_0),
+ BPF_MOV64_IMM(BPF_REG_3,
+ offsetof(struct test_val, foo)),
+ BPF_ALU64_REG(BPF_ADD, BPF_REG_1, BPF_REG_3),
+ BPF_MOV64_IMM(BPF_REG_2,
+ sizeof(struct test_val) -
+ offsetof(struct test_val, foo) + 8),
+ BPF_MOV64_IMM(BPF_REG_3, 0),
+ BPF_EMIT_CALL(BPF_FUNC_probe_read),
+ BPF_EXIT_INSN(),
+ },
+ .fixup_map2 = { 3 },
+ .errstr = "invalid access to map value, value_size=48 off=4 size=52",
+ .result = REJECT,
+ .prog_type = BPF_PROG_TYPE_TRACEPOINT,
+ },
+ {
+ "helper access to adjusted map (via const reg): negative range (> adjustment)",
+ .insns = {
+ BPF_MOV64_REG(BPF_REG_2, BPF_REG_10),
+ BPF_ALU64_IMM(BPF_ADD, BPF_REG_2, -8),
+ BPF_ST_MEM(BPF_DW, BPF_REG_2, 0, 0),
+ BPF_LD_MAP_FD(BPF_REG_1, 0),
+ BPF_EMIT_CALL(BPF_FUNC_map_lookup_elem),
+ BPF_JMP_IMM(BPF_JEQ, BPF_REG_0, 0, 6),
+ BPF_MOV64_REG(BPF_REG_1, BPF_REG_0),
+ BPF_MOV64_IMM(BPF_REG_3,
+ offsetof(struct test_val, foo)),
+ BPF_ALU64_REG(BPF_ADD, BPF_REG_1, BPF_REG_3),
+ BPF_MOV64_IMM(BPF_REG_2, -8),
+ BPF_MOV64_IMM(BPF_REG_3, 0),
+ BPF_EMIT_CALL(BPF_FUNC_probe_read),
+ BPF_EXIT_INSN(),
+ },
+ .fixup_map2 = { 3 },
+ .errstr = "invalid access to map value, value_size=48 off=4 size=-8",
+ .result = REJECT,
+ .prog_type = BPF_PROG_TYPE_TRACEPOINT,
+ },
+ {
+ "helper access to adjusted map (via const reg): negative range (< adjustment)",
+ .insns = {
+ BPF_MOV64_REG(BPF_REG_2, BPF_REG_10),
+ BPF_ALU64_IMM(BPF_ADD, BPF_REG_2, -8),
+ BPF_ST_MEM(BPF_DW, BPF_REG_2, 0, 0),
+ BPF_LD_MAP_FD(BPF_REG_1, 0),
+ BPF_EMIT_CALL(BPF_FUNC_map_lookup_elem),
+ BPF_JMP_IMM(BPF_JEQ, BPF_REG_0, 0, 6),
+ BPF_MOV64_REG(BPF_REG_1, BPF_REG_0),
+ BPF_MOV64_IMM(BPF_REG_3,
+ offsetof(struct test_val, foo)),
+ BPF_ALU64_REG(BPF_ADD, BPF_REG_1, BPF_REG_3),
+ BPF_MOV64_IMM(BPF_REG_2, -1),
+ BPF_MOV64_IMM(BPF_REG_3, 0),
+ BPF_EMIT_CALL(BPF_FUNC_probe_read),
+ BPF_EXIT_INSN(),
+ },
+ .fixup_map2 = { 3 },
+ .errstr = "R1 min value is outside of the array range",
+ .result = REJECT,
+ .prog_type = BPF_PROG_TYPE_TRACEPOINT,
+ },
+ {
+ "helper access to adjusted map (via variable): full range",
+ .insns = {
+ BPF_MOV64_REG(BPF_REG_2, BPF_REG_10),
+ BPF_ALU64_IMM(BPF_ADD, BPF_REG_2, -8),
+ BPF_ST_MEM(BPF_DW, BPF_REG_2, 0, 0),
+ BPF_LD_MAP_FD(BPF_REG_1, 0),
+ BPF_EMIT_CALL(BPF_FUNC_map_lookup_elem),
+ BPF_JMP_IMM(BPF_JEQ, BPF_REG_0, 0, 7),
+ BPF_MOV64_REG(BPF_REG_1, BPF_REG_0),
+ BPF_LDX_MEM(BPF_W, BPF_REG_3, BPF_REG_0, 0),
+ BPF_JMP_IMM(BPF_JGT, BPF_REG_3,
+ offsetof(struct test_val, foo), 4),
+ BPF_ALU64_REG(BPF_ADD, BPF_REG_1, BPF_REG_3),
+ BPF_MOV64_IMM(BPF_REG_2,
+ sizeof(struct test_val) -
+ offsetof(struct test_val, foo)),
+ BPF_MOV64_IMM(BPF_REG_3, 0),
+ BPF_EMIT_CALL(BPF_FUNC_probe_read),
+ BPF_EXIT_INSN(),
+ },
+ .fixup_map2 = { 3 },
+ .result = ACCEPT,
+ .prog_type = BPF_PROG_TYPE_TRACEPOINT,
+ },
+ {
+ "helper access to adjusted map (via variable): partial range",
+ .insns = {
+ BPF_MOV64_REG(BPF_REG_2, BPF_REG_10),
+ BPF_ALU64_IMM(BPF_ADD, BPF_REG_2, -8),
+ BPF_ST_MEM(BPF_DW, BPF_REG_2, 0, 0),
+ BPF_LD_MAP_FD(BPF_REG_1, 0),
+ BPF_EMIT_CALL(BPF_FUNC_map_lookup_elem),
+ BPF_JMP_IMM(BPF_JEQ, BPF_REG_0, 0, 7),
+ BPF_MOV64_REG(BPF_REG_1, BPF_REG_0),
+ BPF_LDX_MEM(BPF_W, BPF_REG_3, BPF_REG_0, 0),
+ BPF_JMP_IMM(BPF_JGT, BPF_REG_3,
+ offsetof(struct test_val, foo), 4),
+ BPF_ALU64_REG(BPF_ADD, BPF_REG_1, BPF_REG_3),
+ BPF_MOV64_IMM(BPF_REG_2, 8),
+ BPF_MOV64_IMM(BPF_REG_3, 0),
+ BPF_EMIT_CALL(BPF_FUNC_probe_read),
+ BPF_EXIT_INSN(),
+ },
+ .fixup_map2 = { 3 },
+ .result = ACCEPT,
+ .prog_type = BPF_PROG_TYPE_TRACEPOINT,
+ },
+ {
+ "helper access to adjusted map (via variable): empty range",
+ .insns = {
+ BPF_MOV64_REG(BPF_REG_2, BPF_REG_10),
+ BPF_ALU64_IMM(BPF_ADD, BPF_REG_2, -8),
+ BPF_ST_MEM(BPF_DW, BPF_REG_2, 0, 0),
+ BPF_LD_MAP_FD(BPF_REG_1, 0),
+ BPF_EMIT_CALL(BPF_FUNC_map_lookup_elem),
+ BPF_JMP_IMM(BPF_JEQ, BPF_REG_0, 0, 7),
+ BPF_MOV64_REG(BPF_REG_1, BPF_REG_0),
+ BPF_LDX_MEM(BPF_W, BPF_REG_3, BPF_REG_0, 0),
+ BPF_JMP_IMM(BPF_JGT, BPF_REG_3,
+ offsetof(struct test_val, foo), 4),
+ BPF_ALU64_REG(BPF_ADD, BPF_REG_1, BPF_REG_3),
+ BPF_MOV64_IMM(BPF_REG_2, 0),
+ BPF_MOV64_IMM(BPF_REG_3, 0),
+ BPF_EMIT_CALL(BPF_FUNC_probe_read),
+ BPF_EXIT_INSN(),
+ },
+ .fixup_map2 = { 3 },
+ .errstr = "R1 min value is outside of the array range",
+ .result = REJECT,
+ .prog_type = BPF_PROG_TYPE_TRACEPOINT,
+ },
+ {
+ "helper access to adjusted map (via variable): no max check",
+ .insns = {
+ BPF_MOV64_REG(BPF_REG_2, BPF_REG_10),
+ BPF_ALU64_IMM(BPF_ADD, BPF_REG_2, -8),
+ BPF_ST_MEM(BPF_DW, BPF_REG_2, 0, 0),
+ BPF_LD_MAP_FD(BPF_REG_1, 0),
+ BPF_EMIT_CALL(BPF_FUNC_map_lookup_elem),
+ BPF_JMP_IMM(BPF_JEQ, BPF_REG_0, 0, 6),
+ BPF_MOV64_REG(BPF_REG_1, BPF_REG_0),
+ BPF_LDX_MEM(BPF_W, BPF_REG_3, BPF_REG_0, 0),
+ BPF_ALU64_REG(BPF_ADD, BPF_REG_1, BPF_REG_3),
+ BPF_MOV64_IMM(BPF_REG_2, 0),
+ BPF_MOV64_IMM(BPF_REG_3, 0),
+ BPF_EMIT_CALL(BPF_FUNC_probe_read),
+ BPF_EXIT_INSN(),
+ },
+ .fixup_map2 = { 3 },
+ .errstr = "R1 min value is negative, either use unsigned index or do a if (index >=0) check",
+ .result = REJECT,
+ .prog_type = BPF_PROG_TYPE_TRACEPOINT,
+ },
+ {
+ "helper access to adjusted map (via variable): wrong max check",
+ .insns = {
+ BPF_MOV64_REG(BPF_REG_2, BPF_REG_10),
+ BPF_ALU64_IMM(BPF_ADD, BPF_REG_2, -8),
+ BPF_ST_MEM(BPF_DW, BPF_REG_2, 0, 0),
+ BPF_LD_MAP_FD(BPF_REG_1, 0),
+ BPF_EMIT_CALL(BPF_FUNC_map_lookup_elem),
+ BPF_JMP_IMM(BPF_JEQ, BPF_REG_0, 0, 7),
+ BPF_MOV64_REG(BPF_REG_1, BPF_REG_0),
+ BPF_LDX_MEM(BPF_W, BPF_REG_3, BPF_REG_0, 0),
+ BPF_JMP_IMM(BPF_JGT, BPF_REG_3,
+ offsetof(struct test_val, foo), 4),
+ BPF_ALU64_REG(BPF_ADD, BPF_REG_1, BPF_REG_3),
+ BPF_MOV64_IMM(BPF_REG_2,
+ sizeof(struct test_val) -
+ offsetof(struct test_val, foo) + 1),
+ BPF_MOV64_IMM(BPF_REG_3, 0),
+ BPF_EMIT_CALL(BPF_FUNC_probe_read),
+ BPF_EXIT_INSN(),
+ },
+ .fixup_map2 = { 3 },
+ .errstr = "invalid access to map value, value_size=48 off=4 size=45",
+ .result = REJECT,
+ .prog_type = BPF_PROG_TYPE_TRACEPOINT,
+ },
};
static int probe_filter_length(const struct bpf_insn *fp)
--
2.8.0
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 7+ messages in thread
* [PATCH net-next 3/5] bpf: allow adjusted map element values to spill
2017-01-09 18:19 [PATCH net-next 0/5] bpf: verifier improvements Alexei Starovoitov
2017-01-09 18:19 ` [PATCH net-next 1/5] bpf: split check_mem_access logic for map values Alexei Starovoitov
2017-01-09 18:19 ` [PATCH net-next 2/5] bpf: allow helpers access to map element values Alexei Starovoitov
@ 2017-01-09 18:19 ` Alexei Starovoitov
2017-01-09 18:19 ` [PATCH net-next 4/5] bpf: allow helpers access to variable memory Alexei Starovoitov
` (2 subsequent siblings)
5 siblings, 0 replies; 7+ messages in thread
From: Alexei Starovoitov @ 2017-01-09 18:19 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: David S . Miller; +Cc: Daniel Borkmann, Gianluca Borello, Josef Bacik, netdev
From: Gianluca Borello <g.borello@gmail.com>
commit 484611357c19 ("bpf: allow access into map value arrays")
introduces the ability to do pointer math inside a map element value via
the PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE_ADJ register type.
The current support doesn't handle the case where a PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE_ADJ
is spilled into the stack, limiting several use cases, especially when
generating bpf code from a compiler.
Handle this case by explicitly enabling the register type
PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE_ADJ to be spilled. Also, make sure that min_value and
max_value are reset just for BPF_LDX operations that don't result in a
restore of a spilled register from stack.
Signed-off-by: Gianluca Borello <g.borello@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
---
kernel/bpf/verifier.c | 21 +++++++++----
tools/testing/selftests/bpf/test_verifier.c | 46 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
2 files changed, 62 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)
diff --git a/kernel/bpf/verifier.c b/kernel/bpf/verifier.c
index b7014606745b..59ed07b9b4ea 100644
--- a/kernel/bpf/verifier.c
+++ b/kernel/bpf/verifier.c
@@ -481,6 +481,13 @@ static void reset_reg_range_values(struct bpf_reg_state *regs, u32 regno)
regs[regno].max_value = BPF_REGISTER_MAX_RANGE;
}
+static void mark_reg_unknown_value_and_range(struct bpf_reg_state *regs,
+ u32 regno)
+{
+ mark_reg_unknown_value(regs, regno);
+ reset_reg_range_values(regs, regno);
+}
+
enum reg_arg_type {
SRC_OP, /* register is used as source operand */
DST_OP, /* register is used as destination operand */
@@ -532,6 +539,7 @@ static bool is_spillable_regtype(enum bpf_reg_type type)
switch (type) {
case PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE:
case PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE_OR_NULL:
+ case PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE_ADJ:
case PTR_TO_STACK:
case PTR_TO_CTX:
case PTR_TO_PACKET:
@@ -616,7 +624,8 @@ static int check_stack_read(struct bpf_verifier_state *state, int off, int size,
}
if (value_regno >= 0)
/* have read misc data from the stack */
- mark_reg_unknown_value(state->regs, value_regno);
+ mark_reg_unknown_value_and_range(state->regs,
+ value_regno);
return 0;
}
}
@@ -825,7 +834,8 @@ static int check_mem_access(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, u32 regno, int off,
else
err = check_map_access(env, regno, off, size);
if (!err && t == BPF_READ && value_regno >= 0)
- mark_reg_unknown_value(state->regs, value_regno);
+ mark_reg_unknown_value_and_range(state->regs,
+ value_regno);
} else if (reg->type == PTR_TO_CTX) {
enum bpf_reg_type reg_type = UNKNOWN_VALUE;
@@ -837,7 +847,8 @@ static int check_mem_access(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, u32 regno, int off,
}
err = check_ctx_access(env, off, size, t, ®_type);
if (!err && t == BPF_READ && value_regno >= 0) {
- mark_reg_unknown_value(state->regs, value_regno);
+ mark_reg_unknown_value_and_range(state->regs,
+ value_regno);
/* note that reg.[id|off|range] == 0 */
state->regs[value_regno].type = reg_type;
}
@@ -870,7 +881,8 @@ static int check_mem_access(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, u32 regno, int off,
}
err = check_packet_access(env, regno, off, size);
if (!err && t == BPF_READ && value_regno >= 0)
- mark_reg_unknown_value(state->regs, value_regno);
+ mark_reg_unknown_value_and_range(state->regs,
+ value_regno);
} else {
verbose("R%d invalid mem access '%s'\n",
regno, reg_type_str[reg->type]);
@@ -2744,7 +2756,6 @@ static int do_check(struct bpf_verifier_env *env)
if (err)
return err;
- reset_reg_range_values(regs, insn->dst_reg);
if (BPF_SIZE(insn->code) != BPF_W &&
BPF_SIZE(insn->code) != BPF_DW) {
insn_idx++;
diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/test_verifier.c b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/test_verifier.c
index b7732e557bf9..e7b075819c08 100644
--- a/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/test_verifier.c
+++ b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/test_verifier.c
@@ -3396,6 +3396,52 @@ static struct bpf_test tests[] = {
.result = REJECT,
.prog_type = BPF_PROG_TYPE_TRACEPOINT,
},
+ {
+ "map element value is preserved across register spilling",
+ .insns = {
+ BPF_MOV64_REG(BPF_REG_2, BPF_REG_10),
+ BPF_ALU64_IMM(BPF_ADD, BPF_REG_2, -8),
+ BPF_ST_MEM(BPF_DW, BPF_REG_2, 0, 0),
+ BPF_LD_MAP_FD(BPF_REG_1, 0),
+ BPF_EMIT_CALL(BPF_FUNC_map_lookup_elem),
+ BPF_JMP_IMM(BPF_JEQ, BPF_REG_0, 0, 6),
+ BPF_ST_MEM(BPF_DW, BPF_REG_0, 0, 42),
+ BPF_MOV64_REG(BPF_REG_1, BPF_REG_10),
+ BPF_ALU64_IMM(BPF_ADD, BPF_REG_1, -184),
+ BPF_STX_MEM(BPF_DW, BPF_REG_1, BPF_REG_0, 0),
+ BPF_LDX_MEM(BPF_DW, BPF_REG_3, BPF_REG_1, 0),
+ BPF_ST_MEM(BPF_DW, BPF_REG_3, 0, 42),
+ BPF_EXIT_INSN(),
+ },
+ .fixup_map2 = { 3 },
+ .errstr_unpriv = "R0 leaks addr",
+ .result = ACCEPT,
+ .result_unpriv = REJECT,
+ },
+ {
+ "map element value (adjusted) is preserved across register spilling",
+ .insns = {
+ BPF_MOV64_REG(BPF_REG_2, BPF_REG_10),
+ BPF_ALU64_IMM(BPF_ADD, BPF_REG_2, -8),
+ BPF_ST_MEM(BPF_DW, BPF_REG_2, 0, 0),
+ BPF_LD_MAP_FD(BPF_REG_1, 0),
+ BPF_EMIT_CALL(BPF_FUNC_map_lookup_elem),
+ BPF_JMP_IMM(BPF_JEQ, BPF_REG_0, 0, 7),
+ BPF_ALU64_IMM(BPF_ADD, BPF_REG_0,
+ offsetof(struct test_val, foo)),
+ BPF_ST_MEM(BPF_DW, BPF_REG_0, 0, 42),
+ BPF_MOV64_REG(BPF_REG_1, BPF_REG_10),
+ BPF_ALU64_IMM(BPF_ADD, BPF_REG_1, -184),
+ BPF_STX_MEM(BPF_DW, BPF_REG_1, BPF_REG_0, 0),
+ BPF_LDX_MEM(BPF_DW, BPF_REG_3, BPF_REG_1, 0),
+ BPF_ST_MEM(BPF_DW, BPF_REG_3, 0, 42),
+ BPF_EXIT_INSN(),
+ },
+ .fixup_map2 = { 3 },
+ .errstr_unpriv = "R0 pointer arithmetic prohibited",
+ .result = ACCEPT,
+ .result_unpriv = REJECT,
+ },
};
static int probe_filter_length(const struct bpf_insn *fp)
--
2.8.0
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 7+ messages in thread
* [PATCH net-next 4/5] bpf: allow helpers access to variable memory
2017-01-09 18:19 [PATCH net-next 0/5] bpf: verifier improvements Alexei Starovoitov
` (2 preceding siblings ...)
2017-01-09 18:19 ` [PATCH net-next 3/5] bpf: allow adjusted map element values to spill Alexei Starovoitov
@ 2017-01-09 18:19 ` Alexei Starovoitov
2017-01-09 18:19 ` [PATCH net-next 5/5] bpf: rename ARG_PTR_TO_STACK Alexei Starovoitov
2017-01-09 21:56 ` [PATCH net-next 0/5] bpf: verifier improvements David Miller
5 siblings, 0 replies; 7+ messages in thread
From: Alexei Starovoitov @ 2017-01-09 18:19 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: David S . Miller; +Cc: Daniel Borkmann, Gianluca Borello, Josef Bacik, netdev
From: Gianluca Borello <g.borello@gmail.com>
Currently, helpers that read and write from/to the stack can do so using
a pair of arguments of type ARG_PTR_TO_STACK and ARG_CONST_STACK_SIZE.
ARG_CONST_STACK_SIZE accepts a constant register of type CONST_IMM, so
that the verifier can safely check the memory access. However, requiring
the argument to be a constant can be limiting in some circumstances.
Since the current logic keeps track of the minimum and maximum value of
a register throughout the simulated execution, ARG_CONST_STACK_SIZE can
be changed to also accept an UNKNOWN_VALUE register in case its
boundaries have been set and the range doesn't cause invalid memory
accesses.
One common situation when this is useful:
int len;
char buf[BUFSIZE]; /* BUFSIZE is 128 */
if (some_condition)
len = 42;
else
len = 84;
some_helper(..., buf, len & (BUFSIZE - 1));
The compiler can often decide to assign the constant values 42 or 48
into a variable on the stack, instead of keeping it in a register. When
the variable is then read back from stack into the register in order to
be passed to the helper, the verifier will not be able to recognize the
register as constant (the verifier is not currently tracking all
constant writes into memory), and the program won't be valid.
However, by allowing the helper to accept an UNKNOWN_VALUE register,
this program will work because the bitwise AND operation will set the
range of possible values for the UNKNOWN_VALUE register to [0, BUFSIZE),
so the verifier can guarantee the helper call will be safe (assuming the
argument is of type ARG_CONST_STACK_SIZE_OR_ZERO, otherwise one more
check against 0 would be needed). Custom ranges can be set not only with
ALU operations, but also by explicitly comparing the UNKNOWN_VALUE
register with constants.
Another very common example happens when intercepting system call
arguments and accessing user-provided data of variable size using
bpf_probe_read(). One can load at runtime the user-provided length in an
UNKNOWN_VALUE register, and then read that exact amount of data up to a
compile-time determined limit in order to fit into the proper local
storage allocated on the stack, without having to guess a suboptimal
access size at compile time.
Also, in case the helpers accepting the UNKNOWN_VALUE register operate
in raw mode, disable the raw mode so that the program is required to
initialize all memory, since there is no guarantee the helper will fill
it completely, leaving possibilities for data leak (just relevant when
the memory used by the helper is the stack, not when using a pointer to
map element value or packet). In other words, ARG_PTR_TO_RAW_STACK will
be treated as ARG_PTR_TO_STACK.
Signed-off-by: Gianluca Borello <g.borello@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
---
kernel/bpf/verifier.c | 74 ++++-
tools/testing/selftests/bpf/test_verifier.c | 410 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
2 files changed, 474 insertions(+), 10 deletions(-)
diff --git a/kernel/bpf/verifier.c b/kernel/bpf/verifier.c
index 59ed07b9b4ea..3d4f7bf32aaf 100644
--- a/kernel/bpf/verifier.c
+++ b/kernel/bpf/verifier.c
@@ -980,6 +980,25 @@ static int check_stack_boundary(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int regno,
return 0;
}
+static int check_helper_mem_access(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int regno,
+ int access_size, bool zero_size_allowed,
+ struct bpf_call_arg_meta *meta)
+{
+ struct bpf_reg_state *regs = env->cur_state.regs;
+
+ switch (regs[regno].type) {
+ case PTR_TO_PACKET:
+ return check_packet_access(env, regno, 0, access_size);
+ case PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE:
+ return check_map_access(env, regno, 0, access_size);
+ case PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE_ADJ:
+ return check_map_access_adj(env, regno, 0, access_size);
+ default: /* const_imm|ptr_to_stack or invalid ptr */
+ return check_stack_boundary(env, regno, access_size,
+ zero_size_allowed, meta);
+ }
+}
+
static int check_func_arg(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, u32 regno,
enum bpf_arg_type arg_type,
struct bpf_call_arg_meta *meta)
@@ -1018,7 +1037,10 @@ static int check_func_arg(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, u32 regno,
} else if (arg_type == ARG_CONST_STACK_SIZE ||
arg_type == ARG_CONST_STACK_SIZE_OR_ZERO) {
expected_type = CONST_IMM;
- if (type != expected_type)
+ /* One exception. Allow UNKNOWN_VALUE registers when the
+ * boundaries are known and don't cause unsafe memory accesses
+ */
+ if (type != UNKNOWN_VALUE && type != expected_type)
goto err_type;
} else if (arg_type == ARG_CONST_MAP_PTR) {
expected_type = CONST_PTR_TO_MAP;
@@ -1099,15 +1121,47 @@ static int check_func_arg(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, u32 regno,
verbose("ARG_CONST_STACK_SIZE cannot be first argument\n");
return -EACCES;
}
- if (regs[regno - 1].type == PTR_TO_PACKET)
- err = check_packet_access(env, regno - 1, 0, reg->imm);
- else if (regs[regno - 1].type == PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE)
- err = check_map_access(env, regno - 1, 0, reg->imm);
- else if (regs[regno - 1].type == PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE_ADJ)
- err = check_map_access_adj(env, regno - 1, 0, reg->imm);
- else
- err = check_stack_boundary(env, regno - 1, reg->imm,
- zero_size_allowed, meta);
+
+ /* If the register is UNKNOWN_VALUE, the access check happens
+ * using its boundaries. Otherwise, just use its imm
+ */
+ if (type == UNKNOWN_VALUE) {
+ /* For unprivileged variable accesses, disable raw
+ * mode so that the program is required to
+ * initialize all the memory that the helper could
+ * just partially fill up.
+ */
+ meta = NULL;
+
+ if (reg->min_value < 0) {
+ verbose("R%d min value is negative, either use unsigned or 'var &= const'\n",
+ regno);
+ return -EACCES;
+ }
+
+ if (reg->min_value == 0) {
+ err = check_helper_mem_access(env, regno - 1, 0,
+ zero_size_allowed,
+ meta);
+ if (err)
+ return err;
+ }
+
+ if (reg->max_value == BPF_REGISTER_MAX_RANGE) {
+ verbose("R%d unbounded memory access, use 'var &= const' or 'if (var < const)'\n",
+ regno);
+ return -EACCES;
+ }
+ err = check_helper_mem_access(env, regno - 1,
+ reg->max_value,
+ zero_size_allowed, meta);
+ if (err)
+ return err;
+ } else {
+ /* register is CONST_IMM */
+ err = check_helper_mem_access(env, regno - 1, reg->imm,
+ zero_size_allowed, meta);
+ }
}
return err;
diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/test_verifier.c b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/test_verifier.c
index e7b075819c08..9bb45346dc72 100644
--- a/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/test_verifier.c
+++ b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/test_verifier.c
@@ -3442,6 +3442,416 @@ static struct bpf_test tests[] = {
.result = ACCEPT,
.result_unpriv = REJECT,
},
+ {
+ "helper access to variable memory: stack, bitwise AND + JMP, correct bounds",
+ .insns = {
+ BPF_MOV64_REG(BPF_REG_1, BPF_REG_10),
+ BPF_ALU64_IMM(BPF_ADD, BPF_REG_1, -64),
+ BPF_MOV64_IMM(BPF_REG_0, 0),
+ BPF_STX_MEM(BPF_DW, BPF_REG_10, BPF_REG_0, -64),
+ BPF_STX_MEM(BPF_DW, BPF_REG_10, BPF_REG_0, -56),
+ BPF_STX_MEM(BPF_DW, BPF_REG_10, BPF_REG_0, -48),
+ BPF_STX_MEM(BPF_DW, BPF_REG_10, BPF_REG_0, -40),
+ BPF_STX_MEM(BPF_DW, BPF_REG_10, BPF_REG_0, -32),
+ BPF_STX_MEM(BPF_DW, BPF_REG_10, BPF_REG_0, -24),
+ BPF_STX_MEM(BPF_DW, BPF_REG_10, BPF_REG_0, -16),
+ BPF_STX_MEM(BPF_DW, BPF_REG_10, BPF_REG_0, -8),
+ BPF_MOV64_IMM(BPF_REG_2, 16),
+ BPF_STX_MEM(BPF_DW, BPF_REG_1, BPF_REG_2, -128),
+ BPF_LDX_MEM(BPF_DW, BPF_REG_2, BPF_REG_1, -128),
+ BPF_ALU64_IMM(BPF_AND, BPF_REG_2, 64),
+ BPF_MOV64_IMM(BPF_REG_4, 0),
+ BPF_JMP_REG(BPF_JGE, BPF_REG_4, BPF_REG_2, 2),
+ BPF_MOV64_IMM(BPF_REG_3, 0),
+ BPF_EMIT_CALL(BPF_FUNC_probe_read),
+ BPF_MOV64_IMM(BPF_REG_0, 0),
+ BPF_EXIT_INSN(),
+ },
+ .result = ACCEPT,
+ .prog_type = BPF_PROG_TYPE_TRACEPOINT,
+ },
+ {
+ "helper access to variable memory: stack, bitwise AND, zero included",
+ .insns = {
+ BPF_MOV64_REG(BPF_REG_1, BPF_REG_10),
+ BPF_ALU64_IMM(BPF_ADD, BPF_REG_1, -64),
+ BPF_MOV64_IMM(BPF_REG_2, 16),
+ BPF_STX_MEM(BPF_DW, BPF_REG_1, BPF_REG_2, -128),
+ BPF_LDX_MEM(BPF_DW, BPF_REG_2, BPF_REG_1, -128),
+ BPF_ALU64_IMM(BPF_AND, BPF_REG_2, 64),
+ BPF_MOV64_IMM(BPF_REG_3, 0),
+ BPF_EMIT_CALL(BPF_FUNC_probe_read),
+ BPF_EXIT_INSN(),
+ },
+ .errstr = "invalid stack type R1 off=-64 access_size=0",
+ .result = REJECT,
+ .prog_type = BPF_PROG_TYPE_TRACEPOINT,
+ },
+ {
+ "helper access to variable memory: stack, bitwise AND + JMP, wrong max",
+ .insns = {
+ BPF_MOV64_REG(BPF_REG_1, BPF_REG_10),
+ BPF_ALU64_IMM(BPF_ADD, BPF_REG_1, -64),
+ BPF_MOV64_IMM(BPF_REG_2, 16),
+ BPF_STX_MEM(BPF_DW, BPF_REG_1, BPF_REG_2, -128),
+ BPF_LDX_MEM(BPF_DW, BPF_REG_2, BPF_REG_1, -128),
+ BPF_ALU64_IMM(BPF_AND, BPF_REG_2, 65),
+ BPF_MOV64_IMM(BPF_REG_4, 0),
+ BPF_JMP_REG(BPF_JGE, BPF_REG_4, BPF_REG_2, 2),
+ BPF_MOV64_IMM(BPF_REG_3, 0),
+ BPF_EMIT_CALL(BPF_FUNC_probe_read),
+ BPF_MOV64_IMM(BPF_REG_0, 0),
+ BPF_EXIT_INSN(),
+ },
+ .errstr = "invalid stack type R1 off=-64 access_size=65",
+ .result = REJECT,
+ .prog_type = BPF_PROG_TYPE_TRACEPOINT,
+ },
+ {
+ "helper access to variable memory: stack, JMP, correct bounds",
+ .insns = {
+ BPF_MOV64_REG(BPF_REG_1, BPF_REG_10),
+ BPF_ALU64_IMM(BPF_ADD, BPF_REG_1, -64),
+ BPF_MOV64_IMM(BPF_REG_0, 0),
+ BPF_STX_MEM(BPF_DW, BPF_REG_10, BPF_REG_0, -64),
+ BPF_STX_MEM(BPF_DW, BPF_REG_10, BPF_REG_0, -56),
+ BPF_STX_MEM(BPF_DW, BPF_REG_10, BPF_REG_0, -48),
+ BPF_STX_MEM(BPF_DW, BPF_REG_10, BPF_REG_0, -40),
+ BPF_STX_MEM(BPF_DW, BPF_REG_10, BPF_REG_0, -32),
+ BPF_STX_MEM(BPF_DW, BPF_REG_10, BPF_REG_0, -24),
+ BPF_STX_MEM(BPF_DW, BPF_REG_10, BPF_REG_0, -16),
+ BPF_STX_MEM(BPF_DW, BPF_REG_10, BPF_REG_0, -8),
+ BPF_MOV64_IMM(BPF_REG_2, 16),
+ BPF_STX_MEM(BPF_DW, BPF_REG_1, BPF_REG_2, -128),
+ BPF_LDX_MEM(BPF_DW, BPF_REG_2, BPF_REG_1, -128),
+ BPF_JMP_IMM(BPF_JGT, BPF_REG_2, 64, 4),
+ BPF_MOV64_IMM(BPF_REG_4, 0),
+ BPF_JMP_REG(BPF_JGE, BPF_REG_4, BPF_REG_2, 2),
+ BPF_MOV64_IMM(BPF_REG_3, 0),
+ BPF_EMIT_CALL(BPF_FUNC_probe_read),
+ BPF_MOV64_IMM(BPF_REG_0, 0),
+ BPF_EXIT_INSN(),
+ },
+ .result = ACCEPT,
+ .prog_type = BPF_PROG_TYPE_TRACEPOINT,
+ },
+ {
+ "helper access to variable memory: stack, JMP (signed), correct bounds",
+ .insns = {
+ BPF_MOV64_REG(BPF_REG_1, BPF_REG_10),
+ BPF_ALU64_IMM(BPF_ADD, BPF_REG_1, -64),
+ BPF_MOV64_IMM(BPF_REG_0, 0),
+ BPF_STX_MEM(BPF_DW, BPF_REG_10, BPF_REG_0, -64),
+ BPF_STX_MEM(BPF_DW, BPF_REG_10, BPF_REG_0, -56),
+ BPF_STX_MEM(BPF_DW, BPF_REG_10, BPF_REG_0, -48),
+ BPF_STX_MEM(BPF_DW, BPF_REG_10, BPF_REG_0, -40),
+ BPF_STX_MEM(BPF_DW, BPF_REG_10, BPF_REG_0, -32),
+ BPF_STX_MEM(BPF_DW, BPF_REG_10, BPF_REG_0, -24),
+ BPF_STX_MEM(BPF_DW, BPF_REG_10, BPF_REG_0, -16),
+ BPF_STX_MEM(BPF_DW, BPF_REG_10, BPF_REG_0, -8),
+ BPF_MOV64_IMM(BPF_REG_2, 16),
+ BPF_STX_MEM(BPF_DW, BPF_REG_1, BPF_REG_2, -128),
+ BPF_LDX_MEM(BPF_DW, BPF_REG_2, BPF_REG_1, -128),
+ BPF_JMP_IMM(BPF_JSGT, BPF_REG_2, 64, 4),
+ BPF_MOV64_IMM(BPF_REG_4, 0),
+ BPF_JMP_REG(BPF_JSGE, BPF_REG_4, BPF_REG_2, 2),
+ BPF_MOV64_IMM(BPF_REG_3, 0),
+ BPF_EMIT_CALL(BPF_FUNC_probe_read),
+ BPF_MOV64_IMM(BPF_REG_0, 0),
+ BPF_EXIT_INSN(),
+ },
+ .result = ACCEPT,
+ .prog_type = BPF_PROG_TYPE_TRACEPOINT,
+ },
+ {
+ "helper access to variable memory: stack, JMP, bounds + offset",
+ .insns = {
+ BPF_MOV64_REG(BPF_REG_1, BPF_REG_10),
+ BPF_ALU64_IMM(BPF_ADD, BPF_REG_1, -64),
+ BPF_MOV64_IMM(BPF_REG_2, 16),
+ BPF_STX_MEM(BPF_DW, BPF_REG_1, BPF_REG_2, -128),
+ BPF_LDX_MEM(BPF_DW, BPF_REG_2, BPF_REG_1, -128),
+ BPF_JMP_IMM(BPF_JGT, BPF_REG_2, 64, 5),
+ BPF_MOV64_IMM(BPF_REG_4, 0),
+ BPF_JMP_REG(BPF_JGE, BPF_REG_4, BPF_REG_2, 3),
+ BPF_ALU64_IMM(BPF_ADD, BPF_REG_2, 1),
+ BPF_MOV64_IMM(BPF_REG_3, 0),
+ BPF_EMIT_CALL(BPF_FUNC_probe_read),
+ BPF_MOV64_IMM(BPF_REG_0, 0),
+ BPF_EXIT_INSN(),
+ },
+ .errstr = "invalid stack type R1 off=-64 access_size=65",
+ .result = REJECT,
+ .prog_type = BPF_PROG_TYPE_TRACEPOINT,
+ },
+ {
+ "helper access to variable memory: stack, JMP, wrong max",
+ .insns = {
+ BPF_MOV64_REG(BPF_REG_1, BPF_REG_10),
+ BPF_ALU64_IMM(BPF_ADD, BPF_REG_1, -64),
+ BPF_MOV64_IMM(BPF_REG_2, 16),
+ BPF_STX_MEM(BPF_DW, BPF_REG_1, BPF_REG_2, -128),
+ BPF_LDX_MEM(BPF_DW, BPF_REG_2, BPF_REG_1, -128),
+ BPF_JMP_IMM(BPF_JGT, BPF_REG_2, 65, 4),
+ BPF_MOV64_IMM(BPF_REG_4, 0),
+ BPF_JMP_REG(BPF_JGE, BPF_REG_4, BPF_REG_2, 2),
+ BPF_MOV64_IMM(BPF_REG_3, 0),
+ BPF_EMIT_CALL(BPF_FUNC_probe_read),
+ BPF_MOV64_IMM(BPF_REG_0, 0),
+ BPF_EXIT_INSN(),
+ },
+ .errstr = "invalid stack type R1 off=-64 access_size=65",
+ .result = REJECT,
+ .prog_type = BPF_PROG_TYPE_TRACEPOINT,
+ },
+ {
+ "helper access to variable memory: stack, JMP, no max check",
+ .insns = {
+ BPF_MOV64_REG(BPF_REG_1, BPF_REG_10),
+ BPF_ALU64_IMM(BPF_ADD, BPF_REG_1, -64),
+ BPF_MOV64_IMM(BPF_REG_2, 16),
+ BPF_STX_MEM(BPF_DW, BPF_REG_1, BPF_REG_2, -128),
+ BPF_LDX_MEM(BPF_DW, BPF_REG_2, BPF_REG_1, -128),
+ BPF_MOV64_IMM(BPF_REG_4, 0),
+ BPF_JMP_REG(BPF_JGE, BPF_REG_4, BPF_REG_2, 2),
+ BPF_MOV64_IMM(BPF_REG_3, 0),
+ BPF_EMIT_CALL(BPF_FUNC_probe_read),
+ BPF_MOV64_IMM(BPF_REG_0, 0),
+ BPF_EXIT_INSN(),
+ },
+ .errstr = "R2 unbounded memory access",
+ .result = REJECT,
+ .prog_type = BPF_PROG_TYPE_TRACEPOINT,
+ },
+ {
+ "helper access to variable memory: stack, JMP, no min check",
+ .insns = {
+ BPF_MOV64_REG(BPF_REG_1, BPF_REG_10),
+ BPF_ALU64_IMM(BPF_ADD, BPF_REG_1, -64),
+ BPF_MOV64_IMM(BPF_REG_2, 16),
+ BPF_STX_MEM(BPF_DW, BPF_REG_1, BPF_REG_2, -128),
+ BPF_LDX_MEM(BPF_DW, BPF_REG_2, BPF_REG_1, -128),
+ BPF_JMP_IMM(BPF_JGT, BPF_REG_2, 64, 3),
+ BPF_MOV64_IMM(BPF_REG_3, 0),
+ BPF_EMIT_CALL(BPF_FUNC_probe_read),
+ BPF_MOV64_IMM(BPF_REG_0, 0),
+ BPF_EXIT_INSN(),
+ },
+ .errstr = "invalid stack type R1 off=-64 access_size=0",
+ .result = REJECT,
+ .prog_type = BPF_PROG_TYPE_TRACEPOINT,
+ },
+ {
+ "helper access to variable memory: stack, JMP (signed), no min check",
+ .insns = {
+ BPF_MOV64_REG(BPF_REG_1, BPF_REG_10),
+ BPF_ALU64_IMM(BPF_ADD, BPF_REG_1, -64),
+ BPF_MOV64_IMM(BPF_REG_2, 16),
+ BPF_STX_MEM(BPF_DW, BPF_REG_1, BPF_REG_2, -128),
+ BPF_LDX_MEM(BPF_DW, BPF_REG_2, BPF_REG_1, -128),
+ BPF_JMP_IMM(BPF_JSGT, BPF_REG_2, 64, 3),
+ BPF_MOV64_IMM(BPF_REG_3, 0),
+ BPF_EMIT_CALL(BPF_FUNC_probe_read),
+ BPF_MOV64_IMM(BPF_REG_0, 0),
+ BPF_EXIT_INSN(),
+ },
+ .errstr = "R2 min value is negative",
+ .result = REJECT,
+ .prog_type = BPF_PROG_TYPE_TRACEPOINT,
+ },
+ {
+ "helper access to variable memory: map, JMP, correct bounds",
+ .insns = {
+ BPF_MOV64_REG(BPF_REG_2, BPF_REG_10),
+ BPF_ALU64_IMM(BPF_ADD, BPF_REG_2, -8),
+ BPF_ST_MEM(BPF_DW, BPF_REG_2, 0, 0),
+ BPF_LD_MAP_FD(BPF_REG_1, 0),
+ BPF_EMIT_CALL(BPF_FUNC_map_lookup_elem),
+ BPF_JMP_IMM(BPF_JEQ, BPF_REG_0, 0, 10),
+ BPF_MOV64_REG(BPF_REG_1, BPF_REG_0),
+ BPF_MOV64_IMM(BPF_REG_2, sizeof(struct test_val)),
+ BPF_STX_MEM(BPF_DW, BPF_REG_10, BPF_REG_2, -128),
+ BPF_LDX_MEM(BPF_DW, BPF_REG_2, BPF_REG_10, -128),
+ BPF_JMP_IMM(BPF_JSGT, BPF_REG_2,
+ sizeof(struct test_val), 4),
+ BPF_MOV64_IMM(BPF_REG_4, 0),
+ BPF_JMP_REG(BPF_JGE, BPF_REG_4, BPF_REG_2, 2),
+ BPF_MOV64_IMM(BPF_REG_3, 0),
+ BPF_EMIT_CALL(BPF_FUNC_probe_read),
+ BPF_MOV64_IMM(BPF_REG_0, 0),
+ BPF_EXIT_INSN(),
+ },
+ .fixup_map2 = { 3 },
+ .result = ACCEPT,
+ .prog_type = BPF_PROG_TYPE_TRACEPOINT,
+ },
+ {
+ "helper access to variable memory: map, JMP, wrong max",
+ .insns = {
+ BPF_MOV64_REG(BPF_REG_2, BPF_REG_10),
+ BPF_ALU64_IMM(BPF_ADD, BPF_REG_2, -8),
+ BPF_ST_MEM(BPF_DW, BPF_REG_2, 0, 0),
+ BPF_LD_MAP_FD(BPF_REG_1, 0),
+ BPF_EMIT_CALL(BPF_FUNC_map_lookup_elem),
+ BPF_JMP_IMM(BPF_JEQ, BPF_REG_0, 0, 10),
+ BPF_MOV64_REG(BPF_REG_1, BPF_REG_0),
+ BPF_MOV64_IMM(BPF_REG_2, sizeof(struct test_val)),
+ BPF_STX_MEM(BPF_DW, BPF_REG_10, BPF_REG_2, -128),
+ BPF_LDX_MEM(BPF_DW, BPF_REG_2, BPF_REG_10, -128),
+ BPF_JMP_IMM(BPF_JSGT, BPF_REG_2,
+ sizeof(struct test_val) + 1, 4),
+ BPF_MOV64_IMM(BPF_REG_4, 0),
+ BPF_JMP_REG(BPF_JGE, BPF_REG_4, BPF_REG_2, 2),
+ BPF_MOV64_IMM(BPF_REG_3, 0),
+ BPF_EMIT_CALL(BPF_FUNC_probe_read),
+ BPF_MOV64_IMM(BPF_REG_0, 0),
+ BPF_EXIT_INSN(),
+ },
+ .fixup_map2 = { 3 },
+ .errstr = "invalid access to map value, value_size=48 off=0 size=49",
+ .result = REJECT,
+ .prog_type = BPF_PROG_TYPE_TRACEPOINT,
+ },
+ {
+ "helper access to variable memory: map adjusted, JMP, correct bounds",
+ .insns = {
+ BPF_MOV64_REG(BPF_REG_2, BPF_REG_10),
+ BPF_ALU64_IMM(BPF_ADD, BPF_REG_2, -8),
+ BPF_ST_MEM(BPF_DW, BPF_REG_2, 0, 0),
+ BPF_LD_MAP_FD(BPF_REG_1, 0),
+ BPF_EMIT_CALL(BPF_FUNC_map_lookup_elem),
+ BPF_JMP_IMM(BPF_JEQ, BPF_REG_0, 0, 11),
+ BPF_MOV64_REG(BPF_REG_1, BPF_REG_0),
+ BPF_ALU64_IMM(BPF_ADD, BPF_REG_1, 20),
+ BPF_MOV64_IMM(BPF_REG_2, sizeof(struct test_val)),
+ BPF_STX_MEM(BPF_DW, BPF_REG_10, BPF_REG_2, -128),
+ BPF_LDX_MEM(BPF_DW, BPF_REG_2, BPF_REG_10, -128),
+ BPF_JMP_IMM(BPF_JSGT, BPF_REG_2,
+ sizeof(struct test_val) - 20, 4),
+ BPF_MOV64_IMM(BPF_REG_4, 0),
+ BPF_JMP_REG(BPF_JGE, BPF_REG_4, BPF_REG_2, 2),
+ BPF_MOV64_IMM(BPF_REG_3, 0),
+ BPF_EMIT_CALL(BPF_FUNC_probe_read),
+ BPF_MOV64_IMM(BPF_REG_0, 0),
+ BPF_EXIT_INSN(),
+ },
+ .fixup_map2 = { 3 },
+ .result = ACCEPT,
+ .prog_type = BPF_PROG_TYPE_TRACEPOINT,
+ },
+ {
+ "helper access to variable memory: map adjusted, JMP, wrong max",
+ .insns = {
+ BPF_MOV64_REG(BPF_REG_2, BPF_REG_10),
+ BPF_ALU64_IMM(BPF_ADD, BPF_REG_2, -8),
+ BPF_ST_MEM(BPF_DW, BPF_REG_2, 0, 0),
+ BPF_LD_MAP_FD(BPF_REG_1, 0),
+ BPF_EMIT_CALL(BPF_FUNC_map_lookup_elem),
+ BPF_JMP_IMM(BPF_JEQ, BPF_REG_0, 0, 11),
+ BPF_MOV64_REG(BPF_REG_1, BPF_REG_0),
+ BPF_ALU64_IMM(BPF_ADD, BPF_REG_1, 20),
+ BPF_MOV64_IMM(BPF_REG_2, sizeof(struct test_val)),
+ BPF_STX_MEM(BPF_DW, BPF_REG_10, BPF_REG_2, -128),
+ BPF_LDX_MEM(BPF_DW, BPF_REG_2, BPF_REG_10, -128),
+ BPF_JMP_IMM(BPF_JSGT, BPF_REG_2,
+ sizeof(struct test_val) - 19, 4),
+ BPF_MOV64_IMM(BPF_REG_4, 0),
+ BPF_JMP_REG(BPF_JGE, BPF_REG_4, BPF_REG_2, 2),
+ BPF_MOV64_IMM(BPF_REG_3, 0),
+ BPF_EMIT_CALL(BPF_FUNC_probe_read),
+ BPF_MOV64_IMM(BPF_REG_0, 0),
+ BPF_EXIT_INSN(),
+ },
+ .fixup_map2 = { 3 },
+ .errstr = "R1 min value is outside of the array range",
+ .result = REJECT,
+ .prog_type = BPF_PROG_TYPE_TRACEPOINT,
+ },
+ {
+ "helper access to variable memory: size > 0 not allowed on NULL",
+ .insns = {
+ BPF_MOV64_IMM(BPF_REG_1, 0),
+ BPF_MOV64_IMM(BPF_REG_2, 0),
+ BPF_ALU64_IMM(BPF_AND, BPF_REG_2, 64),
+ BPF_MOV64_IMM(BPF_REG_3, 0),
+ BPF_MOV64_IMM(BPF_REG_4, 0),
+ BPF_MOV64_IMM(BPF_REG_5, 0),
+ BPF_EMIT_CALL(BPF_FUNC_csum_diff),
+ BPF_EXIT_INSN(),
+ },
+ .errstr = "R1 type=imm expected=fp",
+ .result = REJECT,
+ .prog_type = BPF_PROG_TYPE_SCHED_CLS,
+ },
+ {
+ "helper access to variable memory: size = 0 not allowed on != NULL",
+ .insns = {
+ BPF_MOV64_REG(BPF_REG_1, BPF_REG_10),
+ BPF_ALU64_IMM(BPF_ADD, BPF_REG_1, -8),
+ BPF_MOV64_IMM(BPF_REG_2, 0),
+ BPF_STX_MEM(BPF_DW, BPF_REG_1, BPF_REG_2, 0),
+ BPF_ALU64_IMM(BPF_AND, BPF_REG_2, 8),
+ BPF_MOV64_IMM(BPF_REG_3, 0),
+ BPF_MOV64_IMM(BPF_REG_4, 0),
+ BPF_MOV64_IMM(BPF_REG_5, 0),
+ BPF_EMIT_CALL(BPF_FUNC_csum_diff),
+ BPF_EXIT_INSN(),
+ },
+ .errstr = "invalid stack type R1 off=-8 access_size=0",
+ .result = REJECT,
+ .prog_type = BPF_PROG_TYPE_SCHED_CLS,
+ },
+ {
+ "helper access to variable memory: 8 bytes leak",
+ .insns = {
+ BPF_MOV64_REG(BPF_REG_1, BPF_REG_10),
+ BPF_ALU64_IMM(BPF_ADD, BPF_REG_1, -64),
+ BPF_MOV64_IMM(BPF_REG_0, 0),
+ BPF_STX_MEM(BPF_DW, BPF_REG_10, BPF_REG_0, -64),
+ BPF_STX_MEM(BPF_DW, BPF_REG_10, BPF_REG_0, -56),
+ BPF_STX_MEM(BPF_DW, BPF_REG_10, BPF_REG_0, -48),
+ BPF_STX_MEM(BPF_DW, BPF_REG_10, BPF_REG_0, -40),
+ BPF_STX_MEM(BPF_DW, BPF_REG_10, BPF_REG_0, -24),
+ BPF_STX_MEM(BPF_DW, BPF_REG_10, BPF_REG_0, -16),
+ BPF_STX_MEM(BPF_DW, BPF_REG_10, BPF_REG_0, -8),
+ BPF_MOV64_IMM(BPF_REG_2, 0),
+ BPF_ALU64_IMM(BPF_AND, BPF_REG_2, 63),
+ BPF_ALU64_IMM(BPF_ADD, BPF_REG_2, 1),
+ BPF_MOV64_IMM(BPF_REG_3, 0),
+ BPF_EMIT_CALL(BPF_FUNC_probe_read),
+ BPF_LDX_MEM(BPF_DW, BPF_REG_1, BPF_REG_10, -16),
+ BPF_EXIT_INSN(),
+ },
+ .errstr = "invalid indirect read from stack off -64+32 size 64",
+ .result = REJECT,
+ .prog_type = BPF_PROG_TYPE_TRACEPOINT,
+ },
+ {
+ "helper access to variable memory: 8 bytes no leak (init memory)",
+ .insns = {
+ BPF_MOV64_REG(BPF_REG_1, BPF_REG_10),
+ BPF_MOV64_IMM(BPF_REG_0, 0),
+ BPF_MOV64_IMM(BPF_REG_0, 0),
+ BPF_STX_MEM(BPF_DW, BPF_REG_10, BPF_REG_0, -64),
+ BPF_STX_MEM(BPF_DW, BPF_REG_10, BPF_REG_0, -56),
+ BPF_STX_MEM(BPF_DW, BPF_REG_10, BPF_REG_0, -48),
+ BPF_STX_MEM(BPF_DW, BPF_REG_10, BPF_REG_0, -40),
+ BPF_STX_MEM(BPF_DW, BPF_REG_10, BPF_REG_0, -32),
+ BPF_STX_MEM(BPF_DW, BPF_REG_10, BPF_REG_0, -24),
+ BPF_STX_MEM(BPF_DW, BPF_REG_10, BPF_REG_0, -16),
+ BPF_STX_MEM(BPF_DW, BPF_REG_10, BPF_REG_0, -8),
+ BPF_ALU64_IMM(BPF_ADD, BPF_REG_1, -64),
+ BPF_MOV64_IMM(BPF_REG_2, 0),
+ BPF_ALU64_IMM(BPF_AND, BPF_REG_2, 32),
+ BPF_ALU64_IMM(BPF_ADD, BPF_REG_2, 32),
+ BPF_MOV64_IMM(BPF_REG_3, 0),
+ BPF_EMIT_CALL(BPF_FUNC_probe_read),
+ BPF_LDX_MEM(BPF_DW, BPF_REG_1, BPF_REG_10, -16),
+ BPF_EXIT_INSN(),
+ },
+ .result = ACCEPT,
+ .prog_type = BPF_PROG_TYPE_TRACEPOINT,
+ },
};
static int probe_filter_length(const struct bpf_insn *fp)
--
2.8.0
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 7+ messages in thread
* [PATCH net-next 5/5] bpf: rename ARG_PTR_TO_STACK
2017-01-09 18:19 [PATCH net-next 0/5] bpf: verifier improvements Alexei Starovoitov
` (3 preceding siblings ...)
2017-01-09 18:19 ` [PATCH net-next 4/5] bpf: allow helpers access to variable memory Alexei Starovoitov
@ 2017-01-09 18:19 ` Alexei Starovoitov
2017-01-09 21:56 ` [PATCH net-next 0/5] bpf: verifier improvements David Miller
5 siblings, 0 replies; 7+ messages in thread
From: Alexei Starovoitov @ 2017-01-09 18:19 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: David S . Miller; +Cc: Daniel Borkmann, Gianluca Borello, Josef Bacik, netdev
since ARG_PTR_TO_STACK is no longer just pointer to stack
rename it to ARG_PTR_TO_MEM and adjust comment.
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
---
include/linux/bpf.h | 12 ++++++------
kernel/bpf/helpers.c | 4 ++--
kernel/bpf/verifier.c | 28 ++++++++++++++--------------
kernel/trace/bpf_trace.c | 20 ++++++++++----------
net/core/filter.c | 40 ++++++++++++++++++++--------------------
5 files changed, 52 insertions(+), 52 deletions(-)
diff --git a/include/linux/bpf.h b/include/linux/bpf.h
index f74ae68086dc..94ea8d2383e6 100644
--- a/include/linux/bpf.h
+++ b/include/linux/bpf.h
@@ -69,14 +69,14 @@ enum bpf_arg_type {
/* the following constraints used to prototype bpf_memcmp() and other
* functions that access data on eBPF program stack
*/
- ARG_PTR_TO_STACK, /* any pointer to eBPF program stack */
- ARG_PTR_TO_RAW_STACK, /* any pointer to eBPF program stack, area does not
- * need to be initialized, helper function must fill
- * all bytes or clear them in error case.
+ ARG_PTR_TO_MEM, /* pointer to valid memory (stack, packet, map value) */
+ ARG_PTR_TO_UNINIT_MEM, /* pointer to memory does not need to be initialized,
+ * helper function must fill all bytes or clear
+ * them in error case.
*/
- ARG_CONST_STACK_SIZE, /* number of bytes accessed from stack */
- ARG_CONST_STACK_SIZE_OR_ZERO, /* number of bytes accessed from stack or 0 */
+ ARG_CONST_SIZE, /* number of bytes accessed from memory */
+ ARG_CONST_SIZE_OR_ZERO, /* number of bytes accessed from memory or 0 */
ARG_PTR_TO_CTX, /* pointer to context */
ARG_ANYTHING, /* any (initialized) argument is ok */
diff --git a/kernel/bpf/helpers.c b/kernel/bpf/helpers.c
index 045cbe673356..3d24e238221e 100644
--- a/kernel/bpf/helpers.c
+++ b/kernel/bpf/helpers.c
@@ -176,6 +176,6 @@ const struct bpf_func_proto bpf_get_current_comm_proto = {
.func = bpf_get_current_comm,
.gpl_only = false,
.ret_type = RET_INTEGER,
- .arg1_type = ARG_PTR_TO_RAW_STACK,
- .arg2_type = ARG_CONST_STACK_SIZE,
+ .arg1_type = ARG_PTR_TO_UNINIT_MEM,
+ .arg2_type = ARG_CONST_SIZE,
};
diff --git a/kernel/bpf/verifier.c b/kernel/bpf/verifier.c
index 3d4f7bf32aaf..2efdc9128e3c 100644
--- a/kernel/bpf/verifier.c
+++ b/kernel/bpf/verifier.c
@@ -1034,8 +1034,8 @@ static int check_func_arg(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, u32 regno,
expected_type = PTR_TO_STACK;
if (type != PTR_TO_PACKET && type != expected_type)
goto err_type;
- } else if (arg_type == ARG_CONST_STACK_SIZE ||
- arg_type == ARG_CONST_STACK_SIZE_OR_ZERO) {
+ } else if (arg_type == ARG_CONST_SIZE ||
+ arg_type == ARG_CONST_SIZE_OR_ZERO) {
expected_type = CONST_IMM;
/* One exception. Allow UNKNOWN_VALUE registers when the
* boundaries are known and don't cause unsafe memory accesses
@@ -1050,8 +1050,8 @@ static int check_func_arg(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, u32 regno,
expected_type = PTR_TO_CTX;
if (type != expected_type)
goto err_type;
- } else if (arg_type == ARG_PTR_TO_STACK ||
- arg_type == ARG_PTR_TO_RAW_STACK) {
+ } else if (arg_type == ARG_PTR_TO_MEM ||
+ arg_type == ARG_PTR_TO_UNINIT_MEM) {
expected_type = PTR_TO_STACK;
/* One exception here. In case function allows for NULL to be
* passed in as argument, it's a CONST_IMM type. Final test
@@ -1062,7 +1062,7 @@ static int check_func_arg(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, u32 regno,
else if (type != PTR_TO_PACKET && type != PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE &&
type != PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE_ADJ && type != expected_type)
goto err_type;
- meta->raw_mode = arg_type == ARG_PTR_TO_RAW_STACK;
+ meta->raw_mode = arg_type == ARG_PTR_TO_UNINIT_MEM;
} else {
verbose("unsupported arg_type %d\n", arg_type);
return -EFAULT;
@@ -1108,9 +1108,9 @@ static int check_func_arg(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, u32 regno,
err = check_stack_boundary(env, regno,
meta->map_ptr->value_size,
false, NULL);
- } else if (arg_type == ARG_CONST_STACK_SIZE ||
- arg_type == ARG_CONST_STACK_SIZE_OR_ZERO) {
- bool zero_size_allowed = (arg_type == ARG_CONST_STACK_SIZE_OR_ZERO);
+ } else if (arg_type == ARG_CONST_SIZE ||
+ arg_type == ARG_CONST_SIZE_OR_ZERO) {
+ bool zero_size_allowed = (arg_type == ARG_CONST_SIZE_OR_ZERO);
/* bpf_xxx(..., buf, len) call will access 'len' bytes
* from stack pointer 'buf'. Check it
@@ -1118,7 +1118,7 @@ static int check_func_arg(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, u32 regno,
*/
if (regno == 0) {
/* kernel subsystem misconfigured verifier */
- verbose("ARG_CONST_STACK_SIZE cannot be first argument\n");
+ verbose("ARG_CONST_SIZE cannot be first argument\n");
return -EACCES;
}
@@ -1235,15 +1235,15 @@ static int check_raw_mode(const struct bpf_func_proto *fn)
{
int count = 0;
- if (fn->arg1_type == ARG_PTR_TO_RAW_STACK)
+ if (fn->arg1_type == ARG_PTR_TO_UNINIT_MEM)
count++;
- if (fn->arg2_type == ARG_PTR_TO_RAW_STACK)
+ if (fn->arg2_type == ARG_PTR_TO_UNINIT_MEM)
count++;
- if (fn->arg3_type == ARG_PTR_TO_RAW_STACK)
+ if (fn->arg3_type == ARG_PTR_TO_UNINIT_MEM)
count++;
- if (fn->arg4_type == ARG_PTR_TO_RAW_STACK)
+ if (fn->arg4_type == ARG_PTR_TO_UNINIT_MEM)
count++;
- if (fn->arg5_type == ARG_PTR_TO_RAW_STACK)
+ if (fn->arg5_type == ARG_PTR_TO_UNINIT_MEM)
count++;
return count > 1 ? -EINVAL : 0;
diff --git a/kernel/trace/bpf_trace.c b/kernel/trace/bpf_trace.c
index fa77311dadb2..f883c43c96f3 100644
--- a/kernel/trace/bpf_trace.c
+++ b/kernel/trace/bpf_trace.c
@@ -76,8 +76,8 @@ static const struct bpf_func_proto bpf_probe_read_proto = {
.func = bpf_probe_read,
.gpl_only = true,
.ret_type = RET_INTEGER,
- .arg1_type = ARG_PTR_TO_RAW_STACK,
- .arg2_type = ARG_CONST_STACK_SIZE,
+ .arg1_type = ARG_PTR_TO_UNINIT_MEM,
+ .arg2_type = ARG_CONST_SIZE,
.arg3_type = ARG_ANYTHING,
};
@@ -109,8 +109,8 @@ static const struct bpf_func_proto bpf_probe_write_user_proto = {
.gpl_only = true,
.ret_type = RET_INTEGER,
.arg1_type = ARG_ANYTHING,
- .arg2_type = ARG_PTR_TO_STACK,
- .arg3_type = ARG_CONST_STACK_SIZE,
+ .arg2_type = ARG_PTR_TO_MEM,
+ .arg3_type = ARG_CONST_SIZE,
};
static const struct bpf_func_proto *bpf_get_probe_write_proto(void)
@@ -213,8 +213,8 @@ static const struct bpf_func_proto bpf_trace_printk_proto = {
.func = bpf_trace_printk,
.gpl_only = true,
.ret_type = RET_INTEGER,
- .arg1_type = ARG_PTR_TO_STACK,
- .arg2_type = ARG_CONST_STACK_SIZE,
+ .arg1_type = ARG_PTR_TO_MEM,
+ .arg2_type = ARG_CONST_SIZE,
};
const struct bpf_func_proto *bpf_get_trace_printk_proto(void)
@@ -329,8 +329,8 @@ static const struct bpf_func_proto bpf_perf_event_output_proto = {
.arg1_type = ARG_PTR_TO_CTX,
.arg2_type = ARG_CONST_MAP_PTR,
.arg3_type = ARG_ANYTHING,
- .arg4_type = ARG_PTR_TO_STACK,
- .arg5_type = ARG_CONST_STACK_SIZE,
+ .arg4_type = ARG_PTR_TO_MEM,
+ .arg5_type = ARG_CONST_SIZE,
};
static DEFINE_PER_CPU(struct pt_regs, bpf_pt_regs);
@@ -492,8 +492,8 @@ static const struct bpf_func_proto bpf_perf_event_output_proto_tp = {
.arg1_type = ARG_PTR_TO_CTX,
.arg2_type = ARG_CONST_MAP_PTR,
.arg3_type = ARG_ANYTHING,
- .arg4_type = ARG_PTR_TO_STACK,
- .arg5_type = ARG_CONST_STACK_SIZE,
+ .arg4_type = ARG_PTR_TO_MEM,
+ .arg5_type = ARG_CONST_SIZE,
};
BPF_CALL_3(bpf_get_stackid_tp, void *, tp_buff, struct bpf_map *, map,
diff --git a/net/core/filter.c b/net/core/filter.c
index 1969b3f118c1..f4d16a905754 100644
--- a/net/core/filter.c
+++ b/net/core/filter.c
@@ -1416,8 +1416,8 @@ static const struct bpf_func_proto bpf_skb_store_bytes_proto = {
.ret_type = RET_INTEGER,
.arg1_type = ARG_PTR_TO_CTX,
.arg2_type = ARG_ANYTHING,
- .arg3_type = ARG_PTR_TO_STACK,
- .arg4_type = ARG_CONST_STACK_SIZE,
+ .arg3_type = ARG_PTR_TO_MEM,
+ .arg4_type = ARG_CONST_SIZE,
.arg5_type = ARG_ANYTHING,
};
@@ -1447,8 +1447,8 @@ static const struct bpf_func_proto bpf_skb_load_bytes_proto = {
.ret_type = RET_INTEGER,
.arg1_type = ARG_PTR_TO_CTX,
.arg2_type = ARG_ANYTHING,
- .arg3_type = ARG_PTR_TO_RAW_STACK,
- .arg4_type = ARG_CONST_STACK_SIZE,
+ .arg3_type = ARG_PTR_TO_UNINIT_MEM,
+ .arg4_type = ARG_CONST_SIZE,
};
BPF_CALL_2(bpf_skb_pull_data, struct sk_buff *, skb, u32, len)
@@ -1601,10 +1601,10 @@ static const struct bpf_func_proto bpf_csum_diff_proto = {
.gpl_only = false,
.pkt_access = true,
.ret_type = RET_INTEGER,
- .arg1_type = ARG_PTR_TO_STACK,
- .arg2_type = ARG_CONST_STACK_SIZE_OR_ZERO,
- .arg3_type = ARG_PTR_TO_STACK,
- .arg4_type = ARG_CONST_STACK_SIZE_OR_ZERO,
+ .arg1_type = ARG_PTR_TO_MEM,
+ .arg2_type = ARG_CONST_SIZE_OR_ZERO,
+ .arg3_type = ARG_PTR_TO_MEM,
+ .arg4_type = ARG_CONST_SIZE_OR_ZERO,
.arg5_type = ARG_ANYTHING,
};
@@ -2306,8 +2306,8 @@ static const struct bpf_func_proto bpf_skb_event_output_proto = {
.arg1_type = ARG_PTR_TO_CTX,
.arg2_type = ARG_CONST_MAP_PTR,
.arg3_type = ARG_ANYTHING,
- .arg4_type = ARG_PTR_TO_STACK,
- .arg5_type = ARG_CONST_STACK_SIZE,
+ .arg4_type = ARG_PTR_TO_MEM,
+ .arg5_type = ARG_CONST_SIZE,
};
static unsigned short bpf_tunnel_key_af(u64 flags)
@@ -2377,8 +2377,8 @@ static const struct bpf_func_proto bpf_skb_get_tunnel_key_proto = {
.gpl_only = false,
.ret_type = RET_INTEGER,
.arg1_type = ARG_PTR_TO_CTX,
- .arg2_type = ARG_PTR_TO_RAW_STACK,
- .arg3_type = ARG_CONST_STACK_SIZE,
+ .arg2_type = ARG_PTR_TO_UNINIT_MEM,
+ .arg3_type = ARG_CONST_SIZE,
.arg4_type = ARG_ANYTHING,
};
@@ -2412,8 +2412,8 @@ static const struct bpf_func_proto bpf_skb_get_tunnel_opt_proto = {
.gpl_only = false,
.ret_type = RET_INTEGER,
.arg1_type = ARG_PTR_TO_CTX,
- .arg2_type = ARG_PTR_TO_RAW_STACK,
- .arg3_type = ARG_CONST_STACK_SIZE,
+ .arg2_type = ARG_PTR_TO_UNINIT_MEM,
+ .arg3_type = ARG_CONST_SIZE,
};
static struct metadata_dst __percpu *md_dst;
@@ -2483,8 +2483,8 @@ static const struct bpf_func_proto bpf_skb_set_tunnel_key_proto = {
.gpl_only = false,
.ret_type = RET_INTEGER,
.arg1_type = ARG_PTR_TO_CTX,
- .arg2_type = ARG_PTR_TO_STACK,
- .arg3_type = ARG_CONST_STACK_SIZE,
+ .arg2_type = ARG_PTR_TO_MEM,
+ .arg3_type = ARG_CONST_SIZE,
.arg4_type = ARG_ANYTHING,
};
@@ -2509,8 +2509,8 @@ static const struct bpf_func_proto bpf_skb_set_tunnel_opt_proto = {
.gpl_only = false,
.ret_type = RET_INTEGER,
.arg1_type = ARG_PTR_TO_CTX,
- .arg2_type = ARG_PTR_TO_STACK,
- .arg3_type = ARG_CONST_STACK_SIZE,
+ .arg2_type = ARG_PTR_TO_MEM,
+ .arg3_type = ARG_CONST_SIZE,
};
static const struct bpf_func_proto *
@@ -2593,8 +2593,8 @@ static const struct bpf_func_proto bpf_xdp_event_output_proto = {
.arg1_type = ARG_PTR_TO_CTX,
.arg2_type = ARG_CONST_MAP_PTR,
.arg3_type = ARG_ANYTHING,
- .arg4_type = ARG_PTR_TO_STACK,
- .arg5_type = ARG_CONST_STACK_SIZE,
+ .arg4_type = ARG_PTR_TO_MEM,
+ .arg5_type = ARG_CONST_SIZE,
};
static const struct bpf_func_proto *
--
2.8.0
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 7+ messages in thread
* Re: [PATCH net-next 0/5] bpf: verifier improvements
2017-01-09 18:19 [PATCH net-next 0/5] bpf: verifier improvements Alexei Starovoitov
` (4 preceding siblings ...)
2017-01-09 18:19 ` [PATCH net-next 5/5] bpf: rename ARG_PTR_TO_STACK Alexei Starovoitov
@ 2017-01-09 21:56 ` David Miller
5 siblings, 0 replies; 7+ messages in thread
From: David Miller @ 2017-01-09 21:56 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: ast; +Cc: daniel, g.borello, jbacik, netdev
From: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@fb.com>
Date: Mon, 9 Jan 2017 10:19:45 -0800
> A number of bpf verifier improvements from Gianluca.
> See individual patches for details.
Series applied, thanks!
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 7+ messages in thread
end of thread, other threads:[~2017-01-09 21:56 UTC | newest]
Thread overview: 7+ messages (download: mbox.gz / follow: Atom feed)
-- links below jump to the message on this page --
2017-01-09 18:19 [PATCH net-next 0/5] bpf: verifier improvements Alexei Starovoitov
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2017-01-09 18:19 ` [PATCH net-next 2/5] bpf: allow helpers access to map element values Alexei Starovoitov
2017-01-09 18:19 ` [PATCH net-next 3/5] bpf: allow adjusted map element values to spill Alexei Starovoitov
2017-01-09 18:19 ` [PATCH net-next 4/5] bpf: allow helpers access to variable memory Alexei Starovoitov
2017-01-09 18:19 ` [PATCH net-next 5/5] bpf: rename ARG_PTR_TO_STACK Alexei Starovoitov
2017-01-09 21:56 ` [PATCH net-next 0/5] bpf: verifier improvements David Miller
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