All of lore.kernel.org
 help / color / mirror / Atom feed
From: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com>
To: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-arch@vger.kernel.org, akpm@linux-foundation.org,
	kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com, gregkh@linuxfoundation.org,
	Christian Lamparter <chunkeey@gmail.com>,
	linux-wireless@vger.kernel.org, tglx@linutronix.de,
	Johannes Berg <johannes@sipsolutions.net>,
	torvalds@linux-foundation.org,
	"David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net>,
	Elena Reshetova <elena.reshetova@intel.com>,
	alan@linux.intel.com
Subject: [PATCH v4 10/10] nl80211: sanitize array index in parse_txq_params
Date: Thu, 18 Jan 2018 16:02:41 -0800	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <151632015637.21271.10452415430644852207.stgit@dwillia2-desk3.amr.corp.intel.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <151632009605.21271.11304291057104672116.stgit@dwillia2-desk3.amr.corp.intel.com>

Wireless drivers rely on parse_txq_params to validate that
txq_params->ac is less than NL80211_NUM_ACS by the time the low-level
driver's ->conf_tx() handler is called. Use a new helper, 'array_idx',
to sanitize txq_params->ac with respect to speculation. I.e. ensure that
any speculation into ->conf_tx() handlers is done with a value of
txq_params->ac that is within the bounds of [0, NL80211_NUM_ACS).

Reported-by: Christian Lamparter <chunkeey@gmail.com>
Reported-by: Elena Reshetova <elena.reshetova@intel.com>
Cc: Johannes Berg <johannes@sipsolutions.net>
Cc: "David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net>
Cc: linux-wireless@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com>
---
 include/linux/nospec.h |   21 +++++++++++++++++++++
 net/wireless/nl80211.c |   10 +++++++---
 2 files changed, 28 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)

diff --git a/include/linux/nospec.h b/include/linux/nospec.h
index f841c11f3f1f..8af35be1869e 100644
--- a/include/linux/nospec.h
+++ b/include/linux/nospec.h
@@ -41,4 +41,25 @@ static inline unsigned long array_ptr_mask(unsigned long idx, unsigned long sz)
 	__u._bit &= _mask;						\
 	__u._ptr;							\
 })
+
+/**
+ * array_idx - Generate a pointer to an array index, ensuring the
+ * pointer is bounded under speculation to NULL.
+ *
+ * @idx: the index of the element, must be less than LONG_MAX
+ * @sz: the number of elements in the array, must be less than LONG_MAX
+ *
+ * If @idx falls in the interval [0, @sz), returns &@idx otherwise
+ * returns NULL.
+ */
+#define array_idx(idx, sz)						\
+({									\
+	union { typeof((idx)) *_ptr; unsigned long _bit; } __u;		\
+	typeof(idx) *_i = &(idx);					\
+	unsigned long _mask = array_ptr_mask(*_i, (sz));		\
+									\
+	__u._ptr = _i;							\
+	__u._bit &= _mask;						\
+	__u._ptr;							\
+})
 #endif /* __NOSPEC_H__ */
diff --git a/net/wireless/nl80211.c b/net/wireless/nl80211.c
index 2b3dbcd40e46..202cb1dc03ee 100644
--- a/net/wireless/nl80211.c
+++ b/net/wireless/nl80211.c
@@ -16,6 +16,7 @@
 #include <linux/nl80211.h>
 #include <linux/rtnetlink.h>
 #include <linux/netlink.h>
+#include <linux/nospec.h>
 #include <linux/etherdevice.h>
 #include <net/net_namespace.h>
 #include <net/genetlink.h>
@@ -2056,20 +2057,23 @@ static const struct nla_policy txq_params_policy[NL80211_TXQ_ATTR_MAX + 1] = {
 static int parse_txq_params(struct nlattr *tb[],
 			    struct ieee80211_txq_params *txq_params)
 {
+	u8 ac, *idx;
+
 	if (!tb[NL80211_TXQ_ATTR_AC] || !tb[NL80211_TXQ_ATTR_TXOP] ||
 	    !tb[NL80211_TXQ_ATTR_CWMIN] || !tb[NL80211_TXQ_ATTR_CWMAX] ||
 	    !tb[NL80211_TXQ_ATTR_AIFS])
 		return -EINVAL;
 
-	txq_params->ac = nla_get_u8(tb[NL80211_TXQ_ATTR_AC]);
+	ac = nla_get_u8(tb[NL80211_TXQ_ATTR_AC]);
 	txq_params->txop = nla_get_u16(tb[NL80211_TXQ_ATTR_TXOP]);
 	txq_params->cwmin = nla_get_u16(tb[NL80211_TXQ_ATTR_CWMIN]);
 	txq_params->cwmax = nla_get_u16(tb[NL80211_TXQ_ATTR_CWMAX]);
 	txq_params->aifs = nla_get_u8(tb[NL80211_TXQ_ATTR_AIFS]);
 
-	if (txq_params->ac >= NL80211_NUM_ACS)
+	idx = array_idx(ac, NL80211_NUM_ACS);
+	if (!idx)
 		return -EINVAL;
-
+	txq_params->ac = *idx;
 	return 0;
 }
 

WARNING: multiple messages have this Message-ID (diff)
From: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams-ral2JQCrhuEAvxtiuMwx3w@public.gmane.org>
To: linux-kernel-u79uwXL29TY76Z2rM5mHXA@public.gmane.org
Cc: linux-arch-u79uwXL29TY76Z2rM5mHXA@public.gmane.org,
	akpm-de/tnXTf+JLsfHDXvbKv3WD2FQJk+8+b@public.gmane.org,
	kernel-hardening-ZwoEplunGu1jrUoiu81ncdBPR1lH4CV8@public.gmane.org,
	gregkh-hQyY1W1yCW8ekmWlsbkhG0B+6BGkLq7r@public.gmane.org,
	Christian Lamparter
	<chunkeey-Re5JQEeQqe8AvxtiuMwx3w@public.gmane.org>,
	linux-wireless-u79uwXL29TY76Z2rM5mHXA@public.gmane.org,
	tglx-hfZtesqFncYOwBW4kG4KsQ@public.gmane.org,
	Johannes Berg <johannes-cdvu00un1VgdHxzADdlk8Q@public.gmane.org>,
	torvalds-de/tnXTf+JLsfHDXvbKv3WD2FQJk+8+b@public.gmane.org,
	"David S. Miller" <davem-fT/PcQaiUtIeIZ0/mPfg9Q@public.gmane.org>,
	Elena Reshetova
	<elena.reshetova-ral2JQCrhuEAvxtiuMwx3w@public.gmane.org>,
	alan-VuQAYsv1563Yd54FQh9/CA@public.gmane.org
Subject: [PATCH v4 10/10] nl80211: sanitize array index in parse_txq_params
Date: Thu, 18 Jan 2018 16:02:41 -0800	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <151632015637.21271.10452415430644852207.stgit@dwillia2-desk3.amr.corp.intel.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <151632009605.21271.11304291057104672116.stgit-p8uTFz9XbKj2zm6wflaqv1nYeNYlB/vhral2JQCrhuEAvxtiuMwx3w@public.gmane.org>

Wireless drivers rely on parse_txq_params to validate that
txq_params->ac is less than NL80211_NUM_ACS by the time the low-level
driver's ->conf_tx() handler is called. Use a new helper, 'array_idx',
to sanitize txq_params->ac with respect to speculation. I.e. ensure that
any speculation into ->conf_tx() handlers is done with a value of
txq_params->ac that is within the bounds of [0, NL80211_NUM_ACS).

Reported-by: Christian Lamparter <chunkeey-Re5JQEeQqe8AvxtiuMwx3w@public.gmane.org>
Reported-by: Elena Reshetova <elena.reshetova-ral2JQCrhuEAvxtiuMwx3w@public.gmane.org>
Cc: Johannes Berg <johannes-cdvu00un1VgdHxzADdlk8Q@public.gmane.org>
Cc: "David S. Miller" <davem-fT/PcQaiUtIeIZ0/mPfg9Q@public.gmane.org>
Cc: linux-wireless-u79uwXL29TY76Z2rM5mHXA@public.gmane.org
Signed-off-by: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams-ral2JQCrhuEAvxtiuMwx3w@public.gmane.org>
---
 include/linux/nospec.h |   21 +++++++++++++++++++++
 net/wireless/nl80211.c |   10 +++++++---
 2 files changed, 28 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)

diff --git a/include/linux/nospec.h b/include/linux/nospec.h
index f841c11f3f1f..8af35be1869e 100644
--- a/include/linux/nospec.h
+++ b/include/linux/nospec.h
@@ -41,4 +41,25 @@ static inline unsigned long array_ptr_mask(unsigned long idx, unsigned long sz)
 	__u._bit &= _mask;						\
 	__u._ptr;							\
 })
+
+/**
+ * array_idx - Generate a pointer to an array index, ensuring the
+ * pointer is bounded under speculation to NULL.
+ *
+ * @idx: the index of the element, must be less than LONG_MAX
+ * @sz: the number of elements in the array, must be less than LONG_MAX
+ *
+ * If @idx falls in the interval [0, @sz), returns &@idx otherwise
+ * returns NULL.
+ */
+#define array_idx(idx, sz)						\
+({									\
+	union { typeof((idx)) *_ptr; unsigned long _bit; } __u;		\
+	typeof(idx) *_i = &(idx);					\
+	unsigned long _mask = array_ptr_mask(*_i, (sz));		\
+									\
+	__u._ptr = _i;							\
+	__u._bit &= _mask;						\
+	__u._ptr;							\
+})
 #endif /* __NOSPEC_H__ */
diff --git a/net/wireless/nl80211.c b/net/wireless/nl80211.c
index 2b3dbcd40e46..202cb1dc03ee 100644
--- a/net/wireless/nl80211.c
+++ b/net/wireless/nl80211.c
@@ -16,6 +16,7 @@
 #include <linux/nl80211.h>
 #include <linux/rtnetlink.h>
 #include <linux/netlink.h>
+#include <linux/nospec.h>
 #include <linux/etherdevice.h>
 #include <net/net_namespace.h>
 #include <net/genetlink.h>
@@ -2056,20 +2057,23 @@ static const struct nla_policy txq_params_policy[NL80211_TXQ_ATTR_MAX + 1] = {
 static int parse_txq_params(struct nlattr *tb[],
 			    struct ieee80211_txq_params *txq_params)
 {
+	u8 ac, *idx;
+
 	if (!tb[NL80211_TXQ_ATTR_AC] || !tb[NL80211_TXQ_ATTR_TXOP] ||
 	    !tb[NL80211_TXQ_ATTR_CWMIN] || !tb[NL80211_TXQ_ATTR_CWMAX] ||
 	    !tb[NL80211_TXQ_ATTR_AIFS])
 		return -EINVAL;
 
-	txq_params->ac = nla_get_u8(tb[NL80211_TXQ_ATTR_AC]);
+	ac = nla_get_u8(tb[NL80211_TXQ_ATTR_AC]);
 	txq_params->txop = nla_get_u16(tb[NL80211_TXQ_ATTR_TXOP]);
 	txq_params->cwmin = nla_get_u16(tb[NL80211_TXQ_ATTR_CWMIN]);
 	txq_params->cwmax = nla_get_u16(tb[NL80211_TXQ_ATTR_CWMAX]);
 	txq_params->aifs = nla_get_u8(tb[NL80211_TXQ_ATTR_AIFS]);
 
-	if (txq_params->ac >= NL80211_NUM_ACS)
+	idx = array_idx(ac, NL80211_NUM_ACS);
+	if (!idx)
 		return -EINVAL;

WARNING: multiple messages have this Message-ID (diff)
From: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com>
To: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-arch@vger.kernel.org, akpm@linux-foundation.org,
	kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com, gregkh@linuxfoundation.org,
	Christian Lamparter <chunkeey@gmail.com>,
	linux-wireless@vger.kernel.org, tglx@linutronix.de,
	Johannes Berg <johannes@sipsolutions.net>,
	torvalds@linux-foundation.org,
	"David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net>,
	Elena Reshetova <elena.reshetova@intel.com>,
	alan@linux.intel.com
Subject: [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v4 10/10] nl80211: sanitize array index in parse_txq_params
Date: Thu, 18 Jan 2018 16:02:41 -0800	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <151632015637.21271.10452415430644852207.stgit@dwillia2-desk3.amr.corp.intel.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <151632009605.21271.11304291057104672116.stgit@dwillia2-desk3.amr.corp.intel.com>

Wireless drivers rely on parse_txq_params to validate that
txq_params->ac is less than NL80211_NUM_ACS by the time the low-level
driver's ->conf_tx() handler is called. Use a new helper, 'array_idx',
to sanitize txq_params->ac with respect to speculation. I.e. ensure that
any speculation into ->conf_tx() handlers is done with a value of
txq_params->ac that is within the bounds of [0, NL80211_NUM_ACS).

Reported-by: Christian Lamparter <chunkeey@gmail.com>
Reported-by: Elena Reshetova <elena.reshetova@intel.com>
Cc: Johannes Berg <johannes@sipsolutions.net>
Cc: "David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net>
Cc: linux-wireless@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com>
---
 include/linux/nospec.h |   21 +++++++++++++++++++++
 net/wireless/nl80211.c |   10 +++++++---
 2 files changed, 28 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)

diff --git a/include/linux/nospec.h b/include/linux/nospec.h
index f841c11f3f1f..8af35be1869e 100644
--- a/include/linux/nospec.h
+++ b/include/linux/nospec.h
@@ -41,4 +41,25 @@ static inline unsigned long array_ptr_mask(unsigned long idx, unsigned long sz)
 	__u._bit &= _mask;						\
 	__u._ptr;							\
 })
+
+/**
+ * array_idx - Generate a pointer to an array index, ensuring the
+ * pointer is bounded under speculation to NULL.
+ *
+ * @idx: the index of the element, must be less than LONG_MAX
+ * @sz: the number of elements in the array, must be less than LONG_MAX
+ *
+ * If @idx falls in the interval [0, @sz), returns &@idx otherwise
+ * returns NULL.
+ */
+#define array_idx(idx, sz)						\
+({									\
+	union { typeof((idx)) *_ptr; unsigned long _bit; } __u;		\
+	typeof(idx) *_i = &(idx);					\
+	unsigned long _mask = array_ptr_mask(*_i, (sz));		\
+									\
+	__u._ptr = _i;							\
+	__u._bit &= _mask;						\
+	__u._ptr;							\
+})
 #endif /* __NOSPEC_H__ */
diff --git a/net/wireless/nl80211.c b/net/wireless/nl80211.c
index 2b3dbcd40e46..202cb1dc03ee 100644
--- a/net/wireless/nl80211.c
+++ b/net/wireless/nl80211.c
@@ -16,6 +16,7 @@
 #include <linux/nl80211.h>
 #include <linux/rtnetlink.h>
 #include <linux/netlink.h>
+#include <linux/nospec.h>
 #include <linux/etherdevice.h>
 #include <net/net_namespace.h>
 #include <net/genetlink.h>
@@ -2056,20 +2057,23 @@ static const struct nla_policy txq_params_policy[NL80211_TXQ_ATTR_MAX + 1] = {
 static int parse_txq_params(struct nlattr *tb[],
 			    struct ieee80211_txq_params *txq_params)
 {
+	u8 ac, *idx;
+
 	if (!tb[NL80211_TXQ_ATTR_AC] || !tb[NL80211_TXQ_ATTR_TXOP] ||
 	    !tb[NL80211_TXQ_ATTR_CWMIN] || !tb[NL80211_TXQ_ATTR_CWMAX] ||
 	    !tb[NL80211_TXQ_ATTR_AIFS])
 		return -EINVAL;
 
-	txq_params->ac = nla_get_u8(tb[NL80211_TXQ_ATTR_AC]);
+	ac = nla_get_u8(tb[NL80211_TXQ_ATTR_AC]);
 	txq_params->txop = nla_get_u16(tb[NL80211_TXQ_ATTR_TXOP]);
 	txq_params->cwmin = nla_get_u16(tb[NL80211_TXQ_ATTR_CWMIN]);
 	txq_params->cwmax = nla_get_u16(tb[NL80211_TXQ_ATTR_CWMAX]);
 	txq_params->aifs = nla_get_u8(tb[NL80211_TXQ_ATTR_AIFS]);
 
-	if (txq_params->ac >= NL80211_NUM_ACS)
+	idx = array_idx(ac, NL80211_NUM_ACS);
+	if (!idx)
 		return -EINVAL;
-
+	txq_params->ac = *idx;
 	return 0;
 }
 

  parent reply	other threads:[~2018-01-19  0:11 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 70+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2018-01-19  0:01 [PATCH v4 00/10] prevent bounds-check bypass via speculative execution Dan Williams
2018-01-19  0:01 ` [kernel-hardening] " Dan Williams
2018-01-19  0:01 ` Dan Williams
2018-01-19  0:01 ` [PATCH v4 01/10] Documentation: document array_ptr Dan Williams
2018-01-19  0:01   ` [kernel-hardening] " Dan Williams
2018-01-19  0:01 ` [PATCH v4 02/10] asm/nospec, array_ptr: sanitize speculative array de-references Dan Williams
2018-01-19  0:01   ` [kernel-hardening] " Dan Williams
2018-01-19 10:20   ` Jann Horn
2018-01-19 17:48     ` Adam Sampson
2018-01-19 17:48       ` Adam Sampson
2018-01-19 17:48       ` Adam Sampson
2018-01-19 17:48       ` Adam Sampson
2018-01-19 18:12       ` Dan Williams
2018-01-19 18:18         ` Will Deacon
2018-01-19 18:18           ` Will Deacon
2018-01-19 18:26           ` [kernel-hardening] " Dan Williams
2018-01-19 18:18     ` Linus Torvalds
2018-01-19 18:18       ` Linus Torvalds
2018-01-19 20:55       ` [kernel-hardening] " Dan Williams
2018-01-25  7:09   ` Cyril Novikov
2018-01-25  7:09     ` [kernel-hardening] " Cyril Novikov
2018-01-25 22:37     ` Dan Williams
2018-01-25 22:37       ` [kernel-hardening] " Dan Williams
2018-01-19  0:01 ` [PATCH v4 03/10] x86: implement array_ptr_mask() Dan Williams
2018-01-19  0:01   ` [kernel-hardening] " Dan Williams
2018-01-19  0:01 ` [PATCH v4 04/10] x86: introduce __uaccess_begin_nospec and ifence Dan Williams
2018-01-19  0:01   ` [kernel-hardening] " Dan Williams
2018-01-19  0:02 ` [PATCH v4 05/10] x86, __get_user: use __uaccess_begin_nospec Dan Williams
2018-01-19  0:02   ` [kernel-hardening] " Dan Williams
2018-01-19  0:02 ` [PATCH v4 06/10] x86, get_user: use pointer masking to limit speculation Dan Williams
2018-01-19  0:02   ` [kernel-hardening] " Dan Williams
2018-01-19  0:02 ` [PATCH v4 07/10] x86: narrow out of bounds syscalls to sys_read under speculation Dan Williams
2018-01-19  0:02   ` [kernel-hardening] " Dan Williams
2018-01-24 14:40   ` Jiri Slaby
2018-01-24 14:40     ` [kernel-hardening] " Jiri Slaby
2018-02-06 19:29   ` Luis Henriques
2018-02-06 19:48     ` Dan Williams
2018-02-06 20:26       ` Linus Torvalds
2018-02-06 20:37         ` Dan Williams
2018-02-06 20:42           ` Linus Torvalds
2018-02-06 20:43             ` Linus Torvalds
2018-02-06 20:49             ` Andy Lutomirski
2018-02-06 20:58               ` Linus Torvalds
2018-02-06 21:37                 ` Dan Williams
2018-02-06 22:52                   ` Linus Torvalds
2018-02-07  0:33                     ` Dan Williams
2018-02-07  1:23                       ` Linus Torvalds
2018-02-06 22:51       ` Luis Henriques
2018-02-06 22:51         ` Luis Henriques
2018-01-19  0:02 ` [PATCH v4 08/10] vfs, fdtable: prevent bounds-check bypass via speculative execution Dan Williams
2018-01-19  0:02   ` [kernel-hardening] " Dan Williams
2018-01-19  0:02 ` [PATCH v4 09/10] kvm, x86: fix spectre-v1 mitigation Dan Williams
2018-01-19  0:02   ` [kernel-hardening] " Dan Williams
2018-01-19  8:42   ` Paolo Bonzini
2018-01-19  8:42     ` [kernel-hardening] " Paolo Bonzini
2018-01-19  0:02 ` Dan Williams [this message]
2018-01-19  0:02   ` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v4 10/10] nl80211: sanitize array index in parse_txq_params Dan Williams
2018-01-19  0:02   ` Dan Williams
2018-01-21 10:37   ` Johannes Berg
2018-01-21 10:37     ` [kernel-hardening] " Johannes Berg
2018-01-21 10:37     ` Johannes Berg
2018-01-20  6:58 ` [PATCH v4 00/10] prevent bounds-check bypass via speculative execution Dan Williams
2018-01-20  6:58   ` [kernel-hardening] " Dan Williams
2018-01-20  6:58   ` Dan Williams
2018-01-20 16:56   ` Alexei Starovoitov
2018-01-20 16:56     ` [kernel-hardening] " Alexei Starovoitov
2018-01-20 16:56     ` Alexei Starovoitov
2018-01-20 17:07     ` Alexei Starovoitov
2018-01-20 17:07       ` [kernel-hardening] " Alexei Starovoitov
2018-01-20 17:07       ` Alexei Starovoitov

Reply instructions:

You may reply publicly to this message via plain-text email
using any one of the following methods:

* Save the following mbox file, import it into your mail client,
  and reply-to-all from there: mbox

  Avoid top-posting and favor interleaved quoting:
  https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Posting_style#Interleaved_style

* Reply using the --to, --cc, and --in-reply-to
  switches of git-send-email(1):

  git send-email \
    --in-reply-to=151632015637.21271.10452415430644852207.stgit@dwillia2-desk3.amr.corp.intel.com \
    --to=dan.j.williams@intel.com \
    --cc=akpm@linux-foundation.org \
    --cc=alan@linux.intel.com \
    --cc=chunkeey@gmail.com \
    --cc=davem@davemloft.net \
    --cc=elena.reshetova@intel.com \
    --cc=gregkh@linuxfoundation.org \
    --cc=johannes@sipsolutions.net \
    --cc=kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com \
    --cc=linux-arch@vger.kernel.org \
    --cc=linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org \
    --cc=linux-wireless@vger.kernel.org \
    --cc=tglx@linutronix.de \
    --cc=torvalds@linux-foundation.org \
    /path/to/YOUR_REPLY

  https://kernel.org/pub/software/scm/git/docs/git-send-email.html

* If your mail client supports setting the In-Reply-To header
  via mailto: links, try the mailto: link
Be sure your reply has a Subject: header at the top and a blank line before the message body.
This is an external index of several public inboxes,
see mirroring instructions on how to clone and mirror
all data and code used by this external index.