From: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com> To: "Theodore Ts'o" <tytso@mit.edu>, James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>, Linux Kernel Mailing List <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>, LSM List <linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org>, Christoph Hellwig <hch@infradead.org> Subject: Re: [GIT PULL] Security subsystem updates for 4.14 Date: Sun, 10 Sep 2017 03:13:23 -0400 [thread overview] Message-ID: <1505027603.3224.56.camel@linux.vnet.ibm.com> (raw) In-Reply-To: <20170908223806.7yv6eohtsispwgas@thunk.org> On Fri, 2017-09-08 at 18:38 -0400, Theodore Ts'o wrote: > On Fri, Sep 08, 2017 at 02:48:51PM +1000, James Morris wrote: > > > > Mimi and Christoph worked together on this over several iterations -- I'll > > let them respond. > > Mimi --- we should chat next week in LA. I've been working on a > design internally at work which proposes a generic VFS-layer library > (ala how fscrypt in fs/crypto works) which provides data integrity > using per-file Merkle trees. > > The goals of this design: > > * Simplicity; for ease in security review and upstream review and > acceptance > * Useful for multiple use cases. It is *not* Android/APK specific, > and indeed can be used for other things > * A better way of providing Linux IMA/EVM support for immutable > files by moving the verification from time-of-open to > time-of-readpage. (This significantly reduces the performance > impact, since we don't need to lock down the file while the kernel > needs to run SHA1 on potentially gigabytes worth of file data.) > * Most use cases for file-level checksums are for files that > don’t change over time (e.g., for Video, Audio, Backup files, > etc.) This allows us to provide a cheap and efficient way to > provide checksum protect against storage-level corruption > fairly easily. So by supporting both SHA and CRC-32, we can > make this feature useful for more than just the security heads. :-) > * Like the encryption/fscrypt feature, most of the code to this > feature can be in a VFS-level library, with minimal hooks needed > to those file systems (ext4, f2fs) that wish to provide this > functionality. >From a file integrity perspective this would be interesting, but that only addresses IMA-appraisal, not IMA-integrity or IMA-audit. We would still need to calculate the file hash to be included in the measurement list and used for auditing. Have you done any work on protecting the directory information itself (eg. file names) using Merkle trees? Mimi
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From: zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com (Mimi Zohar) To: linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org Subject: [GIT PULL] Security subsystem updates for 4.14 Date: Sun, 10 Sep 2017 03:13:23 -0400 [thread overview] Message-ID: <1505027603.3224.56.camel@linux.vnet.ibm.com> (raw) In-Reply-To: <20170908223806.7yv6eohtsispwgas@thunk.org> On Fri, 2017-09-08 at 18:38 -0400, Theodore Ts'o wrote: > On Fri, Sep 08, 2017 at 02:48:51PM +1000, James Morris wrote: > > > > Mimi and Christoph worked together on this over several iterations -- I'll > > let them respond. > > Mimi --- we should chat next week in LA. I've been working on a > design internally at work which proposes a generic VFS-layer library > (ala how fscrypt in fs/crypto works) which provides data integrity > using per-file Merkle trees. > > The goals of this design: > > * Simplicity; for ease in security review and upstream review and > acceptance > * Useful for multiple use cases. It is *not* Android/APK specific, > and indeed can be used for other things > * A better way of providing Linux IMA/EVM support for immutable > files by moving the verification from time-of-open to > time-of-readpage. (This significantly reduces the performance > impact, since we don't need to lock down the file while the kernel > needs to run SHA1 on potentially gigabytes worth of file data.) > * Most use cases for file-level checksums are for files that > don?t change over time (e.g., for Video, Audio, Backup files, > etc.) This allows us to provide a cheap and efficient way to > provide checksum protect against storage-level corruption > fairly easily. So by supporting both SHA and CRC-32, we can > make this feature useful for more than just the security heads. :-) > * Like the encryption/fscrypt feature, most of the code to this > feature can be in a VFS-level library, with minimal hooks needed > to those file systems (ext4, f2fs) that wish to provide this > functionality. >From a file integrity perspective this would be interesting, but that only addresses IMA-appraisal, not IMA-integrity or IMA-audit. ?We would still need to calculate the file hash to be included in the measurement list and used for auditing. Have you done any work on protecting the directory information itself (eg. file names) using Merkle trees? Mimi -- To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-security-module" in the body of a message to majordomo at vger.kernel.org More majordomo info at http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2017-09-10 7:13 UTC|newest] Thread overview: 46+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top 2017-09-04 10:29 [GIT PULL] Security subsystem updates for 4.14 James Morris 2017-09-04 10:29 ` James Morris 2017-09-07 18:19 ` Linus Torvalds 2017-09-07 18:19 ` Linus Torvalds 2017-09-08 4:48 ` James Morris 2017-09-08 4:48 ` James Morris 2017-09-08 7:09 ` Christoph Hellwig 2017-09-08 7:09 ` Christoph Hellwig 2017-09-08 17:25 ` Linus Torvalds 2017-09-08 17:25 ` Linus Torvalds 2017-09-08 17:36 ` Paul Moore 2017-09-08 17:36 ` Paul Moore 2017-09-10 4:32 ` James Morris 2017-09-10 4:32 ` James Morris 2017-09-10 4:53 ` James Morris 2017-09-10 4:53 ` James Morris 2017-09-11 22:30 ` Paul Moore 2017-09-11 22:30 ` Paul Moore 2017-09-14 21:09 ` Kees Cook 2017-09-14 21:09 ` Kees Cook 2017-09-14 21:13 ` James Morris 2017-09-14 21:13 ` James Morris 2017-09-14 21:25 ` Kees Cook 2017-09-14 21:25 ` Kees Cook 2017-09-08 19:57 ` James Morris 2017-09-08 19:57 ` James Morris 2017-09-17 7:36 ` Mimi Zohar 2017-09-17 7:36 ` Mimi Zohar 2017-09-10 8:10 ` Christoph Hellwig 2017-09-10 8:10 ` Christoph Hellwig 2017-09-10 14:02 ` Mimi Zohar 2017-09-10 14:02 ` Mimi Zohar 2017-09-11 6:38 ` Christoph Hellwig 2017-09-11 6:38 ` Christoph Hellwig 2017-09-11 21:34 ` Mimi Zohar 2017-09-11 21:34 ` Mimi Zohar 2017-09-08 22:38 ` Theodore Ts'o 2017-09-08 22:38 ` Theodore Ts'o 2017-09-10 2:08 ` James Morris 2017-09-10 2:08 ` James Morris 2017-09-10 7:13 ` Mimi Zohar [this message] 2017-09-10 7:13 ` Mimi Zohar 2017-09-10 12:17 ` Theodore Ts'o 2017-09-10 12:17 ` Theodore Ts'o 2017-09-10 6:46 ` Mimi Zohar 2017-09-10 6:46 ` Mimi Zohar
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