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From: Dianzhang Chen <dianzhangchen0@gmail.com>
To: akpm@linux-foundation.org
Cc: gorcunov@gmail.com, kristina.martsenko@arm.com,
	ebiederm@xmission.com, j.neuschaefer@gmx.net, jannh@google.com,
	mortonm@chromium.org, yang.shi@linux.alibaba.com,
	linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
	Dianzhang Chen <dianzhangchen0@gmail.com>
Subject: [PATCH] kernel/sys.c: fix possible spectre-v1 in do_prlimit()
Date: Mon, 27 May 2019 15:23:08 +0800	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <1558941788-969-1-git-send-email-dianzhangchen0@gmail.com> (raw)

The `resource` in do_prlimit() is controlled by userspace via syscall: setrlimit(defined in kernel/sys.c), hence leading to a potential exploitation of the Spectre variant 1 vulnerability.
The relevant code in do_prlimit() is as below:

if (resource >= RLIM_NLIMITS)
        return -EINVAL;
...
rlim = tsk->signal->rlim + resource;    // use resource as index
...
            *old_rlim = *rlim;

Fix this by sanitizing resource before using it to index tsk->signal->rlim.

Signed-off-by: Dianzhang Chen <dianzhangchen0@gmail.com>
---
 kernel/sys.c | 2 ++
 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+)

diff --git a/kernel/sys.c b/kernel/sys.c
index bdbfe8d..7eba1ca 100644
--- a/kernel/sys.c
+++ b/kernel/sys.c
@@ -1532,6 +1532,8 @@ int do_prlimit(struct task_struct *tsk, unsigned int resource,
 
 	if (resource >= RLIM_NLIMITS)
 		return -EINVAL;
+
+	resource = array_index_nospec(resource, RLIM_NLIMITS);
 	if (new_rlim) {
 		if (new_rlim->rlim_cur > new_rlim->rlim_max)
 			return -EINVAL;
-- 
2.7.4


             reply	other threads:[~2019-05-27  7:23 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 7+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2019-05-27  7:23 Dianzhang Chen [this message]
2019-05-27  7:38 ` [PATCH] kernel/sys.c: fix possible spectre-v1 in do_prlimit() Cyrill Gorcunov
     [not found] <CAFbcbMATqCCpCR596FTaSdUV50nQSxDgXMd1ASgXu1CE+DJqTw@mail.gmail.com>
2019-05-28  7:10 ` Cyrill Gorcunov
2019-05-29  2:39   ` Dianzhang Chen
2019-05-29 12:18     ` Cyrill Gorcunov
2019-05-30  5:45       ` Dianzhang Chen
2019-05-30  7:58         ` Cyrill Gorcunov

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