Re: [tip: locking/core] lockdep: Fix usage_traceoverflow

[Chris Wilson <chris@chris-wilson.co.uk>]

Quoting Chris Wilson (2020-10-28 17:40:48)
> Quoting Chris Wilson (2020-10-27 16:34:53)
> > Quoting Peter Zijlstra (2020-10-27 15:45:33)
> > > On Tue, Oct 27, 2020 at 01:29:10PM +0000, Chris Wilson wrote:
> > > 
> > > > <4> [304.908891] hm#2, depth: 6 [6], 3425cfea6ff31f7f != 547d92e9ec2ab9af
> > > > <4> [304.908897] WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 5658 at kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3679 check_chain_key+0x1a4/0x1f0
> > > 
> > > Urgh, I don't think I've _ever_ seen that warning trigger.
> > > 
> > > The comments that go with it suggest memory corruption is the most
> > > likely trigger of it. Is it easy to trigger?
> > 
> > For the automated CI, yes, the few machines that run that particular HW
> > test seem to hit it regularly. I have not yet reproduced it for myself.
> > I thought it looked like something kasan would provide some insight for
> > and we should get a kasan run through CI over the w/e. I suspect we've
> > feed in some garbage and called it a lock.
> 
> I tracked it down to a second invocation of lock_acquire_shared_recursive()
> intermingled with some other regular mutexes (in this case ww_mutex).
> 
> We hit this path in validate_chain():
>         /*
>          * Mark recursive read, as we jump over it when
>          * building dependencies (just like we jump over
>          * trylock entries):
>          */
>         if (ret == 2)
>                 hlock->read = 2;
> 
> and that is modifying hlock_id() and so the chain-key, after it has
> already been computed.
> 
> diff --git a/kernel/locking/lockdep.c b/kernel/locking/lockdep.c
> index 035f81b1cc87..f193f756e1e3 100644
> --- a/kernel/locking/lockdep.c
> +++ b/kernel/locking/lockdep.c
> @@ -4831,7 +4831,7 @@ static int __lock_acquire(struct lockdep_map *lock, unsigned int subclass,
>         if (!validate_chain(curr, hlock, chain_head, chain_key))
>                 return 0;
> 
> -       curr->curr_chain_key = chain_key;
> +       curr->curr_chain_key = iterate_chain_key(chain_key, hlock_id(hlock));
>         curr->lockdep_depth++;
>         check_chain_key(curr);

No, chain_key should not be chained onto itself again, but I hope it
makes the issue clear nevertheless.
-Chris