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From: Daniel Micay <danielmicay@gmail.com>
To: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>, Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>
Cc: "kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com"
	<kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com>,
	Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>,
	Matt Fleming <matt@codeblueprint.co.uk>
Subject: Re: [kernel-hardening] [PATCH] add the option of fortified string.h functions
Date: Tue, 09 May 2017 19:02:47 -0400	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <1494370967.7678.1.camel@gmail.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <CAGXu5jKXAfOa_2kbWTN==Uibw94QM06Xw+0Bw9ZioSpiaxXsBA@mail.gmail.com>

On Tue, 2017-05-09 at 13:39 -0700, Kees Cook wrote:
> On Fri, May 5, 2017 at 3:38 AM, Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>
> wrote:
> > ---->8----
> > diff --git a/drivers/firmware/efi/libstub/Makefile
> > b/drivers/firmware/efi/libstub/Makefile
> > index f742596..b5327f5 100644
> > --- a/drivers/firmware/efi/libstub/Makefile
> > +++ b/drivers/firmware/efi/libstub/Makefile
> > @@ -18,7 +18,8 @@ cflags-$(CONFIG_EFI_ARMSTUB)  +=
> > -I$(srctree)/scripts/dtc/libfdt
> > 
> >  KBUILD_CFLAGS                  := $(cflags-y)
> > -DDISABLE_BRANCH_PROFILING \
> >                                    $(call cc-option,-ffreestanding)
> > \
> > -                                  $(call cc-option,-fno-stack-
> > protector)
> > +                                  $(call cc-option,-fno-stack-
> > protector) \
> > +                                  -D__NO_FORTIFY
> > 
> >  GCOV_PROFILE                   := n
> >  KASAN_SANITIZE                 := n
> > ---->8----
> 
> Can we split the compile time from runtime checks so the efi stub is
> still covered by the build-time checks? (Or was there a compile
> failure I missed?)
> 
> -Kees

It might just need fortify_panic defined somewhere. It seems like the
place I defined it on x86 covers this but I might be wrong about that.

  reply	other threads:[~2017-05-09 23:02 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 25+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2017-05-04 14:24 [kernel-hardening] [PATCH] add the option of fortified string.h functions Daniel Micay
2017-05-04 14:51 ` [kernel-hardening] " Daniel Micay
2017-05-04 15:48 ` [kernel-hardening] " Mark Rutland
2017-05-04 17:49   ` Daniel Micay
2017-05-04 18:09     ` Mark Rutland
2017-05-04 19:03       ` Daniel Micay
2017-05-05 10:38       ` Mark Rutland
2017-05-05 10:52         ` Mark Rutland
2017-05-05 13:44           ` Kees Cook
2017-05-05 17:38         ` Daniel Micay
2017-05-08 11:41           ` Mark Rutland
2017-05-08 16:08             ` Daniel Micay
2017-05-09 20:39         ` Kees Cook
2017-05-09 23:02           ` Daniel Micay [this message]
2017-05-10 11:12           ` Mark Rutland
2017-05-05 16:42 ` Kees Cook
2017-05-05 16:42   ` [kernel-hardening] " Kees Cook
2017-05-06  2:12 ` Kees Cook
2017-05-08 17:57 ` [kernel-hardening] " Daniel Axtens
2017-05-08 17:57   ` Daniel Axtens
2017-05-08 20:50   ` Daniel Micay
2017-05-08 21:53     ` Kees Cook
2017-05-10 12:00   ` Michael Ellerman
2017-05-10 12:00     ` Michael Ellerman
     [not found] ` <20170508175723.448CCAC043@b01ledav006.gho.pok.ibm.com>
2017-05-09  6:24   ` Andrew Donnellan

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