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From: Matt Weber <matthew.weber@rockwellcollins.com>
To: buildroot@busybox.net
Subject: [Buildroot] [PATCH v4 01/13] stack protector: moved option out of adv menu
Date: Tue, 23 Jan 2018 22:09:40 -0600	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <1516766992-48428-1-git-send-email-matthew.weber@rockwellcollins.com> (raw)

Signed-off-by: Matthew Weber <matthew.weber@rockwellcollins.com>
---
Changes
v1 -> v2
 - Broke out into an individual commit for the menu change (Arnout)

v2 -> v3
 - Moved back up to the menu instead of a submenu (Arnout)

v3 -> v4
 - None.
---
 Config.in | 112 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++------------------------------
 1 file changed, 57 insertions(+), 55 deletions(-)

diff --git a/Config.in b/Config.in
index 62d67ce..e7e5c2d 100644
--- a/Config.in
+++ b/Config.in
@@ -568,61 +568,6 @@ config BR2_GOOGLE_BREAKPAD_INCLUDE_FILES
 endif
 
 choice
-	bool "build code with Stack Smashing Protection"
-	default BR2_SSP_ALL if BR2_ENABLE_SSP # legacy
-	depends on BR2_TOOLCHAIN_HAS_SSP
-	help
-	  Enable stack smashing protection support using GCC's
-	  -fstack-protector option family.
-
-	  See
-	  http://www.linuxfromscratch.org/hints/downloads/files/ssp.txt
-	  for details.
-
-	  Note that this requires the toolchain to have SSP support.
-	  This is always the case for glibc and eglibc toolchain, but is
-	  optional in uClibc toolchains.
-
-config BR2_SSP_NONE
-	bool "None"
-	help
-	  Disable stack-smashing protection.
-
-config BR2_SSP_REGULAR
-	bool "-fstack-protector"
-	help
-	  Emit extra code to check for buffer overflows, such as stack
-	  smashing attacks. This is done by adding a guard variable to
-	  functions with vulnerable objects. This includes functions
-	  that call alloca, and functions with buffers larger than 8
-	  bytes. The guards are initialized when a function is entered
-	  and then checked when the function exits. If a guard check
-	  fails, an error message is printed and the program exits.
-
-config BR2_SSP_STRONG
-	bool "-fstack-protector-strong"
-	depends on BR2_TOOLCHAIN_GCC_AT_LEAST_4_9
-	help
-	  Like -fstack-protector but includes additional functions to be
-	  protected - those that have local array definitions, or have
-	  references to local frame addresses.
-
-comment "Stack Smashing Protection strong needs a toolchain w/ gcc >= 4.9"
-	depends on !BR2_TOOLCHAIN_GCC_AT_LEAST_4_9
-
-config BR2_SSP_ALL
-	bool "-fstack-protector-all"
-	help
-	  Like -fstack-protector except that all functions are
-	  protected. This option might have a significant performance
-	  impact on the compiled binaries.
-
-endchoice
-
-comment "Stack Smashing Protection needs a toolchain w/ SSP"
-	depends on !BR2_TOOLCHAIN_HAS_SSP
-
-choice
 	bool "libraries"
 	default BR2_SHARED_LIBS if BR2_BINFMT_SUPPORTS_SHARED
 	default BR2_STATIC_LIBS if !BR2_BINFMT_SUPPORTS_SHARED
@@ -732,6 +677,63 @@ config BR2_REPRODUCIBLE
 
 endmenu
 
+comment "Security Hardening Options"
+
+choice
+	bool "Stack Smashing Protection"
+	default BR2_SSP_ALL if BR2_ENABLE_SSP # legacy
+	depends on BR2_TOOLCHAIN_HAS_SSP
+	help
+	  Enable stack smashing protection support using GCC's
+	  -fstack-protector option family.
+
+	  See
+	  http://www.linuxfromscratch.org/hints/downloads/files/ssp.txt
+	  for details.
+
+	  Note that this requires the toolchain to have SSP support.
+	  This is always the case for glibc and eglibc toolchain, but is
+	  optional in uClibc toolchains.
+
+config BR2_SSP_NONE
+	bool "None"
+	help
+	  Disable stack-smashing protection.
+
+config BR2_SSP_REGULAR
+	bool "-fstack-protector"
+	help
+	  Emit extra code to check for buffer overflows, such as stack
+	  smashing attacks. This is done by adding a guard variable to
+	  functions with vulnerable objects. This includes functions
+	  that call alloca, and functions with buffers larger than 8
+	  bytes. The guards are initialized when a function is entered
+	  and then checked when the function exits. If a guard check
+	  fails, an error message is printed and the program exits.
+
+config BR2_SSP_STRONG
+	bool "-fstack-protector-strong"
+	depends on BR2_TOOLCHAIN_GCC_AT_LEAST_4_9
+	help
+	  Like -fstack-protector but includes additional functions to be
+	  protected - those that have local array definitions, or have
+	  references to local frame addresses.
+
+comment "Stack Smashing Protection strong needs a toolchain w/ gcc >= 4.9"
+	depends on !BR2_TOOLCHAIN_GCC_AT_LEAST_4_9
+
+config BR2_SSP_ALL
+	bool "-fstack-protector-all"
+	help
+	  Like -fstack-protector except that all functions are
+	  protected. This option might have a significant performance
+	  impact on the compiled binaries.
+
+endchoice
+
+comment "Stack Smashing Protection needs a toolchain w/ SSP"
+	depends on !BR2_TOOLCHAIN_HAS_SSP
+
 endmenu
 
 source "toolchain/Config.in"
-- 
1.9.1

             reply	other threads:[~2018-01-24  4:09 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 19+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2018-01-24  4:09 Matt Weber [this message]
2018-01-24  4:09 ` [Buildroot] [PATCH v4 02/13] security hardening: add RELFO, FORTIFY options Matt Weber
2018-01-28 14:20   ` Peter Korsgaard
2018-02-04 21:56   ` Matthew Weber
2018-04-26 15:55   ` Johan Oudinet
2018-04-27 13:05     ` Matthew Weber
2018-05-02 13:10       ` Matthew Weber
2018-01-24  4:09 ` [Buildroot] [PATCH v4 03/13] valgrind: correct linker flag seq Matt Weber
2018-01-24  4:09 ` [Buildroot] [PATCH v4 04/13] ncurses: " Matt Weber
2018-01-24  4:09 ` [Buildroot] [PATCH v4 05/13] boost: " Matt Weber
2018-01-24  4:09 ` [Buildroot] [PATCH v4 06/13] busybox: patch to remove -pie from LDFLAGS Matt Weber
2018-01-24  4:09 ` [Buildroot] [PATCH v4 07/13] libpcap: correct linker flag seq Matt Weber
2018-01-24  4:09 ` [Buildroot] [PATCH v4 08/13] iptables: " Matt Weber
2018-01-24  4:09 ` [Buildroot] [PATCH v4 09/13] zlib: correct linker flag sequence Matt Weber
2018-01-24  4:09 ` [Buildroot] [PATCH v4 10/13] ustr: " Matt Weber
2018-01-24  4:09 ` [Buildroot] [PATCH v4 11/13] tcl: " Matt Weber
2018-01-24  4:09 ` [Buildroot] [PATCH v4 12/13] readline: " Matt Weber
2018-01-24  4:09 ` [Buildroot] [PATCH v4 13/13] libcap: corrected " Matt Weber
2018-01-28 14:17 ` [Buildroot] [PATCH v4 01/13] stack protector: moved option out of adv menu Peter Korsgaard

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