From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Return-Path: Received: from mx0a-001b2d01.pphosted.com ([148.163.156.1]:39221 "EHLO mx0a-001b2d01.pphosted.com" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S1752031AbdHPRan (ORCPT ); Wed, 16 Aug 2017 13:30:43 -0400 Received: from pps.filterd (m0098410.ppops.net [127.0.0.1]) by mx0a-001b2d01.pphosted.com (8.16.0.21/8.16.0.21) with SMTP id v7GHSmph070939 for ; Wed, 16 Aug 2017 13:30:43 -0400 Received: from e23smtp03.au.ibm.com (e23smtp03.au.ibm.com [202.81.31.145]) by mx0a-001b2d01.pphosted.com with ESMTP id 2ccrrt5suk-1 (version=TLSv1.2 cipher=AES256-SHA bits=256 verify=NOT) for ; Wed, 16 Aug 2017 13:30:43 -0400 Received: from localhost by e23smtp03.au.ibm.com with IBM ESMTP SMTP Gateway: Authorized Use Only! Violators will be prosecuted for from ; Thu, 17 Aug 2017 03:30:39 +1000 From: Mimi Zohar To: Christoph Hellwig , Al Viro Cc: Jan Kara , Jeff Layton , Mimi Zohar , linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org, linux-ima-devel@lists.sourceforge.net, linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org Subject: [RFC PATCH 2/4] ima: define new ima_sb_post_new_mount hook Date: Wed, 16 Aug 2017 13:30:18 -0400 In-Reply-To: <1502904620-20075-1-git-send-email-zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com> References: <1502904620-20075-1-git-send-email-zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Message-Id: <1502904620-20075-3-git-send-email-zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Sender: linux-fsdevel-owner@vger.kernel.org List-ID: IMA measures a file, verifies a file's integrity, and caches the results. On filesystems with MS_I_VERSION enabled, IMA can detect file changes and cause them to be re-measured and verified. On filesystems without MS_I_VERSION enabled, files are measured and verified just once. This patch logs filesystems mounted without MS_I_VERSION. Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar --- include/linux/ima.h | 5 +++++ security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c | 44 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ security/security.c | 1 + 3 files changed, 50 insertions(+) diff --git a/include/linux/ima.h b/include/linux/ima.h index 0e4647e0eb60..4475cb01149c 100644 --- a/include/linux/ima.h +++ b/include/linux/ima.h @@ -23,6 +23,8 @@ extern int ima_read_file(struct file *file, enum kernel_read_file_id id); extern int ima_post_read_file(struct file *file, void *buf, loff_t size, enum kernel_read_file_id id); extern void ima_post_path_mknod(struct dentry *dentry); +extern void ima_sb_post_new_mount(const struct vfsmount *newmnt, + const struct path *path); #ifdef CONFIG_IMA_KEXEC extern void ima_add_kexec_buffer(struct kimage *image); @@ -65,6 +67,9 @@ static inline void ima_post_path_mknod(struct dentry *dentry) return; } +static inline void ima_sb_post_new_mount(const struct vfsmount *newmnt, + const struct path *path) +{ } #endif /* CONFIG_IMA */ #ifndef CONFIG_IMA_KEXEC diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c index b00186914df8..a0a685189001 100644 --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c @@ -354,6 +354,50 @@ void ima_post_path_mknod(struct dentry *dentry) } /** + * ima_sb_post_new_mount - check filesystem mounted flags + * + * Indicate that filesystem isn't mounted with i_version enabled. + */ +void ima_sb_post_new_mount(const struct vfsmount *newmnt, + const struct path *path) +{ + struct super_block *sb; + unsigned long pseudo_fs[] = {CGROUP_SUPER_MAGIC, CGROUP2_SUPER_MAGIC, + SYSFS_MAGIC, DEVPTS_SUPER_MAGIC, PSTOREFS_MAGIC, EFIVARFS_MAGIC, + DEBUGFS_MAGIC, TMPFS_MAGIC}; + char *pathbuf = NULL; + char filename[NAME_MAX]; + const char *pathname; + bool found = 0; + int i; + + sb = newmnt ? newmnt->mnt_sb : path->mnt->mnt_sb; + + if ((sb->s_flags & MS_I_VERSION) || (sb->s_flags & MS_RDONLY) || + (sb->s_flags & MS_KERNMOUNT)) + return; + + for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(pseudo_fs); i++) { + if (pseudo_fs[i] != sb->s_magic) + continue; + + found = 1; + break; + } + if (found) + return; + + pathname = ima_d_path(path, &pathbuf, filename); + if (!pathname) + return; + + if (newmnt) + pr_warn("ima: %s mounted without i_version enabled\n", + pathname); + __putname(pathbuf); +} + +/** * ima_read_file - pre-measure/appraise hook decision based on policy * @file: pointer to the file to be measured/appraised/audit * @read_id: caller identifier diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c index 592153e8d2b6..79111141b383 100644 --- a/security/security.c +++ b/security/security.c @@ -402,6 +402,7 @@ void security_sb_post_new_mount(const struct vfsmount *newmnt, const struct path *path) { call_void_hook(sb_post_new_mount, newmnt, path); + ima_sb_post_new_mount(newmnt, path); } int security_sb_umount(struct vfsmount *mnt, int flags) -- 2.7.4 From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 From: zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com (Mimi Zohar) Date: Wed, 16 Aug 2017 13:30:18 -0400 Subject: [RFC PATCH 2/4] ima: define new ima_sb_post_new_mount hook In-Reply-To: <1502904620-20075-1-git-send-email-zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com> References: <1502904620-20075-1-git-send-email-zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Message-ID: <1502904620-20075-3-git-send-email-zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com> To: linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org List-Id: linux-security-module.vger.kernel.org IMA measures a file, verifies a file's integrity, and caches the results. On filesystems with MS_I_VERSION enabled, IMA can detect file changes and cause them to be re-measured and verified. On filesystems without MS_I_VERSION enabled, files are measured and verified just once. This patch logs filesystems mounted without MS_I_VERSION. Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar --- include/linux/ima.h | 5 +++++ security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c | 44 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ security/security.c | 1 + 3 files changed, 50 insertions(+) diff --git a/include/linux/ima.h b/include/linux/ima.h index 0e4647e0eb60..4475cb01149c 100644 --- a/include/linux/ima.h +++ b/include/linux/ima.h @@ -23,6 +23,8 @@ extern int ima_read_file(struct file *file, enum kernel_read_file_id id); extern int ima_post_read_file(struct file *file, void *buf, loff_t size, enum kernel_read_file_id id); extern void ima_post_path_mknod(struct dentry *dentry); +extern void ima_sb_post_new_mount(const struct vfsmount *newmnt, + const struct path *path); #ifdef CONFIG_IMA_KEXEC extern void ima_add_kexec_buffer(struct kimage *image); @@ -65,6 +67,9 @@ static inline void ima_post_path_mknod(struct dentry *dentry) return; } +static inline void ima_sb_post_new_mount(const struct vfsmount *newmnt, + const struct path *path) +{ } #endif /* CONFIG_IMA */ #ifndef CONFIG_IMA_KEXEC diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c index b00186914df8..a0a685189001 100644 --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c @@ -354,6 +354,50 @@ void ima_post_path_mknod(struct dentry *dentry) } /** + * ima_sb_post_new_mount - check filesystem mounted flags + * + * Indicate that filesystem isn't mounted with i_version enabled. + */ +void ima_sb_post_new_mount(const struct vfsmount *newmnt, + const struct path *path) +{ + struct super_block *sb; + unsigned long pseudo_fs[] = {CGROUP_SUPER_MAGIC, CGROUP2_SUPER_MAGIC, + SYSFS_MAGIC, DEVPTS_SUPER_MAGIC, PSTOREFS_MAGIC, EFIVARFS_MAGIC, + DEBUGFS_MAGIC, TMPFS_MAGIC}; + char *pathbuf = NULL; + char filename[NAME_MAX]; + const char *pathname; + bool found = 0; + int i; + + sb = newmnt ? newmnt->mnt_sb : path->mnt->mnt_sb; + + if ((sb->s_flags & MS_I_VERSION) || (sb->s_flags & MS_RDONLY) || + (sb->s_flags & MS_KERNMOUNT)) + return; + + for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(pseudo_fs); i++) { + if (pseudo_fs[i] != sb->s_magic) + continue; + + found = 1; + break; + } + if (found) + return; + + pathname = ima_d_path(path, &pathbuf, filename); + if (!pathname) + return; + + if (newmnt) + pr_warn("ima: %s mounted without i_version enabled\n", + pathname); + __putname(pathbuf); +} + +/** * ima_read_file - pre-measure/appraise hook decision based on policy * @file: pointer to the file to be measured/appraised/audit * @read_id: caller identifier diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c index 592153e8d2b6..79111141b383 100644 --- a/security/security.c +++ b/security/security.c @@ -402,6 +402,7 @@ void security_sb_post_new_mount(const struct vfsmount *newmnt, const struct path *path) { call_void_hook(sb_post_new_mount, newmnt, path); + ima_sb_post_new_mount(newmnt, path); } int security_sb_umount(struct vfsmount *mnt, int flags) -- 2.7.4 -- To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-security-module" in the body of a message to majordomo at vger.kernel.org More majordomo info at http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html