From: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
To: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, akpm@linux-foundation.org,
torvalds@linux-foundation.org, stable@vger.kernel.org
Cc: lwn@lwn.net, jslaby@suse.cz,
Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Subject: Re: Linux 5.10.119
Date: Mon, 30 May 2022 09:48:15 +0200 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <165389689476245@kroah.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <165389689496142@kroah.com>
diff --git a/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt b/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt
index 611172f68bb5..5e34deec819f 100644
--- a/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt
+++ b/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt
@@ -4035,6 +4035,12 @@
fully seed the kernel's CRNG. Default is controlled
by CONFIG_RANDOM_TRUST_CPU.
+ random.trust_bootloader={on,off}
+ [KNL] Enable or disable trusting the use of a
+ seed passed by the bootloader (if available) to
+ fully seed the kernel's CRNG. Default is controlled
+ by CONFIG_RANDOM_TRUST_BOOTLOADER.
+
ras=option[,option,...] [KNL] RAS-specific options
cec_disable [X86]
diff --git a/Documentation/admin-guide/sysctl/kernel.rst b/Documentation/admin-guide/sysctl/kernel.rst
index e338306f4587..a4b1ebc2e70b 100644
--- a/Documentation/admin-guide/sysctl/kernel.rst
+++ b/Documentation/admin-guide/sysctl/kernel.rst
@@ -1006,28 +1006,22 @@ This is a directory, with the following entries:
* ``boot_id``: a UUID generated the first time this is retrieved, and
unvarying after that;
+* ``uuid``: a UUID generated every time this is retrieved (this can
+ thus be used to generate UUIDs at will);
+
* ``entropy_avail``: the pool's entropy count, in bits;
* ``poolsize``: the entropy pool size, in bits;
* ``urandom_min_reseed_secs``: obsolete (used to determine the minimum
- number of seconds between urandom pool reseeding).
-
-* ``uuid``: a UUID generated every time this is retrieved (this can
- thus be used to generate UUIDs at will);
+ number of seconds between urandom pool reseeding). This file is
+ writable for compatibility purposes, but writing to it has no effect
+ on any RNG behavior;
* ``write_wakeup_threshold``: when the entropy count drops below this
(as a number of bits), processes waiting to write to ``/dev/random``
- are woken up.
-
-If ``drivers/char/random.c`` is built with ``ADD_INTERRUPT_BENCH``
-defined, these additional entries are present:
-
-* ``add_interrupt_avg_cycles``: the average number of cycles between
- interrupts used to feed the pool;
-
-* ``add_interrupt_avg_deviation``: the standard deviation seen on the
- number of cycles between interrupts used to feed the pool.
+ are woken up. This file is writable for compatibility purposes, but
+ writing to it has no effect on any RNG behavior.
randomize_va_space
diff --git a/MAINTAINERS b/MAINTAINERS
index c64c9354c287..7c118b507912 100644
--- a/MAINTAINERS
+++ b/MAINTAINERS
@@ -14671,6 +14671,8 @@ F: arch/mips/generic/board-ranchu.c
RANDOM NUMBER DRIVER
M: "Theodore Ts'o" <tytso@mit.edu>
+M: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com>
+T: git https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/crng/random.git
S: Maintained
F: drivers/char/random.c
diff --git a/Makefile b/Makefile
index f9210e43121d..b442cc5bbfc3 100644
--- a/Makefile
+++ b/Makefile
@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
# SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
VERSION = 5
PATCHLEVEL = 10
-SUBLEVEL = 118
+SUBLEVEL = 119
EXTRAVERSION =
NAME = Dare mighty things
diff --git a/arch/alpha/include/asm/timex.h b/arch/alpha/include/asm/timex.h
index b565cc6f408e..f89798da8a14 100644
--- a/arch/alpha/include/asm/timex.h
+++ b/arch/alpha/include/asm/timex.h
@@ -28,5 +28,6 @@ static inline cycles_t get_cycles (void)
__asm__ __volatile__ ("rpcc %0" : "=r"(ret));
return ret;
}
+#define get_cycles get_cycles
#endif
diff --git a/arch/arm/include/asm/timex.h b/arch/arm/include/asm/timex.h
index 7c3b3671d6c2..6d1337c169cd 100644
--- a/arch/arm/include/asm/timex.h
+++ b/arch/arm/include/asm/timex.h
@@ -11,5 +11,6 @@
typedef unsigned long cycles_t;
#define get_cycles() ({ cycles_t c; read_current_timer(&c) ? 0 : c; })
+#define random_get_entropy() (((unsigned long)get_cycles()) ?: random_get_entropy_fallback())
#endif
diff --git a/arch/ia64/include/asm/timex.h b/arch/ia64/include/asm/timex.h
index 869a3ac6bf23..7ccc077a60be 100644
--- a/arch/ia64/include/asm/timex.h
+++ b/arch/ia64/include/asm/timex.h
@@ -39,6 +39,7 @@ get_cycles (void)
ret = ia64_getreg(_IA64_REG_AR_ITC);
return ret;
}
+#define get_cycles get_cycles
extern void ia64_cpu_local_tick (void);
extern unsigned long long ia64_native_sched_clock (void);
diff --git a/arch/m68k/include/asm/timex.h b/arch/m68k/include/asm/timex.h
index 6a21d9358280..f4a7a340f4ca 100644
--- a/arch/m68k/include/asm/timex.h
+++ b/arch/m68k/include/asm/timex.h
@@ -35,7 +35,7 @@ static inline unsigned long random_get_entropy(void)
{
if (mach_random_get_entropy)
return mach_random_get_entropy();
- return 0;
+ return random_get_entropy_fallback();
}
#define random_get_entropy random_get_entropy
diff --git a/arch/mips/include/asm/timex.h b/arch/mips/include/asm/timex.h
index 8026baf46e72..2e107886f97a 100644
--- a/arch/mips/include/asm/timex.h
+++ b/arch/mips/include/asm/timex.h
@@ -76,25 +76,24 @@ static inline cycles_t get_cycles(void)
else
return 0; /* no usable counter */
}
+#define get_cycles get_cycles
/*
* Like get_cycles - but where c0_count is not available we desperately
* use c0_random in an attempt to get at least a little bit of entropy.
- *
- * R6000 and R6000A neither have a count register nor a random register.
- * That leaves no entropy source in the CPU itself.
*/
static inline unsigned long random_get_entropy(void)
{
- unsigned int prid = read_c0_prid();
- unsigned int imp = prid & PRID_IMP_MASK;
+ unsigned int c0_random;
- if (can_use_mips_counter(prid))
+ if (can_use_mips_counter(read_c0_prid()))
return read_c0_count();
- else if (likely(imp != PRID_IMP_R6000 && imp != PRID_IMP_R6000A))
- return read_c0_random();
+
+ if (cpu_has_3kex)
+ c0_random = (read_c0_random() >> 8) & 0x3f;
else
- return 0; /* no usable register */
+ c0_random = read_c0_random() & 0x3f;
+ return (random_get_entropy_fallback() << 6) | (0x3f - c0_random);
}
#define random_get_entropy random_get_entropy
diff --git a/arch/nios2/include/asm/timex.h b/arch/nios2/include/asm/timex.h
index a769f871b28d..40a1adc9bd03 100644
--- a/arch/nios2/include/asm/timex.h
+++ b/arch/nios2/include/asm/timex.h
@@ -8,5 +8,8 @@
typedef unsigned long cycles_t;
extern cycles_t get_cycles(void);
+#define get_cycles get_cycles
+
+#define random_get_entropy() (((unsigned long)get_cycles()) ?: random_get_entropy_fallback())
#endif
diff --git a/arch/parisc/include/asm/timex.h b/arch/parisc/include/asm/timex.h
index 06b510f8172e..b4622cb06a75 100644
--- a/arch/parisc/include/asm/timex.h
+++ b/arch/parisc/include/asm/timex.h
@@ -13,9 +13,10 @@
typedef unsigned long cycles_t;
-static inline cycles_t get_cycles (void)
+static inline cycles_t get_cycles(void)
{
return mfctl(16);
}
+#define get_cycles get_cycles
#endif
diff --git a/arch/powerpc/include/asm/timex.h b/arch/powerpc/include/asm/timex.h
index 95988870a57b..171602fd358e 100644
--- a/arch/powerpc/include/asm/timex.h
+++ b/arch/powerpc/include/asm/timex.h
@@ -19,6 +19,7 @@ static inline cycles_t get_cycles(void)
{
return mftb();
}
+#define get_cycles get_cycles
#endif /* __KERNEL__ */
#endif /* _ASM_POWERPC_TIMEX_H */
diff --git a/arch/riscv/include/asm/timex.h b/arch/riscv/include/asm/timex.h
index 81de51e6aa32..a06697846e69 100644
--- a/arch/riscv/include/asm/timex.h
+++ b/arch/riscv/include/asm/timex.h
@@ -41,7 +41,7 @@ static inline u32 get_cycles_hi(void)
static inline unsigned long random_get_entropy(void)
{
if (unlikely(clint_time_val == NULL))
- return 0;
+ return random_get_entropy_fallback();
return get_cycles();
}
#define random_get_entropy() random_get_entropy()
diff --git a/arch/s390/include/asm/timex.h b/arch/s390/include/asm/timex.h
index 289aaff4d365..588aa0f2c842 100644
--- a/arch/s390/include/asm/timex.h
+++ b/arch/s390/include/asm/timex.h
@@ -172,6 +172,7 @@ static inline cycles_t get_cycles(void)
{
return (cycles_t) get_tod_clock() >> 2;
}
+#define get_cycles get_cycles
int get_phys_clock(unsigned long *clock);
void init_cpu_timer(void);
diff --git a/arch/sparc/include/asm/timex_32.h b/arch/sparc/include/asm/timex_32.h
index 542915b46209..f86326a6f89e 100644
--- a/arch/sparc/include/asm/timex_32.h
+++ b/arch/sparc/include/asm/timex_32.h
@@ -9,8 +9,6 @@
#define CLOCK_TICK_RATE 1193180 /* Underlying HZ */
-/* XXX Maybe do something better at some point... -DaveM */
-typedef unsigned long cycles_t;
-#define get_cycles() (0)
+#include <asm-generic/timex.h>
#endif
diff --git a/arch/um/include/asm/timex.h b/arch/um/include/asm/timex.h
index e392a9a5bc9b..9f27176adb26 100644
--- a/arch/um/include/asm/timex.h
+++ b/arch/um/include/asm/timex.h
@@ -2,13 +2,8 @@
#ifndef __UM_TIMEX_H
#define __UM_TIMEX_H
-typedef unsigned long cycles_t;
-
-static inline cycles_t get_cycles (void)
-{
- return 0;
-}
-
#define CLOCK_TICK_RATE (HZ)
+#include <asm-generic/timex.h>
+
#endif
diff --git a/arch/x86/crypto/Makefile b/arch/x86/crypto/Makefile
index a31de0c6ccde..66f25c2938bf 100644
--- a/arch/x86/crypto/Makefile
+++ b/arch/x86/crypto/Makefile
@@ -66,7 +66,9 @@ obj-$(CONFIG_CRYPTO_SHA512_SSSE3) += sha512-ssse3.o
sha512-ssse3-y := sha512-ssse3-asm.o sha512-avx-asm.o sha512-avx2-asm.o sha512_ssse3_glue.o
obj-$(CONFIG_CRYPTO_BLAKE2S_X86) += blake2s-x86_64.o
-blake2s-x86_64-y := blake2s-core.o blake2s-glue.o
+blake2s-x86_64-y := blake2s-shash.o
+obj-$(if $(CONFIG_CRYPTO_BLAKE2S_X86),y) += libblake2s-x86_64.o
+libblake2s-x86_64-y := blake2s-core.o blake2s-glue.o
obj-$(CONFIG_CRYPTO_GHASH_CLMUL_NI_INTEL) += ghash-clmulni-intel.o
ghash-clmulni-intel-y := ghash-clmulni-intel_asm.o ghash-clmulni-intel_glue.o
diff --git a/arch/x86/crypto/blake2s-glue.c b/arch/x86/crypto/blake2s-glue.c
index c025a01cf708..69853c13e8fb 100644
--- a/arch/x86/crypto/blake2s-glue.c
+++ b/arch/x86/crypto/blake2s-glue.c
@@ -5,7 +5,6 @@
#include <crypto/internal/blake2s.h>
#include <crypto/internal/simd.h>
-#include <crypto/internal/hash.h>
#include <linux/types.h>
#include <linux/jump_label.h>
@@ -28,9 +27,8 @@ asmlinkage void blake2s_compress_avx512(struct blake2s_state *state,
static __ro_after_init DEFINE_STATIC_KEY_FALSE(blake2s_use_ssse3);
static __ro_after_init DEFINE_STATIC_KEY_FALSE(blake2s_use_avx512);
-void blake2s_compress_arch(struct blake2s_state *state,
- const u8 *block, size_t nblocks,
- const u32 inc)
+void blake2s_compress(struct blake2s_state *state, const u8 *block,
+ size_t nblocks, const u32 inc)
{
/* SIMD disables preemption, so relax after processing each page. */
BUILD_BUG_ON(SZ_4K / BLAKE2S_BLOCK_SIZE < 8);
@@ -56,147 +54,12 @@ void blake2s_compress_arch(struct blake2s_state *state,
block += blocks * BLAKE2S_BLOCK_SIZE;
} while (nblocks);
}
-EXPORT_SYMBOL(blake2s_compress_arch);
-
-static int crypto_blake2s_setkey(struct crypto_shash *tfm, const u8 *key,
- unsigned int keylen)
-{
- struct blake2s_tfm_ctx *tctx = crypto_shash_ctx(tfm);
-
- if (keylen == 0 || keylen > BLAKE2S_KEY_SIZE)
- return -EINVAL;
-
- memcpy(tctx->key, key, keylen);
- tctx->keylen = keylen;
-
- return 0;
-}
-
-static int crypto_blake2s_init(struct shash_desc *desc)
-{
- struct blake2s_tfm_ctx *tctx = crypto_shash_ctx(desc->tfm);
- struct blake2s_state *state = shash_desc_ctx(desc);
- const int outlen = crypto_shash_digestsize(desc->tfm);
-
- if (tctx->keylen)
- blake2s_init_key(state, outlen, tctx->key, tctx->keylen);
- else
- blake2s_init(state, outlen);
-
- return 0;
-}
-
-static int crypto_blake2s_update(struct shash_desc *desc, const u8 *in,
- unsigned int inlen)
-{
- struct blake2s_state *state = shash_desc_ctx(desc);
- const size_t fill = BLAKE2S_BLOCK_SIZE - state->buflen;
-
- if (unlikely(!inlen))
- return 0;
- if (inlen > fill) {
- memcpy(state->buf + state->buflen, in, fill);
- blake2s_compress_arch(state, state->buf, 1, BLAKE2S_BLOCK_SIZE);
- state->buflen = 0;
- in += fill;
- inlen -= fill;
- }
- if (inlen > BLAKE2S_BLOCK_SIZE) {
- const size_t nblocks = DIV_ROUND_UP(inlen, BLAKE2S_BLOCK_SIZE);
- /* Hash one less (full) block than strictly possible */
- blake2s_compress_arch(state, in, nblocks - 1, BLAKE2S_BLOCK_SIZE);
- in += BLAKE2S_BLOCK_SIZE * (nblocks - 1);
- inlen -= BLAKE2S_BLOCK_SIZE * (nblocks - 1);
- }
- memcpy(state->buf + state->buflen, in, inlen);
- state->buflen += inlen;
-
- return 0;
-}
-
-static int crypto_blake2s_final(struct shash_desc *desc, u8 *out)
-{
- struct blake2s_state *state = shash_desc_ctx(desc);
-
- blake2s_set_lastblock(state);
- memset(state->buf + state->buflen, 0,
- BLAKE2S_BLOCK_SIZE - state->buflen); /* Padding */
- blake2s_compress_arch(state, state->buf, 1, state->buflen);
- cpu_to_le32_array(state->h, ARRAY_SIZE(state->h));
- memcpy(out, state->h, state->outlen);
- memzero_explicit(state, sizeof(*state));
-
- return 0;
-}
-
-static struct shash_alg blake2s_algs[] = {{
- .base.cra_name = "blake2s-128",
- .base.cra_driver_name = "blake2s-128-x86",
- .base.cra_flags = CRYPTO_ALG_OPTIONAL_KEY,
- .base.cra_ctxsize = sizeof(struct blake2s_tfm_ctx),
- .base.cra_priority = 200,
- .base.cra_blocksize = BLAKE2S_BLOCK_SIZE,
- .base.cra_module = THIS_MODULE,
-
- .digestsize = BLAKE2S_128_HASH_SIZE,
- .setkey = crypto_blake2s_setkey,
- .init = crypto_blake2s_init,
- .update = crypto_blake2s_update,
- .final = crypto_blake2s_final,
- .descsize = sizeof(struct blake2s_state),
-}, {
- .base.cra_name = "blake2s-160",
- .base.cra_driver_name = "blake2s-160-x86",
- .base.cra_flags = CRYPTO_ALG_OPTIONAL_KEY,
- .base.cra_ctxsize = sizeof(struct blake2s_tfm_ctx),
- .base.cra_priority = 200,
- .base.cra_blocksize = BLAKE2S_BLOCK_SIZE,
- .base.cra_module = THIS_MODULE,
-
- .digestsize = BLAKE2S_160_HASH_SIZE,
- .setkey = crypto_blake2s_setkey,
- .init = crypto_blake2s_init,
- .update = crypto_blake2s_update,
- .final = crypto_blake2s_final,
- .descsize = sizeof(struct blake2s_state),
-}, {
- .base.cra_name = "blake2s-224",
- .base.cra_driver_name = "blake2s-224-x86",
- .base.cra_flags = CRYPTO_ALG_OPTIONAL_KEY,
- .base.cra_ctxsize = sizeof(struct blake2s_tfm_ctx),
- .base.cra_priority = 200,
- .base.cra_blocksize = BLAKE2S_BLOCK_SIZE,
- .base.cra_module = THIS_MODULE,
-
- .digestsize = BLAKE2S_224_HASH_SIZE,
- .setkey = crypto_blake2s_setkey,
- .init = crypto_blake2s_init,
- .update = crypto_blake2s_update,
- .final = crypto_blake2s_final,
- .descsize = sizeof(struct blake2s_state),
-}, {
- .base.cra_name = "blake2s-256",
- .base.cra_driver_name = "blake2s-256-x86",
- .base.cra_flags = CRYPTO_ALG_OPTIONAL_KEY,
- .base.cra_ctxsize = sizeof(struct blake2s_tfm_ctx),
- .base.cra_priority = 200,
- .base.cra_blocksize = BLAKE2S_BLOCK_SIZE,
- .base.cra_module = THIS_MODULE,
-
- .digestsize = BLAKE2S_256_HASH_SIZE,
- .setkey = crypto_blake2s_setkey,
- .init = crypto_blake2s_init,
- .update = crypto_blake2s_update,
- .final = crypto_blake2s_final,
- .descsize = sizeof(struct blake2s_state),
-}};
+EXPORT_SYMBOL(blake2s_compress);
static int __init blake2s_mod_init(void)
{
- if (!boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_SSSE3))
- return 0;
-
- static_branch_enable(&blake2s_use_ssse3);
+ if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_SSSE3))
+ static_branch_enable(&blake2s_use_ssse3);
if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_AS_AVX512) &&
boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_AVX) &&
@@ -207,26 +70,9 @@ static int __init blake2s_mod_init(void)
XFEATURE_MASK_AVX512, NULL))
static_branch_enable(&blake2s_use_avx512);
- return IS_REACHABLE(CONFIG_CRYPTO_HASH) ?
- crypto_register_shashes(blake2s_algs,
- ARRAY_SIZE(blake2s_algs)) : 0;
-}
-
-static void __exit blake2s_mod_exit(void)
-{
- if (IS_REACHABLE(CONFIG_CRYPTO_HASH) && boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_SSSE3))
- crypto_unregister_shashes(blake2s_algs, ARRAY_SIZE(blake2s_algs));
+ return 0;
}
module_init(blake2s_mod_init);
-module_exit(blake2s_mod_exit);
-MODULE_ALIAS_CRYPTO("blake2s-128");
-MODULE_ALIAS_CRYPTO("blake2s-128-x86");
-MODULE_ALIAS_CRYPTO("blake2s-160");
-MODULE_ALIAS_CRYPTO("blake2s-160-x86");
-MODULE_ALIAS_CRYPTO("blake2s-224");
-MODULE_ALIAS_CRYPTO("blake2s-224-x86");
-MODULE_ALIAS_CRYPTO("blake2s-256");
-MODULE_ALIAS_CRYPTO("blake2s-256-x86");
MODULE_LICENSE("GPL v2");
diff --git a/arch/x86/crypto/blake2s-shash.c b/arch/x86/crypto/blake2s-shash.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..59ae28abe35c
--- /dev/null
+++ b/arch/x86/crypto/blake2s-shash.c
@@ -0,0 +1,77 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 OR MIT
+/*
+ * Copyright (C) 2015-2019 Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com>. All Rights Reserved.
+ */
+
+#include <crypto/internal/blake2s.h>
+#include <crypto/internal/simd.h>
+#include <crypto/internal/hash.h>
+
+#include <linux/types.h>
+#include <linux/kernel.h>
+#include <linux/module.h>
+#include <linux/sizes.h>
+
+#include <asm/cpufeature.h>
+#include <asm/processor.h>
+
+static int crypto_blake2s_update_x86(struct shash_desc *desc,
+ const u8 *in, unsigned int inlen)
+{
+ return crypto_blake2s_update(desc, in, inlen, false);
+}
+
+static int crypto_blake2s_final_x86(struct shash_desc *desc, u8 *out)
+{
+ return crypto_blake2s_final(desc, out, false);
+}
+
+#define BLAKE2S_ALG(name, driver_name, digest_size) \
+ { \
+ .base.cra_name = name, \
+ .base.cra_driver_name = driver_name, \
+ .base.cra_priority = 200, \
+ .base.cra_flags = CRYPTO_ALG_OPTIONAL_KEY, \
+ .base.cra_blocksize = BLAKE2S_BLOCK_SIZE, \
+ .base.cra_ctxsize = sizeof(struct blake2s_tfm_ctx), \
+ .base.cra_module = THIS_MODULE, \
+ .digestsize = digest_size, \
+ .setkey = crypto_blake2s_setkey, \
+ .init = crypto_blake2s_init, \
+ .update = crypto_blake2s_update_x86, \
+ .final = crypto_blake2s_final_x86, \
+ .descsize = sizeof(struct blake2s_state), \
+ }
+
+static struct shash_alg blake2s_algs[] = {
+ BLAKE2S_ALG("blake2s-128", "blake2s-128-x86", BLAKE2S_128_HASH_SIZE),
+ BLAKE2S_ALG("blake2s-160", "blake2s-160-x86", BLAKE2S_160_HASH_SIZE),
+ BLAKE2S_ALG("blake2s-224", "blake2s-224-x86", BLAKE2S_224_HASH_SIZE),
+ BLAKE2S_ALG("blake2s-256", "blake2s-256-x86", BLAKE2S_256_HASH_SIZE),
+};
+
+static int __init blake2s_mod_init(void)
+{
+ if (IS_REACHABLE(CONFIG_CRYPTO_HASH) && boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_SSSE3))
+ return crypto_register_shashes(blake2s_algs, ARRAY_SIZE(blake2s_algs));
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static void __exit blake2s_mod_exit(void)
+{
+ if (IS_REACHABLE(CONFIG_CRYPTO_HASH) && boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_SSSE3))
+ crypto_unregister_shashes(blake2s_algs, ARRAY_SIZE(blake2s_algs));
+}
+
+module_init(blake2s_mod_init);
+module_exit(blake2s_mod_exit);
+
+MODULE_ALIAS_CRYPTO("blake2s-128");
+MODULE_ALIAS_CRYPTO("blake2s-128-x86");
+MODULE_ALIAS_CRYPTO("blake2s-160");
+MODULE_ALIAS_CRYPTO("blake2s-160-x86");
+MODULE_ALIAS_CRYPTO("blake2s-224");
+MODULE_ALIAS_CRYPTO("blake2s-224-x86");
+MODULE_ALIAS_CRYPTO("blake2s-256");
+MODULE_ALIAS_CRYPTO("blake2s-256-x86");
+MODULE_LICENSE("GPL v2");
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/timex.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/timex.h
index a4a8b1b16c0c..956e4145311b 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/timex.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/timex.h
@@ -5,6 +5,15 @@
#include <asm/processor.h>
#include <asm/tsc.h>
+static inline unsigned long random_get_entropy(void)
+{
+ if (!IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_X86_TSC) &&
+ !cpu_feature_enabled(X86_FEATURE_TSC))
+ return random_get_entropy_fallback();
+ return rdtsc();
+}
+#define random_get_entropy random_get_entropy
+
/* Assume we use the PIT time source for the clock tick */
#define CLOCK_TICK_RATE PIT_TICK_RATE
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/tsc.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/tsc.h
index 01a300a9700b..fbdc3d951494 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/tsc.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/tsc.h
@@ -20,13 +20,12 @@ extern void disable_TSC(void);
static inline cycles_t get_cycles(void)
{
-#ifndef CONFIG_X86_TSC
- if (!boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_TSC))
+ if (!IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_X86_TSC) &&
+ !cpu_feature_enabled(X86_FEATURE_TSC))
return 0;
-#endif
-
return rdtsc();
}
+#define get_cycles get_cycles
extern struct system_counterval_t convert_art_to_tsc(u64 art);
extern struct system_counterval_t convert_art_ns_to_tsc(u64 art_ns);
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/mshyperv.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/mshyperv.c
index 65d11711cd7b..021cd067733e 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/mshyperv.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/mshyperv.c
@@ -84,7 +84,7 @@ DEFINE_IDTENTRY_SYSVEC(sysvec_hyperv_stimer0)
inc_irq_stat(hyperv_stimer0_count);
if (hv_stimer0_handler)
hv_stimer0_handler();
- add_interrupt_randomness(HYPERV_STIMER0_VECTOR, 0);
+ add_interrupt_randomness(HYPERV_STIMER0_VECTOR);
ack_APIC_irq();
set_irq_regs(old_regs);
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/lapic.c b/arch/x86/kvm/lapic.c
index a3ef793fce5f..6ed6b090be94 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/lapic.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/lapic.c
@@ -297,6 +297,10 @@ static inline void apic_set_spiv(struct kvm_lapic *apic, u32 val)
atomic_set_release(&apic->vcpu->kvm->arch.apic_map_dirty, DIRTY);
}
+
+ /* Check if there are APF page ready requests pending */
+ if (enabled)
+ kvm_make_request(KVM_REQ_APF_READY, apic->vcpu);
}
static inline void kvm_apic_set_xapic_id(struct kvm_lapic *apic, u8 id)
@@ -2260,6 +2264,8 @@ void kvm_lapic_set_base(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u64 value)
if (value & MSR_IA32_APICBASE_ENABLE) {
kvm_apic_set_xapic_id(apic, vcpu->vcpu_id);
static_key_slow_dec_deferred(&apic_hw_disabled);
+ /* Check if there are APF page ready requests pending */
+ kvm_make_request(KVM_REQ_APF_READY, vcpu);
} else {
static_key_slow_inc(&apic_hw_disabled.key);
atomic_set_release(&apic->vcpu->kvm->arch.apic_map_dirty, DIRTY);
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/mmu/mmu.c b/arch/x86/kvm/mmu/mmu.c
index 306268f90455..6096d0f1a62a 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/mmu/mmu.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/mmu/mmu.c
@@ -5178,14 +5178,16 @@ void kvm_mmu_invpcid_gva(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, gva_t gva, unsigned long pcid)
uint i;
if (pcid == kvm_get_active_pcid(vcpu)) {
- mmu->invlpg(vcpu, gva, mmu->root_hpa);
+ if (mmu->invlpg)
+ mmu->invlpg(vcpu, gva, mmu->root_hpa);
tlb_flush = true;
}
for (i = 0; i < KVM_MMU_NUM_PREV_ROOTS; i++) {
if (VALID_PAGE(mmu->prev_roots[i].hpa) &&
pcid == kvm_get_pcid(vcpu, mmu->prev_roots[i].pgd)) {
- mmu->invlpg(vcpu, gva, mmu->prev_roots[i].hpa);
+ if (mmu->invlpg)
+ mmu->invlpg(vcpu, gva, mmu->prev_roots[i].hpa);
tlb_flush = true;
}
}
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c b/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c
index 4588f73bf59a..ae18062c26a6 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c
@@ -11146,7 +11146,7 @@ bool kvm_arch_can_dequeue_async_page_present(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
if (!kvm_pv_async_pf_enabled(vcpu))
return true;
else
- return apf_pageready_slot_free(vcpu);
+ return kvm_lapic_enabled(vcpu) && apf_pageready_slot_free(vcpu);
}
void kvm_arch_start_assignment(struct kvm *kvm)
diff --git a/arch/xtensa/include/asm/timex.h b/arch/xtensa/include/asm/timex.h
index 233ec75e60c6..3f2462f2d027 100644
--- a/arch/xtensa/include/asm/timex.h
+++ b/arch/xtensa/include/asm/timex.h
@@ -29,10 +29,6 @@
extern unsigned long ccount_freq;
-typedef unsigned long long cycles_t;
-
-#define get_cycles() (0)
-
void local_timer_setup(unsigned cpu);
/*
@@ -59,4 +55,6 @@ static inline void set_linux_timer (unsigned long ccompare)
xtensa_set_sr(ccompare, SREG_CCOMPARE + LINUX_TIMER);
}
+#include <asm-generic/timex.h>
+
#endif /* _XTENSA_TIMEX_H */
diff --git a/crypto/Kconfig b/crypto/Kconfig
index 1157f82dc9cf..0dee9242491c 100644
--- a/crypto/Kconfig
+++ b/crypto/Kconfig
@@ -1936,9 +1936,10 @@ config CRYPTO_STATS
config CRYPTO_HASH_INFO
bool
-source "lib/crypto/Kconfig"
source "drivers/crypto/Kconfig"
source "crypto/asymmetric_keys/Kconfig"
source "certs/Kconfig"
endif # if CRYPTO
+
+source "lib/crypto/Kconfig"
diff --git a/crypto/blake2s_generic.c b/crypto/blake2s_generic.c
index 005783ff45ad..5f96a21f8788 100644
--- a/crypto/blake2s_generic.c
+++ b/crypto/blake2s_generic.c
@@ -1,149 +1,55 @@
// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 OR MIT
/*
+ * shash interface to the generic implementation of BLAKE2s
+ *
* Copyright (C) 2015-2019 Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com>. All Rights Reserved.
*/
#include <crypto/internal/blake2s.h>
-#include <crypto/internal/simd.h>
#include <crypto/internal/hash.h>
#include <linux/types.h>
-#include <linux/jump_label.h>
#include <linux/kernel.h>
#include <linux/module.h>
-static int crypto_blake2s_setkey(struct crypto_shash *tfm, const u8 *key,
- unsigned int keylen)
+static int crypto_blake2s_update_generic(struct shash_desc *desc,
+ const u8 *in, unsigned int inlen)
{
- struct blake2s_tfm_ctx *tctx = crypto_shash_ctx(tfm);
-
- if (keylen == 0 || keylen > BLAKE2S_KEY_SIZE)
- return -EINVAL;
-
- memcpy(tctx->key, key, keylen);
- tctx->keylen = keylen;
-
- return 0;
+ return crypto_blake2s_update(desc, in, inlen, true);
}
-static int crypto_blake2s_init(struct shash_desc *desc)
+static int crypto_blake2s_final_generic(struct shash_desc *desc, u8 *out)
{
- struct blake2s_tfm_ctx *tctx = crypto_shash_ctx(desc->tfm);
- struct blake2s_state *state = shash_desc_ctx(desc);
- const int outlen = crypto_shash_digestsize(desc->tfm);
-
- if (tctx->keylen)
- blake2s_init_key(state, outlen, tctx->key, tctx->keylen);
- else
- blake2s_init(state, outlen);
-
- return 0;
+ return crypto_blake2s_final(desc, out, true);
}
-static int crypto_blake2s_update(struct shash_desc *desc, const u8 *in,
- unsigned int inlen)
-{
- struct blake2s_state *state = shash_desc_ctx(desc);
- const size_t fill = BLAKE2S_BLOCK_SIZE - state->buflen;
-
- if (unlikely(!inlen))
- return 0;
- if (inlen > fill) {
- memcpy(state->buf + state->buflen, in, fill);
- blake2s_compress_generic(state, state->buf, 1, BLAKE2S_BLOCK_SIZE);
- state->buflen = 0;
- in += fill;
- inlen -= fill;
- }
- if (inlen > BLAKE2S_BLOCK_SIZE) {
- const size_t nblocks = DIV_ROUND_UP(inlen, BLAKE2S_BLOCK_SIZE);
- /* Hash one less (full) block than strictly possible */
- blake2s_compress_generic(state, in, nblocks - 1, BLAKE2S_BLOCK_SIZE);
- in += BLAKE2S_BLOCK_SIZE * (nblocks - 1);
- inlen -= BLAKE2S_BLOCK_SIZE * (nblocks - 1);
+#define BLAKE2S_ALG(name, driver_name, digest_size) \
+ { \
+ .base.cra_name = name, \
+ .base.cra_driver_name = driver_name, \
+ .base.cra_priority = 100, \
+ .base.cra_flags = CRYPTO_ALG_OPTIONAL_KEY, \
+ .base.cra_blocksize = BLAKE2S_BLOCK_SIZE, \
+ .base.cra_ctxsize = sizeof(struct blake2s_tfm_ctx), \
+ .base.cra_module = THIS_MODULE, \
+ .digestsize = digest_size, \
+ .setkey = crypto_blake2s_setkey, \
+ .init = crypto_blake2s_init, \
+ .update = crypto_blake2s_update_generic, \
+ .final = crypto_blake2s_final_generic, \
+ .descsize = sizeof(struct blake2s_state), \
}
- memcpy(state->buf + state->buflen, in, inlen);
- state->buflen += inlen;
-
- return 0;
-}
-
-static int crypto_blake2s_final(struct shash_desc *desc, u8 *out)
-{
- struct blake2s_state *state = shash_desc_ctx(desc);
-
- blake2s_set_lastblock(state);
- memset(state->buf + state->buflen, 0,
- BLAKE2S_BLOCK_SIZE - state->buflen); /* Padding */
- blake2s_compress_generic(state, state->buf, 1, state->buflen);
- cpu_to_le32_array(state->h, ARRAY_SIZE(state->h));
- memcpy(out, state->h, state->outlen);
- memzero_explicit(state, sizeof(*state));
-
- return 0;
-}
-
-static struct shash_alg blake2s_algs[] = {{
- .base.cra_name = "blake2s-128",
- .base.cra_driver_name = "blake2s-128-generic",
- .base.cra_flags = CRYPTO_ALG_OPTIONAL_KEY,
- .base.cra_ctxsize = sizeof(struct blake2s_tfm_ctx),
- .base.cra_priority = 200,
- .base.cra_blocksize = BLAKE2S_BLOCK_SIZE,
- .base.cra_module = THIS_MODULE,
-
- .digestsize = BLAKE2S_128_HASH_SIZE,
- .setkey = crypto_blake2s_setkey,
- .init = crypto_blake2s_init,
- .update = crypto_blake2s_update,
- .final = crypto_blake2s_final,
- .descsize = sizeof(struct blake2s_state),
-}, {
- .base.cra_name = "blake2s-160",
- .base.cra_driver_name = "blake2s-160-generic",
- .base.cra_flags = CRYPTO_ALG_OPTIONAL_KEY,
- .base.cra_ctxsize = sizeof(struct blake2s_tfm_ctx),
- .base.cra_priority = 200,
- .base.cra_blocksize = BLAKE2S_BLOCK_SIZE,
- .base.cra_module = THIS_MODULE,
-
- .digestsize = BLAKE2S_160_HASH_SIZE,
- .setkey = crypto_blake2s_setkey,
- .init = crypto_blake2s_init,
- .update = crypto_blake2s_update,
- .final = crypto_blake2s_final,
- .descsize = sizeof(struct blake2s_state),
-}, {
- .base.cra_name = "blake2s-224",
- .base.cra_driver_name = "blake2s-224-generic",
- .base.cra_flags = CRYPTO_ALG_OPTIONAL_KEY,
- .base.cra_ctxsize = sizeof(struct blake2s_tfm_ctx),
- .base.cra_priority = 200,
- .base.cra_blocksize = BLAKE2S_BLOCK_SIZE,
- .base.cra_module = THIS_MODULE,
-
- .digestsize = BLAKE2S_224_HASH_SIZE,
- .setkey = crypto_blake2s_setkey,
- .init = crypto_blake2s_init,
- .update = crypto_blake2s_update,
- .final = crypto_blake2s_final,
- .descsize = sizeof(struct blake2s_state),
-}, {
- .base.cra_name = "blake2s-256",
- .base.cra_driver_name = "blake2s-256-generic",
- .base.cra_flags = CRYPTO_ALG_OPTIONAL_KEY,
- .base.cra_ctxsize = sizeof(struct blake2s_tfm_ctx),
- .base.cra_priority = 200,
- .base.cra_blocksize = BLAKE2S_BLOCK_SIZE,
- .base.cra_module = THIS_MODULE,
- .digestsize = BLAKE2S_256_HASH_SIZE,
- .setkey = crypto_blake2s_setkey,
- .init = crypto_blake2s_init,
- .update = crypto_blake2s_update,
- .final = crypto_blake2s_final,
- .descsize = sizeof(struct blake2s_state),
-}};
+static struct shash_alg blake2s_algs[] = {
+ BLAKE2S_ALG("blake2s-128", "blake2s-128-generic",
+ BLAKE2S_128_HASH_SIZE),
+ BLAKE2S_ALG("blake2s-160", "blake2s-160-generic",
+ BLAKE2S_160_HASH_SIZE),
+ BLAKE2S_ALG("blake2s-224", "blake2s-224-generic",
+ BLAKE2S_224_HASH_SIZE),
+ BLAKE2S_ALG("blake2s-256", "blake2s-256-generic",
+ BLAKE2S_256_HASH_SIZE),
+};
static int __init blake2s_mod_init(void)
{
diff --git a/crypto/drbg.c b/crypto/drbg.c
index 3132967a1749..19ea8d6628ff 100644
--- a/crypto/drbg.c
+++ b/crypto/drbg.c
@@ -1490,12 +1490,13 @@ static int drbg_generate_long(struct drbg_state *drbg,
return 0;
}
-static void drbg_schedule_async_seed(struct random_ready_callback *rdy)
+static int drbg_schedule_async_seed(struct notifier_block *nb, unsigned long action, void *data)
{
- struct drbg_state *drbg = container_of(rdy, struct drbg_state,
+ struct drbg_state *drbg = container_of(nb, struct drbg_state,
random_ready);
schedule_work(&drbg->seed_work);
+ return 0;
}
static int drbg_prepare_hrng(struct drbg_state *drbg)
@@ -1510,10 +1511,8 @@ static int drbg_prepare_hrng(struct drbg_state *drbg)
INIT_WORK(&drbg->seed_work, drbg_async_seed);
- drbg->random_ready.owner = THIS_MODULE;
- drbg->random_ready.func = drbg_schedule_async_seed;
-
- err = add_random_ready_callback(&drbg->random_ready);
+ drbg->random_ready.notifier_call = drbg_schedule_async_seed;
+ err = register_random_ready_notifier(&drbg->random_ready);
switch (err) {
case 0:
@@ -1524,7 +1523,7 @@ static int drbg_prepare_hrng(struct drbg_state *drbg)
fallthrough;
default:
- drbg->random_ready.func = NULL;
+ drbg->random_ready.notifier_call = NULL;
return err;
}
@@ -1628,8 +1627,8 @@ static int drbg_instantiate(struct drbg_state *drbg, struct drbg_string *pers,
*/
static int drbg_uninstantiate(struct drbg_state *drbg)
{
- if (drbg->random_ready.func) {
- del_random_ready_callback(&drbg->random_ready);
+ if (drbg->random_ready.notifier_call) {
+ unregister_random_ready_notifier(&drbg->random_ready);
cancel_work_sync(&drbg->seed_work);
}
diff --git a/drivers/acpi/sysfs.c b/drivers/acpi/sysfs.c
index a5cc4f3bb1e3..1d94c4625f36 100644
--- a/drivers/acpi/sysfs.c
+++ b/drivers/acpi/sysfs.c
@@ -439,18 +439,29 @@ static ssize_t acpi_data_show(struct file *filp, struct kobject *kobj,
{
struct acpi_data_attr *data_attr;
void __iomem *base;
- ssize_t rc;
+ ssize_t size;
data_attr = container_of(bin_attr, struct acpi_data_attr, attr);
+ size = data_attr->attr.size;
+
+ if (offset < 0)
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ if (offset >= size)
+ return 0;
- base = acpi_os_map_memory(data_attr->addr, data_attr->attr.size);
+ if (count > size - offset)
+ count = size - offset;
+
+ base = acpi_os_map_iomem(data_attr->addr, size);
if (!base)
return -ENOMEM;
- rc = memory_read_from_buffer(buf, count, &offset, base,
- data_attr->attr.size);
- acpi_os_unmap_memory(base, data_attr->attr.size);
- return rc;
+ memcpy_fromio(buf, base + offset, count);
+
+ acpi_os_unmap_iomem(base, size);
+
+ return count;
}
static int acpi_bert_data_init(void *th, struct acpi_data_attr *data_attr)
diff --git a/drivers/char/Kconfig b/drivers/char/Kconfig
index d229a2d0c017..3e2703a49632 100644
--- a/drivers/char/Kconfig
+++ b/drivers/char/Kconfig
@@ -495,4 +495,5 @@ config RANDOM_TRUST_BOOTLOADER
device randomness. Say Y here to assume the entropy provided by the
booloader is trustworthy so it will be added to the kernel's entropy
pool. Otherwise, say N here so it will be regarded as device input that
- only mixes the entropy pool.
+ only mixes the entropy pool. This can also be configured at boot with
+ "random.trust_bootloader=on/off".
diff --git a/drivers/char/hw_random/core.c b/drivers/char/hw_random/core.c
index 8c1c47dd9f46..5749998feaa4 100644
--- a/drivers/char/hw_random/core.c
+++ b/drivers/char/hw_random/core.c
@@ -15,6 +15,7 @@
#include <linux/err.h>
#include <linux/fs.h>
#include <linux/hw_random.h>
+#include <linux/random.h>
#include <linux/kernel.h>
#include <linux/kthread.h>
#include <linux/sched/signal.h>
diff --git a/drivers/char/random.c b/drivers/char/random.c
index 5f541c946559..00b50ccc9fae 100644
--- a/drivers/char/random.c
+++ b/drivers/char/random.c
@@ -1,310 +1,26 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: (GPL-2.0 OR BSD-3-Clause)
/*
- * random.c -- A strong random number generator
- *
- * Copyright (C) 2017 Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com>. All
- * Rights Reserved.
- *
+ * Copyright (C) 2017-2022 Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com>. All Rights Reserved.
* Copyright Matt Mackall <mpm@selenic.com>, 2003, 2004, 2005
- *
- * Copyright Theodore Ts'o, 1994, 1995, 1996, 1997, 1998, 1999. All
- * rights reserved.
- *
- * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
- * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
- * are met:
- * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
- * notice, and the entire permission notice in its entirety,
- * including the disclaimer of warranties.
- * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
- * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
- * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
- * 3. The name of the author may not be used to endorse or promote
- * products derived from this software without specific prior
- * written permission.
- *
- * ALTERNATIVELY, this product may be distributed under the terms of
- * the GNU General Public License, in which case the provisions of the GPL are
- * required INSTEAD OF the above restrictions. (This clause is
- * necessary due to a potential bad interaction between the GPL and
- * the restrictions contained in a BSD-style copyright.)
- *
- * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED
- * WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
- * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE, ALL OF
- * WHICH ARE HEREBY DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE
- * LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR
- * CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT
- * OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR
- * BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF
- * LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
- * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE
- * USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF NOT ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH
- * DAMAGE.
- */
-
-/*
- * (now, with legal B.S. out of the way.....)
- *
- * This routine gathers environmental noise from device drivers, etc.,
- * and returns good random numbers, suitable for cryptographic use.
- * Besides the obvious cryptographic uses, these numbers are also good
- * for seeding TCP sequence numbers, and other places where it is
- * desirable to have numbers which are not only random, but hard to
- * predict by an attacker.
- *
- * Theory of operation
- * ===================
- *
- * Computers are very predictable devices. Hence it is extremely hard
- * to produce truly random numbers on a computer --- as opposed to
- * pseudo-random numbers, which can easily generated by using a
- * algorithm. Unfortunately, it is very easy for attackers to guess
- * the sequence of pseudo-random number generators, and for some
- * applications this is not acceptable. So instead, we must try to
- * gather "environmental noise" from the computer's environment, which
- * must be hard for outside attackers to observe, and use that to
- * generate random numbers. In a Unix environment, this is best done
- * from inside the kernel.
- *
- * Sources of randomness from the environment include inter-keyboard
- * timings, inter-interrupt timings from some interrupts, and other
- * events which are both (a) non-deterministic and (b) hard for an
- * outside observer to measure. Randomness from these sources are
- * added to an "entropy pool", which is mixed using a CRC-like function.
- * This is not cryptographically strong, but it is adequate assuming
- * the randomness is not chosen maliciously, and it is fast enough that
- * the overhead of doing it on every interrupt is very reasonable.
- * As random bytes are mixed into the entropy pool, the routines keep
- * an *estimate* of how many bits of randomness have been stored into
- * the random number generator's internal state.
- *
- * When random bytes are desired, they are obtained by taking the SHA
- * hash of the contents of the "entropy pool". The SHA hash avoids
- * exposing the internal state of the entropy pool. It is believed to
- * be computationally infeasible to derive any useful information
- * about the input of SHA from its output. Even if it is possible to
- * analyze SHA in some clever way, as long as the amount of data
- * returned from the generator is less than the inherent entropy in
- * the pool, the output data is totally unpredictable. For this
- * reason, the routine decreases its internal estimate of how many
- * bits of "true randomness" are contained in the entropy pool as it
- * outputs random numbers.
- *
- * If this estimate goes to zero, the routine can still generate
- * random numbers; however, an attacker may (at least in theory) be
- * able to infer the future output of the generator from prior
- * outputs. This requires successful cryptanalysis of SHA, which is
- * not believed to be feasible, but there is a remote possibility.
- * Nonetheless, these numbers should be useful for the vast majority
- * of purposes.
- *
- * Exported interfaces ---- output
- * ===============================
- *
- * There are four exported interfaces; two for use within the kernel,
- * and two or use from userspace.
- *
- * Exported interfaces ---- userspace output
- * -----------------------------------------
- *
- * The userspace interfaces are two character devices /dev/random and
- * /dev/urandom. /dev/random is suitable for use when very high
- * quality randomness is desired (for example, for key generation or
- * one-time pads), as it will only return a maximum of the number of
- * bits of randomness (as estimated by the random number generator)
- * contained in the entropy pool.
- *
- * The /dev/urandom device does not have this limit, and will return
- * as many bytes as are requested. As more and more random bytes are
- * requested without giving time for the entropy pool to recharge,
- * this will result in random numbers that are merely cryptographically
- * strong. For many applications, however, this is acceptable.
- *
- * Exported interfaces ---- kernel output
- * --------------------------------------
- *
- * The primary kernel interface is
- *
- * void get_random_bytes(void *buf, int nbytes);
- *
- * This interface will return the requested number of random bytes,
- * and place it in the requested buffer. This is equivalent to a
- * read from /dev/urandom.
- *
- * For less critical applications, there are the functions:
- *
- * u32 get_random_u32()
- * u64 get_random_u64()
- * unsigned int get_random_int()
- * unsigned long get_random_long()
- *
- * These are produced by a cryptographic RNG seeded from get_random_bytes,
- * and so do not deplete the entropy pool as much. These are recommended
- * for most in-kernel operations *if the result is going to be stored in
- * the kernel*.
- *
- * Specifically, the get_random_int() family do not attempt to do
- * "anti-backtracking". If you capture the state of the kernel (e.g.
- * by snapshotting the VM), you can figure out previous get_random_int()
- * return values. But if the value is stored in the kernel anyway,
- * this is not a problem.
- *
- * It *is* safe to expose get_random_int() output to attackers (e.g. as
- * network cookies); given outputs 1..n, it's not feasible to predict
- * outputs 0 or n+1. The only concern is an attacker who breaks into
- * the kernel later; the get_random_int() engine is not reseeded as
- * often as the get_random_bytes() one.
- *
- * get_random_bytes() is needed for keys that need to stay secret after
- * they are erased from the kernel. For example, any key that will
- * be wrapped and stored encrypted. And session encryption keys: we'd
- * like to know that after the session is closed and the keys erased,
- * the plaintext is unrecoverable to someone who recorded the ciphertext.
- *
- * But for network ports/cookies, stack canaries, PRNG seeds, address
- * space layout randomization, session *authentication* keys, or other
- * applications where the sensitive data is stored in the kernel in
- * plaintext for as long as it's sensitive, the get_random_int() family
- * is just fine.
- *
- * Consider ASLR. We want to keep the address space secret from an
- * outside attacker while the process is running, but once the address
- * space is torn down, it's of no use to an attacker any more. And it's
- * stored in kernel data structures as long as it's alive, so worrying
- * about an attacker's ability to extrapolate it from the get_random_int()
- * CRNG is silly.
- *
- * Even some cryptographic keys are safe to generate with get_random_int().
- * In particular, keys for SipHash are generally fine. Here, knowledge
- * of the key authorizes you to do something to a kernel object (inject
- * packets to a network connection, or flood a hash table), and the
- * key is stored with the object being protected. Once it goes away,
- * we no longer care if anyone knows the key.
- *
- * prandom_u32()
- * -------------
- *
- * For even weaker applications, see the pseudorandom generator
- * prandom_u32(), prandom_max(), and prandom_bytes(). If the random
- * numbers aren't security-critical at all, these are *far* cheaper.
- * Useful for self-tests, random error simulation, randomized backoffs,
- * and any other application where you trust that nobody is trying to
- * maliciously mess with you by guessing the "random" numbers.
- *
- * Exported interfaces ---- input
- * ==============================
- *
- * The current exported interfaces for gathering environmental noise
- * from the devices are:
- *
- * void add_device_randomness(const void *buf, unsigned int size);
- * void add_input_randomness(unsigned int type, unsigned int code,
- * unsigned int value);
- * void add_interrupt_randomness(int irq, int irq_flags);
- * void add_disk_randomness(struct gendisk *disk);
- *
- * add_device_randomness() is for adding data to the random pool that
- * is likely to differ between two devices (or possibly even per boot).
- * This would be things like MAC addresses or serial numbers, or the
- * read-out of the RTC. This does *not* add any actual entropy to the
- * pool, but it initializes the pool to different values for devices
- * that might otherwise be identical and have very little entropy
- * available to them (particularly common in the embedded world).
- *
- * add_input_randomness() uses the input layer interrupt timing, as well as
- * the event type information from the hardware.
- *
- * add_interrupt_randomness() uses the interrupt timing as random
- * inputs to the entropy pool. Using the cycle counters and the irq source
- * as inputs, it feeds the randomness roughly once a second.
- *
- * add_disk_randomness() uses what amounts to the seek time of block
- * layer request events, on a per-disk_devt basis, as input to the
- * entropy pool. Note that high-speed solid state drives with very low
- * seek times do not make for good sources of entropy, as their seek
- * times are usually fairly consistent.
- *
- * All of these routines try to estimate how many bits of randomness a
- * particular randomness source. They do this by keeping track of the
- * first and second order deltas of the event timings.
- *
- * Ensuring unpredictability at system startup
- * ============================================
- *
- * When any operating system starts up, it will go through a sequence
- * of actions that are fairly predictable by an adversary, especially
- * if the start-up does not involve interaction with a human operator.
- * This reduces the actual number of bits of unpredictability in the
- * entropy pool below the value in entropy_count. In order to
- * counteract this effect, it helps to carry information in the
- * entropy pool across shut-downs and start-ups. To do this, put the
- * following lines an appropriate script which is run during the boot
- * sequence:
- *
- * echo "Initializing random number generator..."
- * random_seed=/var/run/random-seed
- * # Carry a random seed from start-up to start-up
- * # Load and then save the whole entropy pool
- * if [ -f $random_seed ]; then
- * cat $random_seed >/dev/urandom
- * else
- * touch $random_seed
- * fi
- * chmod 600 $random_seed
- * dd if=/dev/urandom of=$random_seed count=1 bs=512
- *
- * and the following lines in an appropriate script which is run as
- * the system is shutdown:
- *
- * # Carry a random seed from shut-down to start-up
- * # Save the whole entropy pool
- * echo "Saving random seed..."
- * random_seed=/var/run/random-seed
- * touch $random_seed
- * chmod 600 $random_seed
- * dd if=/dev/urandom of=$random_seed count=1 bs=512
- *
- * For example, on most modern systems using the System V init
- * scripts, such code fragments would be found in
- * /etc/rc.d/init.d/random. On older Linux systems, the correct script
- * location might be in /etc/rcb.d/rc.local or /etc/rc.d/rc.0.
- *
- * Effectively, these commands cause the contents of the entropy pool
- * to be saved at shut-down time and reloaded into the entropy pool at
- * start-up. (The 'dd' in the addition to the bootup script is to
- * make sure that /etc/random-seed is different for every start-up,
- * even if the system crashes without executing rc.0.) Even with
- * complete knowledge of the start-up activities, predicting the state
- * of the entropy pool requires knowledge of the previous history of
- * the system.
- *
- * Configuring the /dev/random driver under Linux
- * ==============================================
- *
- * The /dev/random driver under Linux uses minor numbers 8 and 9 of
- * the /dev/mem major number (#1). So if your system does not have
- * /dev/random and /dev/urandom created already, they can be created
- * by using the commands:
- *
- * mknod /dev/random c 1 8
- * mknod /dev/urandom c 1 9
- *
- * Acknowledgements:
- * =================
- *
- * Ideas for constructing this random number generator were derived
- * from Pretty Good Privacy's random number generator, and from private
- * discussions with Phil Karn. Colin Plumb provided a faster random
- * number generator, which speed up the mixing function of the entropy
- * pool, taken from PGPfone. Dale Worley has also contributed many
- * useful ideas and suggestions to improve this driver.
- *
- * Any flaws in the design are solely my responsibility, and should
- * not be attributed to the Phil, Colin, or any of authors of PGP.
- *
- * Further background information on this topic may be obtained from
- * RFC 1750, "Randomness Recommendations for Security", by Donald
- * Eastlake, Steve Crocker, and Jeff Schiller.
+ * Copyright Theodore Ts'o, 1994, 1995, 1996, 1997, 1998, 1999. All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * This driver produces cryptographically secure pseudorandom data. It is divided
+ * into roughly six sections, each with a section header:
+ *
+ * - Initialization and readiness waiting.
+ * - Fast key erasure RNG, the "crng".
+ * - Entropy accumulation and extraction routines.
+ * - Entropy collection routines.
+ * - Userspace reader/writer interfaces.
+ * - Sysctl interface.
+ *
+ * The high level overview is that there is one input pool, into which
+ * various pieces of data are hashed. Prior to initialization, some of that
+ * data is then "credited" as having a certain number of bits of entropy.
+ * When enough bits of entropy are available, the hash is finalized and
+ * handed as a key to a stream cipher that expands it indefinitely for
+ * various consumers. This key is periodically refreshed as the various
+ * entropy collectors, described below, add data to the input pool.
*/
#define pr_fmt(fmt) KBUILD_MODNAME ": " fmt
@@ -327,7 +43,6 @@
#include <linux/spinlock.h>
#include <linux/kthread.h>
#include <linux/percpu.h>
-#include <linux/fips.h>
#include <linux/ptrace.h>
#include <linux/workqueue.h>
#include <linux/irq.h>
@@ -335,1503 +50,1082 @@
#include <linux/syscalls.h>
#include <linux/completion.h>
#include <linux/uuid.h>
+#include <linux/uaccess.h>
+#include <linux/siphash.h>
+#include <linux/uio.h>
#include <crypto/chacha.h>
-#include <crypto/sha.h>
-
+#include <crypto/blake2s.h>
#include <asm/processor.h>
-#include <linux/uaccess.h>
#include <asm/irq.h>
#include <asm/irq_regs.h>
#include <asm/io.h>
-#define CREATE_TRACE_POINTS
-#include <trace/events/random.h>
-
-/* #define ADD_INTERRUPT_BENCH */
+/*********************************************************************
+ *
+ * Initialization and readiness waiting.
+ *
+ * Much of the RNG infrastructure is devoted to various dependencies
+ * being able to wait until the RNG has collected enough entropy and
+ * is ready for safe consumption.
+ *
+ *********************************************************************/
/*
- * Configuration information
+ * crng_init is protected by base_crng->lock, and only increases
+ * its value (from empty->early->ready).
*/
-#define INPUT_POOL_SHIFT 12
-#define INPUT_POOL_WORDS (1 << (INPUT_POOL_SHIFT-5))
-#define OUTPUT_POOL_SHIFT 10
-#define OUTPUT_POOL_WORDS (1 << (OUTPUT_POOL_SHIFT-5))
-#define EXTRACT_SIZE 10
-
+static enum {
+ CRNG_EMPTY = 0, /* Little to no entropy collected */
+ CRNG_EARLY = 1, /* At least POOL_EARLY_BITS collected */
+ CRNG_READY = 2 /* Fully initialized with POOL_READY_BITS collected */
+} crng_init __read_mostly = CRNG_EMPTY;
+static DEFINE_STATIC_KEY_FALSE(crng_is_ready);
+#define crng_ready() (static_branch_likely(&crng_is_ready) || crng_init >= CRNG_READY)
+/* Various types of waiters for crng_init->CRNG_READY transition. */
+static DECLARE_WAIT_QUEUE_HEAD(crng_init_wait);
+static struct fasync_struct *fasync;
+static DEFINE_SPINLOCK(random_ready_chain_lock);
+static RAW_NOTIFIER_HEAD(random_ready_chain);
-#define LONGS(x) (((x) + sizeof(unsigned long) - 1)/sizeof(unsigned long))
+/* Control how we warn userspace. */
+static struct ratelimit_state urandom_warning =
+ RATELIMIT_STATE_INIT("warn_urandom_randomness", HZ, 3);
+static int ratelimit_disable __read_mostly =
+ IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_WARN_ALL_UNSEEDED_RANDOM);
+module_param_named(ratelimit_disable, ratelimit_disable, int, 0644);
+MODULE_PARM_DESC(ratelimit_disable, "Disable random ratelimit suppression");
/*
- * To allow fractional bits to be tracked, the entropy_count field is
- * denominated in units of 1/8th bits.
+ * Returns whether or not the input pool has been seeded and thus guaranteed
+ * to supply cryptographically secure random numbers. This applies to: the
+ * /dev/urandom device, the get_random_bytes function, and the get_random_{u32,
+ * ,u64,int,long} family of functions.
*
- * 2*(ENTROPY_SHIFT + poolbitshift) must <= 31, or the multiply in
- * credit_entropy_bits() needs to be 64 bits wide.
+ * Returns: true if the input pool has been seeded.
+ * false if the input pool has not been seeded.
*/
-#define ENTROPY_SHIFT 3
-#define ENTROPY_BITS(r) ((r)->entropy_count >> ENTROPY_SHIFT)
+bool rng_is_initialized(void)
+{
+ return crng_ready();
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL(rng_is_initialized);
-/*
- * If the entropy count falls under this number of bits, then we
- * should wake up processes which are selecting or polling on write
- * access to /dev/random.
- */
-static int random_write_wakeup_bits = 28 * OUTPUT_POOL_WORDS;
+static void __cold crng_set_ready(struct work_struct *work)
+{
+ static_branch_enable(&crng_is_ready);
+}
+
+/* Used by wait_for_random_bytes(), and considered an entropy collector, below. */
+static void try_to_generate_entropy(void);
/*
- * Originally, we used a primitive polynomial of degree .poolwords
- * over GF(2). The taps for various sizes are defined below. They
- * were chosen to be evenly spaced except for the last tap, which is 1
- * to get the twisting happening as fast as possible.
- *
- * For the purposes of better mixing, we use the CRC-32 polynomial as
- * well to make a (modified) twisted Generalized Feedback Shift
- * Register. (See M. Matsumoto & Y. Kurita, 1992. Twisted GFSR
- * generators. ACM Transactions on Modeling and Computer Simulation
- * 2(3):179-194. Also see M. Matsumoto & Y. Kurita, 1994. Twisted
- * GFSR generators II. ACM Transactions on Modeling and Computer
- * Simulation 4:254-266)
- *
- * Thanks to Colin Plumb for suggesting this.
- *
- * The mixing operation is much less sensitive than the output hash,
- * where we use SHA-1. All that we want of mixing operation is that
- * it be a good non-cryptographic hash; i.e. it not produce collisions
- * when fed "random" data of the sort we expect to see. As long as
- * the pool state differs for different inputs, we have preserved the
- * input entropy and done a good job. The fact that an intelligent
- * attacker can construct inputs that will produce controlled
- * alterations to the pool's state is not important because we don't
- * consider such inputs to contribute any randomness. The only
- * property we need with respect to them is that the attacker can't
- * increase his/her knowledge of the pool's state. Since all
- * additions are reversible (knowing the final state and the input,
- * you can reconstruct the initial state), if an attacker has any
- * uncertainty about the initial state, he/she can only shuffle that
- * uncertainty about, but never cause any collisions (which would
- * decrease the uncertainty).
+ * Wait for the input pool to be seeded and thus guaranteed to supply
+ * cryptographically secure random numbers. This applies to: the /dev/urandom
+ * device, the get_random_bytes function, and the get_random_{u32,u64,int,long}
+ * family of functions. Using any of these functions without first calling
+ * this function forfeits the guarantee of security.
*
- * Our mixing functions were analyzed by Lacharme, Roeck, Strubel, and
- * Videau in their paper, "The Linux Pseudorandom Number Generator
- * Revisited" (see: http://eprint.iacr.org/2012/251.pdf). In their
- * paper, they point out that we are not using a true Twisted GFSR,
- * since Matsumoto & Kurita used a trinomial feedback polynomial (that
- * is, with only three taps, instead of the six that we are using).
- * As a result, the resulting polynomial is neither primitive nor
- * irreducible, and hence does not have a maximal period over
- * GF(2**32). They suggest a slight change to the generator
- * polynomial which improves the resulting TGFSR polynomial to be
- * irreducible, which we have made here.
+ * Returns: 0 if the input pool has been seeded.
+ * -ERESTARTSYS if the function was interrupted by a signal.
*/
-static const struct poolinfo {
- int poolbitshift, poolwords, poolbytes, poolfracbits;
-#define S(x) ilog2(x)+5, (x), (x)*4, (x) << (ENTROPY_SHIFT+5)
- int tap1, tap2, tap3, tap4, tap5;
-} poolinfo_table[] = {
- /* was: x^128 + x^103 + x^76 + x^51 +x^25 + x + 1 */
- /* x^128 + x^104 + x^76 + x^51 +x^25 + x + 1 */
- { S(128), 104, 76, 51, 25, 1 },
-};
+int wait_for_random_bytes(void)
+{
+ while (!crng_ready()) {
+ int ret;
+
+ try_to_generate_entropy();
+ ret = wait_event_interruptible_timeout(crng_init_wait, crng_ready(), HZ);
+ if (ret)
+ return ret > 0 ? 0 : ret;
+ }
+ return 0;
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL(wait_for_random_bytes);
/*
- * Static global variables
+ * Add a callback function that will be invoked when the input
+ * pool is initialised.
+ *
+ * returns: 0 if callback is successfully added
+ * -EALREADY if pool is already initialised (callback not called)
*/
-static DECLARE_WAIT_QUEUE_HEAD(random_write_wait);
-static struct fasync_struct *fasync;
-
-static DEFINE_SPINLOCK(random_ready_list_lock);
-static LIST_HEAD(random_ready_list);
+int __cold register_random_ready_notifier(struct notifier_block *nb)
+{
+ unsigned long flags;
+ int ret = -EALREADY;
-struct crng_state {
- __u32 state[16];
- unsigned long init_time;
- spinlock_t lock;
-};
+ if (crng_ready())
+ return ret;
-static struct crng_state primary_crng = {
- .lock = __SPIN_LOCK_UNLOCKED(primary_crng.lock),
-};
+ spin_lock_irqsave(&random_ready_chain_lock, flags);
+ if (!crng_ready())
+ ret = raw_notifier_chain_register(&random_ready_chain, nb);
+ spin_unlock_irqrestore(&random_ready_chain_lock, flags);
+ return ret;
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL(register_random_ready_notifier);
/*
- * crng_init = 0 --> Uninitialized
- * 1 --> Initialized
- * 2 --> Initialized from input_pool
- *
- * crng_init is protected by primary_crng->lock, and only increases
- * its value (from 0->1->2).
+ * Delete a previously registered readiness callback function.
*/
-static int crng_init = 0;
-static bool crng_need_final_init = false;
-#define crng_ready() (likely(crng_init > 1))
-static int crng_init_cnt = 0;
-static unsigned long crng_global_init_time = 0;
-#define CRNG_INIT_CNT_THRESH (2*CHACHA_KEY_SIZE)
-static void _extract_crng(struct crng_state *crng, __u8 out[CHACHA_BLOCK_SIZE]);
-static void _crng_backtrack_protect(struct crng_state *crng,
- __u8 tmp[CHACHA_BLOCK_SIZE], int used);
-static void process_random_ready_list(void);
-static void _get_random_bytes(void *buf, int nbytes);
-
-static struct ratelimit_state unseeded_warning =
- RATELIMIT_STATE_INIT("warn_unseeded_randomness", HZ, 3);
-static struct ratelimit_state urandom_warning =
- RATELIMIT_STATE_INIT("warn_urandom_randomness", HZ, 3);
+int __cold unregister_random_ready_notifier(struct notifier_block *nb)
+{
+ unsigned long flags;
+ int ret;
-static int ratelimit_disable __read_mostly;
+ spin_lock_irqsave(&random_ready_chain_lock, flags);
+ ret = raw_notifier_chain_unregister(&random_ready_chain, nb);
+ spin_unlock_irqrestore(&random_ready_chain_lock, flags);
+ return ret;
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL(unregister_random_ready_notifier);
-module_param_named(ratelimit_disable, ratelimit_disable, int, 0644);
-MODULE_PARM_DESC(ratelimit_disable, "Disable random ratelimit suppression");
+static void __cold process_random_ready_list(void)
+{
+ unsigned long flags;
-/**********************************************************************
+ spin_lock_irqsave(&random_ready_chain_lock, flags);
+ raw_notifier_call_chain(&random_ready_chain, 0, NULL);
+ spin_unlock_irqrestore(&random_ready_chain_lock, flags);
+}
+
+#define warn_unseeded_randomness() \
+ if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_WARN_ALL_UNSEEDED_RANDOM) && !crng_ready()) \
+ printk_deferred(KERN_NOTICE "random: %s called from %pS with crng_init=%d\n", \
+ __func__, (void *)_RET_IP_, crng_init)
+
+
+/*********************************************************************
*
- * OS independent entropy store. Here are the functions which handle
- * storing entropy in an entropy pool.
+ * Fast key erasure RNG, the "crng".
*
- **********************************************************************/
+ * These functions expand entropy from the entropy extractor into
+ * long streams for external consumption using the "fast key erasure"
+ * RNG described at <https://blog.cr.yp.to/20170723-random.html>.
+ *
+ * There are a few exported interfaces for use by other drivers:
+ *
+ * void get_random_bytes(void *buf, size_t len)
+ * u32 get_random_u32()
+ * u64 get_random_u64()
+ * unsigned int get_random_int()
+ * unsigned long get_random_long()
+ *
+ * These interfaces will return the requested number of random bytes
+ * into the given buffer or as a return value. This is equivalent to
+ * a read from /dev/urandom. The u32, u64, int, and long family of
+ * functions may be higher performance for one-off random integers,
+ * because they do a bit of buffering and do not invoke reseeding
+ * until the buffer is emptied.
+ *
+ *********************************************************************/
-struct entropy_store;
-struct entropy_store {
- /* read-only data: */
- const struct poolinfo *poolinfo;
- __u32 *pool;
- const char *name;
+enum {
+ CRNG_RESEED_START_INTERVAL = HZ,
+ CRNG_RESEED_INTERVAL = 60 * HZ
+};
- /* read-write data: */
+static struct {
+ u8 key[CHACHA_KEY_SIZE] __aligned(__alignof__(long));
+ unsigned long birth;
+ unsigned long generation;
spinlock_t lock;
- unsigned short add_ptr;
- unsigned short input_rotate;
- int entropy_count;
- unsigned int initialized:1;
- unsigned int last_data_init:1;
- __u8 last_data[EXTRACT_SIZE];
+} base_crng = {
+ .lock = __SPIN_LOCK_UNLOCKED(base_crng.lock)
};
-static ssize_t extract_entropy(struct entropy_store *r, void *buf,
- size_t nbytes, int min, int rsvd);
-static ssize_t _extract_entropy(struct entropy_store *r, void *buf,
- size_t nbytes, int fips);
-
-static void crng_reseed(struct crng_state *crng, struct entropy_store *r);
-static __u32 input_pool_data[INPUT_POOL_WORDS] __latent_entropy;
-
-static struct entropy_store input_pool = {
- .poolinfo = &poolinfo_table[0],
- .name = "input",
- .lock = __SPIN_LOCK_UNLOCKED(input_pool.lock),
- .pool = input_pool_data
+struct crng {
+ u8 key[CHACHA_KEY_SIZE];
+ unsigned long generation;
+ local_lock_t lock;
};
-static __u32 const twist_table[8] = {
- 0x00000000, 0x3b6e20c8, 0x76dc4190, 0x4db26158,
- 0xedb88320, 0xd6d6a3e8, 0x9b64c2b0, 0xa00ae278 };
-
-/*
- * This function adds bytes into the entropy "pool". It does not
- * update the entropy estimate. The caller should call
- * credit_entropy_bits if this is appropriate.
- *
- * The pool is stirred with a primitive polynomial of the appropriate
- * degree, and then twisted. We twist by three bits at a time because
- * it's cheap to do so and helps slightly in the expected case where
- * the entropy is concentrated in the low-order bits.
- */
-static void _mix_pool_bytes(struct entropy_store *r, const void *in,
- int nbytes)
-{
- unsigned long i, tap1, tap2, tap3, tap4, tap5;
- int input_rotate;
- int wordmask = r->poolinfo->poolwords - 1;
- const char *bytes = in;
- __u32 w;
-
- tap1 = r->poolinfo->tap1;
- tap2 = r->poolinfo->tap2;
- tap3 = r->poolinfo->tap3;
- tap4 = r->poolinfo->tap4;
- tap5 = r->poolinfo->tap5;
-
- input_rotate = r->input_rotate;
- i = r->add_ptr;
-
- /* mix one byte at a time to simplify size handling and churn faster */
- while (nbytes--) {
- w = rol32(*bytes++, input_rotate);
- i = (i - 1) & wordmask;
-
- /* XOR in the various taps */
- w ^= r->pool[i];
- w ^= r->pool[(i + tap1) & wordmask];
- w ^= r->pool[(i + tap2) & wordmask];
- w ^= r->pool[(i + tap3) & wordmask];
- w ^= r->pool[(i + tap4) & wordmask];
- w ^= r->pool[(i + tap5) & wordmask];
-
- /* Mix the result back in with a twist */
- r->pool[i] = (w >> 3) ^ twist_table[w & 7];
-
- /*
- * Normally, we add 7 bits of rotation to the pool.
- * At the beginning of the pool, add an extra 7 bits
- * rotation, so that successive passes spread the
- * input bits across the pool evenly.
- */
- input_rotate = (input_rotate + (i ? 7 : 14)) & 31;
- }
-
- r->input_rotate = input_rotate;
- r->add_ptr = i;
-}
+static DEFINE_PER_CPU(struct crng, crngs) = {
+ .generation = ULONG_MAX,
+ .lock = INIT_LOCAL_LOCK(crngs.lock),
+};
-static void __mix_pool_bytes(struct entropy_store *r, const void *in,
- int nbytes)
-{
- trace_mix_pool_bytes_nolock(r->name, nbytes, _RET_IP_);
- _mix_pool_bytes(r, in, nbytes);
-}
+/* Used by crng_reseed() and crng_make_state() to extract a new seed from the input pool. */
+static void extract_entropy(void *buf, size_t len);
-static void mix_pool_bytes(struct entropy_store *r, const void *in,
- int nbytes)
+/* This extracts a new crng key from the input pool. */
+static void crng_reseed(void)
{
unsigned long flags;
+ unsigned long next_gen;
+ u8 key[CHACHA_KEY_SIZE];
- trace_mix_pool_bytes(r->name, nbytes, _RET_IP_);
- spin_lock_irqsave(&r->lock, flags);
- _mix_pool_bytes(r, in, nbytes);
- spin_unlock_irqrestore(&r->lock, flags);
-}
+ extract_entropy(key, sizeof(key));
-struct fast_pool {
- __u32 pool[4];
- unsigned long last;
- unsigned short reg_idx;
- unsigned char count;
-};
+ /*
+ * We copy the new key into the base_crng, overwriting the old one,
+ * and update the generation counter. We avoid hitting ULONG_MAX,
+ * because the per-cpu crngs are initialized to ULONG_MAX, so this
+ * forces new CPUs that come online to always initialize.
+ */
+ spin_lock_irqsave(&base_crng.lock, flags);
+ memcpy(base_crng.key, key, sizeof(base_crng.key));
+ next_gen = base_crng.generation + 1;
+ if (next_gen == ULONG_MAX)
+ ++next_gen;
+ WRITE_ONCE(base_crng.generation, next_gen);
+ WRITE_ONCE(base_crng.birth, jiffies);
+ if (!static_branch_likely(&crng_is_ready))
+ crng_init = CRNG_READY;
+ spin_unlock_irqrestore(&base_crng.lock, flags);
+ memzero_explicit(key, sizeof(key));
+}
/*
- * This is a fast mixing routine used by the interrupt randomness
- * collector. It's hardcoded for an 128 bit pool and assumes that any
- * locks that might be needed are taken by the caller.
+ * This generates a ChaCha block using the provided key, and then
+ * immediately overwites that key with half the block. It returns
+ * the resultant ChaCha state to the user, along with the second
+ * half of the block containing 32 bytes of random data that may
+ * be used; random_data_len may not be greater than 32.
+ *
+ * The returned ChaCha state contains within it a copy of the old
+ * key value, at index 4, so the state should always be zeroed out
+ * immediately after using in order to maintain forward secrecy.
+ * If the state cannot be erased in a timely manner, then it is
+ * safer to set the random_data parameter to &chacha_state[4] so
+ * that this function overwrites it before returning.
*/
-static void fast_mix(struct fast_pool *f)
+static void crng_fast_key_erasure(u8 key[CHACHA_KEY_SIZE],
+ u32 chacha_state[CHACHA_STATE_WORDS],
+ u8 *random_data, size_t random_data_len)
{
- __u32 a = f->pool[0], b = f->pool[1];
- __u32 c = f->pool[2], d = f->pool[3];
-
- a += b; c += d;
- b = rol32(b, 6); d = rol32(d, 27);
- d ^= a; b ^= c;
+ u8 first_block[CHACHA_BLOCK_SIZE];
- a += b; c += d;
- b = rol32(b, 16); d = rol32(d, 14);
- d ^= a; b ^= c;
+ BUG_ON(random_data_len > 32);
- a += b; c += d;
- b = rol32(b, 6); d = rol32(d, 27);
- d ^= a; b ^= c;
+ chacha_init_consts(chacha_state);
+ memcpy(&chacha_state[4], key, CHACHA_KEY_SIZE);
+ memset(&chacha_state[12], 0, sizeof(u32) * 4);
+ chacha20_block(chacha_state, first_block);
- a += b; c += d;
- b = rol32(b, 16); d = rol32(d, 14);
- d ^= a; b ^= c;
-
- f->pool[0] = a; f->pool[1] = b;
- f->pool[2] = c; f->pool[3] = d;
- f->count++;
+ memcpy(key, first_block, CHACHA_KEY_SIZE);
+ memcpy(random_data, first_block + CHACHA_KEY_SIZE, random_data_len);
+ memzero_explicit(first_block, sizeof(first_block));
}
-static void process_random_ready_list(void)
-{
- unsigned long flags;
- struct random_ready_callback *rdy, *tmp;
-
- spin_lock_irqsave(&random_ready_list_lock, flags);
- list_for_each_entry_safe(rdy, tmp, &random_ready_list, list) {
- struct module *owner = rdy->owner;
-
- list_del_init(&rdy->list);
- rdy->func(rdy);
- module_put(owner);
+/*
+ * Return whether the crng seed is considered to be sufficiently old
+ * that a reseeding is needed. This happens if the last reseeding
+ * was CRNG_RESEED_INTERVAL ago, or during early boot, at an interval
+ * proportional to the uptime.
+ */
+static bool crng_has_old_seed(void)
+{
+ static bool early_boot = true;
+ unsigned long interval = CRNG_RESEED_INTERVAL;
+
+ if (unlikely(READ_ONCE(early_boot))) {
+ time64_t uptime = ktime_get_seconds();
+ if (uptime >= CRNG_RESEED_INTERVAL / HZ * 2)
+ WRITE_ONCE(early_boot, false);
+ else
+ interval = max_t(unsigned int, CRNG_RESEED_START_INTERVAL,
+ (unsigned int)uptime / 2 * HZ);
}
- spin_unlock_irqrestore(&random_ready_list_lock, flags);
+ return time_is_before_jiffies(READ_ONCE(base_crng.birth) + interval);
}
/*
- * Credit (or debit) the entropy store with n bits of entropy.
- * Use credit_entropy_bits_safe() if the value comes from userspace
- * or otherwise should be checked for extreme values.
+ * This function returns a ChaCha state that you may use for generating
+ * random data. It also returns up to 32 bytes on its own of random data
+ * that may be used; random_data_len may not be greater than 32.
*/
-static void credit_entropy_bits(struct entropy_store *r, int nbits)
+static void crng_make_state(u32 chacha_state[CHACHA_STATE_WORDS],
+ u8 *random_data, size_t random_data_len)
{
- int entropy_count, orig, has_initialized = 0;
- const int pool_size = r->poolinfo->poolfracbits;
- int nfrac = nbits << ENTROPY_SHIFT;
-
- if (!nbits)
- return;
+ unsigned long flags;
+ struct crng *crng;
-retry:
- entropy_count = orig = READ_ONCE(r->entropy_count);
- if (nfrac < 0) {
- /* Debit */
- entropy_count += nfrac;
- } else {
- /*
- * Credit: we have to account for the possibility of
- * overwriting already present entropy. Even in the
- * ideal case of pure Shannon entropy, new contributions
- * approach the full value asymptotically:
- *
- * entropy <- entropy + (pool_size - entropy) *
- * (1 - exp(-add_entropy/pool_size))
- *
- * For add_entropy <= pool_size/2 then
- * (1 - exp(-add_entropy/pool_size)) >=
- * (add_entropy/pool_size)*0.7869...
- * so we can approximate the exponential with
- * 3/4*add_entropy/pool_size and still be on the
- * safe side by adding at most pool_size/2 at a time.
- *
- * The use of pool_size-2 in the while statement is to
- * prevent rounding artifacts from making the loop
- * arbitrarily long; this limits the loop to log2(pool_size)*2
- * turns no matter how large nbits is.
- */
- int pnfrac = nfrac;
- const int s = r->poolinfo->poolbitshift + ENTROPY_SHIFT + 2;
- /* The +2 corresponds to the /4 in the denominator */
-
- do {
- unsigned int anfrac = min(pnfrac, pool_size/2);
- unsigned int add =
- ((pool_size - entropy_count)*anfrac*3) >> s;
-
- entropy_count += add;
- pnfrac -= anfrac;
- } while (unlikely(entropy_count < pool_size-2 && pnfrac));
- }
+ BUG_ON(random_data_len > 32);
- if (WARN_ON(entropy_count < 0)) {
- pr_warn("negative entropy/overflow: pool %s count %d\n",
- r->name, entropy_count);
- entropy_count = 0;
- } else if (entropy_count > pool_size)
- entropy_count = pool_size;
- if (cmpxchg(&r->entropy_count, orig, entropy_count) != orig)
- goto retry;
-
- if (has_initialized) {
- r->initialized = 1;
- kill_fasync(&fasync, SIGIO, POLL_IN);
+ /*
+ * For the fast path, we check whether we're ready, unlocked first, and
+ * then re-check once locked later. In the case where we're really not
+ * ready, we do fast key erasure with the base_crng directly, extracting
+ * when crng_init is CRNG_EMPTY.
+ */
+ if (!crng_ready()) {
+ bool ready;
+
+ spin_lock_irqsave(&base_crng.lock, flags);
+ ready = crng_ready();
+ if (!ready) {
+ if (crng_init == CRNG_EMPTY)
+ extract_entropy(base_crng.key, sizeof(base_crng.key));
+ crng_fast_key_erasure(base_crng.key, chacha_state,
+ random_data, random_data_len);
+ }
+ spin_unlock_irqrestore(&base_crng.lock, flags);
+ if (!ready)
+ return;
}
- trace_credit_entropy_bits(r->name, nbits,
- entropy_count >> ENTROPY_SHIFT, _RET_IP_);
+ /*
+ * If the base_crng is old enough, we reseed, which in turn bumps the
+ * generation counter that we check below.
+ */
+ if (unlikely(crng_has_old_seed()))
+ crng_reseed();
- if (r == &input_pool) {
- int entropy_bits = entropy_count >> ENTROPY_SHIFT;
+ local_lock_irqsave(&crngs.lock, flags);
+ crng = raw_cpu_ptr(&crngs);
- if (crng_init < 2) {
- if (entropy_bits < 128)
- return;
- crng_reseed(&primary_crng, r);
- entropy_bits = ENTROPY_BITS(r);
- }
+ /*
+ * If our per-cpu crng is older than the base_crng, then it means
+ * somebody reseeded the base_crng. In that case, we do fast key
+ * erasure on the base_crng, and use its output as the new key
+ * for our per-cpu crng. This brings us up to date with base_crng.
+ */
+ if (unlikely(crng->generation != READ_ONCE(base_crng.generation))) {
+ spin_lock(&base_crng.lock);
+ crng_fast_key_erasure(base_crng.key, chacha_state,
+ crng->key, sizeof(crng->key));
+ crng->generation = base_crng.generation;
+ spin_unlock(&base_crng.lock);
}
+
+ /*
+ * Finally, when we've made it this far, our per-cpu crng has an up
+ * to date key, and we can do fast key erasure with it to produce
+ * some random data and a ChaCha state for the caller. All other
+ * branches of this function are "unlikely", so most of the time we
+ * should wind up here immediately.
+ */
+ crng_fast_key_erasure(crng->key, chacha_state, random_data, random_data_len);
+ local_unlock_irqrestore(&crngs.lock, flags);
}
-static int credit_entropy_bits_safe(struct entropy_store *r, int nbits)
+static void _get_random_bytes(void *buf, size_t len)
{
- const int nbits_max = r->poolinfo->poolwords * 32;
-
- if (nbits < 0)
- return -EINVAL;
+ u32 chacha_state[CHACHA_STATE_WORDS];
+ u8 tmp[CHACHA_BLOCK_SIZE];
+ size_t first_block_len;
- /* Cap the value to avoid overflows */
- nbits = min(nbits, nbits_max);
+ if (!len)
+ return;
- credit_entropy_bits(r, nbits);
- return 0;
-}
+ first_block_len = min_t(size_t, 32, len);
+ crng_make_state(chacha_state, buf, first_block_len);
+ len -= first_block_len;
+ buf += first_block_len;
-/*********************************************************************
- *
- * CRNG using CHACHA20
- *
- *********************************************************************/
+ while (len) {
+ if (len < CHACHA_BLOCK_SIZE) {
+ chacha20_block(chacha_state, tmp);
+ memcpy(buf, tmp, len);
+ memzero_explicit(tmp, sizeof(tmp));
+ break;
+ }
-#define CRNG_RESEED_INTERVAL (300*HZ)
+ chacha20_block(chacha_state, buf);
+ if (unlikely(chacha_state[12] == 0))
+ ++chacha_state[13];
+ len -= CHACHA_BLOCK_SIZE;
+ buf += CHACHA_BLOCK_SIZE;
+ }
-static DECLARE_WAIT_QUEUE_HEAD(crng_init_wait);
+ memzero_explicit(chacha_state, sizeof(chacha_state));
+}
-#ifdef CONFIG_NUMA
/*
- * Hack to deal with crazy userspace progams when they are all trying
- * to access /dev/urandom in parallel. The programs are almost
- * certainly doing something terribly wrong, but we'll work around
- * their brain damage.
+ * This function is the exported kernel interface. It returns some
+ * number of good random numbers, suitable for key generation, seeding
+ * TCP sequence numbers, etc. It does not rely on the hardware random
+ * number generator. For random bytes direct from the hardware RNG
+ * (when available), use get_random_bytes_arch(). In order to ensure
+ * that the randomness provided by this function is okay, the function
+ * wait_for_random_bytes() should be called and return 0 at least once
+ * at any point prior.
*/
-static struct crng_state **crng_node_pool __read_mostly;
-#endif
-
-static void invalidate_batched_entropy(void);
-static void numa_crng_init(void);
-
-static bool trust_cpu __ro_after_init = IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_RANDOM_TRUST_CPU);
-static int __init parse_trust_cpu(char *arg)
+void get_random_bytes(void *buf, size_t len)
{
- return kstrtobool(arg, &trust_cpu);
+ warn_unseeded_randomness();
+ _get_random_bytes(buf, len);
}
-early_param("random.trust_cpu", parse_trust_cpu);
+EXPORT_SYMBOL(get_random_bytes);
-static bool crng_init_try_arch(struct crng_state *crng)
+static ssize_t get_random_bytes_user(struct iov_iter *iter)
{
- int i;
- bool arch_init = true;
- unsigned long rv;
-
- for (i = 4; i < 16; i++) {
- if (!arch_get_random_seed_long(&rv) &&
- !arch_get_random_long(&rv)) {
- rv = random_get_entropy();
- arch_init = false;
- }
- crng->state[i] ^= rv;
+ u32 chacha_state[CHACHA_STATE_WORDS];
+ u8 block[CHACHA_BLOCK_SIZE];
+ size_t ret = 0, copied;
+
+ if (unlikely(!iov_iter_count(iter)))
+ return 0;
+
+ /*
+ * Immediately overwrite the ChaCha key at index 4 with random
+ * bytes, in case userspace causes copy_to_user() below to sleep
+ * forever, so that we still retain forward secrecy in that case.
+ */
+ crng_make_state(chacha_state, (u8 *)&chacha_state[4], CHACHA_KEY_SIZE);
+ /*
+ * However, if we're doing a read of len <= 32, we don't need to
+ * use chacha_state after, so we can simply return those bytes to
+ * the user directly.
+ */
+ if (iov_iter_count(iter) <= CHACHA_KEY_SIZE) {
+ ret = copy_to_iter(&chacha_state[4], CHACHA_KEY_SIZE, iter);
+ goto out_zero_chacha;
}
- return arch_init;
-}
+ for (;;) {
+ chacha20_block(chacha_state, block);
+ if (unlikely(chacha_state[12] == 0))
+ ++chacha_state[13];
-static bool __init crng_init_try_arch_early(struct crng_state *crng)
-{
- int i;
- bool arch_init = true;
- unsigned long rv;
-
- for (i = 4; i < 16; i++) {
- if (!arch_get_random_seed_long_early(&rv) &&
- !arch_get_random_long_early(&rv)) {
- rv = random_get_entropy();
- arch_init = false;
+ copied = copy_to_iter(block, sizeof(block), iter);
+ ret += copied;
+ if (!iov_iter_count(iter) || copied != sizeof(block))
+ break;
+
+ BUILD_BUG_ON(PAGE_SIZE % sizeof(block) != 0);
+ if (ret % PAGE_SIZE == 0) {
+ if (signal_pending(current))
+ break;
+ cond_resched();
}
- crng->state[i] ^= rv;
}
- return arch_init;
+ memzero_explicit(block, sizeof(block));
+out_zero_chacha:
+ memzero_explicit(chacha_state, sizeof(chacha_state));
+ return ret ? ret : -EFAULT;
}
-static void __maybe_unused crng_initialize_secondary(struct crng_state *crng)
-{
- chacha_init_consts(crng->state);
- _get_random_bytes(&crng->state[4], sizeof(__u32) * 12);
- crng_init_try_arch(crng);
- crng->init_time = jiffies - CRNG_RESEED_INTERVAL - 1;
-}
+/*
+ * Batched entropy returns random integers. The quality of the random
+ * number is good as /dev/urandom. In order to ensure that the randomness
+ * provided by this function is okay, the function wait_for_random_bytes()
+ * should be called and return 0 at least once at any point prior.
+ */
-static void __init crng_initialize_primary(struct crng_state *crng)
+#define DEFINE_BATCHED_ENTROPY(type) \
+struct batch_ ##type { \
+ /* \
+ * We make this 1.5x a ChaCha block, so that we get the \
+ * remaining 32 bytes from fast key erasure, plus one full \
+ * block from the detached ChaCha state. We can increase \
+ * the size of this later if needed so long as we keep the \
+ * formula of (integer_blocks + 0.5) * CHACHA_BLOCK_SIZE. \
+ */ \
+ type entropy[CHACHA_BLOCK_SIZE * 3 / (2 * sizeof(type))]; \
+ local_lock_t lock; \
+ unsigned long generation; \
+ unsigned int position; \
+}; \
+ \
+static DEFINE_PER_CPU(struct batch_ ##type, batched_entropy_ ##type) = { \
+ .lock = INIT_LOCAL_LOCK(batched_entropy_ ##type.lock), \
+ .position = UINT_MAX \
+}; \
+ \
+type get_random_ ##type(void) \
+{ \
+ type ret; \
+ unsigned long flags; \
+ struct batch_ ##type *batch; \
+ unsigned long next_gen; \
+ \
+ warn_unseeded_randomness(); \
+ \
+ if (!crng_ready()) { \
+ _get_random_bytes(&ret, sizeof(ret)); \
+ return ret; \
+ } \
+ \
+ local_lock_irqsave(&batched_entropy_ ##type.lock, flags); \
+ batch = raw_cpu_ptr(&batched_entropy_##type); \
+ \
+ next_gen = READ_ONCE(base_crng.generation); \
+ if (batch->position >= ARRAY_SIZE(batch->entropy) || \
+ next_gen != batch->generation) { \
+ _get_random_bytes(batch->entropy, sizeof(batch->entropy)); \
+ batch->position = 0; \
+ batch->generation = next_gen; \
+ } \
+ \
+ ret = batch->entropy[batch->position]; \
+ batch->entropy[batch->position] = 0; \
+ ++batch->position; \
+ local_unlock_irqrestore(&batched_entropy_ ##type.lock, flags); \
+ return ret; \
+} \
+EXPORT_SYMBOL(get_random_ ##type);
+
+DEFINE_BATCHED_ENTROPY(u64)
+DEFINE_BATCHED_ENTROPY(u32)
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_SMP
+/*
+ * This function is called when the CPU is coming up, with entry
+ * CPUHP_RANDOM_PREPARE, which comes before CPUHP_WORKQUEUE_PREP.
+ */
+int __cold random_prepare_cpu(unsigned int cpu)
{
- chacha_init_consts(crng->state);
- _extract_entropy(&input_pool, &crng->state[4], sizeof(__u32) * 12, 0);
- if (crng_init_try_arch_early(crng) && trust_cpu) {
- invalidate_batched_entropy();
- numa_crng_init();
- crng_init = 2;
- pr_notice("crng done (trusting CPU's manufacturer)\n");
- }
- crng->init_time = jiffies - CRNG_RESEED_INTERVAL - 1;
-}
-
-static void crng_finalize_init(struct crng_state *crng)
-{
- if (crng != &primary_crng || crng_init >= 2)
- return;
- if (!system_wq) {
- /* We can't call numa_crng_init until we have workqueues,
- * so mark this for processing later. */
- crng_need_final_init = true;
- return;
- }
-
- invalidate_batched_entropy();
- numa_crng_init();
- crng_init = 2;
- process_random_ready_list();
- wake_up_interruptible(&crng_init_wait);
- kill_fasync(&fasync, SIGIO, POLL_IN);
- pr_notice("crng init done\n");
- if (unseeded_warning.missed) {
- pr_notice("%d get_random_xx warning(s) missed due to ratelimiting\n",
- unseeded_warning.missed);
- unseeded_warning.missed = 0;
- }
- if (urandom_warning.missed) {
- pr_notice("%d urandom warning(s) missed due to ratelimiting\n",
- urandom_warning.missed);
- urandom_warning.missed = 0;
- }
-}
-
-#ifdef CONFIG_NUMA
-static void do_numa_crng_init(struct work_struct *work)
-{
- int i;
- struct crng_state *crng;
- struct crng_state **pool;
-
- pool = kcalloc(nr_node_ids, sizeof(*pool), GFP_KERNEL|__GFP_NOFAIL);
- for_each_online_node(i) {
- crng = kmalloc_node(sizeof(struct crng_state),
- GFP_KERNEL | __GFP_NOFAIL, i);
- spin_lock_init(&crng->lock);
- crng_initialize_secondary(crng);
- pool[i] = crng;
- }
- /* pairs with READ_ONCE() in select_crng() */
- if (cmpxchg_release(&crng_node_pool, NULL, pool) != NULL) {
- for_each_node(i)
- kfree(pool[i]);
- kfree(pool);
- }
-}
-
-static DECLARE_WORK(numa_crng_init_work, do_numa_crng_init);
-
-static void numa_crng_init(void)
-{
- schedule_work(&numa_crng_init_work);
-}
-
-static struct crng_state *select_crng(void)
-{
- struct crng_state **pool;
- int nid = numa_node_id();
-
- /* pairs with cmpxchg_release() in do_numa_crng_init() */
- pool = READ_ONCE(crng_node_pool);
- if (pool && pool[nid])
- return pool[nid];
-
- return &primary_crng;
-}
-#else
-static void numa_crng_init(void) {}
-
-static struct crng_state *select_crng(void)
-{
- return &primary_crng;
+ /*
+ * When the cpu comes back online, immediately invalidate both
+ * the per-cpu crng and all batches, so that we serve fresh
+ * randomness.
+ */
+ per_cpu_ptr(&crngs, cpu)->generation = ULONG_MAX;
+ per_cpu_ptr(&batched_entropy_u32, cpu)->position = UINT_MAX;
+ per_cpu_ptr(&batched_entropy_u64, cpu)->position = UINT_MAX;
+ return 0;
}
#endif
/*
- * crng_fast_load() can be called by code in the interrupt service
- * path. So we can't afford to dilly-dally. Returns the number of
- * bytes processed from cp.
- */
-static size_t crng_fast_load(const char *cp, size_t len)
-{
- unsigned long flags;
- char *p;
- size_t ret = 0;
-
- if (!spin_trylock_irqsave(&primary_crng.lock, flags))
- return 0;
- if (crng_init != 0) {
- spin_unlock_irqrestore(&primary_crng.lock, flags);
- return 0;
- }
- p = (unsigned char *) &primary_crng.state[4];
- while (len > 0 && crng_init_cnt < CRNG_INIT_CNT_THRESH) {
- p[crng_init_cnt % CHACHA_KEY_SIZE] ^= *cp;
- cp++; crng_init_cnt++; len--; ret++;
- }
- spin_unlock_irqrestore(&primary_crng.lock, flags);
- if (crng_init_cnt >= CRNG_INIT_CNT_THRESH) {
- invalidate_batched_entropy();
- crng_init = 1;
- pr_notice("fast init done\n");
- }
- return ret;
-}
-
-/*
- * crng_slow_load() is called by add_device_randomness, which has two
- * attributes. (1) We can't trust the buffer passed to it is
- * guaranteed to be unpredictable (so it might not have any entropy at
- * all), and (2) it doesn't have the performance constraints of
- * crng_fast_load().
- *
- * So we do something more comprehensive which is guaranteed to touch
- * all of the primary_crng's state, and which uses a LFSR with a
- * period of 255 as part of the mixing algorithm. Finally, we do
- * *not* advance crng_init_cnt since buffer we may get may be something
- * like a fixed DMI table (for example), which might very well be
- * unique to the machine, but is otherwise unvarying.
- */
-static int crng_slow_load(const char *cp, size_t len)
-{
- unsigned long flags;
- static unsigned char lfsr = 1;
- unsigned char tmp;
- unsigned i, max = CHACHA_KEY_SIZE;
- const char * src_buf = cp;
- char * dest_buf = (char *) &primary_crng.state[4];
-
- if (!spin_trylock_irqsave(&primary_crng.lock, flags))
- return 0;
- if (crng_init != 0) {
- spin_unlock_irqrestore(&primary_crng.lock, flags);
- return 0;
- }
- if (len > max)
- max = len;
-
- for (i = 0; i < max ; i++) {
- tmp = lfsr;
- lfsr >>= 1;
- if (tmp & 1)
- lfsr ^= 0xE1;
- tmp = dest_buf[i % CHACHA_KEY_SIZE];
- dest_buf[i % CHACHA_KEY_SIZE] ^= src_buf[i % len] ^ lfsr;
- lfsr += (tmp << 3) | (tmp >> 5);
- }
- spin_unlock_irqrestore(&primary_crng.lock, flags);
- return 1;
-}
-
-static void crng_reseed(struct crng_state *crng, struct entropy_store *r)
-{
- unsigned long flags;
- int i, num;
- union {
- __u8 block[CHACHA_BLOCK_SIZE];
- __u32 key[8];
- } buf;
-
- if (r) {
- num = extract_entropy(r, &buf, 32, 16, 0);
- if (num == 0)
- return;
- } else {
- _extract_crng(&primary_crng, buf.block);
- _crng_backtrack_protect(&primary_crng, buf.block,
- CHACHA_KEY_SIZE);
- }
- spin_lock_irqsave(&crng->lock, flags);
- for (i = 0; i < 8; i++) {
- unsigned long rv;
- if (!arch_get_random_seed_long(&rv) &&
- !arch_get_random_long(&rv))
- rv = random_get_entropy();
- crng->state[i+4] ^= buf.key[i] ^ rv;
- }
- memzero_explicit(&buf, sizeof(buf));
- WRITE_ONCE(crng->init_time, jiffies);
- spin_unlock_irqrestore(&crng->lock, flags);
- crng_finalize_init(crng);
-}
-
-static void _extract_crng(struct crng_state *crng,
- __u8 out[CHACHA_BLOCK_SIZE])
-{
- unsigned long v, flags, init_time;
-
- if (crng_ready()) {
- init_time = READ_ONCE(crng->init_time);
- if (time_after(READ_ONCE(crng_global_init_time), init_time) ||
- time_after(jiffies, init_time + CRNG_RESEED_INTERVAL))
- crng_reseed(crng, crng == &primary_crng ?
- &input_pool : NULL);
- }
- spin_lock_irqsave(&crng->lock, flags);
- if (arch_get_random_long(&v))
- crng->state[14] ^= v;
- chacha20_block(&crng->state[0], out);
- if (crng->state[12] == 0)
- crng->state[13]++;
- spin_unlock_irqrestore(&crng->lock, flags);
-}
-
-static void extract_crng(__u8 out[CHACHA_BLOCK_SIZE])
-{
- _extract_crng(select_crng(), out);
-}
-
-/*
- * Use the leftover bytes from the CRNG block output (if there is
- * enough) to mutate the CRNG key to provide backtracking protection.
+ * This function will use the architecture-specific hardware random
+ * number generator if it is available. It is not recommended for
+ * use. Use get_random_bytes() instead. It returns the number of
+ * bytes filled in.
*/
-static void _crng_backtrack_protect(struct crng_state *crng,
- __u8 tmp[CHACHA_BLOCK_SIZE], int used)
+size_t __must_check get_random_bytes_arch(void *buf, size_t len)
{
- unsigned long flags;
- __u32 *s, *d;
- int i;
-
- used = round_up(used, sizeof(__u32));
- if (used + CHACHA_KEY_SIZE > CHACHA_BLOCK_SIZE) {
- extract_crng(tmp);
- used = 0;
- }
- spin_lock_irqsave(&crng->lock, flags);
- s = (__u32 *) &tmp[used];
- d = &crng->state[4];
- for (i=0; i < 8; i++)
- *d++ ^= *s++;
- spin_unlock_irqrestore(&crng->lock, flags);
-}
+ size_t left = len;
+ u8 *p = buf;
-static void crng_backtrack_protect(__u8 tmp[CHACHA_BLOCK_SIZE], int used)
-{
- _crng_backtrack_protect(select_crng(), tmp, used);
-}
-
-static ssize_t extract_crng_user(void __user *buf, size_t nbytes)
-{
- ssize_t ret = 0, i = CHACHA_BLOCK_SIZE;
- __u8 tmp[CHACHA_BLOCK_SIZE] __aligned(4);
- int large_request = (nbytes > 256);
-
- while (nbytes) {
- if (large_request && need_resched()) {
- if (signal_pending(current)) {
- if (ret == 0)
- ret = -ERESTARTSYS;
- break;
- }
- schedule();
- }
+ while (left) {
+ unsigned long v;
+ size_t block_len = min_t(size_t, left, sizeof(unsigned long));
- extract_crng(tmp);
- i = min_t(int, nbytes, CHACHA_BLOCK_SIZE);
- if (copy_to_user(buf, tmp, i)) {
- ret = -EFAULT;
+ if (!arch_get_random_long(&v))
break;
- }
- nbytes -= i;
- buf += i;
- ret += i;
+ memcpy(p, &v, block_len);
+ p += block_len;
+ left -= block_len;
}
- crng_backtrack_protect(tmp, i);
-
- /* Wipe data just written to memory */
- memzero_explicit(tmp, sizeof(tmp));
- return ret;
+ return len - left;
}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL(get_random_bytes_arch);
-/*********************************************************************
+/**********************************************************************
*
- * Entropy input management
+ * Entropy accumulation and extraction routines.
*
- *********************************************************************/
+ * Callers may add entropy via:
+ *
+ * static void mix_pool_bytes(const void *buf, size_t len)
+ *
+ * After which, if added entropy should be credited:
+ *
+ * static void credit_init_bits(size_t bits)
+ *
+ * Finally, extract entropy via:
+ *
+ * static void extract_entropy(void *buf, size_t len)
+ *
+ **********************************************************************/
-/* There is one of these per entropy source */
-struct timer_rand_state {
- cycles_t last_time;
- long last_delta, last_delta2;
+enum {
+ POOL_BITS = BLAKE2S_HASH_SIZE * 8,
+ POOL_READY_BITS = POOL_BITS, /* When crng_init->CRNG_READY */
+ POOL_EARLY_BITS = POOL_READY_BITS / 2 /* When crng_init->CRNG_EARLY */
};
-#define INIT_TIMER_RAND_STATE { INITIAL_JIFFIES, };
+static struct {
+ struct blake2s_state hash;
+ spinlock_t lock;
+ unsigned int init_bits;
+} input_pool = {
+ .hash.h = { BLAKE2S_IV0 ^ (0x01010000 | BLAKE2S_HASH_SIZE),
+ BLAKE2S_IV1, BLAKE2S_IV2, BLAKE2S_IV3, BLAKE2S_IV4,
+ BLAKE2S_IV5, BLAKE2S_IV6, BLAKE2S_IV7 },
+ .hash.outlen = BLAKE2S_HASH_SIZE,
+ .lock = __SPIN_LOCK_UNLOCKED(input_pool.lock),
+};
+
+static void _mix_pool_bytes(const void *buf, size_t len)
+{
+ blake2s_update(&input_pool.hash, buf, len);
+}
/*
- * Add device- or boot-specific data to the input pool to help
- * initialize it.
- *
- * None of this adds any entropy; it is meant to avoid the problem of
- * the entropy pool having similar initial state across largely
- * identical devices.
+ * This function adds bytes into the input pool. It does not
+ * update the initialization bit counter; the caller should call
+ * credit_init_bits if this is appropriate.
*/
-void add_device_randomness(const void *buf, unsigned int size)
+static void mix_pool_bytes(const void *buf, size_t len)
{
- unsigned long time = random_get_entropy() ^ jiffies;
unsigned long flags;
- if (!crng_ready() && size)
- crng_slow_load(buf, size);
-
- trace_add_device_randomness(size, _RET_IP_);
spin_lock_irqsave(&input_pool.lock, flags);
- _mix_pool_bytes(&input_pool, buf, size);
- _mix_pool_bytes(&input_pool, &time, sizeof(time));
+ _mix_pool_bytes(buf, len);
spin_unlock_irqrestore(&input_pool.lock, flags);
}
-EXPORT_SYMBOL(add_device_randomness);
-
-static struct timer_rand_state input_timer_state = INIT_TIMER_RAND_STATE;
/*
- * This function adds entropy to the entropy "pool" by using timing
- * delays. It uses the timer_rand_state structure to make an estimate
- * of how many bits of entropy this call has added to the pool.
- *
- * The number "num" is also added to the pool - it should somehow describe
- * the type of event which just happened. This is currently 0-255 for
- * keyboard scan codes, and 256 upwards for interrupts.
- *
+ * This is an HKDF-like construction for using the hashed collected entropy
+ * as a PRF key, that's then expanded block-by-block.
*/
-static void add_timer_randomness(struct timer_rand_state *state, unsigned num)
+static void extract_entropy(void *buf, size_t len)
{
- struct entropy_store *r;
+ unsigned long flags;
+ u8 seed[BLAKE2S_HASH_SIZE], next_key[BLAKE2S_HASH_SIZE];
struct {
- long jiffies;
- unsigned cycles;
- unsigned num;
- } sample;
- long delta, delta2, delta3;
-
- sample.jiffies = jiffies;
- sample.cycles = random_get_entropy();
- sample.num = num;
- r = &input_pool;
- mix_pool_bytes(r, &sample, sizeof(sample));
-
- /*
- * Calculate number of bits of randomness we probably added.
- * We take into account the first, second and third-order deltas
- * in order to make our estimate.
- */
- delta = sample.jiffies - READ_ONCE(state->last_time);
- WRITE_ONCE(state->last_time, sample.jiffies);
-
- delta2 = delta - READ_ONCE(state->last_delta);
- WRITE_ONCE(state->last_delta, delta);
-
- delta3 = delta2 - READ_ONCE(state->last_delta2);
- WRITE_ONCE(state->last_delta2, delta2);
-
- if (delta < 0)
- delta = -delta;
- if (delta2 < 0)
- delta2 = -delta2;
- if (delta3 < 0)
- delta3 = -delta3;
- if (delta > delta2)
- delta = delta2;
- if (delta > delta3)
- delta = delta3;
-
- /*
- * delta is now minimum absolute delta.
- * Round down by 1 bit on general principles,
- * and limit entropy estimate to 12 bits.
- */
- credit_entropy_bits(r, min_t(int, fls(delta>>1), 11));
-}
-
-void add_input_randomness(unsigned int type, unsigned int code,
- unsigned int value)
-{
- static unsigned char last_value;
-
- /* ignore autorepeat and the like */
- if (value == last_value)
- return;
+ unsigned long rdseed[32 / sizeof(long)];
+ size_t counter;
+ } block;
+ size_t i;
+
+ for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(block.rdseed); ++i) {
+ if (!arch_get_random_seed_long(&block.rdseed[i]) &&
+ !arch_get_random_long(&block.rdseed[i]))
+ block.rdseed[i] = random_get_entropy();
+ }
- last_value = value;
- add_timer_randomness(&input_timer_state,
- (type << 4) ^ code ^ (code >> 4) ^ value);
- trace_add_input_randomness(ENTROPY_BITS(&input_pool));
-}
-EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(add_input_randomness);
+ spin_lock_irqsave(&input_pool.lock, flags);
-static DEFINE_PER_CPU(struct fast_pool, irq_randomness);
+ /* seed = HASHPRF(last_key, entropy_input) */
+ blake2s_final(&input_pool.hash, seed);
-#ifdef ADD_INTERRUPT_BENCH
-static unsigned long avg_cycles, avg_deviation;
+ /* next_key = HASHPRF(seed, RDSEED || 0) */
+ block.counter = 0;
+ blake2s(next_key, (u8 *)&block, seed, sizeof(next_key), sizeof(block), sizeof(seed));
+ blake2s_init_key(&input_pool.hash, BLAKE2S_HASH_SIZE, next_key, sizeof(next_key));
-#define AVG_SHIFT 8 /* Exponential average factor k=1/256 */
-#define FIXED_1_2 (1 << (AVG_SHIFT-1))
+ spin_unlock_irqrestore(&input_pool.lock, flags);
+ memzero_explicit(next_key, sizeof(next_key));
+
+ while (len) {
+ i = min_t(size_t, len, BLAKE2S_HASH_SIZE);
+ /* output = HASHPRF(seed, RDSEED || ++counter) */
+ ++block.counter;
+ blake2s(buf, (u8 *)&block, seed, i, sizeof(block), sizeof(seed));
+ len -= i;
+ buf += i;
+ }
-static void add_interrupt_bench(cycles_t start)
-{
- long delta = random_get_entropy() - start;
-
- /* Use a weighted moving average */
- delta = delta - ((avg_cycles + FIXED_1_2) >> AVG_SHIFT);
- avg_cycles += delta;
- /* And average deviation */
- delta = abs(delta) - ((avg_deviation + FIXED_1_2) >> AVG_SHIFT);
- avg_deviation += delta;
+ memzero_explicit(seed, sizeof(seed));
+ memzero_explicit(&block, sizeof(block));
}
-#else
-#define add_interrupt_bench(x)
-#endif
-
-static __u32 get_reg(struct fast_pool *f, struct pt_regs *regs)
-{
- __u32 *ptr = (__u32 *) regs;
- unsigned int idx;
- if (regs == NULL)
- return 0;
- idx = READ_ONCE(f->reg_idx);
- if (idx >= sizeof(struct pt_regs) / sizeof(__u32))
- idx = 0;
- ptr += idx++;
- WRITE_ONCE(f->reg_idx, idx);
- return *ptr;
-}
+#define credit_init_bits(bits) if (!crng_ready()) _credit_init_bits(bits)
-void add_interrupt_randomness(int irq, int irq_flags)
+static void __cold _credit_init_bits(size_t bits)
{
- struct entropy_store *r;
- struct fast_pool *fast_pool = this_cpu_ptr(&irq_randomness);
- struct pt_regs *regs = get_irq_regs();
- unsigned long now = jiffies;
- cycles_t cycles = random_get_entropy();
- __u32 c_high, j_high;
- __u64 ip;
- unsigned long seed;
- int credit = 0;
-
- if (cycles == 0)
- cycles = get_reg(fast_pool, regs);
- c_high = (sizeof(cycles) > 4) ? cycles >> 32 : 0;
- j_high = (sizeof(now) > 4) ? now >> 32 : 0;
- fast_pool->pool[0] ^= cycles ^ j_high ^ irq;
- fast_pool->pool[1] ^= now ^ c_high;
- ip = regs ? instruction_pointer(regs) : _RET_IP_;
- fast_pool->pool[2] ^= ip;
- fast_pool->pool[3] ^= (sizeof(ip) > 4) ? ip >> 32 :
- get_reg(fast_pool, regs);
-
- fast_mix(fast_pool);
- add_interrupt_bench(cycles);
-
- if (unlikely(crng_init == 0)) {
- if ((fast_pool->count >= 64) &&
- crng_fast_load((char *) fast_pool->pool,
- sizeof(fast_pool->pool)) > 0) {
- fast_pool->count = 0;
- fast_pool->last = now;
- }
- return;
- }
-
- if ((fast_pool->count < 64) &&
- !time_after(now, fast_pool->last + HZ))
- return;
+ static struct execute_work set_ready;
+ unsigned int new, orig, add;
+ unsigned long flags;
- r = &input_pool;
- if (!spin_trylock(&r->lock))
+ if (!bits)
return;
- fast_pool->last = now;
- __mix_pool_bytes(r, &fast_pool->pool, sizeof(fast_pool->pool));
+ add = min_t(size_t, bits, POOL_BITS);
- /*
- * If we have architectural seed generator, produce a seed and
- * add it to the pool. For the sake of paranoia don't let the
- * architectural seed generator dominate the input from the
- * interrupt noise.
- */
- if (arch_get_random_seed_long(&seed)) {
- __mix_pool_bytes(r, &seed, sizeof(seed));
- credit = 1;
+ do {
+ orig = READ_ONCE(input_pool.init_bits);
+ new = min_t(unsigned int, POOL_BITS, orig + add);
+ } while (cmpxchg(&input_pool.init_bits, orig, new) != orig);
+
+ if (orig < POOL_READY_BITS && new >= POOL_READY_BITS) {
+ crng_reseed(); /* Sets crng_init to CRNG_READY under base_crng.lock. */
+ execute_in_process_context(crng_set_ready, &set_ready);
+ process_random_ready_list();
+ wake_up_interruptible(&crng_init_wait);
+ kill_fasync(&fasync, SIGIO, POLL_IN);
+ pr_notice("crng init done\n");
+ if (urandom_warning.missed)
+ pr_notice("%d urandom warning(s) missed due to ratelimiting\n",
+ urandom_warning.missed);
+ } else if (orig < POOL_EARLY_BITS && new >= POOL_EARLY_BITS) {
+ spin_lock_irqsave(&base_crng.lock, flags);
+ /* Check if crng_init is CRNG_EMPTY, to avoid race with crng_reseed(). */
+ if (crng_init == CRNG_EMPTY) {
+ extract_entropy(base_crng.key, sizeof(base_crng.key));
+ crng_init = CRNG_EARLY;
+ }
+ spin_unlock_irqrestore(&base_crng.lock, flags);
}
- spin_unlock(&r->lock);
-
- fast_pool->count = 0;
-
- /* award one bit for the contents of the fast pool */
- credit_entropy_bits(r, credit + 1);
}
-EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(add_interrupt_randomness);
-#ifdef CONFIG_BLOCK
-void add_disk_randomness(struct gendisk *disk)
-{
- if (!disk || !disk->random)
- return;
- /* first major is 1, so we get >= 0x200 here */
- add_timer_randomness(disk->random, 0x100 + disk_devt(disk));
- trace_add_disk_randomness(disk_devt(disk), ENTROPY_BITS(&input_pool));
-}
-EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(add_disk_randomness);
-#endif
-/*********************************************************************
+/**********************************************************************
*
- * Entropy extraction routines
+ * Entropy collection routines.
*
- *********************************************************************/
+ * The following exported functions are used for pushing entropy into
+ * the above entropy accumulation routines:
+ *
+ * void add_device_randomness(const void *buf, size_t len);
+ * void add_hwgenerator_randomness(const void *buf, size_t len, size_t entropy);
+ * void add_bootloader_randomness(const void *buf, size_t len);
+ * void add_interrupt_randomness(int irq);
+ * void add_input_randomness(unsigned int type, unsigned int code, unsigned int value);
+ * void add_disk_randomness(struct gendisk *disk);
+ *
+ * add_device_randomness() adds data to the input pool that
+ * is likely to differ between two devices (or possibly even per boot).
+ * This would be things like MAC addresses or serial numbers, or the
+ * read-out of the RTC. This does *not* credit any actual entropy to
+ * the pool, but it initializes the pool to different values for devices
+ * that might otherwise be identical and have very little entropy
+ * available to them (particularly common in the embedded world).
+ *
+ * add_hwgenerator_randomness() is for true hardware RNGs, and will credit
+ * entropy as specified by the caller. If the entropy pool is full it will
+ * block until more entropy is needed.
+ *
+ * add_bootloader_randomness() is called by bootloader drivers, such as EFI
+ * and device tree, and credits its input depending on whether or not the
+ * configuration option CONFIG_RANDOM_TRUST_BOOTLOADER is set.
+ *
+ * add_interrupt_randomness() uses the interrupt timing as random
+ * inputs to the entropy pool. Using the cycle counters and the irq source
+ * as inputs, it feeds the input pool roughly once a second or after 64
+ * interrupts, crediting 1 bit of entropy for whichever comes first.
+ *
+ * add_input_randomness() uses the input layer interrupt timing, as well
+ * as the event type information from the hardware.
+ *
+ * add_disk_randomness() uses what amounts to the seek time of block
+ * layer request events, on a per-disk_devt basis, as input to the
+ * entropy pool. Note that high-speed solid state drives with very low
+ * seek times do not make for good sources of entropy, as their seek
+ * times are usually fairly consistent.
+ *
+ * The last two routines try to estimate how many bits of entropy
+ * to credit. They do this by keeping track of the first and second
+ * order deltas of the event timings.
+ *
+ **********************************************************************/
-/*
- * This function decides how many bytes to actually take from the
- * given pool, and also debits the entropy count accordingly.
- */
-static size_t account(struct entropy_store *r, size_t nbytes, int min,
- int reserved)
+static bool trust_cpu __ro_after_init = IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_RANDOM_TRUST_CPU);
+static bool trust_bootloader __ro_after_init = IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_RANDOM_TRUST_BOOTLOADER);
+static int __init parse_trust_cpu(char *arg)
{
- int entropy_count, orig, have_bytes;
- size_t ibytes, nfrac;
-
- BUG_ON(r->entropy_count > r->poolinfo->poolfracbits);
-
- /* Can we pull enough? */
-retry:
- entropy_count = orig = READ_ONCE(r->entropy_count);
- ibytes = nbytes;
- /* never pull more than available */
- have_bytes = entropy_count >> (ENTROPY_SHIFT + 3);
-
- if ((have_bytes -= reserved) < 0)
- have_bytes = 0;
- ibytes = min_t(size_t, ibytes, have_bytes);
- if (ibytes < min)
- ibytes = 0;
-
- if (WARN_ON(entropy_count < 0)) {
- pr_warn("negative entropy count: pool %s count %d\n",
- r->name, entropy_count);
- entropy_count = 0;
- }
- nfrac = ibytes << (ENTROPY_SHIFT + 3);
- if ((size_t) entropy_count > nfrac)
- entropy_count -= nfrac;
- else
- entropy_count = 0;
-
- if (cmpxchg(&r->entropy_count, orig, entropy_count) != orig)
- goto retry;
-
- trace_debit_entropy(r->name, 8 * ibytes);
- if (ibytes && ENTROPY_BITS(r) < random_write_wakeup_bits) {
- wake_up_interruptible(&random_write_wait);
- kill_fasync(&fasync, SIGIO, POLL_OUT);
- }
-
- return ibytes;
+ return kstrtobool(arg, &trust_cpu);
}
-
-/*
- * This function does the actual extraction for extract_entropy and
- * extract_entropy_user.
- *
- * Note: we assume that .poolwords is a multiple of 16 words.
- */
-static void extract_buf(struct entropy_store *r, __u8 *out)
+static int __init parse_trust_bootloader(char *arg)
{
- int i;
- union {
- __u32 w[5];
- unsigned long l[LONGS(20)];
- } hash;
- __u32 workspace[SHA1_WORKSPACE_WORDS];
- unsigned long flags;
-
- /*
- * If we have an architectural hardware random number
- * generator, use it for SHA's initial vector
- */
- sha1_init(hash.w);
- for (i = 0; i < LONGS(20); i++) {
- unsigned long v;
- if (!arch_get_random_long(&v))
- break;
- hash.l[i] = v;
- }
-
- /* Generate a hash across the pool, 16 words (512 bits) at a time */
- spin_lock_irqsave(&r->lock, flags);
- for (i = 0; i < r->poolinfo->poolwords; i += 16)
- sha1_transform(hash.w, (__u8 *)(r->pool + i), workspace);
-
- /*
- * We mix the hash back into the pool to prevent backtracking
- * attacks (where the attacker knows the state of the pool
- * plus the current outputs, and attempts to find previous
- * ouputs), unless the hash function can be inverted. By
- * mixing at least a SHA1 worth of hash data back, we make
- * brute-forcing the feedback as hard as brute-forcing the
- * hash.
- */
- __mix_pool_bytes(r, hash.w, sizeof(hash.w));
- spin_unlock_irqrestore(&r->lock, flags);
-
- memzero_explicit(workspace, sizeof(workspace));
-
- /*
- * In case the hash function has some recognizable output
- * pattern, we fold it in half. Thus, we always feed back
- * twice as much data as we output.
- */
- hash.w[0] ^= hash.w[3];
- hash.w[1] ^= hash.w[4];
- hash.w[2] ^= rol32(hash.w[2], 16);
-
- memcpy(out, &hash, EXTRACT_SIZE);
- memzero_explicit(&hash, sizeof(hash));
+ return kstrtobool(arg, &trust_bootloader);
}
+early_param("random.trust_cpu", parse_trust_cpu);
+early_param("random.trust_bootloader", parse_trust_bootloader);
-static ssize_t _extract_entropy(struct entropy_store *r, void *buf,
- size_t nbytes, int fips)
+/*
+ * The first collection of entropy occurs at system boot while interrupts
+ * are still turned off. Here we push in latent entropy, RDSEED, a timestamp,
+ * utsname(), and the command line. Depending on the above configuration knob,
+ * RDSEED may be considered sufficient for initialization. Note that much
+ * earlier setup may already have pushed entropy into the input pool by the
+ * time we get here.
+ */
+int __init random_init(const char *command_line)
{
- ssize_t ret = 0, i;
- __u8 tmp[EXTRACT_SIZE];
- unsigned long flags;
+ ktime_t now = ktime_get_real();
+ unsigned int i, arch_bytes;
+ unsigned long entropy;
- while (nbytes) {
- extract_buf(r, tmp);
+#if defined(LATENT_ENTROPY_PLUGIN)
+ static const u8 compiletime_seed[BLAKE2S_BLOCK_SIZE] __initconst __latent_entropy;
+ _mix_pool_bytes(compiletime_seed, sizeof(compiletime_seed));
+#endif
- if (fips) {
- spin_lock_irqsave(&r->lock, flags);
- if (!memcmp(tmp, r->last_data, EXTRACT_SIZE))
- panic("Hardware RNG duplicated output!\n");
- memcpy(r->last_data, tmp, EXTRACT_SIZE);
- spin_unlock_irqrestore(&r->lock, flags);
+ for (i = 0, arch_bytes = BLAKE2S_BLOCK_SIZE;
+ i < BLAKE2S_BLOCK_SIZE; i += sizeof(entropy)) {
+ if (!arch_get_random_seed_long_early(&entropy) &&
+ !arch_get_random_long_early(&entropy)) {
+ entropy = random_get_entropy();
+ arch_bytes -= sizeof(entropy);
}
- i = min_t(int, nbytes, EXTRACT_SIZE);
- memcpy(buf, tmp, i);
- nbytes -= i;
- buf += i;
- ret += i;
+ _mix_pool_bytes(&entropy, sizeof(entropy));
}
+ _mix_pool_bytes(&now, sizeof(now));
+ _mix_pool_bytes(utsname(), sizeof(*(utsname())));
+ _mix_pool_bytes(command_line, strlen(command_line));
+ add_latent_entropy();
- /* Wipe data just returned from memory */
- memzero_explicit(tmp, sizeof(tmp));
+ if (crng_ready())
+ crng_reseed();
+ else if (trust_cpu)
+ credit_init_bits(arch_bytes * 8);
- return ret;
+ return 0;
}
/*
- * This function extracts randomness from the "entropy pool", and
- * returns it in a buffer.
+ * Add device- or boot-specific data to the input pool to help
+ * initialize it.
*
- * The min parameter specifies the minimum amount we can pull before
- * failing to avoid races that defeat catastrophic reseeding while the
- * reserved parameter indicates how much entropy we must leave in the
- * pool after each pull to avoid starving other readers.
+ * None of this adds any entropy; it is meant to avoid the problem of
+ * the entropy pool having similar initial state across largely
+ * identical devices.
*/
-static ssize_t extract_entropy(struct entropy_store *r, void *buf,
- size_t nbytes, int min, int reserved)
+void add_device_randomness(const void *buf, size_t len)
{
- __u8 tmp[EXTRACT_SIZE];
+ unsigned long entropy = random_get_entropy();
unsigned long flags;
- /* if last_data isn't primed, we need EXTRACT_SIZE extra bytes */
- if (fips_enabled) {
- spin_lock_irqsave(&r->lock, flags);
- if (!r->last_data_init) {
- r->last_data_init = 1;
- spin_unlock_irqrestore(&r->lock, flags);
- trace_extract_entropy(r->name, EXTRACT_SIZE,
- ENTROPY_BITS(r), _RET_IP_);
- extract_buf(r, tmp);
- spin_lock_irqsave(&r->lock, flags);
- memcpy(r->last_data, tmp, EXTRACT_SIZE);
- }
- spin_unlock_irqrestore(&r->lock, flags);
- }
-
- trace_extract_entropy(r->name, nbytes, ENTROPY_BITS(r), _RET_IP_);
- nbytes = account(r, nbytes, min, reserved);
-
- return _extract_entropy(r, buf, nbytes, fips_enabled);
+ spin_lock_irqsave(&input_pool.lock, flags);
+ _mix_pool_bytes(&entropy, sizeof(entropy));
+ _mix_pool_bytes(buf, len);
+ spin_unlock_irqrestore(&input_pool.lock, flags);
}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL(add_device_randomness);
-#define warn_unseeded_randomness(previous) \
- _warn_unseeded_randomness(__func__, (void *) _RET_IP_, (previous))
-
-static void _warn_unseeded_randomness(const char *func_name, void *caller,
- void **previous)
+/*
+ * Interface for in-kernel drivers of true hardware RNGs.
+ * Those devices may produce endless random bits and will be throttled
+ * when our pool is full.
+ */
+void add_hwgenerator_randomness(const void *buf, size_t len, size_t entropy)
{
-#ifdef CONFIG_WARN_ALL_UNSEEDED_RANDOM
- const bool print_once = false;
-#else
- static bool print_once __read_mostly;
-#endif
+ mix_pool_bytes(buf, len);
+ credit_init_bits(entropy);
- if (print_once ||
- crng_ready() ||
- (previous && (caller == READ_ONCE(*previous))))
- return;
- WRITE_ONCE(*previous, caller);
-#ifndef CONFIG_WARN_ALL_UNSEEDED_RANDOM
- print_once = true;
-#endif
- if (__ratelimit(&unseeded_warning))
- printk_deferred(KERN_NOTICE "random: %s called from %pS "
- "with crng_init=%d\n", func_name, caller,
- crng_init);
+ /*
+ * Throttle writing to once every CRNG_RESEED_INTERVAL, unless
+ * we're not yet initialized.
+ */
+ if (!kthread_should_stop() && crng_ready())
+ schedule_timeout_interruptible(CRNG_RESEED_INTERVAL);
}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(add_hwgenerator_randomness);
/*
- * This function is the exported kernel interface. It returns some
- * number of good random numbers, suitable for key generation, seeding
- * TCP sequence numbers, etc. It does not rely on the hardware random
- * number generator. For random bytes direct from the hardware RNG
- * (when available), use get_random_bytes_arch(). In order to ensure
- * that the randomness provided by this function is okay, the function
- * wait_for_random_bytes() should be called and return 0 at least once
- * at any point prior.
+ * Handle random seed passed by bootloader, and credit it if
+ * CONFIG_RANDOM_TRUST_BOOTLOADER is set.
*/
-static void _get_random_bytes(void *buf, int nbytes)
+void __cold add_bootloader_randomness(const void *buf, size_t len)
{
- __u8 tmp[CHACHA_BLOCK_SIZE] __aligned(4);
-
- trace_get_random_bytes(nbytes, _RET_IP_);
-
- while (nbytes >= CHACHA_BLOCK_SIZE) {
- extract_crng(buf);
- buf += CHACHA_BLOCK_SIZE;
- nbytes -= CHACHA_BLOCK_SIZE;
- }
-
- if (nbytes > 0) {
- extract_crng(tmp);
- memcpy(buf, tmp, nbytes);
- crng_backtrack_protect(tmp, nbytes);
- } else
- crng_backtrack_protect(tmp, CHACHA_BLOCK_SIZE);
- memzero_explicit(tmp, sizeof(tmp));
+ mix_pool_bytes(buf, len);
+ if (trust_bootloader)
+ credit_init_bits(len * 8);
}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(add_bootloader_randomness);
-void get_random_bytes(void *buf, int nbytes)
-{
- static void *previous;
-
- warn_unseeded_randomness(&previous);
- _get_random_bytes(buf, nbytes);
-}
-EXPORT_SYMBOL(get_random_bytes);
+struct fast_pool {
+ struct work_struct mix;
+ unsigned long pool[4];
+ unsigned long last;
+ unsigned int count;
+};
+static DEFINE_PER_CPU(struct fast_pool, irq_randomness) = {
+#ifdef CONFIG_64BIT
+#define FASTMIX_PERM SIPHASH_PERMUTATION
+ .pool = { SIPHASH_CONST_0, SIPHASH_CONST_1, SIPHASH_CONST_2, SIPHASH_CONST_3 }
+#else
+#define FASTMIX_PERM HSIPHASH_PERMUTATION
+ .pool = { HSIPHASH_CONST_0, HSIPHASH_CONST_1, HSIPHASH_CONST_2, HSIPHASH_CONST_3 }
+#endif
+};
/*
- * Each time the timer fires, we expect that we got an unpredictable
- * jump in the cycle counter. Even if the timer is running on another
- * CPU, the timer activity will be touching the stack of the CPU that is
- * generating entropy..
- *
- * Note that we don't re-arm the timer in the timer itself - we are
- * happy to be scheduled away, since that just makes the load more
- * complex, but we do not want the timer to keep ticking unless the
- * entropy loop is running.
- *
- * So the re-arming always happens in the entropy loop itself.
+ * This is [Half]SipHash-1-x, starting from an empty key. Because
+ * the key is fixed, it assumes that its inputs are non-malicious,
+ * and therefore this has no security on its own. s represents the
+ * four-word SipHash state, while v represents a two-word input.
*/
-static void entropy_timer(struct timer_list *t)
+static void fast_mix(unsigned long s[4], unsigned long v1, unsigned long v2)
{
- credit_entropy_bits(&input_pool, 1);
+ s[3] ^= v1;
+ FASTMIX_PERM(s[0], s[1], s[2], s[3]);
+ s[0] ^= v1;
+ s[3] ^= v2;
+ FASTMIX_PERM(s[0], s[1], s[2], s[3]);
+ s[0] ^= v2;
}
+#ifdef CONFIG_SMP
/*
- * If we have an actual cycle counter, see if we can
- * generate enough entropy with timing noise
+ * This function is called when the CPU has just come online, with
+ * entry CPUHP_AP_RANDOM_ONLINE, just after CPUHP_AP_WORKQUEUE_ONLINE.
*/
-static void try_to_generate_entropy(void)
+int __cold random_online_cpu(unsigned int cpu)
{
- struct {
- unsigned long now;
- struct timer_list timer;
- } stack;
+ /*
+ * During CPU shutdown and before CPU onlining, add_interrupt_
+ * randomness() may schedule mix_interrupt_randomness(), and
+ * set the MIX_INFLIGHT flag. However, because the worker can
+ * be scheduled on a different CPU during this period, that
+ * flag will never be cleared. For that reason, we zero out
+ * the flag here, which runs just after workqueues are onlined
+ * for the CPU again. This also has the effect of setting the
+ * irq randomness count to zero so that new accumulated irqs
+ * are fresh.
+ */
+ per_cpu_ptr(&irq_randomness, cpu)->count = 0;
+ return 0;
+}
+#endif
- stack.now = random_get_entropy();
+static void mix_interrupt_randomness(struct work_struct *work)
+{
+ struct fast_pool *fast_pool = container_of(work, struct fast_pool, mix);
+ /*
+ * The size of the copied stack pool is explicitly 2 longs so that we
+ * only ever ingest half of the siphash output each time, retaining
+ * the other half as the next "key" that carries over. The entropy is
+ * supposed to be sufficiently dispersed between bits so on average
+ * we don't wind up "losing" some.
+ */
+ unsigned long pool[2];
+ unsigned int count;
- /* Slow counter - or none. Don't even bother */
- if (stack.now == random_get_entropy())
+ /* Check to see if we're running on the wrong CPU due to hotplug. */
+ local_irq_disable();
+ if (fast_pool != this_cpu_ptr(&irq_randomness)) {
+ local_irq_enable();
return;
-
- timer_setup_on_stack(&stack.timer, entropy_timer, 0);
- while (!crng_ready()) {
- if (!timer_pending(&stack.timer))
- mod_timer(&stack.timer, jiffies+1);
- mix_pool_bytes(&input_pool, &stack.now, sizeof(stack.now));
- schedule();
- stack.now = random_get_entropy();
}
- del_timer_sync(&stack.timer);
- destroy_timer_on_stack(&stack.timer);
- mix_pool_bytes(&input_pool, &stack.now, sizeof(stack.now));
-}
-
-/*
- * Wait for the urandom pool to be seeded and thus guaranteed to supply
- * cryptographically secure random numbers. This applies to: the /dev/urandom
- * device, the get_random_bytes function, and the get_random_{u32,u64,int,long}
- * family of functions. Using any of these functions without first calling
- * this function forfeits the guarantee of security.
- *
- * Returns: 0 if the urandom pool has been seeded.
- * -ERESTARTSYS if the function was interrupted by a signal.
- */
-int wait_for_random_bytes(void)
-{
- if (likely(crng_ready()))
- return 0;
-
- do {
- int ret;
- ret = wait_event_interruptible_timeout(crng_init_wait, crng_ready(), HZ);
- if (ret)
- return ret > 0 ? 0 : ret;
+ /*
+ * Copy the pool to the stack so that the mixer always has a
+ * consistent view, before we reenable irqs again.
+ */
+ memcpy(pool, fast_pool->pool, sizeof(pool));
+ count = fast_pool->count;
+ fast_pool->count = 0;
+ fast_pool->last = jiffies;
+ local_irq_enable();
- try_to_generate_entropy();
- } while (!crng_ready());
+ mix_pool_bytes(pool, sizeof(pool));
+ credit_init_bits(max(1u, (count & U16_MAX) / 64));
- return 0;
+ memzero_explicit(pool, sizeof(pool));
}
-EXPORT_SYMBOL(wait_for_random_bytes);
-/*
- * Returns whether or not the urandom pool has been seeded and thus guaranteed
- * to supply cryptographically secure random numbers. This applies to: the
- * /dev/urandom device, the get_random_bytes function, and the get_random_{u32,
- * ,u64,int,long} family of functions.
- *
- * Returns: true if the urandom pool has been seeded.
- * false if the urandom pool has not been seeded.
- */
-bool rng_is_initialized(void)
-{
- return crng_ready();
-}
-EXPORT_SYMBOL(rng_is_initialized);
-
-/*
- * Add a callback function that will be invoked when the nonblocking
- * pool is initialised.
- *
- * returns: 0 if callback is successfully added
- * -EALREADY if pool is already initialised (callback not called)
- * -ENOENT if module for callback is not alive
- */
-int add_random_ready_callback(struct random_ready_callback *rdy)
+void add_interrupt_randomness(int irq)
{
- struct module *owner;
- unsigned long flags;
- int err = -EALREADY;
+ enum { MIX_INFLIGHT = 1U << 31 };
+ unsigned long entropy = random_get_entropy();
+ struct fast_pool *fast_pool = this_cpu_ptr(&irq_randomness);
+ struct pt_regs *regs = get_irq_regs();
+ unsigned int new_count;
- if (crng_ready())
- return err;
+ fast_mix(fast_pool->pool, entropy,
+ (regs ? instruction_pointer(regs) : _RET_IP_) ^ swab(irq));
+ new_count = ++fast_pool->count;
- owner = rdy->owner;
- if (!try_module_get(owner))
- return -ENOENT;
-
- spin_lock_irqsave(&random_ready_list_lock, flags);
- if (crng_ready())
- goto out;
-
- owner = NULL;
-
- list_add(&rdy->list, &random_ready_list);
- err = 0;
-
-out:
- spin_unlock_irqrestore(&random_ready_list_lock, flags);
+ if (new_count & MIX_INFLIGHT)
+ return;
- module_put(owner);
+ if (new_count < 64 && !time_is_before_jiffies(fast_pool->last + HZ))
+ return;
- return err;
+ if (unlikely(!fast_pool->mix.func))
+ INIT_WORK(&fast_pool->mix, mix_interrupt_randomness);
+ fast_pool->count |= MIX_INFLIGHT;
+ queue_work_on(raw_smp_processor_id(), system_highpri_wq, &fast_pool->mix);
}
-EXPORT_SYMBOL(add_random_ready_callback);
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(add_interrupt_randomness);
+
+/* There is one of these per entropy source */
+struct timer_rand_state {
+ unsigned long last_time;
+ long last_delta, last_delta2;
+};
/*
- * Delete a previously registered readiness callback function.
+ * This function adds entropy to the entropy "pool" by using timing
+ * delays. It uses the timer_rand_state structure to make an estimate
+ * of how many bits of entropy this call has added to the pool. The
+ * value "num" is also added to the pool; it should somehow describe
+ * the type of event that just happened.
*/
-void del_random_ready_callback(struct random_ready_callback *rdy)
+static void add_timer_randomness(struct timer_rand_state *state, unsigned int num)
{
- unsigned long flags;
- struct module *owner = NULL;
+ unsigned long entropy = random_get_entropy(), now = jiffies, flags;
+ long delta, delta2, delta3;
+ unsigned int bits;
- spin_lock_irqsave(&random_ready_list_lock, flags);
- if (!list_empty(&rdy->list)) {
- list_del_init(&rdy->list);
- owner = rdy->owner;
+ /*
+ * If we're in a hard IRQ, add_interrupt_randomness() will be called
+ * sometime after, so mix into the fast pool.
+ */
+ if (in_irq()) {
+ fast_mix(this_cpu_ptr(&irq_randomness)->pool, entropy, num);
+ } else {
+ spin_lock_irqsave(&input_pool.lock, flags);
+ _mix_pool_bytes(&entropy, sizeof(entropy));
+ _mix_pool_bytes(&num, sizeof(num));
+ spin_unlock_irqrestore(&input_pool.lock, flags);
}
- spin_unlock_irqrestore(&random_ready_list_lock, flags);
- module_put(owner);
-}
-EXPORT_SYMBOL(del_random_ready_callback);
+ if (crng_ready())
+ return;
-/*
- * This function will use the architecture-specific hardware random
- * number generator if it is available. The arch-specific hw RNG will
- * almost certainly be faster than what we can do in software, but it
- * is impossible to verify that it is implemented securely (as
- * opposed, to, say, the AES encryption of a sequence number using a
- * key known by the NSA). So it's useful if we need the speed, but
- * only if we're willing to trust the hardware manufacturer not to
- * have put in a back door.
- *
- * Return number of bytes filled in.
- */
-int __must_check get_random_bytes_arch(void *buf, int nbytes)
-{
- int left = nbytes;
- char *p = buf;
+ /*
+ * Calculate number of bits of randomness we probably added.
+ * We take into account the first, second and third-order deltas
+ * in order to make our estimate.
+ */
+ delta = now - READ_ONCE(state->last_time);
+ WRITE_ONCE(state->last_time, now);
- trace_get_random_bytes_arch(left, _RET_IP_);
- while (left) {
- unsigned long v;
- int chunk = min_t(int, left, sizeof(unsigned long));
+ delta2 = delta - READ_ONCE(state->last_delta);
+ WRITE_ONCE(state->last_delta, delta);
- if (!arch_get_random_long(&v))
- break;
+ delta3 = delta2 - READ_ONCE(state->last_delta2);
+ WRITE_ONCE(state->last_delta2, delta2);
- memcpy(p, &v, chunk);
- p += chunk;
- left -= chunk;
- }
+ if (delta < 0)
+ delta = -delta;
+ if (delta2 < 0)
+ delta2 = -delta2;
+ if (delta3 < 0)
+ delta3 = -delta3;
+ if (delta > delta2)
+ delta = delta2;
+ if (delta > delta3)
+ delta = delta3;
+
+ /*
+ * delta is now minimum absolute delta. Round down by 1 bit
+ * on general principles, and limit entropy estimate to 11 bits.
+ */
+ bits = min(fls(delta >> 1), 11);
- return nbytes - left;
+ /*
+ * As mentioned above, if we're in a hard IRQ, add_interrupt_randomness()
+ * will run after this, which uses a different crediting scheme of 1 bit
+ * per every 64 interrupts. In order to let that function do accounting
+ * close to the one in this function, we credit a full 64/64 bit per bit,
+ * and then subtract one to account for the extra one added.
+ */
+ if (in_irq())
+ this_cpu_ptr(&irq_randomness)->count += max(1u, bits * 64) - 1;
+ else
+ _credit_init_bits(bits);
}
-EXPORT_SYMBOL(get_random_bytes_arch);
-/*
- * init_std_data - initialize pool with system data
- *
- * @r: pool to initialize
- *
- * This function clears the pool's entropy count and mixes some system
- * data into the pool to prepare it for use. The pool is not cleared
- * as that can only decrease the entropy in the pool.
- */
-static void __init init_std_data(struct entropy_store *r)
+void add_input_randomness(unsigned int type, unsigned int code, unsigned int value)
{
- int i;
- ktime_t now = ktime_get_real();
- unsigned long rv;
-
- mix_pool_bytes(r, &now, sizeof(now));
- for (i = r->poolinfo->poolbytes; i > 0; i -= sizeof(rv)) {
- if (!arch_get_random_seed_long(&rv) &&
- !arch_get_random_long(&rv))
- rv = random_get_entropy();
- mix_pool_bytes(r, &rv, sizeof(rv));
- }
- mix_pool_bytes(r, utsname(), sizeof(*(utsname())));
+ static unsigned char last_value;
+ static struct timer_rand_state input_timer_state = { INITIAL_JIFFIES };
+
+ /* Ignore autorepeat and the like. */
+ if (value == last_value)
+ return;
+
+ last_value = value;
+ add_timer_randomness(&input_timer_state,
+ (type << 4) ^ code ^ (code >> 4) ^ value);
}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(add_input_randomness);
-/*
- * Note that setup_arch() may call add_device_randomness()
- * long before we get here. This allows seeding of the pools
- * with some platform dependent data very early in the boot
- * process. But it limits our options here. We must use
- * statically allocated structures that already have all
- * initializations complete at compile time. We should also
- * take care not to overwrite the precious per platform data
- * we were given.
- */
-int __init rand_initialize(void)
+#ifdef CONFIG_BLOCK
+void add_disk_randomness(struct gendisk *disk)
{
- init_std_data(&input_pool);
- if (crng_need_final_init)
- crng_finalize_init(&primary_crng);
- crng_initialize_primary(&primary_crng);
- crng_global_init_time = jiffies;
- if (ratelimit_disable) {
- urandom_warning.interval = 0;
- unseeded_warning.interval = 0;
- }
- return 0;
+ if (!disk || !disk->random)
+ return;
+ /* First major is 1, so we get >= 0x200 here. */
+ add_timer_randomness(disk->random, 0x100 + disk_devt(disk));
}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(add_disk_randomness);
-#ifdef CONFIG_BLOCK
-void rand_initialize_disk(struct gendisk *disk)
+void __cold rand_initialize_disk(struct gendisk *disk)
{
struct timer_rand_state *state;
@@ -1847,116 +1141,189 @@ void rand_initialize_disk(struct gendisk *disk)
}
#endif
-static ssize_t
-urandom_read_nowarn(struct file *file, char __user *buf, size_t nbytes,
- loff_t *ppos)
+/*
+ * Each time the timer fires, we expect that we got an unpredictable
+ * jump in the cycle counter. Even if the timer is running on another
+ * CPU, the timer activity will be touching the stack of the CPU that is
+ * generating entropy..
+ *
+ * Note that we don't re-arm the timer in the timer itself - we are
+ * happy to be scheduled away, since that just makes the load more
+ * complex, but we do not want the timer to keep ticking unless the
+ * entropy loop is running.
+ *
+ * So the re-arming always happens in the entropy loop itself.
+ */
+static void __cold entropy_timer(struct timer_list *t)
{
- int ret;
-
- nbytes = min_t(size_t, nbytes, INT_MAX >> (ENTROPY_SHIFT + 3));
- ret = extract_crng_user(buf, nbytes);
- trace_urandom_read(8 * nbytes, 0, ENTROPY_BITS(&input_pool));
- return ret;
+ credit_init_bits(1);
}
-static ssize_t
-urandom_read(struct file *file, char __user *buf, size_t nbytes, loff_t *ppos)
+/*
+ * If we have an actual cycle counter, see if we can
+ * generate enough entropy with timing noise
+ */
+static void __cold try_to_generate_entropy(void)
{
- unsigned long flags;
- static int maxwarn = 10;
+ struct {
+ unsigned long entropy;
+ struct timer_list timer;
+ } stack;
+
+ stack.entropy = random_get_entropy();
- if (!crng_ready() && maxwarn > 0) {
- maxwarn--;
- if (__ratelimit(&urandom_warning))
- pr_notice("%s: uninitialized urandom read (%zd bytes read)\n",
- current->comm, nbytes);
- spin_lock_irqsave(&primary_crng.lock, flags);
- crng_init_cnt = 0;
- spin_unlock_irqrestore(&primary_crng.lock, flags);
+ /* Slow counter - or none. Don't even bother */
+ if (stack.entropy == random_get_entropy())
+ return;
+
+ timer_setup_on_stack(&stack.timer, entropy_timer, 0);
+ while (!crng_ready() && !signal_pending(current)) {
+ if (!timer_pending(&stack.timer))
+ mod_timer(&stack.timer, jiffies + 1);
+ mix_pool_bytes(&stack.entropy, sizeof(stack.entropy));
+ schedule();
+ stack.entropy = random_get_entropy();
}
- return urandom_read_nowarn(file, buf, nbytes, ppos);
+ del_timer_sync(&stack.timer);
+ destroy_timer_on_stack(&stack.timer);
+ mix_pool_bytes(&stack.entropy, sizeof(stack.entropy));
}
-static ssize_t
-random_read(struct file *file, char __user *buf, size_t nbytes, loff_t *ppos)
+
+/**********************************************************************
+ *
+ * Userspace reader/writer interfaces.
+ *
+ * getrandom(2) is the primary modern interface into the RNG and should
+ * be used in preference to anything else.
+ *
+ * Reading from /dev/random has the same functionality as calling
+ * getrandom(2) with flags=0. In earlier versions, however, it had
+ * vastly different semantics and should therefore be avoided, to
+ * prevent backwards compatibility issues.
+ *
+ * Reading from /dev/urandom has the same functionality as calling
+ * getrandom(2) with flags=GRND_INSECURE. Because it does not block
+ * waiting for the RNG to be ready, it should not be used.
+ *
+ * Writing to either /dev/random or /dev/urandom adds entropy to
+ * the input pool but does not credit it.
+ *
+ * Polling on /dev/random indicates when the RNG is initialized, on
+ * the read side, and when it wants new entropy, on the write side.
+ *
+ * Both /dev/random and /dev/urandom have the same set of ioctls for
+ * adding entropy, getting the entropy count, zeroing the count, and
+ * reseeding the crng.
+ *
+ **********************************************************************/
+
+SYSCALL_DEFINE3(getrandom, char __user *, ubuf, size_t, len, unsigned int, flags)
{
+ struct iov_iter iter;
+ struct iovec iov;
int ret;
- ret = wait_for_random_bytes();
- if (ret != 0)
+ if (flags & ~(GRND_NONBLOCK | GRND_RANDOM | GRND_INSECURE))
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ /*
+ * Requesting insecure and blocking randomness at the same time makes
+ * no sense.
+ */
+ if ((flags & (GRND_INSECURE | GRND_RANDOM)) == (GRND_INSECURE | GRND_RANDOM))
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ if (!crng_ready() && !(flags & GRND_INSECURE)) {
+ if (flags & GRND_NONBLOCK)
+ return -EAGAIN;
+ ret = wait_for_random_bytes();
+ if (unlikely(ret))
+ return ret;
+ }
+
+ ret = import_single_range(READ, ubuf, len, &iov, &iter);
+ if (unlikely(ret))
return ret;
- return urandom_read_nowarn(file, buf, nbytes, ppos);
+ return get_random_bytes_user(&iter);
}
-static __poll_t
-random_poll(struct file *file, poll_table * wait)
+static __poll_t random_poll(struct file *file, poll_table *wait)
{
- __poll_t mask;
-
poll_wait(file, &crng_init_wait, wait);
- poll_wait(file, &random_write_wait, wait);
- mask = 0;
- if (crng_ready())
- mask |= EPOLLIN | EPOLLRDNORM;
- if (ENTROPY_BITS(&input_pool) < random_write_wakeup_bits)
- mask |= EPOLLOUT | EPOLLWRNORM;
- return mask;
+ return crng_ready() ? EPOLLIN | EPOLLRDNORM : EPOLLOUT | EPOLLWRNORM;
}
-static int
-write_pool(struct entropy_store *r, const char __user *buffer, size_t count)
+static ssize_t write_pool_user(struct iov_iter *iter)
{
- size_t bytes;
- __u32 t, buf[16];
- const char __user *p = buffer;
+ u8 block[BLAKE2S_BLOCK_SIZE];
+ ssize_t ret = 0;
+ size_t copied;
- while (count > 0) {
- int b, i = 0;
+ if (unlikely(!iov_iter_count(iter)))
+ return 0;
- bytes = min(count, sizeof(buf));
- if (copy_from_user(&buf, p, bytes))
- return -EFAULT;
+ for (;;) {
+ copied = copy_from_iter(block, sizeof(block), iter);
+ ret += copied;
+ mix_pool_bytes(block, copied);
+ if (!iov_iter_count(iter) || copied != sizeof(block))
+ break;
- for (b = bytes ; b > 0 ; b -= sizeof(__u32), i++) {
- if (!arch_get_random_int(&t))
+ BUILD_BUG_ON(PAGE_SIZE % sizeof(block) != 0);
+ if (ret % PAGE_SIZE == 0) {
+ if (signal_pending(current))
break;
- buf[i] ^= t;
+ cond_resched();
}
+ }
+
+ memzero_explicit(block, sizeof(block));
+ return ret ? ret : -EFAULT;
+}
+
+static ssize_t random_write_iter(struct kiocb *kiocb, struct iov_iter *iter)
+{
+ return write_pool_user(iter);
+}
- count -= bytes;
- p += bytes;
+static ssize_t urandom_read_iter(struct kiocb *kiocb, struct iov_iter *iter)
+{
+ static int maxwarn = 10;
- mix_pool_bytes(r, buf, bytes);
- cond_resched();
+ if (!crng_ready()) {
+ if (!ratelimit_disable && maxwarn <= 0)
+ ++urandom_warning.missed;
+ else if (ratelimit_disable || __ratelimit(&urandom_warning)) {
+ --maxwarn;
+ pr_notice("%s: uninitialized urandom read (%zu bytes read)\n",
+ current->comm, iov_iter_count(iter));
+ }
}
- return 0;
+ return get_random_bytes_user(iter);
}
-static ssize_t random_write(struct file *file, const char __user *buffer,
- size_t count, loff_t *ppos)
+static ssize_t random_read_iter(struct kiocb *kiocb, struct iov_iter *iter)
{
- size_t ret;
+ int ret;
- ret = write_pool(&input_pool, buffer, count);
- if (ret)
+ ret = wait_for_random_bytes();
+ if (ret != 0)
return ret;
-
- return (ssize_t)count;
+ return get_random_bytes_user(iter);
}
static long random_ioctl(struct file *f, unsigned int cmd, unsigned long arg)
{
- int size, ent_count;
int __user *p = (int __user *)arg;
- int retval;
+ int ent_count;
switch (cmd) {
case RNDGETENTCNT:
- /* inherently racy, no point locking */
- ent_count = ENTROPY_BITS(&input_pool);
- if (put_user(ent_count, p))
+ /* Inherently racy, no point locking. */
+ if (put_user(input_pool.init_bits, p))
return -EFAULT;
return 0;
case RNDADDTOENTCNT:
@@ -1964,41 +1331,48 @@ static long random_ioctl(struct file *f, unsigned int cmd, unsigned long arg)
return -EPERM;
if (get_user(ent_count, p))
return -EFAULT;
- return credit_entropy_bits_safe(&input_pool, ent_count);
- case RNDADDENTROPY:
+ if (ent_count < 0)
+ return -EINVAL;
+ credit_init_bits(ent_count);
+ return 0;
+ case RNDADDENTROPY: {
+ struct iov_iter iter;
+ struct iovec iov;
+ ssize_t ret;
+ int len;
+
if (!capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN))
return -EPERM;
if (get_user(ent_count, p++))
return -EFAULT;
if (ent_count < 0)
return -EINVAL;
- if (get_user(size, p++))
+ if (get_user(len, p++))
+ return -EFAULT;
+ ret = import_single_range(WRITE, p, len, &iov, &iter);
+ if (unlikely(ret))
+ return ret;
+ ret = write_pool_user(&iter);
+ if (unlikely(ret < 0))
+ return ret;
+ /* Since we're crediting, enforce that it was all written into the pool. */
+ if (unlikely(ret != len))
return -EFAULT;
- retval = write_pool(&input_pool, (const char __user *)p,
- size);
- if (retval < 0)
- return retval;
- return credit_entropy_bits_safe(&input_pool, ent_count);
+ credit_init_bits(ent_count);
+ return 0;
+ }
case RNDZAPENTCNT:
case RNDCLEARPOOL:
- /*
- * Clear the entropy pool counters. We no longer clear
- * the entropy pool, as that's silly.
- */
+ /* No longer has any effect. */
if (!capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN))
return -EPERM;
- if (xchg(&input_pool.entropy_count, 0) && random_write_wakeup_bits) {
- wake_up_interruptible(&random_write_wait);
- kill_fasync(&fasync, SIGIO, POLL_OUT);
- }
return 0;
case RNDRESEEDCRNG:
if (!capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN))
return -EPERM;
- if (crng_init < 2)
+ if (!crng_ready())
return -ENODATA;
- crng_reseed(&primary_crng, &input_pool);
- WRITE_ONCE(crng_global_init_time, jiffies - 1);
+ crng_reseed();
return 0;
default:
return -EINVAL;
@@ -2011,55 +1385,56 @@ static int random_fasync(int fd, struct file *filp, int on)
}
const struct file_operations random_fops = {
- .read = random_read,
- .write = random_write,
- .poll = random_poll,
+ .read_iter = random_read_iter,
+ .write_iter = random_write_iter,
+ .poll = random_poll,
.unlocked_ioctl = random_ioctl,
.compat_ioctl = compat_ptr_ioctl,
.fasync = random_fasync,
.llseek = noop_llseek,
+ .splice_read = generic_file_splice_read,
+ .splice_write = iter_file_splice_write,
};
const struct file_operations urandom_fops = {
- .read = urandom_read,
- .write = random_write,
+ .read_iter = urandom_read_iter,
+ .write_iter = random_write_iter,
.unlocked_ioctl = random_ioctl,
.compat_ioctl = compat_ptr_ioctl,
.fasync = random_fasync,
.llseek = noop_llseek,
+ .splice_read = generic_file_splice_read,
+ .splice_write = iter_file_splice_write,
};
-SYSCALL_DEFINE3(getrandom, char __user *, buf, size_t, count,
- unsigned int, flags)
-{
- int ret;
-
- if (flags & ~(GRND_NONBLOCK|GRND_RANDOM|GRND_INSECURE))
- return -EINVAL;
-
- /*
- * Requesting insecure and blocking randomness at the same time makes
- * no sense.
- */
- if ((flags & (GRND_INSECURE|GRND_RANDOM)) == (GRND_INSECURE|GRND_RANDOM))
- return -EINVAL;
-
- if (count > INT_MAX)
- count = INT_MAX;
-
- if (!(flags & GRND_INSECURE) && !crng_ready()) {
- if (flags & GRND_NONBLOCK)
- return -EAGAIN;
- ret = wait_for_random_bytes();
- if (unlikely(ret))
- return ret;
- }
- return urandom_read_nowarn(NULL, buf, count, NULL);
-}
/********************************************************************
*
- * Sysctl interface
+ * Sysctl interface.
+ *
+ * These are partly unused legacy knobs with dummy values to not break
+ * userspace and partly still useful things. They are usually accessible
+ * in /proc/sys/kernel/random/ and are as follows:
+ *
+ * - boot_id - a UUID representing the current boot.
+ *
+ * - uuid - a random UUID, different each time the file is read.
+ *
+ * - poolsize - the number of bits of entropy that the input pool can
+ * hold, tied to the POOL_BITS constant.
+ *
+ * - entropy_avail - the number of bits of entropy currently in the
+ * input pool. Always <= poolsize.
+ *
+ * - write_wakeup_threshold - the amount of entropy in the input pool
+ * below which write polls to /dev/random will unblock, requesting
+ * more entropy, tied to the POOL_READY_BITS constant. It is writable
+ * to avoid breaking old userspaces, but writing to it does not
+ * change any behavior of the RNG.
+ *
+ * - urandom_min_reseed_secs - fixed to the value CRNG_RESEED_INTERVAL.
+ * It is writable to avoid breaking old userspaces, but writing
+ * to it does not change any behavior of the RNG.
*
********************************************************************/
@@ -2067,25 +1442,28 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE3(getrandom, char __user *, buf, size_t, count,
#include <linux/sysctl.h>
-static int min_write_thresh;
-static int max_write_thresh = INPUT_POOL_WORDS * 32;
-static int random_min_urandom_seed = 60;
-static char sysctl_bootid[16];
+static int sysctl_random_min_urandom_seed = CRNG_RESEED_INTERVAL / HZ;
+static int sysctl_random_write_wakeup_bits = POOL_READY_BITS;
+static int sysctl_poolsize = POOL_BITS;
+static u8 sysctl_bootid[UUID_SIZE];
/*
* This function is used to return both the bootid UUID, and random
- * UUID. The difference is in whether table->data is NULL; if it is,
+ * UUID. The difference is in whether table->data is NULL; if it is,
* then a new UUID is generated and returned to the user.
- *
- * If the user accesses this via the proc interface, the UUID will be
- * returned as an ASCII string in the standard UUID format; if via the
- * sysctl system call, as 16 bytes of binary data.
*/
-static int proc_do_uuid(struct ctl_table *table, int write,
- void *buffer, size_t *lenp, loff_t *ppos)
-{
- struct ctl_table fake_table;
- unsigned char buf[64], tmp_uuid[16], *uuid;
+static int proc_do_uuid(struct ctl_table *table, int write, void *buf,
+ size_t *lenp, loff_t *ppos)
+{
+ u8 tmp_uuid[UUID_SIZE], *uuid;
+ char uuid_string[UUID_STRING_LEN + 1];
+ struct ctl_table fake_table = {
+ .data = uuid_string,
+ .maxlen = UUID_STRING_LEN
+ };
+
+ if (write)
+ return -EPERM;
uuid = table->data;
if (!uuid) {
@@ -2100,32 +1478,17 @@ static int proc_do_uuid(struct ctl_table *table, int write,
spin_unlock(&bootid_spinlock);
}
- sprintf(buf, "%pU", uuid);
-
- fake_table.data = buf;
- fake_table.maxlen = sizeof(buf);
-
- return proc_dostring(&fake_table, write, buffer, lenp, ppos);
+ snprintf(uuid_string, sizeof(uuid_string), "%pU", uuid);
+ return proc_dostring(&fake_table, 0, buf, lenp, ppos);
}
-/*
- * Return entropy available scaled to integral bits
- */
-static int proc_do_entropy(struct ctl_table *table, int write,
- void *buffer, size_t *lenp, loff_t *ppos)
+/* The same as proc_dointvec, but writes don't change anything. */
+static int proc_do_rointvec(struct ctl_table *table, int write, void *buf,
+ size_t *lenp, loff_t *ppos)
{
- struct ctl_table fake_table;
- int entropy_count;
-
- entropy_count = *(int *)table->data >> ENTROPY_SHIFT;
-
- fake_table.data = &entropy_count;
- fake_table.maxlen = sizeof(entropy_count);
-
- return proc_dointvec(&fake_table, write, buffer, lenp, ppos);
+ return write ? 0 : proc_dointvec(table, 0, buf, lenp, ppos);
}
-static int sysctl_poolsize = INPUT_POOL_WORDS * 32;
extern struct ctl_table random_table[];
struct ctl_table random_table[] = {
{
@@ -2137,222 +1500,36 @@ struct ctl_table random_table[] = {
},
{
.procname = "entropy_avail",
+ .data = &input_pool.init_bits,
.maxlen = sizeof(int),
.mode = 0444,
- .proc_handler = proc_do_entropy,
- .data = &input_pool.entropy_count,
+ .proc_handler = proc_dointvec,
},
{
.procname = "write_wakeup_threshold",
- .data = &random_write_wakeup_bits,
+ .data = &sysctl_random_write_wakeup_bits,
.maxlen = sizeof(int),
.mode = 0644,
- .proc_handler = proc_dointvec_minmax,
- .extra1 = &min_write_thresh,
- .extra2 = &max_write_thresh,
+ .proc_handler = proc_do_rointvec,
},
{
.procname = "urandom_min_reseed_secs",
- .data = &random_min_urandom_seed,
+ .data = &sysctl_random_min_urandom_seed,
.maxlen = sizeof(int),
.mode = 0644,
- .proc_handler = proc_dointvec,
+ .proc_handler = proc_do_rointvec,
},
{
.procname = "boot_id",
.data = &sysctl_bootid,
- .maxlen = 16,
.mode = 0444,
.proc_handler = proc_do_uuid,
},
{
.procname = "uuid",
- .maxlen = 16,
.mode = 0444,
.proc_handler = proc_do_uuid,
},
-#ifdef ADD_INTERRUPT_BENCH
- {
- .procname = "add_interrupt_avg_cycles",
- .data = &avg_cycles,
- .maxlen = sizeof(avg_cycles),
- .mode = 0444,
- .proc_handler = proc_doulongvec_minmax,
- },
- {
- .procname = "add_interrupt_avg_deviation",
- .data = &avg_deviation,
- .maxlen = sizeof(avg_deviation),
- .mode = 0444,
- .proc_handler = proc_doulongvec_minmax,
- },
-#endif
{ }
};
-#endif /* CONFIG_SYSCTL */
-
-struct batched_entropy {
- union {
- u64 entropy_u64[CHACHA_BLOCK_SIZE / sizeof(u64)];
- u32 entropy_u32[CHACHA_BLOCK_SIZE / sizeof(u32)];
- };
- unsigned int position;
- spinlock_t batch_lock;
-};
-
-/*
- * Get a random word for internal kernel use only. The quality of the random
- * number is good as /dev/urandom, but there is no backtrack protection, with
- * the goal of being quite fast and not depleting entropy. In order to ensure
- * that the randomness provided by this function is okay, the function
- * wait_for_random_bytes() should be called and return 0 at least once at any
- * point prior.
- */
-static DEFINE_PER_CPU(struct batched_entropy, batched_entropy_u64) = {
- .batch_lock = __SPIN_LOCK_UNLOCKED(batched_entropy_u64.lock),
-};
-
-u64 get_random_u64(void)
-{
- u64 ret;
- unsigned long flags;
- struct batched_entropy *batch;
- static void *previous;
-
- warn_unseeded_randomness(&previous);
-
- batch = raw_cpu_ptr(&batched_entropy_u64);
- spin_lock_irqsave(&batch->batch_lock, flags);
- if (batch->position % ARRAY_SIZE(batch->entropy_u64) == 0) {
- extract_crng((u8 *)batch->entropy_u64);
- batch->position = 0;
- }
- ret = batch->entropy_u64[batch->position++];
- spin_unlock_irqrestore(&batch->batch_lock, flags);
- return ret;
-}
-EXPORT_SYMBOL(get_random_u64);
-
-static DEFINE_PER_CPU(struct batched_entropy, batched_entropy_u32) = {
- .batch_lock = __SPIN_LOCK_UNLOCKED(batched_entropy_u32.lock),
-};
-u32 get_random_u32(void)
-{
- u32 ret;
- unsigned long flags;
- struct batched_entropy *batch;
- static void *previous;
-
- warn_unseeded_randomness(&previous);
-
- batch = raw_cpu_ptr(&batched_entropy_u32);
- spin_lock_irqsave(&batch->batch_lock, flags);
- if (batch->position % ARRAY_SIZE(batch->entropy_u32) == 0) {
- extract_crng((u8 *)batch->entropy_u32);
- batch->position = 0;
- }
- ret = batch->entropy_u32[batch->position++];
- spin_unlock_irqrestore(&batch->batch_lock, flags);
- return ret;
-}
-EXPORT_SYMBOL(get_random_u32);
-
-/* It's important to invalidate all potential batched entropy that might
- * be stored before the crng is initialized, which we can do lazily by
- * simply resetting the counter to zero so that it's re-extracted on the
- * next usage. */
-static void invalidate_batched_entropy(void)
-{
- int cpu;
- unsigned long flags;
-
- for_each_possible_cpu (cpu) {
- struct batched_entropy *batched_entropy;
-
- batched_entropy = per_cpu_ptr(&batched_entropy_u32, cpu);
- spin_lock_irqsave(&batched_entropy->batch_lock, flags);
- batched_entropy->position = 0;
- spin_unlock(&batched_entropy->batch_lock);
-
- batched_entropy = per_cpu_ptr(&batched_entropy_u64, cpu);
- spin_lock(&batched_entropy->batch_lock);
- batched_entropy->position = 0;
- spin_unlock_irqrestore(&batched_entropy->batch_lock, flags);
- }
-}
-
-/**
- * randomize_page - Generate a random, page aligned address
- * @start: The smallest acceptable address the caller will take.
- * @range: The size of the area, starting at @start, within which the
- * random address must fall.
- *
- * If @start + @range would overflow, @range is capped.
- *
- * NOTE: Historical use of randomize_range, which this replaces, presumed that
- * @start was already page aligned. We now align it regardless.
- *
- * Return: A page aligned address within [start, start + range). On error,
- * @start is returned.
- */
-unsigned long
-randomize_page(unsigned long start, unsigned long range)
-{
- if (!PAGE_ALIGNED(start)) {
- range -= PAGE_ALIGN(start) - start;
- start = PAGE_ALIGN(start);
- }
-
- if (start > ULONG_MAX - range)
- range = ULONG_MAX - start;
-
- range >>= PAGE_SHIFT;
-
- if (range == 0)
- return start;
-
- return start + (get_random_long() % range << PAGE_SHIFT);
-}
-
-/* Interface for in-kernel drivers of true hardware RNGs.
- * Those devices may produce endless random bits and will be throttled
- * when our pool is full.
- */
-void add_hwgenerator_randomness(const char *buffer, size_t count,
- size_t entropy)
-{
- struct entropy_store *poolp = &input_pool;
-
- if (unlikely(crng_init == 0)) {
- size_t ret = crng_fast_load(buffer, count);
- count -= ret;
- buffer += ret;
- if (!count || crng_init == 0)
- return;
- }
-
- /* Suspend writing if we're above the trickle threshold.
- * We'll be woken up again once below random_write_wakeup_thresh,
- * or when the calling thread is about to terminate.
- */
- wait_event_interruptible(random_write_wait,
- !system_wq || kthread_should_stop() ||
- ENTROPY_BITS(&input_pool) <= random_write_wakeup_bits);
- mix_pool_bytes(poolp, buffer, count);
- credit_entropy_bits(poolp, entropy);
-}
-EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(add_hwgenerator_randomness);
-
-/* Handle random seed passed by bootloader.
- * If the seed is trustworthy, it would be regarded as hardware RNGs. Otherwise
- * it would be regarded as device data.
- * The decision is controlled by CONFIG_RANDOM_TRUST_BOOTLOADER.
- */
-void add_bootloader_randomness(const void *buf, unsigned int size)
-{
- if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_RANDOM_TRUST_BOOTLOADER))
- add_hwgenerator_randomness(buf, size, size * 8);
- else
- add_device_randomness(buf, size);
-}
-EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(add_bootloader_randomness);
+#endif /* CONFIG_SYSCTL */
diff --git a/drivers/hv/vmbus_drv.c b/drivers/hv/vmbus_drv.c
index b9ac357e465d..5d820037e291 100644
--- a/drivers/hv/vmbus_drv.c
+++ b/drivers/hv/vmbus_drv.c
@@ -1351,7 +1351,7 @@ static void vmbus_isr(void)
tasklet_schedule(&hv_cpu->msg_dpc);
}
- add_interrupt_randomness(hv_get_vector(), 0);
+ add_interrupt_randomness(hv_get_vector());
}
/*
diff --git a/drivers/media/test-drivers/vim2m.c b/drivers/media/test-drivers/vim2m.c
index a776bb8e0e09..a24624353f9e 100644
--- a/drivers/media/test-drivers/vim2m.c
+++ b/drivers/media/test-drivers/vim2m.c
@@ -1325,12 +1325,6 @@ static int vim2m_probe(struct platform_device *pdev)
vfd->lock = &dev->dev_mutex;
vfd->v4l2_dev = &dev->v4l2_dev;
- ret = video_register_device(vfd, VFL_TYPE_VIDEO, 0);
- if (ret) {
- v4l2_err(&dev->v4l2_dev, "Failed to register video device\n");
- goto error_v4l2;
- }
-
video_set_drvdata(vfd, dev);
v4l2_info(&dev->v4l2_dev,
"Device registered as /dev/video%d\n", vfd->num);
@@ -1353,12 +1347,20 @@ static int vim2m_probe(struct platform_device *pdev)
media_device_init(&dev->mdev);
dev->mdev.ops = &m2m_media_ops;
dev->v4l2_dev.mdev = &dev->mdev;
+#endif
+
+ ret = video_register_device(vfd, VFL_TYPE_VIDEO, 0);
+ if (ret) {
+ v4l2_err(&dev->v4l2_dev, "Failed to register video device\n");
+ goto error_m2m;
+ }
+#ifdef CONFIG_MEDIA_CONTROLLER
ret = v4l2_m2m_register_media_controller(dev->m2m_dev, vfd,
MEDIA_ENT_F_PROC_VIDEO_SCALER);
if (ret) {
v4l2_err(&dev->v4l2_dev, "Failed to init mem2mem media controller\n");
- goto error_dev;
+ goto error_v4l2;
}
ret = media_device_register(&dev->mdev);
@@ -1373,11 +1375,13 @@ static int vim2m_probe(struct platform_device *pdev)
error_m2m_mc:
v4l2_m2m_unregister_media_controller(dev->m2m_dev);
#endif
-error_dev:
+error_v4l2:
video_unregister_device(&dev->vfd);
/* vim2m_device_release called by video_unregister_device to release various objects */
return ret;
-error_v4l2:
+error_m2m:
+ v4l2_m2m_release(dev->m2m_dev);
+error_dev:
v4l2_device_unregister(&dev->v4l2_dev);
error_free:
kfree(dev);
diff --git a/drivers/net/Kconfig b/drivers/net/Kconfig
index cb865b7ec375..f20808024305 100644
--- a/drivers/net/Kconfig
+++ b/drivers/net/Kconfig
@@ -80,7 +80,6 @@ config WIREGUARD
select CRYPTO
select CRYPTO_LIB_CURVE25519
select CRYPTO_LIB_CHACHA20POLY1305
- select CRYPTO_LIB_BLAKE2S
select CRYPTO_CHACHA20_X86_64 if X86 && 64BIT
select CRYPTO_POLY1305_X86_64 if X86 && 64BIT
select CRYPTO_BLAKE2S_X86 if X86 && 64BIT
diff --git a/drivers/net/wireguard/noise.c b/drivers/net/wireguard/noise.c
index c0cfd9b36c0b..720952b92e78 100644
--- a/drivers/net/wireguard/noise.c
+++ b/drivers/net/wireguard/noise.c
@@ -302,6 +302,41 @@ void wg_noise_set_static_identity_private_key(
static_identity->static_public, private_key);
}
+static void hmac(u8 *out, const u8 *in, const u8 *key, const size_t inlen, const size_t keylen)
+{
+ struct blake2s_state state;
+ u8 x_key[BLAKE2S_BLOCK_SIZE] __aligned(__alignof__(u32)) = { 0 };
+ u8 i_hash[BLAKE2S_HASH_SIZE] __aligned(__alignof__(u32));
+ int i;
+
+ if (keylen > BLAKE2S_BLOCK_SIZE) {
+ blake2s_init(&state, BLAKE2S_HASH_SIZE);
+ blake2s_update(&state, key, keylen);
+ blake2s_final(&state, x_key);
+ } else
+ memcpy(x_key, key, keylen);
+
+ for (i = 0; i < BLAKE2S_BLOCK_SIZE; ++i)
+ x_key[i] ^= 0x36;
+
+ blake2s_init(&state, BLAKE2S_HASH_SIZE);
+ blake2s_update(&state, x_key, BLAKE2S_BLOCK_SIZE);
+ blake2s_update(&state, in, inlen);
+ blake2s_final(&state, i_hash);
+
+ for (i = 0; i < BLAKE2S_BLOCK_SIZE; ++i)
+ x_key[i] ^= 0x5c ^ 0x36;
+
+ blake2s_init(&state, BLAKE2S_HASH_SIZE);
+ blake2s_update(&state, x_key, BLAKE2S_BLOCK_SIZE);
+ blake2s_update(&state, i_hash, BLAKE2S_HASH_SIZE);
+ blake2s_final(&state, i_hash);
+
+ memcpy(out, i_hash, BLAKE2S_HASH_SIZE);
+ memzero_explicit(x_key, BLAKE2S_BLOCK_SIZE);
+ memzero_explicit(i_hash, BLAKE2S_HASH_SIZE);
+}
+
/* This is Hugo Krawczyk's HKDF:
* - https://eprint.iacr.org/2010/264.pdf
* - https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5869
@@ -322,14 +357,14 @@ static void kdf(u8 *first_dst, u8 *second_dst, u8 *third_dst, const u8 *data,
((third_len || third_dst) && (!second_len || !second_dst))));
/* Extract entropy from data into secret */
- blake2s256_hmac(secret, data, chaining_key, data_len, NOISE_HASH_LEN);
+ hmac(secret, data, chaining_key, data_len, NOISE_HASH_LEN);
if (!first_dst || !first_len)
goto out;
/* Expand first key: key = secret, data = 0x1 */
output[0] = 1;
- blake2s256_hmac(output, output, secret, 1, BLAKE2S_HASH_SIZE);
+ hmac(output, output, secret, 1, BLAKE2S_HASH_SIZE);
memcpy(first_dst, output, first_len);
if (!second_dst || !second_len)
@@ -337,8 +372,7 @@ static void kdf(u8 *first_dst, u8 *second_dst, u8 *third_dst, const u8 *data,
/* Expand second key: key = secret, data = first-key || 0x2 */
output[BLAKE2S_HASH_SIZE] = 2;
- blake2s256_hmac(output, output, secret, BLAKE2S_HASH_SIZE + 1,
- BLAKE2S_HASH_SIZE);
+ hmac(output, output, secret, BLAKE2S_HASH_SIZE + 1, BLAKE2S_HASH_SIZE);
memcpy(second_dst, output, second_len);
if (!third_dst || !third_len)
@@ -346,8 +380,7 @@ static void kdf(u8 *first_dst, u8 *second_dst, u8 *third_dst, const u8 *data,
/* Expand third key: key = secret, data = second-key || 0x3 */
output[BLAKE2S_HASH_SIZE] = 3;
- blake2s256_hmac(output, output, secret, BLAKE2S_HASH_SIZE + 1,
- BLAKE2S_HASH_SIZE);
+ hmac(output, output, secret, BLAKE2S_HASH_SIZE + 1, BLAKE2S_HASH_SIZE);
memcpy(third_dst, output, third_len);
out:
diff --git a/drivers/staging/rtl8723bs/os_dep/ioctl_linux.c b/drivers/staging/rtl8723bs/os_dep/ioctl_linux.c
index 902ac8169948..083ff72976cf 100644
--- a/drivers/staging/rtl8723bs/os_dep/ioctl_linux.c
+++ b/drivers/staging/rtl8723bs/os_dep/ioctl_linux.c
@@ -1351,9 +1351,11 @@ static int rtw_wx_set_scan(struct net_device *dev, struct iw_request_info *a,
sec_len = *(pos++); len -= 1;
- if (sec_len > 0 && sec_len <= len) {
+ if (sec_len > 0 &&
+ sec_len <= len &&
+ sec_len <= 32) {
ssid[ssid_index].SsidLength = sec_len;
- memcpy(ssid[ssid_index].Ssid, pos, ssid[ssid_index].SsidLength);
+ memcpy(ssid[ssid_index].Ssid, pos, sec_len);
/* DBG_871X("%s COMBO_SCAN with specific ssid:%s, %d\n", __func__ */
/* , ssid[ssid_index].Ssid, ssid[ssid_index].SsidLength); */
ssid_index++;
diff --git a/include/crypto/blake2s.h b/include/crypto/blake2s.h
index b471deac28ff..4e30e1799e61 100644
--- a/include/crypto/blake2s.h
+++ b/include/crypto/blake2s.h
@@ -3,15 +3,14 @@
* Copyright (C) 2015-2019 Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com>. All Rights Reserved.
*/
-#ifndef BLAKE2S_H
-#define BLAKE2S_H
+#ifndef _CRYPTO_BLAKE2S_H
+#define _CRYPTO_BLAKE2S_H
+#include <linux/bug.h>
#include <linux/types.h>
#include <linux/kernel.h>
#include <linux/string.h>
-#include <asm/bug.h>
-
enum blake2s_lengths {
BLAKE2S_BLOCK_SIZE = 64,
BLAKE2S_HASH_SIZE = 32,
@@ -24,6 +23,7 @@ enum blake2s_lengths {
};
struct blake2s_state {
+ /* 'h', 't', and 'f' are used in assembly code, so keep them as-is. */
u32 h[8];
u32 t[2];
u32 f[2];
@@ -43,29 +43,34 @@ enum blake2s_iv {
BLAKE2S_IV7 = 0x5BE0CD19UL,
};
-void blake2s_update(struct blake2s_state *state, const u8 *in, size_t inlen);
-void blake2s_final(struct blake2s_state *state, u8 *out);
-
-static inline void blake2s_init_param(struct blake2s_state *state,
- const u32 param)
+static inline void __blake2s_init(struct blake2s_state *state, size_t outlen,
+ const void *key, size_t keylen)
{
- *state = (struct blake2s_state){{
- BLAKE2S_IV0 ^ param,
- BLAKE2S_IV1,
- BLAKE2S_IV2,
- BLAKE2S_IV3,
- BLAKE2S_IV4,
- BLAKE2S_IV5,
- BLAKE2S_IV6,
- BLAKE2S_IV7,
- }};
+ state->h[0] = BLAKE2S_IV0 ^ (0x01010000 | keylen << 8 | outlen);
+ state->h[1] = BLAKE2S_IV1;
+ state->h[2] = BLAKE2S_IV2;
+ state->h[3] = BLAKE2S_IV3;
+ state->h[4] = BLAKE2S_IV4;
+ state->h[5] = BLAKE2S_IV5;
+ state->h[6] = BLAKE2S_IV6;
+ state->h[7] = BLAKE2S_IV7;
+ state->t[0] = 0;
+ state->t[1] = 0;
+ state->f[0] = 0;
+ state->f[1] = 0;
+ state->buflen = 0;
+ state->outlen = outlen;
+ if (keylen) {
+ memcpy(state->buf, key, keylen);
+ memset(&state->buf[keylen], 0, BLAKE2S_BLOCK_SIZE - keylen);
+ state->buflen = BLAKE2S_BLOCK_SIZE;
+ }
}
static inline void blake2s_init(struct blake2s_state *state,
const size_t outlen)
{
- blake2s_init_param(state, 0x01010000 | outlen);
- state->outlen = outlen;
+ __blake2s_init(state, outlen, NULL, 0);
}
static inline void blake2s_init_key(struct blake2s_state *state,
@@ -75,12 +80,12 @@ static inline void blake2s_init_key(struct blake2s_state *state,
WARN_ON(IS_ENABLED(DEBUG) && (!outlen || outlen > BLAKE2S_HASH_SIZE ||
!key || !keylen || keylen > BLAKE2S_KEY_SIZE));
- blake2s_init_param(state, 0x01010000 | keylen << 8 | outlen);
- memcpy(state->buf, key, keylen);
- state->buflen = BLAKE2S_BLOCK_SIZE;
- state->outlen = outlen;
+ __blake2s_init(state, outlen, key, keylen);
}
+void blake2s_update(struct blake2s_state *state, const u8 *in, size_t inlen);
+void blake2s_final(struct blake2s_state *state, u8 *out);
+
static inline void blake2s(u8 *out, const u8 *in, const u8 *key,
const size_t outlen, const size_t inlen,
const size_t keylen)
@@ -91,16 +96,9 @@ static inline void blake2s(u8 *out, const u8 *in, const u8 *key,
outlen > BLAKE2S_HASH_SIZE || keylen > BLAKE2S_KEY_SIZE ||
(!key && keylen)));
- if (keylen)
- blake2s_init_key(&state, outlen, key, keylen);
- else
- blake2s_init(&state, outlen);
-
+ __blake2s_init(&state, outlen, key, keylen);
blake2s_update(&state, in, inlen);
blake2s_final(&state, out);
}
-void blake2s256_hmac(u8 *out, const u8 *in, const u8 *key, const size_t inlen,
- const size_t keylen);
-
-#endif /* BLAKE2S_H */
+#endif /* _CRYPTO_BLAKE2S_H */
diff --git a/include/crypto/chacha.h b/include/crypto/chacha.h
index dabaee698718..b3ea73b81944 100644
--- a/include/crypto/chacha.h
+++ b/include/crypto/chacha.h
@@ -47,12 +47,19 @@ static inline void hchacha_block(const u32 *state, u32 *out, int nrounds)
hchacha_block_generic(state, out, nrounds);
}
+enum chacha_constants { /* expand 32-byte k */
+ CHACHA_CONSTANT_EXPA = 0x61707865U,
+ CHACHA_CONSTANT_ND_3 = 0x3320646eU,
+ CHACHA_CONSTANT_2_BY = 0x79622d32U,
+ CHACHA_CONSTANT_TE_K = 0x6b206574U
+};
+
static inline void chacha_init_consts(u32 *state)
{
- state[0] = 0x61707865; /* "expa" */
- state[1] = 0x3320646e; /* "nd 3" */
- state[2] = 0x79622d32; /* "2-by" */
- state[3] = 0x6b206574; /* "te k" */
+ state[0] = CHACHA_CONSTANT_EXPA;
+ state[1] = CHACHA_CONSTANT_ND_3;
+ state[2] = CHACHA_CONSTANT_2_BY;
+ state[3] = CHACHA_CONSTANT_TE_K;
}
void chacha_init_arch(u32 *state, const u32 *key, const u8 *iv);
diff --git a/include/crypto/drbg.h b/include/crypto/drbg.h
index c4165126937e..88e4d145f7cd 100644
--- a/include/crypto/drbg.h
+++ b/include/crypto/drbg.h
@@ -136,7 +136,7 @@ struct drbg_state {
const struct drbg_state_ops *d_ops;
const struct drbg_core *core;
struct drbg_string test_data;
- struct random_ready_callback random_ready;
+ struct notifier_block random_ready;
};
static inline __u8 drbg_statelen(struct drbg_state *drbg)
diff --git a/include/crypto/internal/blake2s.h b/include/crypto/internal/blake2s.h
index 74ff77032e52..52363eee2b20 100644
--- a/include/crypto/internal/blake2s.h
+++ b/include/crypto/internal/blake2s.h
@@ -1,24 +1,129 @@
/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 OR MIT */
+/*
+ * Helper functions for BLAKE2s implementations.
+ * Keep this in sync with the corresponding BLAKE2b header.
+ */
-#ifndef BLAKE2S_INTERNAL_H
-#define BLAKE2S_INTERNAL_H
+#ifndef _CRYPTO_INTERNAL_BLAKE2S_H
+#define _CRYPTO_INTERNAL_BLAKE2S_H
#include <crypto/blake2s.h>
+#include <crypto/internal/hash.h>
+#include <linux/string.h>
+
+void blake2s_compress_generic(struct blake2s_state *state, const u8 *block,
+ size_t nblocks, const u32 inc);
+
+void blake2s_compress(struct blake2s_state *state, const u8 *block,
+ size_t nblocks, const u32 inc);
+
+bool blake2s_selftest(void);
+
+static inline void blake2s_set_lastblock(struct blake2s_state *state)
+{
+ state->f[0] = -1;
+}
+
+/* Helper functions for BLAKE2s shared by the library and shash APIs */
+
+static __always_inline void
+__blake2s_update(struct blake2s_state *state, const u8 *in, size_t inlen,
+ bool force_generic)
+{
+ const size_t fill = BLAKE2S_BLOCK_SIZE - state->buflen;
+
+ if (unlikely(!inlen))
+ return;
+ if (inlen > fill) {
+ memcpy(state->buf + state->buflen, in, fill);
+ if (force_generic)
+ blake2s_compress_generic(state, state->buf, 1,
+ BLAKE2S_BLOCK_SIZE);
+ else
+ blake2s_compress(state, state->buf, 1,
+ BLAKE2S_BLOCK_SIZE);
+ state->buflen = 0;
+ in += fill;
+ inlen -= fill;
+ }
+ if (inlen > BLAKE2S_BLOCK_SIZE) {
+ const size_t nblocks = DIV_ROUND_UP(inlen, BLAKE2S_BLOCK_SIZE);
+ /* Hash one less (full) block than strictly possible */
+ if (force_generic)
+ blake2s_compress_generic(state, in, nblocks - 1,
+ BLAKE2S_BLOCK_SIZE);
+ else
+ blake2s_compress(state, in, nblocks - 1,
+ BLAKE2S_BLOCK_SIZE);
+ in += BLAKE2S_BLOCK_SIZE * (nblocks - 1);
+ inlen -= BLAKE2S_BLOCK_SIZE * (nblocks - 1);
+ }
+ memcpy(state->buf + state->buflen, in, inlen);
+ state->buflen += inlen;
+}
+
+static __always_inline void
+__blake2s_final(struct blake2s_state *state, u8 *out, bool force_generic)
+{
+ blake2s_set_lastblock(state);
+ memset(state->buf + state->buflen, 0,
+ BLAKE2S_BLOCK_SIZE - state->buflen); /* Padding */
+ if (force_generic)
+ blake2s_compress_generic(state, state->buf, 1, state->buflen);
+ else
+ blake2s_compress(state, state->buf, 1, state->buflen);
+ cpu_to_le32_array(state->h, ARRAY_SIZE(state->h));
+ memcpy(out, state->h, state->outlen);
+}
+
+/* Helper functions for shash implementations of BLAKE2s */
struct blake2s_tfm_ctx {
u8 key[BLAKE2S_KEY_SIZE];
unsigned int keylen;
};
-void blake2s_compress_generic(struct blake2s_state *state,const u8 *block,
- size_t nblocks, const u32 inc);
+static inline int crypto_blake2s_setkey(struct crypto_shash *tfm,
+ const u8 *key, unsigned int keylen)
+{
+ struct blake2s_tfm_ctx *tctx = crypto_shash_ctx(tfm);
-void blake2s_compress_arch(struct blake2s_state *state,const u8 *block,
- size_t nblocks, const u32 inc);
+ if (keylen == 0 || keylen > BLAKE2S_KEY_SIZE)
+ return -EINVAL;
-static inline void blake2s_set_lastblock(struct blake2s_state *state)
+ memcpy(tctx->key, key, keylen);
+ tctx->keylen = keylen;
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static inline int crypto_blake2s_init(struct shash_desc *desc)
{
- state->f[0] = -1;
+ const struct blake2s_tfm_ctx *tctx = crypto_shash_ctx(desc->tfm);
+ struct blake2s_state *state = shash_desc_ctx(desc);
+ unsigned int outlen = crypto_shash_digestsize(desc->tfm);
+
+ __blake2s_init(state, outlen, tctx->key, tctx->keylen);
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static inline int crypto_blake2s_update(struct shash_desc *desc,
+ const u8 *in, unsigned int inlen,
+ bool force_generic)
+{
+ struct blake2s_state *state = shash_desc_ctx(desc);
+
+ __blake2s_update(state, in, inlen, force_generic);
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static inline int crypto_blake2s_final(struct shash_desc *desc, u8 *out,
+ bool force_generic)
+{
+ struct blake2s_state *state = shash_desc_ctx(desc);
+
+ __blake2s_final(state, out, force_generic);
+ return 0;
}
-#endif /* BLAKE2S_INTERNAL_H */
+#endif /* _CRYPTO_INTERNAL_BLAKE2S_H */
diff --git a/include/linux/cpuhotplug.h b/include/linux/cpuhotplug.h
index 8fb893ed205e..fc945f9df2c1 100644
--- a/include/linux/cpuhotplug.h
+++ b/include/linux/cpuhotplug.h
@@ -61,6 +61,7 @@ enum cpuhp_state {
CPUHP_LUSTRE_CFS_DEAD,
CPUHP_AP_ARM_CACHE_B15_RAC_DEAD,
CPUHP_PADATA_DEAD,
+ CPUHP_RANDOM_PREPARE,
CPUHP_WORKQUEUE_PREP,
CPUHP_POWER_NUMA_PREPARE,
CPUHP_HRTIMERS_PREPARE,
@@ -187,6 +188,7 @@ enum cpuhp_state {
CPUHP_AP_PERF_POWERPC_HV_GPCI_ONLINE,
CPUHP_AP_WATCHDOG_ONLINE,
CPUHP_AP_WORKQUEUE_ONLINE,
+ CPUHP_AP_RANDOM_ONLINE,
CPUHP_AP_RCUTREE_ONLINE,
CPUHP_AP_BASE_CACHEINFO_ONLINE,
CPUHP_AP_ONLINE_DYN,
diff --git a/include/linux/hw_random.h b/include/linux/hw_random.h
index 8e6dd908da21..aa1d4da03538 100644
--- a/include/linux/hw_random.h
+++ b/include/linux/hw_random.h
@@ -60,7 +60,5 @@ extern int devm_hwrng_register(struct device *dev, struct hwrng *rng);
/** Unregister a Hardware Random Number Generator driver. */
extern void hwrng_unregister(struct hwrng *rng);
extern void devm_hwrng_unregister(struct device *dve, struct hwrng *rng);
-/** Feed random bits into the pool. */
-extern void add_hwgenerator_randomness(const char *buffer, size_t count, size_t entropy);
#endif /* LINUX_HWRANDOM_H_ */
diff --git a/include/linux/mm.h b/include/linux/mm.h
index 289c26f055cd..5b4d88faf114 100644
--- a/include/linux/mm.h
+++ b/include/linux/mm.h
@@ -2585,6 +2585,7 @@ extern int install_special_mapping(struct mm_struct *mm,
unsigned long flags, struct page **pages);
unsigned long randomize_stack_top(unsigned long stack_top);
+unsigned long randomize_page(unsigned long start, unsigned long range);
extern unsigned long get_unmapped_area(struct file *, unsigned long, unsigned long, unsigned long, unsigned long);
diff --git a/include/linux/prandom.h b/include/linux/prandom.h
index 056d31317e49..a4aadd2dc153 100644
--- a/include/linux/prandom.h
+++ b/include/linux/prandom.h
@@ -10,6 +10,7 @@
#include <linux/types.h>
#include <linux/percpu.h>
+#include <linux/siphash.h>
u32 prandom_u32(void);
void prandom_bytes(void *buf, size_t nbytes);
@@ -27,15 +28,10 @@ DECLARE_PER_CPU(unsigned long, net_rand_noise);
* The core SipHash round function. Each line can be executed in
* parallel given enough CPU resources.
*/
-#define PRND_SIPROUND(v0, v1, v2, v3) ( \
- v0 += v1, v1 = rol64(v1, 13), v2 += v3, v3 = rol64(v3, 16), \
- v1 ^= v0, v0 = rol64(v0, 32), v3 ^= v2, \
- v0 += v3, v3 = rol64(v3, 21), v2 += v1, v1 = rol64(v1, 17), \
- v3 ^= v0, v1 ^= v2, v2 = rol64(v2, 32) \
-)
+#define PRND_SIPROUND(v0, v1, v2, v3) SIPHASH_PERMUTATION(v0, v1, v2, v3)
-#define PRND_K0 (0x736f6d6570736575 ^ 0x6c7967656e657261)
-#define PRND_K1 (0x646f72616e646f6d ^ 0x7465646279746573)
+#define PRND_K0 (SIPHASH_CONST_0 ^ SIPHASH_CONST_2)
+#define PRND_K1 (SIPHASH_CONST_1 ^ SIPHASH_CONST_3)
#elif BITS_PER_LONG == 32
/*
@@ -43,14 +39,9 @@ DECLARE_PER_CPU(unsigned long, net_rand_noise);
* This is weaker, but 32-bit machines are not used for high-traffic
* applications, so there is less output for an attacker to analyze.
*/
-#define PRND_SIPROUND(v0, v1, v2, v3) ( \
- v0 += v1, v1 = rol32(v1, 5), v2 += v3, v3 = rol32(v3, 8), \
- v1 ^= v0, v0 = rol32(v0, 16), v3 ^= v2, \
- v0 += v3, v3 = rol32(v3, 7), v2 += v1, v1 = rol32(v1, 13), \
- v3 ^= v0, v1 ^= v2, v2 = rol32(v2, 16) \
-)
-#define PRND_K0 0x6c796765
-#define PRND_K1 0x74656462
+#define PRND_SIPROUND(v0, v1, v2, v3) HSIPHASH_PERMUTATION(v0, v1, v2, v3)
+#define PRND_K0 (HSIPHASH_CONST_0 ^ HSIPHASH_CONST_2)
+#define PRND_K1 (HSIPHASH_CONST_1 ^ HSIPHASH_CONST_3)
#else
#error Unsupported BITS_PER_LONG
diff --git a/include/linux/random.h b/include/linux/random.h
index f45b8be3e3c4..917470c4490a 100644
--- a/include/linux/random.h
+++ b/include/linux/random.h
@@ -1,9 +1,5 @@
/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 */
-/*
- * include/linux/random.h
- *
- * Include file for the random number generator.
- */
+
#ifndef _LINUX_RANDOM_H
#define _LINUX_RANDOM_H
@@ -14,41 +10,26 @@
#include <uapi/linux/random.h>
-struct random_ready_callback {
- struct list_head list;
- void (*func)(struct random_ready_callback *rdy);
- struct module *owner;
-};
+struct notifier_block;
-extern void add_device_randomness(const void *, unsigned int);
-extern void add_bootloader_randomness(const void *, unsigned int);
+void add_device_randomness(const void *buf, size_t len);
+void add_bootloader_randomness(const void *buf, size_t len);
+void add_input_randomness(unsigned int type, unsigned int code,
+ unsigned int value) __latent_entropy;
+void add_interrupt_randomness(int irq) __latent_entropy;
+void add_hwgenerator_randomness(const void *buf, size_t len, size_t entropy);
#if defined(LATENT_ENTROPY_PLUGIN) && !defined(__CHECKER__)
static inline void add_latent_entropy(void)
{
- add_device_randomness((const void *)&latent_entropy,
- sizeof(latent_entropy));
+ add_device_randomness((const void *)&latent_entropy, sizeof(latent_entropy));
}
#else
-static inline void add_latent_entropy(void) {}
-#endif
-
-extern void add_input_randomness(unsigned int type, unsigned int code,
- unsigned int value) __latent_entropy;
-extern void add_interrupt_randomness(int irq, int irq_flags) __latent_entropy;
-
-extern void get_random_bytes(void *buf, int nbytes);
-extern int wait_for_random_bytes(void);
-extern int __init rand_initialize(void);
-extern bool rng_is_initialized(void);
-extern int add_random_ready_callback(struct random_ready_callback *rdy);
-extern void del_random_ready_callback(struct random_ready_callback *rdy);
-extern int __must_check get_random_bytes_arch(void *buf, int nbytes);
-
-#ifndef MODULE
-extern const struct file_operations random_fops, urandom_fops;
+static inline void add_latent_entropy(void) { }
#endif
+void get_random_bytes(void *buf, size_t len);
+size_t __must_check get_random_bytes_arch(void *buf, size_t len);
u32 get_random_u32(void);
u64 get_random_u64(void);
static inline unsigned int get_random_int(void)
@@ -80,36 +61,38 @@ static inline unsigned long get_random_long(void)
static inline unsigned long get_random_canary(void)
{
- unsigned long val = get_random_long();
-
- return val & CANARY_MASK;
+ return get_random_long() & CANARY_MASK;
}
+int __init random_init(const char *command_line);
+bool rng_is_initialized(void);
+int wait_for_random_bytes(void);
+int register_random_ready_notifier(struct notifier_block *nb);
+int unregister_random_ready_notifier(struct notifier_block *nb);
+
/* Calls wait_for_random_bytes() and then calls get_random_bytes(buf, nbytes).
* Returns the result of the call to wait_for_random_bytes. */
-static inline int get_random_bytes_wait(void *buf, int nbytes)
+static inline int get_random_bytes_wait(void *buf, size_t nbytes)
{
int ret = wait_for_random_bytes();
get_random_bytes(buf, nbytes);
return ret;
}
-#define declare_get_random_var_wait(var) \
- static inline int get_random_ ## var ## _wait(var *out) { \
+#define declare_get_random_var_wait(name, ret_type) \
+ static inline int get_random_ ## name ## _wait(ret_type *out) { \
int ret = wait_for_random_bytes(); \
if (unlikely(ret)) \
return ret; \
- *out = get_random_ ## var(); \
+ *out = get_random_ ## name(); \
return 0; \
}
-declare_get_random_var_wait(u32)
-declare_get_random_var_wait(u64)
-declare_get_random_var_wait(int)
-declare_get_random_var_wait(long)
+declare_get_random_var_wait(u32, u32)
+declare_get_random_var_wait(u64, u32)
+declare_get_random_var_wait(int, unsigned int)
+declare_get_random_var_wait(long, unsigned long)
#undef declare_get_random_var
-unsigned long randomize_page(unsigned long start, unsigned long range);
-
/*
* This is designed to be standalone for just prandom
* users, but for now we include it from <linux/random.h>
@@ -120,22 +103,10 @@ unsigned long randomize_page(unsigned long start, unsigned long range);
#ifdef CONFIG_ARCH_RANDOM
# include <asm/archrandom.h>
#else
-static inline bool __must_check arch_get_random_long(unsigned long *v)
-{
- return false;
-}
-static inline bool __must_check arch_get_random_int(unsigned int *v)
-{
- return false;
-}
-static inline bool __must_check arch_get_random_seed_long(unsigned long *v)
-{
- return false;
-}
-static inline bool __must_check arch_get_random_seed_int(unsigned int *v)
-{
- return false;
-}
+static inline bool __must_check arch_get_random_long(unsigned long *v) { return false; }
+static inline bool __must_check arch_get_random_int(unsigned int *v) { return false; }
+static inline bool __must_check arch_get_random_seed_long(unsigned long *v) { return false; }
+static inline bool __must_check arch_get_random_seed_int(unsigned int *v) { return false; }
#endif
/*
@@ -158,4 +129,13 @@ static inline bool __init arch_get_random_long_early(unsigned long *v)
}
#endif
+#ifdef CONFIG_SMP
+int random_prepare_cpu(unsigned int cpu);
+int random_online_cpu(unsigned int cpu);
+#endif
+
+#ifndef MODULE
+extern const struct file_operations random_fops, urandom_fops;
+#endif
+
#endif /* _LINUX_RANDOM_H */
diff --git a/include/linux/security.h b/include/linux/security.h
index 35355429648e..330029ef7e89 100644
--- a/include/linux/security.h
+++ b/include/linux/security.h
@@ -121,10 +121,12 @@ enum lockdown_reason {
LOCKDOWN_DEBUGFS,
LOCKDOWN_XMON_WR,
LOCKDOWN_BPF_WRITE_USER,
+ LOCKDOWN_DBG_WRITE_KERNEL,
LOCKDOWN_INTEGRITY_MAX,
LOCKDOWN_KCORE,
LOCKDOWN_KPROBES,
LOCKDOWN_BPF_READ,
+ LOCKDOWN_DBG_READ_KERNEL,
LOCKDOWN_PERF,
LOCKDOWN_TRACEFS,
LOCKDOWN_XMON_RW,
diff --git a/include/linux/siphash.h b/include/linux/siphash.h
index 0cda61855d90..0bb5ecd507be 100644
--- a/include/linux/siphash.h
+++ b/include/linux/siphash.h
@@ -136,4 +136,32 @@ static inline u32 hsiphash(const void *data, size_t len,
return ___hsiphash_aligned(data, len, key);
}
+/*
+ * These macros expose the raw SipHash and HalfSipHash permutations.
+ * Do not use them directly! If you think you have a use for them,
+ * be sure to CC the maintainer of this file explaining why.
+ */
+
+#define SIPHASH_PERMUTATION(a, b, c, d) ( \
+ (a) += (b), (b) = rol64((b), 13), (b) ^= (a), (a) = rol64((a), 32), \
+ (c) += (d), (d) = rol64((d), 16), (d) ^= (c), \
+ (a) += (d), (d) = rol64((d), 21), (d) ^= (a), \
+ (c) += (b), (b) = rol64((b), 17), (b) ^= (c), (c) = rol64((c), 32))
+
+#define SIPHASH_CONST_0 0x736f6d6570736575ULL
+#define SIPHASH_CONST_1 0x646f72616e646f6dULL
+#define SIPHASH_CONST_2 0x6c7967656e657261ULL
+#define SIPHASH_CONST_3 0x7465646279746573ULL
+
+#define HSIPHASH_PERMUTATION(a, b, c, d) ( \
+ (a) += (b), (b) = rol32((b), 5), (b) ^= (a), (a) = rol32((a), 16), \
+ (c) += (d), (d) = rol32((d), 8), (d) ^= (c), \
+ (a) += (d), (d) = rol32((d), 7), (d) ^= (a), \
+ (c) += (b), (b) = rol32((b), 13), (b) ^= (c), (c) = rol32((c), 16))
+
+#define HSIPHASH_CONST_0 0U
+#define HSIPHASH_CONST_1 0U
+#define HSIPHASH_CONST_2 0x6c796765U
+#define HSIPHASH_CONST_3 0x74656462U
+
#endif /* _LINUX_SIPHASH_H */
diff --git a/include/linux/timex.h b/include/linux/timex.h
index ce0859763670..2efab9a806a9 100644
--- a/include/linux/timex.h
+++ b/include/linux/timex.h
@@ -62,6 +62,8 @@
#include <linux/types.h>
#include <linux/param.h>
+unsigned long random_get_entropy_fallback(void);
+
#include <asm/timex.h>
#ifndef random_get_entropy
@@ -74,8 +76,14 @@
*
* By default we use get_cycles() for this purpose, but individual
* architectures may override this in their asm/timex.h header file.
+ * If a given arch does not have get_cycles(), then we fallback to
+ * using random_get_entropy_fallback().
*/
-#define random_get_entropy() get_cycles()
+#ifdef get_cycles
+#define random_get_entropy() ((unsigned long)get_cycles())
+#else
+#define random_get_entropy() random_get_entropy_fallback()
+#endif
#endif
/*
diff --git a/include/net/inet_hashtables.h b/include/net/inet_hashtables.h
index ca6a3ea9057e..d4d611064a76 100644
--- a/include/net/inet_hashtables.h
+++ b/include/net/inet_hashtables.h
@@ -419,7 +419,7 @@ static inline void sk_rcv_saddr_set(struct sock *sk, __be32 addr)
}
int __inet_hash_connect(struct inet_timewait_death_row *death_row,
- struct sock *sk, u32 port_offset,
+ struct sock *sk, u64 port_offset,
int (*check_established)(struct inet_timewait_death_row *,
struct sock *, __u16,
struct inet_timewait_sock **));
diff --git a/include/net/secure_seq.h b/include/net/secure_seq.h
index d7d2495f83c2..dac91aa38c5a 100644
--- a/include/net/secure_seq.h
+++ b/include/net/secure_seq.h
@@ -4,8 +4,8 @@
#include <linux/types.h>
-u32 secure_ipv4_port_ephemeral(__be32 saddr, __be32 daddr, __be16 dport);
-u32 secure_ipv6_port_ephemeral(const __be32 *saddr, const __be32 *daddr,
+u64 secure_ipv4_port_ephemeral(__be32 saddr, __be32 daddr, __be16 dport);
+u64 secure_ipv6_port_ephemeral(const __be32 *saddr, const __be32 *daddr,
__be16 dport);
u32 secure_tcp_seq(__be32 saddr, __be32 daddr,
__be16 sport, __be16 dport);
diff --git a/include/trace/events/random.h b/include/trace/events/random.h
deleted file mode 100644
index 9570a10cb949..000000000000
--- a/include/trace/events/random.h
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,330 +0,0 @@
-/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 */
-#undef TRACE_SYSTEM
-#define TRACE_SYSTEM random
-
-#if !defined(_TRACE_RANDOM_H) || defined(TRACE_HEADER_MULTI_READ)
-#define _TRACE_RANDOM_H
-
-#include <linux/writeback.h>
-#include <linux/tracepoint.h>
-
-TRACE_EVENT(add_device_randomness,
- TP_PROTO(int bytes, unsigned long IP),
-
- TP_ARGS(bytes, IP),
-
- TP_STRUCT__entry(
- __field( int, bytes )
- __field(unsigned long, IP )
- ),
-
- TP_fast_assign(
- __entry->bytes = bytes;
- __entry->IP = IP;
- ),
-
- TP_printk("bytes %d caller %pS",
- __entry->bytes, (void *)__entry->IP)
-);
-
-DECLARE_EVENT_CLASS(random__mix_pool_bytes,
- TP_PROTO(const char *pool_name, int bytes, unsigned long IP),
-
- TP_ARGS(pool_name, bytes, IP),
-
- TP_STRUCT__entry(
- __field( const char *, pool_name )
- __field( int, bytes )
- __field(unsigned long, IP )
- ),
-
- TP_fast_assign(
- __entry->pool_name = pool_name;
- __entry->bytes = bytes;
- __entry->IP = IP;
- ),
-
- TP_printk("%s pool: bytes %d caller %pS",
- __entry->pool_name, __entry->bytes, (void *)__entry->IP)
-);
-
-DEFINE_EVENT(random__mix_pool_bytes, mix_pool_bytes,
- TP_PROTO(const char *pool_name, int bytes, unsigned long IP),
-
- TP_ARGS(pool_name, bytes, IP)
-);
-
-DEFINE_EVENT(random__mix_pool_bytes, mix_pool_bytes_nolock,
- TP_PROTO(const char *pool_name, int bytes, unsigned long IP),
-
- TP_ARGS(pool_name, bytes, IP)
-);
-
-TRACE_EVENT(credit_entropy_bits,
- TP_PROTO(const char *pool_name, int bits, int entropy_count,
- unsigned long IP),
-
- TP_ARGS(pool_name, bits, entropy_count, IP),
-
- TP_STRUCT__entry(
- __field( const char *, pool_name )
- __field( int, bits )
- __field( int, entropy_count )
- __field(unsigned long, IP )
- ),
-
- TP_fast_assign(
- __entry->pool_name = pool_name;
- __entry->bits = bits;
- __entry->entropy_count = entropy_count;
- __entry->IP = IP;
- ),
-
- TP_printk("%s pool: bits %d entropy_count %d caller %pS",
- __entry->pool_name, __entry->bits,
- __entry->entropy_count, (void *)__entry->IP)
-);
-
-TRACE_EVENT(push_to_pool,
- TP_PROTO(const char *pool_name, int pool_bits, int input_bits),
-
- TP_ARGS(pool_name, pool_bits, input_bits),
-
- TP_STRUCT__entry(
- __field( const char *, pool_name )
- __field( int, pool_bits )
- __field( int, input_bits )
- ),
-
- TP_fast_assign(
- __entry->pool_name = pool_name;
- __entry->pool_bits = pool_bits;
- __entry->input_bits = input_bits;
- ),
-
- TP_printk("%s: pool_bits %d input_pool_bits %d",
- __entry->pool_name, __entry->pool_bits,
- __entry->input_bits)
-);
-
-TRACE_EVENT(debit_entropy,
- TP_PROTO(const char *pool_name, int debit_bits),
-
- TP_ARGS(pool_name, debit_bits),
-
- TP_STRUCT__entry(
- __field( const char *, pool_name )
- __field( int, debit_bits )
- ),
-
- TP_fast_assign(
- __entry->pool_name = pool_name;
- __entry->debit_bits = debit_bits;
- ),
-
- TP_printk("%s: debit_bits %d", __entry->pool_name,
- __entry->debit_bits)
-);
-
-TRACE_EVENT(add_input_randomness,
- TP_PROTO(int input_bits),
-
- TP_ARGS(input_bits),
-
- TP_STRUCT__entry(
- __field( int, input_bits )
- ),
-
- TP_fast_assign(
- __entry->input_bits = input_bits;
- ),
-
- TP_printk("input_pool_bits %d", __entry->input_bits)
-);
-
-TRACE_EVENT(add_disk_randomness,
- TP_PROTO(dev_t dev, int input_bits),
-
- TP_ARGS(dev, input_bits),
-
- TP_STRUCT__entry(
- __field( dev_t, dev )
- __field( int, input_bits )
- ),
-
- TP_fast_assign(
- __entry->dev = dev;
- __entry->input_bits = input_bits;
- ),
-
- TP_printk("dev %d,%d input_pool_bits %d", MAJOR(__entry->dev),
- MINOR(__entry->dev), __entry->input_bits)
-);
-
-TRACE_EVENT(xfer_secondary_pool,
- TP_PROTO(const char *pool_name, int xfer_bits, int request_bits,
- int pool_entropy, int input_entropy),
-
- TP_ARGS(pool_name, xfer_bits, request_bits, pool_entropy,
- input_entropy),
-
- TP_STRUCT__entry(
- __field( const char *, pool_name )
- __field( int, xfer_bits )
- __field( int, request_bits )
- __field( int, pool_entropy )
- __field( int, input_entropy )
- ),
-
- TP_fast_assign(
- __entry->pool_name = pool_name;
- __entry->xfer_bits = xfer_bits;
- __entry->request_bits = request_bits;
- __entry->pool_entropy = pool_entropy;
- __entry->input_entropy = input_entropy;
- ),
-
- TP_printk("pool %s xfer_bits %d request_bits %d pool_entropy %d "
- "input_entropy %d", __entry->pool_name, __entry->xfer_bits,
- __entry->request_bits, __entry->pool_entropy,
- __entry->input_entropy)
-);
-
-DECLARE_EVENT_CLASS(random__get_random_bytes,
- TP_PROTO(int nbytes, unsigned long IP),
-
- TP_ARGS(nbytes, IP),
-
- TP_STRUCT__entry(
- __field( int, nbytes )
- __field(unsigned long, IP )
- ),
-
- TP_fast_assign(
- __entry->nbytes = nbytes;
- __entry->IP = IP;
- ),
-
- TP_printk("nbytes %d caller %pS", __entry->nbytes, (void *)__entry->IP)
-);
-
-DEFINE_EVENT(random__get_random_bytes, get_random_bytes,
- TP_PROTO(int nbytes, unsigned long IP),
-
- TP_ARGS(nbytes, IP)
-);
-
-DEFINE_EVENT(random__get_random_bytes, get_random_bytes_arch,
- TP_PROTO(int nbytes, unsigned long IP),
-
- TP_ARGS(nbytes, IP)
-);
-
-DECLARE_EVENT_CLASS(random__extract_entropy,
- TP_PROTO(const char *pool_name, int nbytes, int entropy_count,
- unsigned long IP),
-
- TP_ARGS(pool_name, nbytes, entropy_count, IP),
-
- TP_STRUCT__entry(
- __field( const char *, pool_name )
- __field( int, nbytes )
- __field( int, entropy_count )
- __field(unsigned long, IP )
- ),
-
- TP_fast_assign(
- __entry->pool_name = pool_name;
- __entry->nbytes = nbytes;
- __entry->entropy_count = entropy_count;
- __entry->IP = IP;
- ),
-
- TP_printk("%s pool: nbytes %d entropy_count %d caller %pS",
- __entry->pool_name, __entry->nbytes, __entry->entropy_count,
- (void *)__entry->IP)
-);
-
-
-DEFINE_EVENT(random__extract_entropy, extract_entropy,
- TP_PROTO(const char *pool_name, int nbytes, int entropy_count,
- unsigned long IP),
-
- TP_ARGS(pool_name, nbytes, entropy_count, IP)
-);
-
-DEFINE_EVENT(random__extract_entropy, extract_entropy_user,
- TP_PROTO(const char *pool_name, int nbytes, int entropy_count,
- unsigned long IP),
-
- TP_ARGS(pool_name, nbytes, entropy_count, IP)
-);
-
-TRACE_EVENT(random_read,
- TP_PROTO(int got_bits, int need_bits, int pool_left, int input_left),
-
- TP_ARGS(got_bits, need_bits, pool_left, input_left),
-
- TP_STRUCT__entry(
- __field( int, got_bits )
- __field( int, need_bits )
- __field( int, pool_left )
- __field( int, input_left )
- ),
-
- TP_fast_assign(
- __entry->got_bits = got_bits;
- __entry->need_bits = need_bits;
- __entry->pool_left = pool_left;
- __entry->input_left = input_left;
- ),
-
- TP_printk("got_bits %d still_needed_bits %d "
- "blocking_pool_entropy_left %d input_entropy_left %d",
- __entry->got_bits, __entry->got_bits, __entry->pool_left,
- __entry->input_left)
-);
-
-TRACE_EVENT(urandom_read,
- TP_PROTO(int got_bits, int pool_left, int input_left),
-
- TP_ARGS(got_bits, pool_left, input_left),
-
- TP_STRUCT__entry(
- __field( int, got_bits )
- __field( int, pool_left )
- __field( int, input_left )
- ),
-
- TP_fast_assign(
- __entry->got_bits = got_bits;
- __entry->pool_left = pool_left;
- __entry->input_left = input_left;
- ),
-
- TP_printk("got_bits %d nonblocking_pool_entropy_left %d "
- "input_entropy_left %d", __entry->got_bits,
- __entry->pool_left, __entry->input_left)
-);
-
-TRACE_EVENT(prandom_u32,
-
- TP_PROTO(unsigned int ret),
-
- TP_ARGS(ret),
-
- TP_STRUCT__entry(
- __field( unsigned int, ret)
- ),
-
- TP_fast_assign(
- __entry->ret = ret;
- ),
-
- TP_printk("ret=%u" , __entry->ret)
-);
-
-#endif /* _TRACE_RANDOM_H */
-
-/* This part must be outside protection */
-#include <trace/define_trace.h>
diff --git a/init/main.c b/init/main.c
index 3526eaec7508..d8bfe61b5a88 100644
--- a/init/main.c
+++ b/init/main.c
@@ -952,21 +952,18 @@ asmlinkage __visible void __init __no_sanitize_address start_kernel(void)
hrtimers_init();
softirq_init();
timekeeping_init();
+ time_init();
/*
* For best initial stack canary entropy, prepare it after:
* - setup_arch() for any UEFI RNG entropy and boot cmdline access
- * - timekeeping_init() for ktime entropy used in rand_initialize()
- * - rand_initialize() to get any arch-specific entropy like RDRAND
- * - add_latent_entropy() to get any latent entropy
- * - adding command line entropy
+ * - timekeeping_init() for ktime entropy used in random_init()
+ * - time_init() for making random_get_entropy() work on some platforms
+ * - random_init() to initialize the RNG from from early entropy sources
*/
- rand_initialize();
- add_latent_entropy();
- add_device_randomness(command_line, strlen(command_line));
+ random_init(command_line);
boot_init_stack_canary();
- time_init();
perf_event_init();
profile_init();
call_function_init();
diff --git a/kernel/cpu.c b/kernel/cpu.c
index c06ced18f78a..3c9ee966c56a 100644
--- a/kernel/cpu.c
+++ b/kernel/cpu.c
@@ -34,6 +34,7 @@
#include <linux/scs.h>
#include <linux/percpu-rwsem.h>
#include <linux/cpuset.h>
+#include <linux/random.h>
#include <trace/events/power.h>
#define CREATE_TRACE_POINTS
@@ -1581,6 +1582,11 @@ static struct cpuhp_step cpuhp_hp_states[] = {
.startup.single = perf_event_init_cpu,
.teardown.single = perf_event_exit_cpu,
},
+ [CPUHP_RANDOM_PREPARE] = {
+ .name = "random:prepare",
+ .startup.single = random_prepare_cpu,
+ .teardown.single = NULL,
+ },
[CPUHP_WORKQUEUE_PREP] = {
.name = "workqueue:prepare",
.startup.single = workqueue_prepare_cpu,
@@ -1697,6 +1703,11 @@ static struct cpuhp_step cpuhp_hp_states[] = {
.startup.single = workqueue_online_cpu,
.teardown.single = workqueue_offline_cpu,
},
+ [CPUHP_AP_RANDOM_ONLINE] = {
+ .name = "random:online",
+ .startup.single = random_online_cpu,
+ .teardown.single = NULL,
+ },
[CPUHP_AP_RCUTREE_ONLINE] = {
.name = "RCU/tree:online",
.startup.single = rcutree_online_cpu,
diff --git a/kernel/debug/debug_core.c b/kernel/debug/debug_core.c
index 8661eb2b1771..0f31b22abe8d 100644
--- a/kernel/debug/debug_core.c
+++ b/kernel/debug/debug_core.c
@@ -56,6 +56,7 @@
#include <linux/vmacache.h>
#include <linux/rcupdate.h>
#include <linux/irq.h>
+#include <linux/security.h>
#include <asm/cacheflush.h>
#include <asm/byteorder.h>
@@ -756,6 +757,29 @@ static int kgdb_cpu_enter(struct kgdb_state *ks, struct pt_regs *regs,
continue;
kgdb_connected = 0;
} else {
+ /*
+ * This is a brutal way to interfere with the debugger
+ * and prevent gdb being used to poke at kernel memory.
+ * This could cause trouble if lockdown is applied when
+ * there is already an active gdb session. For now the
+ * answer is simply "don't do that". Typically lockdown
+ * *will* be applied before the debug core gets started
+ * so only developers using kgdb for fairly advanced
+ * early kernel debug can be biten by this. Hopefully
+ * they are sophisticated enough to take care of
+ * themselves, especially with help from the lockdown
+ * message printed on the console!
+ */
+ if (security_locked_down(LOCKDOWN_DBG_WRITE_KERNEL)) {
+ if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_KGDB_KDB)) {
+ /* Switch back to kdb if possible... */
+ dbg_kdb_mode = 1;
+ continue;
+ } else {
+ /* ... otherwise just bail */
+ break;
+ }
+ }
error = gdb_serial_stub(ks);
}
diff --git a/kernel/debug/kdb/kdb_main.c b/kernel/debug/kdb/kdb_main.c
index 930ac1b25ec7..4e09fab52faf 100644
--- a/kernel/debug/kdb/kdb_main.c
+++ b/kernel/debug/kdb/kdb_main.c
@@ -45,6 +45,7 @@
#include <linux/proc_fs.h>
#include <linux/uaccess.h>
#include <linux/slab.h>
+#include <linux/security.h>
#include "kdb_private.h"
#undef MODULE_PARAM_PREFIX
@@ -197,10 +198,62 @@ struct task_struct *kdb_curr_task(int cpu)
}
/*
- * Check whether the flags of the current command and the permissions
- * of the kdb console has allow a command to be run.
+ * Update the permissions flags (kdb_cmd_enabled) to match the
+ * current lockdown state.
+ *
+ * Within this function the calls to security_locked_down() are "lazy". We
+ * avoid calling them if the current value of kdb_cmd_enabled already excludes
+ * flags that might be subject to lockdown. Additionally we deliberately check
+ * the lockdown flags independently (even though read lockdown implies write
+ * lockdown) since that results in both simpler code and clearer messages to
+ * the user on first-time debugger entry.
+ *
+ * The permission masks during a read+write lockdown permits the following
+ * flags: INSPECT, SIGNAL, REBOOT (and ALWAYS_SAFE).
+ *
+ * The INSPECT commands are not blocked during lockdown because they are
+ * not arbitrary memory reads. INSPECT covers the backtrace family (sometimes
+ * forcing them to have no arguments) and lsmod. These commands do expose
+ * some kernel state but do not allow the developer seated at the console to
+ * choose what state is reported. SIGNAL and REBOOT should not be controversial,
+ * given these are allowed for root during lockdown already.
+ */
+static void kdb_check_for_lockdown(void)
+{
+ const int write_flags = KDB_ENABLE_MEM_WRITE |
+ KDB_ENABLE_REG_WRITE |
+ KDB_ENABLE_FLOW_CTRL;
+ const int read_flags = KDB_ENABLE_MEM_READ |
+ KDB_ENABLE_REG_READ;
+
+ bool need_to_lockdown_write = false;
+ bool need_to_lockdown_read = false;
+
+ if (kdb_cmd_enabled & (KDB_ENABLE_ALL | write_flags))
+ need_to_lockdown_write =
+ security_locked_down(LOCKDOWN_DBG_WRITE_KERNEL);
+
+ if (kdb_cmd_enabled & (KDB_ENABLE_ALL | read_flags))
+ need_to_lockdown_read =
+ security_locked_down(LOCKDOWN_DBG_READ_KERNEL);
+
+ /* De-compose KDB_ENABLE_ALL if required */
+ if (need_to_lockdown_write || need_to_lockdown_read)
+ if (kdb_cmd_enabled & KDB_ENABLE_ALL)
+ kdb_cmd_enabled = KDB_ENABLE_MASK & ~KDB_ENABLE_ALL;
+
+ if (need_to_lockdown_write)
+ kdb_cmd_enabled &= ~write_flags;
+
+ if (need_to_lockdown_read)
+ kdb_cmd_enabled &= ~read_flags;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Check whether the flags of the current command, the permissions of the kdb
+ * console and the lockdown state allow a command to be run.
*/
-static inline bool kdb_check_flags(kdb_cmdflags_t flags, int permissions,
+static bool kdb_check_flags(kdb_cmdflags_t flags, int permissions,
bool no_args)
{
/* permissions comes from userspace so needs massaging slightly */
@@ -1194,6 +1247,9 @@ static int kdb_local(kdb_reason_t reason, int error, struct pt_regs *regs,
kdb_curr_task(raw_smp_processor_id());
KDB_DEBUG_STATE("kdb_local 1", reason);
+
+ kdb_check_for_lockdown();
+
kdb_go_count = 0;
if (reason == KDB_REASON_DEBUG) {
/* special case below */
diff --git a/kernel/irq/handle.c b/kernel/irq/handle.c
index 762a928e18f9..8806444a6855 100644
--- a/kernel/irq/handle.c
+++ b/kernel/irq/handle.c
@@ -195,7 +195,7 @@ irqreturn_t handle_irq_event_percpu(struct irq_desc *desc)
retval = __handle_irq_event_percpu(desc, &flags);
- add_interrupt_randomness(desc->irq_data.irq, flags);
+ add_interrupt_randomness(desc->irq_data.irq);
if (!noirqdebug)
note_interrupt(desc, retval);
diff --git a/kernel/time/timekeeping.c b/kernel/time/timekeeping.c
index cc4dc2857a87..e12ce2821dba 100644
--- a/kernel/time/timekeeping.c
+++ b/kernel/time/timekeeping.c
@@ -17,6 +17,7 @@
#include <linux/clocksource.h>
#include <linux/jiffies.h>
#include <linux/time.h>
+#include <linux/timex.h>
#include <linux/tick.h>
#include <linux/stop_machine.h>
#include <linux/pvclock_gtod.h>
@@ -2378,6 +2379,20 @@ static int timekeeping_validate_timex(const struct __kernel_timex *txc)
return 0;
}
+/**
+ * random_get_entropy_fallback - Returns the raw clock source value,
+ * used by random.c for platforms with no valid random_get_entropy().
+ */
+unsigned long random_get_entropy_fallback(void)
+{
+ struct tk_read_base *tkr = &tk_core.timekeeper.tkr_mono;
+ struct clocksource *clock = READ_ONCE(tkr->clock);
+
+ if (unlikely(timekeeping_suspended || !clock))
+ return 0;
+ return clock->read(clock);
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(random_get_entropy_fallback);
/**
* do_adjtimex() - Accessor function to NTP __do_adjtimex function
diff --git a/lib/Kconfig.debug b/lib/Kconfig.debug
index 95f909540587..3656fa883783 100644
--- a/lib/Kconfig.debug
+++ b/lib/Kconfig.debug
@@ -1426,8 +1426,7 @@ config WARN_ALL_UNSEEDED_RANDOM
so architecture maintainers really need to do what they can
to get the CRNG seeded sooner after the system is booted.
However, since users cannot do anything actionable to
- address this, by default the kernel will issue only a single
- warning for the first use of unseeded randomness.
+ address this, by default this option is disabled.
Say Y here if you want to receive warnings for all uses of
unseeded randomness. This will be of use primarily for
diff --git a/lib/crypto/Kconfig b/lib/crypto/Kconfig
index 14c032de276e..af3da5a8bde8 100644
--- a/lib/crypto/Kconfig
+++ b/lib/crypto/Kconfig
@@ -1,7 +1,5 @@
# SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
-comment "Crypto library routines"
-
config CRYPTO_LIB_AES
tristate
@@ -9,14 +7,14 @@ config CRYPTO_LIB_ARC4
tristate
config CRYPTO_ARCH_HAVE_LIB_BLAKE2S
- tristate
+ bool
help
Declares whether the architecture provides an arch-specific
accelerated implementation of the Blake2s library interface,
either builtin or as a module.
config CRYPTO_LIB_BLAKE2S_GENERIC
- tristate
+ def_bool !CRYPTO_ARCH_HAVE_LIB_BLAKE2S
help
This symbol can be depended upon by arch implementations of the
Blake2s library interface that require the generic code as a
@@ -24,15 +22,6 @@ config CRYPTO_LIB_BLAKE2S_GENERIC
implementation is enabled, this implementation serves the users
of CRYPTO_LIB_BLAKE2S.
-config CRYPTO_LIB_BLAKE2S
- tristate "BLAKE2s hash function library"
- depends on CRYPTO_ARCH_HAVE_LIB_BLAKE2S || !CRYPTO_ARCH_HAVE_LIB_BLAKE2S
- select CRYPTO_LIB_BLAKE2S_GENERIC if CRYPTO_ARCH_HAVE_LIB_BLAKE2S=n
- help
- Enable the Blake2s library interface. This interface may be fulfilled
- by either the generic implementation or an arch-specific one, if one
- is available and enabled.
-
config CRYPTO_ARCH_HAVE_LIB_CHACHA
tristate
help
@@ -51,7 +40,7 @@ config CRYPTO_LIB_CHACHA_GENERIC
of CRYPTO_LIB_CHACHA.
config CRYPTO_LIB_CHACHA
- tristate "ChaCha library interface"
+ tristate
depends on CRYPTO_ARCH_HAVE_LIB_CHACHA || !CRYPTO_ARCH_HAVE_LIB_CHACHA
select CRYPTO_LIB_CHACHA_GENERIC if CRYPTO_ARCH_HAVE_LIB_CHACHA=n
help
@@ -76,7 +65,7 @@ config CRYPTO_LIB_CURVE25519_GENERIC
of CRYPTO_LIB_CURVE25519.
config CRYPTO_LIB_CURVE25519
- tristate "Curve25519 scalar multiplication library"
+ tristate
depends on CRYPTO_ARCH_HAVE_LIB_CURVE25519 || !CRYPTO_ARCH_HAVE_LIB_CURVE25519
select CRYPTO_LIB_CURVE25519_GENERIC if CRYPTO_ARCH_HAVE_LIB_CURVE25519=n
help
@@ -111,7 +100,7 @@ config CRYPTO_LIB_POLY1305_GENERIC
of CRYPTO_LIB_POLY1305.
config CRYPTO_LIB_POLY1305
- tristate "Poly1305 library interface"
+ tristate
depends on CRYPTO_ARCH_HAVE_LIB_POLY1305 || !CRYPTO_ARCH_HAVE_LIB_POLY1305
select CRYPTO_LIB_POLY1305_GENERIC if CRYPTO_ARCH_HAVE_LIB_POLY1305=n
help
@@ -120,7 +109,7 @@ config CRYPTO_LIB_POLY1305
is available and enabled.
config CRYPTO_LIB_CHACHA20POLY1305
- tristate "ChaCha20-Poly1305 AEAD support (8-byte nonce library version)"
+ tristate
depends on CRYPTO_ARCH_HAVE_LIB_CHACHA || !CRYPTO_ARCH_HAVE_LIB_CHACHA
depends on CRYPTO_ARCH_HAVE_LIB_POLY1305 || !CRYPTO_ARCH_HAVE_LIB_POLY1305
select CRYPTO_LIB_CHACHA
diff --git a/lib/crypto/Makefile b/lib/crypto/Makefile
index 3a435629d9ce..26be2bbe09c5 100644
--- a/lib/crypto/Makefile
+++ b/lib/crypto/Makefile
@@ -10,11 +10,10 @@ libaes-y := aes.o
obj-$(CONFIG_CRYPTO_LIB_ARC4) += libarc4.o
libarc4-y := arc4.o
-obj-$(CONFIG_CRYPTO_LIB_BLAKE2S_GENERIC) += libblake2s-generic.o
-libblake2s-generic-y += blake2s-generic.o
-
-obj-$(CONFIG_CRYPTO_LIB_BLAKE2S) += libblake2s.o
-libblake2s-y += blake2s.o
+# blake2s is used by the /dev/random driver which is always builtin
+obj-y += libblake2s.o
+libblake2s-y := blake2s.o
+libblake2s-$(CONFIG_CRYPTO_LIB_BLAKE2S_GENERIC) += blake2s-generic.o
obj-$(CONFIG_CRYPTO_LIB_CHACHA20POLY1305) += libchacha20poly1305.o
libchacha20poly1305-y += chacha20poly1305.o
diff --git a/lib/crypto/blake2s-generic.c b/lib/crypto/blake2s-generic.c
index 04ff8df24513..75ccb3e633e6 100644
--- a/lib/crypto/blake2s-generic.c
+++ b/lib/crypto/blake2s-generic.c
@@ -37,7 +37,11 @@ static inline void blake2s_increment_counter(struct blake2s_state *state,
state->t[1] += (state->t[0] < inc);
}
-void blake2s_compress_generic(struct blake2s_state *state,const u8 *block,
+void blake2s_compress(struct blake2s_state *state, const u8 *block,
+ size_t nblocks, const u32 inc)
+ __weak __alias(blake2s_compress_generic);
+
+void blake2s_compress_generic(struct blake2s_state *state, const u8 *block,
size_t nblocks, const u32 inc)
{
u32 m[16];
diff --git a/lib/crypto/blake2s-selftest.c b/lib/crypto/blake2s-selftest.c
index 79ef404a990d..409e4b728770 100644
--- a/lib/crypto/blake2s-selftest.c
+++ b/lib/crypto/blake2s-selftest.c
@@ -3,7 +3,7 @@
* Copyright (C) 2015-2019 Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com>. All Rights Reserved.
*/
-#include <crypto/blake2s.h>
+#include <crypto/internal/blake2s.h>
#include <linux/string.h>
/*
@@ -15,7 +15,6 @@
* #include <stdio.h>
*
* #include <openssl/evp.h>
- * #include <openssl/hmac.h>
*
* #define BLAKE2S_TESTVEC_COUNT 256
*
@@ -58,16 +57,6 @@
* }
* printf("};\n\n");
*
- * printf("static const u8 blake2s_hmac_testvecs[][BLAKE2S_HASH_SIZE] __initconst = {\n");
- *
- * HMAC(EVP_blake2s256(), key, sizeof(key), buf, sizeof(buf), hash, NULL);
- * print_vec(hash, BLAKE2S_OUTBYTES);
- *
- * HMAC(EVP_blake2s256(), buf, sizeof(buf), key, sizeof(key), hash, NULL);
- * print_vec(hash, BLAKE2S_OUTBYTES);
- *
- * printf("};\n");
- *
* return 0;
*}
*/
@@ -554,15 +543,6 @@ static const u8 blake2s_testvecs[][BLAKE2S_HASH_SIZE] __initconst = {
0xd6, 0x98, 0x6b, 0x07, 0x10, 0x65, 0x52, 0x65, },
};
-static const u8 blake2s_hmac_testvecs[][BLAKE2S_HASH_SIZE] __initconst = {
- { 0xce, 0xe1, 0x57, 0x69, 0x82, 0xdc, 0xbf, 0x43, 0xad, 0x56, 0x4c, 0x70,
- 0xed, 0x68, 0x16, 0x96, 0xcf, 0xa4, 0x73, 0xe8, 0xe8, 0xfc, 0x32, 0x79,
- 0x08, 0x0a, 0x75, 0x82, 0xda, 0x3f, 0x05, 0x11, },
- { 0x77, 0x2f, 0x0c, 0x71, 0x41, 0xf4, 0x4b, 0x2b, 0xb3, 0xc6, 0xb6, 0xf9,
- 0x60, 0xde, 0xe4, 0x52, 0x38, 0x66, 0xe8, 0xbf, 0x9b, 0x96, 0xc4, 0x9f,
- 0x60, 0xd9, 0x24, 0x37, 0x99, 0xd6, 0xec, 0x31, },
-};
-
bool __init blake2s_selftest(void)
{
u8 key[BLAKE2S_KEY_SIZE];
@@ -607,16 +587,5 @@ bool __init blake2s_selftest(void)
}
}
- if (success) {
- blake2s256_hmac(hash, buf, key, sizeof(buf), sizeof(key));
- success &= !memcmp(hash, blake2s_hmac_testvecs[0], BLAKE2S_HASH_SIZE);
-
- blake2s256_hmac(hash, key, buf, sizeof(key), sizeof(buf));
- success &= !memcmp(hash, blake2s_hmac_testvecs[1], BLAKE2S_HASH_SIZE);
-
- if (!success)
- pr_err("blake2s256_hmac self-test: FAIL\n");
- }
-
return success;
}
diff --git a/lib/crypto/blake2s.c b/lib/crypto/blake2s.c
index 41025a30c524..80b194f9a0a0 100644
--- a/lib/crypto/blake2s.c
+++ b/lib/crypto/blake2s.c
@@ -15,98 +15,21 @@
#include <linux/module.h>
#include <linux/init.h>
#include <linux/bug.h>
-#include <asm/unaligned.h>
-
-bool blake2s_selftest(void);
void blake2s_update(struct blake2s_state *state, const u8 *in, size_t inlen)
{
- const size_t fill = BLAKE2S_BLOCK_SIZE - state->buflen;
-
- if (unlikely(!inlen))
- return;
- if (inlen > fill) {
- memcpy(state->buf + state->buflen, in, fill);
- if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_CRYPTO_ARCH_HAVE_LIB_BLAKE2S))
- blake2s_compress_arch(state, state->buf, 1,
- BLAKE2S_BLOCK_SIZE);
- else
- blake2s_compress_generic(state, state->buf, 1,
- BLAKE2S_BLOCK_SIZE);
- state->buflen = 0;
- in += fill;
- inlen -= fill;
- }
- if (inlen > BLAKE2S_BLOCK_SIZE) {
- const size_t nblocks = DIV_ROUND_UP(inlen, BLAKE2S_BLOCK_SIZE);
- /* Hash one less (full) block than strictly possible */
- if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_CRYPTO_ARCH_HAVE_LIB_BLAKE2S))
- blake2s_compress_arch(state, in, nblocks - 1,
- BLAKE2S_BLOCK_SIZE);
- else
- blake2s_compress_generic(state, in, nblocks - 1,
- BLAKE2S_BLOCK_SIZE);
- in += BLAKE2S_BLOCK_SIZE * (nblocks - 1);
- inlen -= BLAKE2S_BLOCK_SIZE * (nblocks - 1);
- }
- memcpy(state->buf + state->buflen, in, inlen);
- state->buflen += inlen;
+ __blake2s_update(state, in, inlen, false);
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(blake2s_update);
void blake2s_final(struct blake2s_state *state, u8 *out)
{
WARN_ON(IS_ENABLED(DEBUG) && !out);
- blake2s_set_lastblock(state);
- memset(state->buf + state->buflen, 0,
- BLAKE2S_BLOCK_SIZE - state->buflen); /* Padding */
- if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_CRYPTO_ARCH_HAVE_LIB_BLAKE2S))
- blake2s_compress_arch(state, state->buf, 1, state->buflen);
- else
- blake2s_compress_generic(state, state->buf, 1, state->buflen);
- cpu_to_le32_array(state->h, ARRAY_SIZE(state->h));
- memcpy(out, state->h, state->outlen);
+ __blake2s_final(state, out, false);
memzero_explicit(state, sizeof(*state));
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(blake2s_final);
-void blake2s256_hmac(u8 *out, const u8 *in, const u8 *key, const size_t inlen,
- const size_t keylen)
-{
- struct blake2s_state state;
- u8 x_key[BLAKE2S_BLOCK_SIZE] __aligned(__alignof__(u32)) = { 0 };
- u8 i_hash[BLAKE2S_HASH_SIZE] __aligned(__alignof__(u32));
- int i;
-
- if (keylen > BLAKE2S_BLOCK_SIZE) {
- blake2s_init(&state, BLAKE2S_HASH_SIZE);
- blake2s_update(&state, key, keylen);
- blake2s_final(&state, x_key);
- } else
- memcpy(x_key, key, keylen);
-
- for (i = 0; i < BLAKE2S_BLOCK_SIZE; ++i)
- x_key[i] ^= 0x36;
-
- blake2s_init(&state, BLAKE2S_HASH_SIZE);
- blake2s_update(&state, x_key, BLAKE2S_BLOCK_SIZE);
- blake2s_update(&state, in, inlen);
- blake2s_final(&state, i_hash);
-
- for (i = 0; i < BLAKE2S_BLOCK_SIZE; ++i)
- x_key[i] ^= 0x5c ^ 0x36;
-
- blake2s_init(&state, BLAKE2S_HASH_SIZE);
- blake2s_update(&state, x_key, BLAKE2S_BLOCK_SIZE);
- blake2s_update(&state, i_hash, BLAKE2S_HASH_SIZE);
- blake2s_final(&state, i_hash);
-
- memcpy(out, i_hash, BLAKE2S_HASH_SIZE);
- memzero_explicit(x_key, BLAKE2S_BLOCK_SIZE);
- memzero_explicit(i_hash, BLAKE2S_HASH_SIZE);
-}
-EXPORT_SYMBOL(blake2s256_hmac);
-
static int __init mod_init(void)
{
if (!IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_CRYPTO_MANAGER_DISABLE_TESTS) &&
diff --git a/lib/random32.c b/lib/random32.c
index 4d0e05e471d7..f0ab17c2244b 100644
--- a/lib/random32.c
+++ b/lib/random32.c
@@ -39,8 +39,9 @@
#include <linux/random.h>
#include <linux/sched.h>
#include <linux/bitops.h>
+#include <linux/slab.h>
+#include <linux/notifier.h>
#include <asm/unaligned.h>
-#include <trace/events/random.h>
/**
* prandom_u32_state - seeded pseudo-random number generator.
@@ -386,7 +387,6 @@ u32 prandom_u32(void)
struct siprand_state *state = get_cpu_ptr(&net_rand_state);
u32 res = siprand_u32(state);
- trace_prandom_u32(res);
put_cpu_ptr(&net_rand_state);
return res;
}
@@ -552,9 +552,11 @@ static void prandom_reseed(struct timer_list *unused)
* To avoid worrying about whether it's safe to delay that interrupt
* long enough to seed all CPUs, just schedule an immediate timer event.
*/
-static void prandom_timer_start(struct random_ready_callback *unused)
+static int prandom_timer_start(struct notifier_block *nb,
+ unsigned long action, void *data)
{
mod_timer(&seed_timer, jiffies);
+ return 0;
}
#ifdef CONFIG_RANDOM32_SELFTEST
@@ -618,13 +620,13 @@ core_initcall(prandom32_state_selftest);
*/
static int __init prandom_init_late(void)
{
- static struct random_ready_callback random_ready = {
- .func = prandom_timer_start
+ static struct notifier_block random_ready = {
+ .notifier_call = prandom_timer_start
};
- int ret = add_random_ready_callback(&random_ready);
+ int ret = register_random_ready_notifier(&random_ready);
if (ret == -EALREADY) {
- prandom_timer_start(&random_ready);
+ prandom_timer_start(&random_ready, 0, NULL);
ret = 0;
}
return ret;
diff --git a/lib/sha1.c b/lib/sha1.c
index 49257a915bb6..5ad4e4948272 100644
--- a/lib/sha1.c
+++ b/lib/sha1.c
@@ -9,6 +9,7 @@
#include <linux/kernel.h>
#include <linux/export.h>
#include <linux/bitops.h>
+#include <linux/string.h>
#include <crypto/sha.h>
#include <asm/unaligned.h>
@@ -55,7 +56,8 @@
#define SHA_ROUND(t, input, fn, constant, A, B, C, D, E) do { \
__u32 TEMP = input(t); setW(t, TEMP); \
E += TEMP + rol32(A,5) + (fn) + (constant); \
- B = ror32(B, 2); } while (0)
+ B = ror32(B, 2); \
+ TEMP = E; E = D; D = C; C = B; B = A; A = TEMP; } while (0)
#define T_0_15(t, A, B, C, D, E) SHA_ROUND(t, SHA_SRC, (((C^D)&B)^D) , 0x5a827999, A, B, C, D, E )
#define T_16_19(t, A, B, C, D, E) SHA_ROUND(t, SHA_MIX, (((C^D)&B)^D) , 0x5a827999, A, B, C, D, E )
@@ -84,6 +86,7 @@
void sha1_transform(__u32 *digest, const char *data, __u32 *array)
{
__u32 A, B, C, D, E;
+ unsigned int i = 0;
A = digest[0];
B = digest[1];
@@ -92,94 +95,24 @@ void sha1_transform(__u32 *digest, const char *data, __u32 *array)
E = digest[4];
/* Round 1 - iterations 0-16 take their input from 'data' */
- T_0_15( 0, A, B, C, D, E);
- T_0_15( 1, E, A, B, C, D);
- T_0_15( 2, D, E, A, B, C);
- T_0_15( 3, C, D, E, A, B);
- T_0_15( 4, B, C, D, E, A);
- T_0_15( 5, A, B, C, D, E);
- T_0_15( 6, E, A, B, C, D);
- T_0_15( 7, D, E, A, B, C);
- T_0_15( 8, C, D, E, A, B);
- T_0_15( 9, B, C, D, E, A);
- T_0_15(10, A, B, C, D, E);
- T_0_15(11, E, A, B, C, D);
- T_0_15(12, D, E, A, B, C);
- T_0_15(13, C, D, E, A, B);
- T_0_15(14, B, C, D, E, A);
- T_0_15(15, A, B, C, D, E);
+ for (; i < 16; ++i)
+ T_0_15(i, A, B, C, D, E);
/* Round 1 - tail. Input from 512-bit mixing array */
- T_16_19(16, E, A, B, C, D);
- T_16_19(17, D, E, A, B, C);
- T_16_19(18, C, D, E, A, B);
- T_16_19(19, B, C, D, E, A);
+ for (; i < 20; ++i)
+ T_16_19(i, A, B, C, D, E);
/* Round 2 */
- T_20_39(20, A, B, C, D, E);
- T_20_39(21, E, A, B, C, D);
- T_20_39(22, D, E, A, B, C);
- T_20_39(23, C, D, E, A, B);
- T_20_39(24, B, C, D, E, A);
- T_20_39(25, A, B, C, D, E);
- T_20_39(26, E, A, B, C, D);
- T_20_39(27, D, E, A, B, C);
- T_20_39(28, C, D, E, A, B);
- T_20_39(29, B, C, D, E, A);
- T_20_39(30, A, B, C, D, E);
- T_20_39(31, E, A, B, C, D);
- T_20_39(32, D, E, A, B, C);
- T_20_39(33, C, D, E, A, B);
- T_20_39(34, B, C, D, E, A);
- T_20_39(35, A, B, C, D, E);
- T_20_39(36, E, A, B, C, D);
- T_20_39(37, D, E, A, B, C);
- T_20_39(38, C, D, E, A, B);
- T_20_39(39, B, C, D, E, A);
+ for (; i < 40; ++i)
+ T_20_39(i, A, B, C, D, E);
/* Round 3 */
- T_40_59(40, A, B, C, D, E);
- T_40_59(41, E, A, B, C, D);
- T_40_59(42, D, E, A, B, C);
- T_40_59(43, C, D, E, A, B);
- T_40_59(44, B, C, D, E, A);
- T_40_59(45, A, B, C, D, E);
- T_40_59(46, E, A, B, C, D);
- T_40_59(47, D, E, A, B, C);
- T_40_59(48, C, D, E, A, B);
- T_40_59(49, B, C, D, E, A);
- T_40_59(50, A, B, C, D, E);
- T_40_59(51, E, A, B, C, D);
- T_40_59(52, D, E, A, B, C);
- T_40_59(53, C, D, E, A, B);
- T_40_59(54, B, C, D, E, A);
- T_40_59(55, A, B, C, D, E);
- T_40_59(56, E, A, B, C, D);
- T_40_59(57, D, E, A, B, C);
- T_40_59(58, C, D, E, A, B);
- T_40_59(59, B, C, D, E, A);
+ for (; i < 60; ++i)
+ T_40_59(i, A, B, C, D, E);
/* Round 4 */
- T_60_79(60, A, B, C, D, E);
- T_60_79(61, E, A, B, C, D);
- T_60_79(62, D, E, A, B, C);
- T_60_79(63, C, D, E, A, B);
- T_60_79(64, B, C, D, E, A);
- T_60_79(65, A, B, C, D, E);
- T_60_79(66, E, A, B, C, D);
- T_60_79(67, D, E, A, B, C);
- T_60_79(68, C, D, E, A, B);
- T_60_79(69, B, C, D, E, A);
- T_60_79(70, A, B, C, D, E);
- T_60_79(71, E, A, B, C, D);
- T_60_79(72, D, E, A, B, C);
- T_60_79(73, C, D, E, A, B);
- T_60_79(74, B, C, D, E, A);
- T_60_79(75, A, B, C, D, E);
- T_60_79(76, E, A, B, C, D);
- T_60_79(77, D, E, A, B, C);
- T_60_79(78, C, D, E, A, B);
- T_60_79(79, B, C, D, E, A);
+ for (; i < 80; ++i)
+ T_60_79(i, A, B, C, D, E);
digest[0] += A;
digest[1] += B;
diff --git a/lib/siphash.c b/lib/siphash.c
index 025f0cbf6d7a..b4055b1cc2f6 100644
--- a/lib/siphash.c
+++ b/lib/siphash.c
@@ -18,19 +18,13 @@
#include <asm/word-at-a-time.h>
#endif
-#define SIPROUND \
- do { \
- v0 += v1; v1 = rol64(v1, 13); v1 ^= v0; v0 = rol64(v0, 32); \
- v2 += v3; v3 = rol64(v3, 16); v3 ^= v2; \
- v0 += v3; v3 = rol64(v3, 21); v3 ^= v0; \
- v2 += v1; v1 = rol64(v1, 17); v1 ^= v2; v2 = rol64(v2, 32); \
- } while (0)
+#define SIPROUND SIPHASH_PERMUTATION(v0, v1, v2, v3)
#define PREAMBLE(len) \
- u64 v0 = 0x736f6d6570736575ULL; \
- u64 v1 = 0x646f72616e646f6dULL; \
- u64 v2 = 0x6c7967656e657261ULL; \
- u64 v3 = 0x7465646279746573ULL; \
+ u64 v0 = SIPHASH_CONST_0; \
+ u64 v1 = SIPHASH_CONST_1; \
+ u64 v2 = SIPHASH_CONST_2; \
+ u64 v3 = SIPHASH_CONST_3; \
u64 b = ((u64)(len)) << 56; \
v3 ^= key->key[1]; \
v2 ^= key->key[0]; \
@@ -389,19 +383,13 @@ u32 hsiphash_4u32(const u32 first, const u32 second, const u32 third,
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(hsiphash_4u32);
#else
-#define HSIPROUND \
- do { \
- v0 += v1; v1 = rol32(v1, 5); v1 ^= v0; v0 = rol32(v0, 16); \
- v2 += v3; v3 = rol32(v3, 8); v3 ^= v2; \
- v0 += v3; v3 = rol32(v3, 7); v3 ^= v0; \
- v2 += v1; v1 = rol32(v1, 13); v1 ^= v2; v2 = rol32(v2, 16); \
- } while (0)
+#define HSIPROUND HSIPHASH_PERMUTATION(v0, v1, v2, v3)
#define HPREAMBLE(len) \
- u32 v0 = 0; \
- u32 v1 = 0; \
- u32 v2 = 0x6c796765U; \
- u32 v3 = 0x74656462U; \
+ u32 v0 = HSIPHASH_CONST_0; \
+ u32 v1 = HSIPHASH_CONST_1; \
+ u32 v2 = HSIPHASH_CONST_2; \
+ u32 v3 = HSIPHASH_CONST_3; \
u32 b = ((u32)(len)) << 24; \
v3 ^= key->key[1]; \
v2 ^= key->key[0]; \
diff --git a/lib/vsprintf.c b/lib/vsprintf.c
index 8ade1a86d818..daf32a489dc0 100644
--- a/lib/vsprintf.c
+++ b/lib/vsprintf.c
@@ -756,14 +756,16 @@ static void enable_ptr_key_workfn(struct work_struct *work)
static DECLARE_WORK(enable_ptr_key_work, enable_ptr_key_workfn);
-static void fill_random_ptr_key(struct random_ready_callback *unused)
+static int fill_random_ptr_key(struct notifier_block *nb,
+ unsigned long action, void *data)
{
/* This may be in an interrupt handler. */
queue_work(system_unbound_wq, &enable_ptr_key_work);
+ return 0;
}
-static struct random_ready_callback random_ready = {
- .func = fill_random_ptr_key
+static struct notifier_block random_ready = {
+ .notifier_call = fill_random_ptr_key
};
static int __init initialize_ptr_random(void)
@@ -777,7 +779,7 @@ static int __init initialize_ptr_random(void)
return 0;
}
- ret = add_random_ready_callback(&random_ready);
+ ret = register_random_ready_notifier(&random_ready);
if (!ret) {
return 0;
} else if (ret == -EALREADY) {
diff --git a/mm/util.c b/mm/util.c
index 890472760790..ba9643de689e 100644
--- a/mm/util.c
+++ b/mm/util.c
@@ -331,6 +331,38 @@ unsigned long randomize_stack_top(unsigned long stack_top)
#endif
}
+/**
+ * randomize_page - Generate a random, page aligned address
+ * @start: The smallest acceptable address the caller will take.
+ * @range: The size of the area, starting at @start, within which the
+ * random address must fall.
+ *
+ * If @start + @range would overflow, @range is capped.
+ *
+ * NOTE: Historical use of randomize_range, which this replaces, presumed that
+ * @start was already page aligned. We now align it regardless.
+ *
+ * Return: A page aligned address within [start, start + range). On error,
+ * @start is returned.
+ */
+unsigned long randomize_page(unsigned long start, unsigned long range)
+{
+ if (!PAGE_ALIGNED(start)) {
+ range -= PAGE_ALIGN(start) - start;
+ start = PAGE_ALIGN(start);
+ }
+
+ if (start > ULONG_MAX - range)
+ range = ULONG_MAX - start;
+
+ range >>= PAGE_SHIFT;
+
+ if (range == 0)
+ return start;
+
+ return start + (get_random_long() % range << PAGE_SHIFT);
+}
+
#ifdef CONFIG_ARCH_WANT_DEFAULT_TOPDOWN_MMAP_LAYOUT
unsigned long arch_randomize_brk(struct mm_struct *mm)
{
diff --git a/net/core/secure_seq.c b/net/core/secure_seq.c
index b8a33c841846..7131cd1fb2ad 100644
--- a/net/core/secure_seq.c
+++ b/net/core/secure_seq.c
@@ -96,7 +96,7 @@ u32 secure_tcpv6_seq(const __be32 *saddr, const __be32 *daddr,
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(secure_tcpv6_seq);
-u32 secure_ipv6_port_ephemeral(const __be32 *saddr, const __be32 *daddr,
+u64 secure_ipv6_port_ephemeral(const __be32 *saddr, const __be32 *daddr,
__be16 dport)
{
const struct {
@@ -146,7 +146,7 @@ u32 secure_tcp_seq(__be32 saddr, __be32 daddr,
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(secure_tcp_seq);
-u32 secure_ipv4_port_ephemeral(__be32 saddr, __be32 daddr, __be16 dport)
+u64 secure_ipv4_port_ephemeral(__be32 saddr, __be32 daddr, __be16 dport)
{
net_secret_init();
return siphash_4u32((__force u32)saddr, (__force u32)daddr,
diff --git a/net/ipv4/inet_hashtables.c b/net/ipv4/inet_hashtables.c
index 915b8e1bd9ef..44b524136f95 100644
--- a/net/ipv4/inet_hashtables.c
+++ b/net/ipv4/inet_hashtables.c
@@ -504,7 +504,7 @@ static int __inet_check_established(struct inet_timewait_death_row *death_row,
return -EADDRNOTAVAIL;
}
-static u32 inet_sk_port_offset(const struct sock *sk)
+static u64 inet_sk_port_offset(const struct sock *sk)
{
const struct inet_sock *inet = inet_sk(sk);
@@ -722,8 +722,19 @@ void inet_unhash(struct sock *sk)
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(inet_unhash);
+/* RFC 6056 3.3.4. Algorithm 4: Double-Hash Port Selection Algorithm
+ * Note that we use 32bit integers (vs RFC 'short integers')
+ * because 2^16 is not a multiple of num_ephemeral and this
+ * property might be used by clever attacker.
+ * RFC claims using TABLE_LENGTH=10 buckets gives an improvement,
+ * we use 256 instead to really give more isolation and
+ * privacy, this only consumes 1 KB of kernel memory.
+ */
+#define INET_TABLE_PERTURB_SHIFT 8
+static u32 table_perturb[1 << INET_TABLE_PERTURB_SHIFT];
+
int __inet_hash_connect(struct inet_timewait_death_row *death_row,
- struct sock *sk, u32 port_offset,
+ struct sock *sk, u64 port_offset,
int (*check_established)(struct inet_timewait_death_row *,
struct sock *, __u16, struct inet_timewait_sock **))
{
@@ -735,8 +746,8 @@ int __inet_hash_connect(struct inet_timewait_death_row *death_row,
struct inet_bind_bucket *tb;
u32 remaining, offset;
int ret, i, low, high;
- static u32 hint;
int l3mdev;
+ u32 index;
if (port) {
head = &hinfo->bhash[inet_bhashfn(net, port,
@@ -763,7 +774,12 @@ int __inet_hash_connect(struct inet_timewait_death_row *death_row,
if (likely(remaining > 1))
remaining &= ~1U;
- offset = (hint + port_offset) % remaining;
+ net_get_random_once(table_perturb, sizeof(table_perturb));
+ index = hash_32(port_offset, INET_TABLE_PERTURB_SHIFT);
+
+ offset = READ_ONCE(table_perturb[index]) + port_offset;
+ offset %= remaining;
+
/* In first pass we try ports of @low parity.
* inet_csk_get_port() does the opposite choice.
*/
@@ -817,7 +833,7 @@ int __inet_hash_connect(struct inet_timewait_death_row *death_row,
return -EADDRNOTAVAIL;
ok:
- hint += i + 2;
+ WRITE_ONCE(table_perturb[index], READ_ONCE(table_perturb[index]) + i + 2);
/* Head lock still held and bh's disabled */
inet_bind_hash(sk, tb, port);
@@ -840,7 +856,7 @@ int __inet_hash_connect(struct inet_timewait_death_row *death_row,
int inet_hash_connect(struct inet_timewait_death_row *death_row,
struct sock *sk)
{
- u32 port_offset = 0;
+ u64 port_offset = 0;
if (!inet_sk(sk)->inet_num)
port_offset = inet_sk_port_offset(sk);
diff --git a/net/ipv6/inet6_hashtables.c b/net/ipv6/inet6_hashtables.c
index 0a2e7f228391..40203255ed88 100644
--- a/net/ipv6/inet6_hashtables.c
+++ b/net/ipv6/inet6_hashtables.c
@@ -308,7 +308,7 @@ static int __inet6_check_established(struct inet_timewait_death_row *death_row,
return -EADDRNOTAVAIL;
}
-static u32 inet6_sk_port_offset(const struct sock *sk)
+static u64 inet6_sk_port_offset(const struct sock *sk)
{
const struct inet_sock *inet = inet_sk(sk);
@@ -320,7 +320,7 @@ static u32 inet6_sk_port_offset(const struct sock *sk)
int inet6_hash_connect(struct inet_timewait_death_row *death_row,
struct sock *sk)
{
- u32 port_offset = 0;
+ u64 port_offset = 0;
if (!inet_sk(sk)->inet_num)
port_offset = inet6_sk_port_offset(sk);
diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c
index d9d42d64f89f..360706cdabab 100644
--- a/security/security.c
+++ b/security/security.c
@@ -59,10 +59,12 @@ const char *const lockdown_reasons[LOCKDOWN_CONFIDENTIALITY_MAX+1] = {
[LOCKDOWN_DEBUGFS] = "debugfs access",
[LOCKDOWN_XMON_WR] = "xmon write access",
[LOCKDOWN_BPF_WRITE_USER] = "use of bpf to write user RAM",
+ [LOCKDOWN_DBG_WRITE_KERNEL] = "use of kgdb/kdb to write kernel RAM",
[LOCKDOWN_INTEGRITY_MAX] = "integrity",
[LOCKDOWN_KCORE] = "/proc/kcore access",
[LOCKDOWN_KPROBES] = "use of kprobes",
[LOCKDOWN_BPF_READ] = "use of bpf to read kernel RAM",
+ [LOCKDOWN_DBG_READ_KERNEL] = "use of kgdb/kdb to read kernel RAM",
[LOCKDOWN_PERF] = "unsafe use of perf",
[LOCKDOWN_TRACEFS] = "use of tracefs",
[LOCKDOWN_XMON_RW] = "xmon read and write access",
diff --git a/sound/pci/ctxfi/ctatc.c b/sound/pci/ctxfi/ctatc.c
index f8ac96cf38a4..06775519dab0 100644
--- a/sound/pci/ctxfi/ctatc.c
+++ b/sound/pci/ctxfi/ctatc.c
@@ -36,6 +36,7 @@
| ((IEC958_AES3_CON_FS_48000) << 24))
static const struct snd_pci_quirk subsys_20k1_list[] = {
+ SND_PCI_QUIRK(PCI_VENDOR_ID_CREATIVE, 0x0021, "SB046x", CTSB046X),
SND_PCI_QUIRK(PCI_VENDOR_ID_CREATIVE, 0x0022, "SB055x", CTSB055X),
SND_PCI_QUIRK(PCI_VENDOR_ID_CREATIVE, 0x002f, "SB055x", CTSB055X),
SND_PCI_QUIRK(PCI_VENDOR_ID_CREATIVE, 0x0029, "SB073x", CTSB073X),
@@ -64,6 +65,7 @@ static const struct snd_pci_quirk subsys_20k2_list[] = {
static const char *ct_subsys_name[NUM_CTCARDS] = {
/* 20k1 models */
+ [CTSB046X] = "SB046x",
[CTSB055X] = "SB055x",
[CTSB073X] = "SB073x",
[CTUAA] = "UAA",
diff --git a/sound/pci/ctxfi/cthardware.h b/sound/pci/ctxfi/cthardware.h
index 9e6b83bd432d..b50d61a08e28 100644
--- a/sound/pci/ctxfi/cthardware.h
+++ b/sound/pci/ctxfi/cthardware.h
@@ -26,8 +26,9 @@ enum CHIPTYP {
enum CTCARDS {
/* 20k1 models */
+ CTSB046X,
+ CT20K1_MODEL_FIRST = CTSB046X,
CTSB055X,
- CT20K1_MODEL_FIRST = CTSB055X,
CTSB073X,
CTUAA,
CT20K1_UNKNOWN,
prev parent reply other threads:[~2022-05-30 7:48 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 2+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2022-05-30 7:48 Linux 5.10.119 Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-05-30 7:48 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman [this message]
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