From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Return-Path: X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.4.0 (2014-02-07) on aws-us-west-2-korg-lkml-1.web.codeaurora.org X-Spam-Level: X-Spam-Status: No, score=-18.6 required=3.0 tests=BAYES_00,DKIM_INVALID, DKIM_SIGNED,HEADER_FROM_DIFFERENT_DOMAINS,INCLUDES_CR_TRAILER,INCLUDES_PATCH, MAILING_LIST_MULTI,MENTIONS_GIT_HOSTING,SPF_HELO_NONE,SPF_PASS autolearn=unavailable autolearn_force=no version=3.4.0 Received: from mail.kernel.org (mail.kernel.org [198.145.29.99]) by smtp.lore.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id EF1C7C433B4 for ; Thu, 20 May 2021 12:00:05 +0000 (UTC) Received: from vger.kernel.org (vger.kernel.org [23.128.96.18]) by mail.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id CAE1361006 for ; Thu, 20 May 2021 12:00:05 +0000 (UTC) Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S241384AbhETMBZ (ORCPT ); Thu, 20 May 2021 08:01:25 -0400 Received: from lindbergh.monkeyblade.net ([23.128.96.19]:48700 "EHLO lindbergh.monkeyblade.net" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S241924AbhETMAw (ORCPT ); Thu, 20 May 2021 08:00:52 -0400 Received: from galois.linutronix.de (Galois.linutronix.de [IPv6:2a0a:51c0:0:12e:550::1]) by lindbergh.monkeyblade.net (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 6B4F8C04FF32; Thu, 20 May 2021 03:22:21 -0700 (PDT) Date: Thu, 20 May 2021 10:22:18 -0000 DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=linutronix.de; s=2020; t=1621506139; h=from:from:sender:sender:reply-to:reply-to:subject:subject:date:date: message-id:message-id:to:to:cc:cc:mime-version:mime-version: content-type:content-type: content-transfer-encoding:content-transfer-encoding: in-reply-to:in-reply-to:references:references; bh=IB5WzEny1VMFztKI/99vS1hgVslzBteBSCM3j6Jl6P8=; b=RjTutPHA9BN4olBfxAtmwR9szJ+hrDlIc4QumZx2b8Jup330HvXbS0UoJOGdF940K+obfS dWiAuPre3m3JWwrnnbcQbm2TiqRucJIRmpTvZnOtj1P7n4m6oRMtaOiaIPKpEXF9pD8xHm xuTZVhgNtilCddHrDFD/C+7q+1ZMmerK8m6c7/wQXxiEFUl3JsXU4GS+8oiTm38Xjg12ca mbP2n13jQ14XXtgTqmknnX/4hudlAgUMeOduHGLu5LmxBj6RqujnDYC+s4QdSLfF52oQs/ LVO2EE2aMUu2KdjFYp070V1CIUjUW4qLOWDrNDC0Q1PVBgeYtfHqw6Rsg5Wrkw== DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=ed25519-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=linutronix.de; s=2020e; t=1621506139; h=from:from:sender:sender:reply-to:reply-to:subject:subject:date:date: message-id:message-id:to:to:cc:cc:mime-version:mime-version: content-type:content-type: content-transfer-encoding:content-transfer-encoding: in-reply-to:in-reply-to:references:references; bh=IB5WzEny1VMFztKI/99vS1hgVslzBteBSCM3j6Jl6P8=; b=9U4K/E3zYbkPZFgmIbKXY+Iyl3xc8yc43UcXBMYen+DY0+jvKYmQ3rF8GHIlihG09gHerN 5J2acNOIGCeCi9Bg== From: "tip-bot2 for Joerg Roedel" Sender: tip-bot2@linutronix.de Reply-to: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org To: linux-tip-commits@vger.kernel.org Subject: [tip: x86/urgent] x86/sev-es: Use __put_user()/__get_user() for data accesses Cc: Joerg Roedel , Borislav Petkov , stable@vger.kernel.org, #@tip-bot2.tec.linutronix.de, v5.10+@tip-bot2.tec.linutronix.de, x86@kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org In-Reply-To: <20210519135251.30093-4-joro@8bytes.org> References: <20210519135251.30093-4-joro@8bytes.org> MIME-Version: 1.0 Message-ID: <162150613809.29796.2550841094526532766.tip-bot2@tip-bot2> Robot-ID: Robot-Unsubscribe: Contact to get blacklisted from these emails Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8" Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org The following commit has been merged into the x86/urgent branch of tip: Commit-ID: 4954f5b8ef0baf70fe978d1a99a5f70e4dd5c877 Gitweb: https://git.kernel.org/tip/4954f5b8ef0baf70fe978d1a99a5f70e4dd5c877 Author: Joerg Roedel AuthorDate: Wed, 19 May 2021 15:52:46 +02:00 Committer: Borislav Petkov CommitterDate: Wed, 19 May 2021 18:45:37 +02:00 x86/sev-es: Use __put_user()/__get_user() for data accesses The put_user() and get_user() functions do checks on the address which is passed to them. They check whether the address is actually a user-space address and whether its fine to access it. They also call might_fault() to indicate that they could fault and possibly sleep. All of these checks are neither wanted nor needed in the #VC exception handler, which can be invoked from almost any context and also for MMIO instructions from kernel space on kernel memory. All the #VC handler wants to know is whether a fault happened when the access was tried. This is provided by __put_user()/__get_user(), which just do the access no matter what. Also add comments explaining why __get_user() and __put_user() are the best choice here and why it is safe to use them in this context. Also explain why copy_to/from_user can't be used. In addition, also revert commit 7024f60d6552 ("x86/sev-es: Handle string port IO to kernel memory properly") because using __get_user()/__put_user() fixes the same problem while the above commit introduced several problems: 1) It uses access_ok() which is only allowed in task context. 2) It uses memcpy() which has no fault handling at all and is thus unsafe to use here. [ bp: Fix up commit ID of the reverted commit above. ] Fixes: f980f9c31a92 ("x86/sev-es: Compile early handler code into kernel image") Signed-off-by: Joerg Roedel Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v5.10+ Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20210519135251.30093-4-joro@8bytes.org --- arch/x86/kernel/sev.c | 66 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++------------- 1 file changed, 46 insertions(+), 20 deletions(-) diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/sev.c b/arch/x86/kernel/sev.c index 1f428f4..651b81c 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kernel/sev.c +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/sev.c @@ -315,31 +315,44 @@ static enum es_result vc_write_mem(struct es_em_ctxt *ctxt, u16 d2; u8 d1; - /* If instruction ran in kernel mode and the I/O buffer is in kernel space */ - if (!user_mode(ctxt->regs) && !access_ok(target, size)) { - memcpy(dst, buf, size); - return ES_OK; - } - + /* + * This function uses __put_user() independent of whether kernel or user + * memory is accessed. This works fine because __put_user() does no + * sanity checks of the pointer being accessed. All that it does is + * to report when the access failed. + * + * Also, this function runs in atomic context, so __put_user() is not + * allowed to sleep. The page-fault handler detects that it is running + * in atomic context and will not try to take mmap_sem and handle the + * fault, so additional pagefault_enable()/disable() calls are not + * needed. + * + * The access can't be done via copy_to_user() here because + * vc_write_mem() must not use string instructions to access unsafe + * memory. The reason is that MOVS is emulated by the #VC handler by + * splitting the move up into a read and a write and taking a nested #VC + * exception on whatever of them is the MMIO access. Using string + * instructions here would cause infinite nesting. + */ switch (size) { case 1: memcpy(&d1, buf, 1); - if (put_user(d1, target)) + if (__put_user(d1, target)) goto fault; break; case 2: memcpy(&d2, buf, 2); - if (put_user(d2, target)) + if (__put_user(d2, target)) goto fault; break; case 4: memcpy(&d4, buf, 4); - if (put_user(d4, target)) + if (__put_user(d4, target)) goto fault; break; case 8: memcpy(&d8, buf, 8); - if (put_user(d8, target)) + if (__put_user(d8, target)) goto fault; break; default: @@ -370,30 +383,43 @@ static enum es_result vc_read_mem(struct es_em_ctxt *ctxt, u16 d2; u8 d1; - /* If instruction ran in kernel mode and the I/O buffer is in kernel space */ - if (!user_mode(ctxt->regs) && !access_ok(s, size)) { - memcpy(buf, src, size); - return ES_OK; - } - + /* + * This function uses __get_user() independent of whether kernel or user + * memory is accessed. This works fine because __get_user() does no + * sanity checks of the pointer being accessed. All that it does is + * to report when the access failed. + * + * Also, this function runs in atomic context, so __get_user() is not + * allowed to sleep. The page-fault handler detects that it is running + * in atomic context and will not try to take mmap_sem and handle the + * fault, so additional pagefault_enable()/disable() calls are not + * needed. + * + * The access can't be done via copy_from_user() here because + * vc_read_mem() must not use string instructions to access unsafe + * memory. The reason is that MOVS is emulated by the #VC handler by + * splitting the move up into a read and a write and taking a nested #VC + * exception on whatever of them is the MMIO access. Using string + * instructions here would cause infinite nesting. + */ switch (size) { case 1: - if (get_user(d1, s)) + if (__get_user(d1, s)) goto fault; memcpy(buf, &d1, 1); break; case 2: - if (get_user(d2, s)) + if (__get_user(d2, s)) goto fault; memcpy(buf, &d2, 2); break; case 4: - if (get_user(d4, s)) + if (__get_user(d4, s)) goto fault; memcpy(buf, &d4, 4); break; case 8: - if (get_user(d8, s)) + if (__get_user(d8, s)) goto fault; memcpy(buf, &d8, 8); break;