From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Return-Path: Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S1753485AbeBKPT2 (ORCPT ); Sun, 11 Feb 2018 10:19:28 -0500 Received: from smtp-fw-4101.amazon.com ([72.21.198.25]:25710 "EHLO smtp-fw-4101.amazon.com" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S1751077AbeBKPT1 (ORCPT ); Sun, 11 Feb 2018 10:19:27 -0500 X-IronPort-AV: E=Sophos;i="5.46,496,1511827200"; d="scan'208";a="707728435" From: David Woodhouse To: x86@kernel.org, mingo@kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Subject: [PATCH v2.1] x86/speculation: Use IBRS if available before calling into firmware Date: Sun, 11 Feb 2018 15:19:19 +0000 Message-Id: <1518362359-1005-1-git-send-email-dwmw@amazon.co.uk> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.7.4 In-Reply-To: <1518305967-31356-1-git-send-email-dwmw@amazon.co.uk> References: <1518305967-31356-1-git-send-email-dwmw@amazon.co.uk> Sender: linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Retpoline means the kernel is safe because it has no indirect branches. But firmware isn't, so use IBRS for firmware calls if it's available. Signed-off-by: David Woodhouse --- Helps to include the right header file. arch/x86/include/asm/apm.h | 6 ++++++ arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h | 1 + arch/x86/include/asm/efi.h | 17 +++++++++++++++-- arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h | 37 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++--------- arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c | 12 +++++++++++- drivers/watchdog/hpwdt.c | 3 +++ 6 files changed, 64 insertions(+), 12 deletions(-) diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/apm.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/apm.h index 4d4015d..c356098 100644 --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/apm.h +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/apm.h @@ -7,6 +7,8 @@ #ifndef _ASM_X86_MACH_DEFAULT_APM_H #define _ASM_X86_MACH_DEFAULT_APM_H +#include + #ifdef APM_ZERO_SEGS # define APM_DO_ZERO_SEGS \ "pushl %%ds\n\t" \ @@ -32,6 +34,7 @@ static inline void apm_bios_call_asm(u32 func, u32 ebx_in, u32 ecx_in, * N.B. We do NOT need a cld after the BIOS call * because we always save and restore the flags. */ + firmware_restrict_branch_speculation_start(); __asm__ __volatile__(APM_DO_ZERO_SEGS "pushl %%edi\n\t" "pushl %%ebp\n\t" @@ -44,6 +47,7 @@ static inline void apm_bios_call_asm(u32 func, u32 ebx_in, u32 ecx_in, "=S" (*esi) : "a" (func), "b" (ebx_in), "c" (ecx_in) : "memory", "cc"); + firmware_restrict_branch_speculation_end(); } static inline bool apm_bios_call_simple_asm(u32 func, u32 ebx_in, @@ -56,6 +60,7 @@ static inline bool apm_bios_call_simple_asm(u32 func, u32 ebx_in, * N.B. We do NOT need a cld after the BIOS call * because we always save and restore the flags. */ + firmware_restrict_branch_speculation_start(); __asm__ __volatile__(APM_DO_ZERO_SEGS "pushl %%edi\n\t" "pushl %%ebp\n\t" @@ -68,6 +73,7 @@ static inline bool apm_bios_call_simple_asm(u32 func, u32 ebx_in, "=S" (si) : "a" (func), "b" (ebx_in), "c" (ecx_in) : "memory", "cc"); + firmware_restrict_branch_speculation_end(); return error; } diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h index 73b5fff..66c1434 100644 --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h @@ -211,6 +211,7 @@ #define X86_FEATURE_RSB_CTXSW ( 7*32+19) /* "" Fill RSB on context switches */ #define X86_FEATURE_USE_IBPB ( 7*32+21) /* "" Indirect Branch Prediction Barrier enabled */ +#define X86_FEATURE_USE_IBRS_FW ( 7*32+22) /* "" Use IBRS during runtime firmware calls */ /* Virtualization flags: Linux defined, word 8 */ #define X86_FEATURE_TPR_SHADOW ( 8*32+ 0) /* Intel TPR Shadow */ diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/efi.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/efi.h index 85f6ccb..a399c1e 100644 --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/efi.h +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/efi.h @@ -6,6 +6,7 @@ #include #include #include +#include /* * We map the EFI regions needed for runtime services non-contiguously, @@ -36,8 +37,18 @@ extern asmlinkage unsigned long efi_call_phys(void *, ...); -#define arch_efi_call_virt_setup() kernel_fpu_begin() -#define arch_efi_call_virt_teardown() kernel_fpu_end() +#define arch_efi_call_virt_setup() \ +({ \ + kernel_fpu_begin(); \ + firmware_restrict_branch_speculation_start(); \ +}) + +#define arch_efi_call_virt_teardown() \ +({ \ + firmware_restrict_branch_speculation_end(); \ + kernel_fpu_end(); \ +}) + /* * Wrap all the virtual calls in a way that forces the parameters on the stack. @@ -73,6 +84,7 @@ struct efi_scratch { efi_sync_low_kernel_mappings(); \ preempt_disable(); \ __kernel_fpu_begin(); \ + firmware_restrict_branch_speculation_start(); \ \ if (efi_scratch.use_pgd) { \ efi_scratch.prev_cr3 = __read_cr3(); \ @@ -91,6 +103,7 @@ struct efi_scratch { __flush_tlb_all(); \ } \ \ + firmware_restrict_branch_speculation_end(); \ __kernel_fpu_end(); \ preempt_enable(); \ }) diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h index 300cc15..788c4da 100644 --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h @@ -162,17 +162,36 @@ static inline void vmexit_fill_RSB(void) #endif } +#define alternative_msr_write(_msr, _val, _feature) \ + asm volatile(ALTERNATIVE("", \ + "movl %[msr], %%ecx\n\t" \ + "movl %[val], %%eax\n\t" \ + "movl $0, %%edx\n\t" \ + "wrmsr", \ + _feature) \ + : : [msr] "i" (_msr), [val] "i" (_val) \ + : "eax", "ecx", "edx", "memory") + static inline void indirect_branch_prediction_barrier(void) { - asm volatile(ALTERNATIVE("", - "movl %[msr], %%ecx\n\t" - "movl %[val], %%eax\n\t" - "movl $0, %%edx\n\t" - "wrmsr", - X86_FEATURE_USE_IBPB) - : : [msr] "i" (MSR_IA32_PRED_CMD), - [val] "i" (PRED_CMD_IBPB) - : "eax", "ecx", "edx", "memory"); + alternative_msr_write(MSR_IA32_PRED_CMD, PRED_CMD_IBPB, + X86_FEATURE_USE_IBPB); +} + +/* + * With retpoline, we must use IBRS to restrict branch prediction + * before calling into firmware. + */ +static inline void firmware_restrict_branch_speculation_start(void) +{ + alternative_msr_write(MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL, SPEC_CTRL_IBRS, + X86_FEATURE_USE_IBRS_FW); +} + +static inline void firmware_restrict_branch_speculation_end(void) +{ + alternative_msr_write(MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL, 0, + X86_FEATURE_USE_IBRS_FW); } #endif /* __ASSEMBLY__ */ diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c index 61152aa..6f6d763 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c @@ -303,6 +303,15 @@ static void __init spectre_v2_select_mitigation(void) setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_USE_IBPB); pr_info("Enabling Indirect Branch Prediction Barrier\n"); } + + /* + * Retpoline means the kernel is safe because it has no indirect + * branches. But firmware isn't, so use IBRS to protect that. + */ + if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_IBRS)) { + setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_USE_IBRS_FW); + pr_info("Enabling Restricted Speculation for firmware calls\n"); + } } #undef pr_fmt @@ -332,8 +341,9 @@ ssize_t cpu_show_spectre_v2(struct device *dev, if (!boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_SPECTRE_V2)) return sprintf(buf, "Not affected\n"); - return sprintf(buf, "%s%s%s\n", spectre_v2_strings[spectre_v2_enabled], + return sprintf(buf, "%s%s%s%s\n", spectre_v2_strings[spectre_v2_enabled], boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_USE_IBPB) ? ", IBPB" : "", + boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_USE_IBRS_FW) ? ", IBRS_FW" : "", spectre_v2_module_string()); } #endif diff --git a/drivers/watchdog/hpwdt.c b/drivers/watchdog/hpwdt.c index 67fbe35..bab3721 100644 --- a/drivers/watchdog/hpwdt.c +++ b/drivers/watchdog/hpwdt.c @@ -38,6 +38,7 @@ #endif /* CONFIG_HPWDT_NMI_DECODING */ #include #include +#include #define HPWDT_VERSION "1.4.0" #define SECS_TO_TICKS(secs) ((secs) * 1000 / 128) @@ -486,11 +487,13 @@ static int hpwdt_pretimeout(unsigned int ulReason, struct pt_regs *regs) if (!hpwdt_nmi_decoding) return NMI_DONE; + firmware_restrict_branch_speculation_start(); spin_lock_irqsave(&rom_lock, rom_pl); if (!die_nmi_called && !is_icru && !is_uefi) asminline_call(&cmn_regs, cru_rom_addr); die_nmi_called = 1; spin_unlock_irqrestore(&rom_lock, rom_pl); + firmware_restrict_branch_speculation_end(); if (allow_kdump) hpwdt_stop(); -- 2.7.4