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From: David Woodhouse <dwmw2@infradead.org>
To: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>,
	"tglx@linutronix.de" <tglx@linutronix.de>,
	"linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org" <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>,
	"tim.c.chen@linux.intel.com" <tim.c.chen@linux.intel.com>,
	"peterz@infradead.org" <peterz@infradead.org>,
	"torvalds@linux-foundation.org" <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>,
	"ak@linux.intel.com" <ak@linux.intel.com>,
	"riel@redhat.com" <riel@redhat.com>,
	"keescook@google.com" <keescook@google.com>,
	"gnomes@lxorguk.ukuu.org.uk" <gnomes@lxorguk.ukuu.org.uk>,
	"pjt@google.com" <pjt@google.com>,
	"dave.hansen@intel.com" <dave.hansen@intel.com>,
	"luto@amacapital.net" <luto@amacapital.net>,
	"jikos@kernel.org" <jikos@kernel.org>,
	"gregkh@linux-foundation.org" <gregkh@linux-foundation.org>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v3 01/13] x86/retpoline: Add initial retpoline support
Date: Sun, 07 Jan 2018 12:21:29 +0000	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <1515327689.29312.319.camel@infradead.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20180107114645.yydecgoi4x53fyrd@pd.tnic>

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On Sun, 2018-01-07 at 12:46 +0100, Borislav Petkov wrote:
> 
> > 
> > The other fun one for alternatives is in entry_64.S, where we really
> > need the return address of the call instruction to be *precisely* the 
> > .Lentry_SYSCALL_64_after_fastpath_call label, so we have to eschew the
> > normal NOSPEC_CALL there:
> 
> So CALL, as the doc says, pushes the offset of the *next* insn onto the
> stack and branches to the target address.
> 
> So I'm thinking, as long as the next insn doesn't move and gcc doesn't
> pad anything, you're fine.
> 
> However, I suspect that I'm missing something else here and I guess I'll
> have more clue if I look at the whole thing. So can you point me to your
> current branch so that I can take a look at the code?

http://git.infradead.org/users/dwmw2/linux-retpoline.git

In particular, this call site in entry_64.S:
http://git.infradead.org/users/dwmw2/linux-retpoline.git/blob/0f5c54a36e:/arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S#l270

It's still just unconditionally calling the out-of-line thunk and not
using ALTERNATIVE in the CONFIG_RETPOLINE case. I can't just use the
NOSPEC_CALL macro from
http://git.infradead.org/users/dwmw2/linux-retpoline.git/blob/0f5c54a36e:/arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h#l46
because of that requirement that the return address (on the stack) for
the CALL instruction must be precisely at the end, in all cases.

Each of the three alternatives *does* end with the CALL, it's just that
for the two which are shorter than the full retpoline one, they'll get
padded with NOPs at the end, so the return address on the stack *won't*
be what's expected.

Explicitly padding the alternatives with leading NOPs so that they are
all precisely the same length would work, and if the alternatives
mechanism were to pad the shorter ones with leading NOPs instead of
trailing NOPs that would *also* work (but be fairly difficult
especially to do that for oldinstr).

I'm not sure I *see* a simple answer, and it isn't really that bad to
just do what GCC is doing and unconditionally call the out-of-line
thunk. So feel free to just throw your hands up in horror and say "no,
we can't cope with that" :)

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  reply	other threads:[~2018-01-07 12:21 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 79+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2018-01-04  9:10 [RFC] Retpoline: Binary mitigation for branch-target-injection (aka "Spectre") Paul Turner
2018-01-04  9:12 ` Paul Turner
2018-01-04  9:24 ` Paul Turner
2018-01-04  9:48   ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-01-04  9:56     ` Woodhouse, David
2018-01-04  9:30 ` Woodhouse, David
2018-01-04 14:36   ` [PATCH v3 01/13] x86/retpoline: Add initial retpoline support David Woodhouse
2018-01-04 18:03     ` Linus Torvalds
2018-01-04 19:32       ` Woodhouse, David
2018-01-04 18:17     ` Alexei Starovoitov
2018-01-04 18:25       ` Linus Torvalds
2018-01-04 18:36         ` Alexei Starovoitov
2018-01-04 19:27           ` David Woodhouse
2018-01-05 10:28             ` Paul Turner
2018-01-05 10:55               ` David Woodhouse
2018-01-05 11:19                 ` Paul Turner
2018-01-05 11:25                 ` Paul Turner
2018-01-05 11:26               ` Paolo Bonzini
2018-01-05 12:20                 ` Paul Turner
2018-01-05 10:40         ` Paul Turner
2018-01-04 18:40       ` Andi Kleen
2018-01-05 10:32         ` Paul Turner
2018-01-05 12:54     ` Thomas Gleixner
2018-01-05 13:01       ` Juergen Gross
2018-01-05 13:03         ` Thomas Gleixner
2018-01-05 13:56       ` Woodhouse, David
2018-01-05 16:41         ` Woodhouse, David
2018-01-05 16:45           ` Borislav Petkov
2018-01-05 17:08             ` Josh Poimboeuf
2018-01-06  0:30               ` Borislav Petkov
2018-01-06  8:23                 ` David Woodhouse
2018-01-06 17:02                   ` Borislav Petkov
2018-01-07  9:40                     ` David Woodhouse
2018-01-07 11:46                       ` Borislav Petkov
2018-01-07 12:21                         ` David Woodhouse [this message]
2018-01-07 14:03                           ` Borislav Petkov
2018-01-08 21:50                             ` David Woodhouse
2018-01-08  5:06                 ` Josh Poimboeuf
2018-01-08  7:55                   ` Woodhouse, David
2018-01-05 17:12             ` Woodhouse, David
2018-01-05 17:28               ` Linus Torvalds
2018-01-05 17:48                 ` David Woodhouse
2018-01-05 18:05                 ` Andi Kleen
2018-01-05 20:32                 ` Woodhouse, David
2018-01-05 21:11                   ` Brian Gerst
2018-01-05 22:16                     ` Woodhouse, David
2018-01-05 22:43                       ` Borislav Petkov
2018-01-05 22:00                 ` Woodhouse, David
2018-01-05 22:06                   ` Borislav Petkov
2018-01-05 23:50                   ` Linus Torvalds
2018-01-06 10:53                     ` Woodhouse, David
2018-01-04 14:36   ` [PATCH v3 02/13] x86/retpoline/crypto: Convert crypto assembler indirect jumps David Woodhouse
2018-01-04 14:37   ` [PATCH v3 03/13] x86/retpoline/entry: Convert entry " David Woodhouse
2018-01-04 14:46     ` Dave Hansen
2018-01-04 14:49       ` Woodhouse, David
2018-01-04 14:37   ` [PATCH v3 04/13] x86/retpoline/ftrace: Convert ftrace " David Woodhouse
2018-01-04 14:37   ` [PATCH v3 05/13] x86/retpoline/hyperv: Convert " David Woodhouse
2018-01-04 14:37   ` [PATCH v3 06/13] x86/retpoline/xen: Convert Xen hypercall " David Woodhouse
2018-01-04 15:10     ` Juergen Gross
2018-01-04 15:18       ` David Woodhouse
2018-01-04 15:54     ` Juergen Gross
2018-01-04 14:37   ` [PATCH v3 07/13] x86/retpoline/checksum32: Convert assembler " David Woodhouse
2018-01-04 14:37   ` [PATCH v3 08/13] x86/alternatives: Add missing \n at end of ALTERNATIVE inline asm David Woodhouse
2018-01-05 13:04     ` [tip:x86/pti] x86/alternatives: Add missing '\n' " tip-bot for David Woodhouse
2018-01-04 14:37   ` [PATCH v3 09/13] x86/retpoline/irq32: Convert assembler indirect jumps David Woodhouse
2018-01-04 14:37   ` [PATCH v3 10/13] x86/retpoline/pvops: " David Woodhouse
2018-01-04 15:02     ` Juergen Gross
2018-01-04 15:12       ` Woodhouse, David
2018-01-04 15:18       ` Andrew Cooper
2018-01-04 16:04         ` Juergen Gross
2018-01-04 16:37       ` Andi Kleen
2018-01-04 14:37   ` [PATCH v3 11/13] retpoline/taint: Taint kernel for missing retpoline in compiler David Woodhouse
2018-01-04 22:06     ` Justin Forbes
2018-01-04 14:37   ` [PATCH v3 12/13] retpoline/objtool: Disable some objtool warnings David Woodhouse
2018-01-04 14:37   ` [PATCH v3 13/13] retpoline: Attempt to quiten objtool warning for unreachable code David Woodhouse
2018-01-04 16:18   ` [RFC] Retpoline: Binary mitigation for branch-target-injection (aka "Spectre") Andy Lutomirski
2018-01-04 16:24     ` David Woodhouse
2018-01-05 10:49     ` Paul Turner
2018-01-05 11:43       ` Woodhouse, David

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