[PATCH v6 5/5] LoongArch: Add support for kernel address space layout randomization (KASLR)

[Youling Tang <tangyouling@loongson.cn>]

This patch adds support for relocating the kernel to a random address.

Entropy is derived from the banner, which will change every build and
random_get_entropy() which should provide additional runtime entropy.

The kernel is relocated by up to RANDOMIZE_BASE_MAX_OFFSET bytes from
its link address. Because relocation happens so early in the kernel boot,
the amount of physical memory has not yet been determined. This means
the only way to limit relocation within the available memory is via
Kconfig. Limit the maximum value of RANDOMIZE_BASE_MAX_OFFSET to
256M(0x10000000) because our memory layout has many holes.

Signed-off-by: Youling Tang <tangyouling@loongson.cn>
Signed-off-by: Xi Ruoyao <xry111@xry111.site> # Fix compiler warnings
---
 arch/loongarch/Kconfig             |  23 +++++
 arch/loongarch/include/asm/setup.h |   2 +
 arch/loongarch/kernel/head.S       |  14 ++-
 arch/loongarch/kernel/relocate.c   | 145 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-
 4 files changed, 179 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)

diff --git a/arch/loongarch/Kconfig b/arch/loongarch/Kconfig
index 406a28758a52..ab4c2ab146ab 100644
--- a/arch/loongarch/Kconfig
+++ b/arch/loongarch/Kconfig
@@ -530,6 +530,29 @@ config RELOCATABLE
 	  kernel binary at runtime to a different virtual address than the
 	  address it was linked at.
 
+config RANDOMIZE_BASE
+	bool "Randomize the address of the kernel image (KASLR)"
+	depends on RELOCATABLE
+	help
+	   Randomizes the physical and virtual address at which the
+	   kernel image is loaded, as a security feature that
+	   deters exploit attempts relying on knowledge of the location
+	   of kernel internals.
+
+	   The kernel will be offset by up to RANDOMIZE_BASE_MAX_OFFSET.
+
+	   If unsure, say N.
+
+config RANDOMIZE_BASE_MAX_OFFSET
+	hex "Maximum KASLR offset" if EXPERT
+	depends on RANDOMIZE_BASE
+	range 0x0 0x10000000 if 64BIT
+	default "0x01000000"
+	help
+	  When KASLR is active, this provides the maximum offset that will
+	  be applied to the kernel image.
+
+
 config SECCOMP
 	bool "Enable seccomp to safely compute untrusted bytecode"
 	depends on PROC_FS
diff --git a/arch/loongarch/include/asm/setup.h b/arch/loongarch/include/asm/setup.h
index 68b5b5a1fe8a..8d2a9d7a4356 100644
--- a/arch/loongarch/include/asm/setup.h
+++ b/arch/loongarch/include/asm/setup.h
@@ -33,6 +33,8 @@ extern void *__la_abs_begin;
 extern void *__la_abs_end;
 
 extern void __init relocate_kernel(void);
+extern void *__init do_kaslr(void);
+
 #endif
 
 #endif /* __SETUP_H */
diff --git a/arch/loongarch/kernel/head.S b/arch/loongarch/kernel/head.S
index 499edc80d8ab..b12f459ad73a 100644
--- a/arch/loongarch/kernel/head.S
+++ b/arch/loongarch/kernel/head.S
@@ -87,10 +87,22 @@ SYM_CODE_START(kernel_entry)			# kernel entry point
 	set_saved_sp	sp, t0, t1
 
 #ifdef CONFIG_RELOCATABLE
+#ifdef CONFIG_RANDOMIZE_BASE
+	bl		do_kaslr
+
+	/* Repoint the sp into the new kernel image */
+	PTR_LI		sp, (_THREAD_SIZE - PT_SIZE)
+	PTR_ADD		sp, sp, tp
+	set_saved_sp	sp, t0, t1
+
+	/* do_kaslr returns the new kernel image entry point */
+	jr		a0
+	ASM_BUG()
+#else
 	/* Apply the relocations */
 	bl		relocate_kernel
 #endif
-
+#endif
 	bl		start_kernel
 	ASM_BUG()
 
diff --git a/arch/loongarch/kernel/relocate.c b/arch/loongarch/kernel/relocate.c
index feeba0730875..73faf7505140 100644
--- a/arch/loongarch/kernel/relocate.c
+++ b/arch/loongarch/kernel/relocate.c
@@ -9,11 +9,15 @@
 #include <linux/kernel.h>
 #include <linux/printk.h>
 #include <linux/panic_notifier.h>
+#include <linux/start_kernel.h>
+#include <asm/bootinfo.h>
+#include <asm/early_ioremap.h>
 #include <asm/inst.h>
 #include <asm/sections.h>
 #include <asm/setup.h>
 
 #define RELOCATED(x) ((void *)((long)x + reloc_offset))
+#define RELOCATED_KASLR(x) ((void *)((long)x + offset))
 
 static unsigned long reloc_offset;
 
@@ -38,13 +42,13 @@ static inline __init void relocate_relative(void)
 	}
 }
 
-static inline void __init relocate_la_abs(void)
+static inline void __init relocate_la_abs(long offset)
 {
 	struct rela_la_abs *p;
 	void *start, *end;
 
-	start = &__la_abs_begin;
-	end = &__la_abs_end;
+	start = RELOCATED_KASLR((unsigned long)&__la_abs_begin);
+	end = RELOCATED_KASLR((unsigned long)&__la_abs_end);
 
 	for (p = start; (void *)p < end; p++) {
 		long v = p->symvalue;
@@ -63,6 +67,139 @@ static inline void __init relocate_la_abs(void)
 	}
 }
 
+#ifdef CONFIG_RANDOMIZE_BASE
+static inline __init unsigned long rotate_xor(unsigned long hash,
+					      const void *area, size_t size)
+{
+	size_t i;
+	unsigned long *ptr = (unsigned long *)area;
+
+	for (i = 0; i < size / sizeof(hash); i++) {
+		/* Rotate by odd number of bits and XOR. */
+		hash = (hash << ((sizeof(hash) * 8) - 7)) | (hash >> 7);
+		hash ^= ptr[i];
+	}
+
+	return hash;
+}
+
+static inline __init unsigned long get_random_boot(void)
+{
+	unsigned long entropy = random_get_entropy();
+	unsigned long hash = 0;
+
+	/* Attempt to create a simple but unpredictable starting entropy. */
+	hash = rotate_xor(hash, linux_banner, strlen(linux_banner));
+
+	/* Add in any runtime entropy we can get */
+	hash = rotate_xor(hash, &entropy, sizeof(entropy));
+
+	return hash;
+}
+
+static inline __init bool kaslr_disabled(void)
+{
+	char *str;
+
+	str = strstr(boot_command_line, "nokaslr");
+	if (str == boot_command_line || (str > boot_command_line && *(str - 1) == ' '))
+		return true;
+
+	return false;
+}
+
+/* Choose a new address for the kernel */
+static inline void __init *determine_relocation_address(void)
+{
+	unsigned long kernel_length;
+	void *dest = _text;
+	unsigned long offset;
+
+	if (kaslr_disabled())
+		return dest;
+
+	kernel_length = (long)_end - (long)_text;
+
+	offset = get_random_boot() << 16;
+	offset &= (CONFIG_RANDOMIZE_BASE_MAX_OFFSET - 1);
+	if (offset < kernel_length)
+		offset += ALIGN(kernel_length, 0xffff);
+
+	return RELOCATED_KASLR(dest);
+}
+
+static inline int __init relocation_addr_valid(void *loc_new)
+{
+	if ((unsigned long)loc_new & 0x00000ffff) {
+		/* Inappropriately aligned new location */
+		return 0;
+	}
+	if ((unsigned long)loc_new < (unsigned long)_end) {
+		/* New location overlaps original kernel */
+		return 0;
+	}
+	return 1;
+}
+
+static inline void __init update_reloc_offset(unsigned long *addr, long offset)
+{
+	unsigned long *new_addr = (unsigned long *)RELOCATED_KASLR(addr);
+
+	*new_addr = (unsigned long)offset;
+}
+
+void *__init do_kaslr(void)
+{
+	void *loc_new;
+	unsigned long kernel_length;
+	long offset = 0;
+	/* Default to original kernel entry point */
+	void *kernel_entry = start_kernel;
+	char *cmdline = early_ioremap(fw_arg1, COMMAND_LINE_SIZE);
+
+	/* Boot command line was passed in fw_arg1 */
+	strscpy(boot_command_line, cmdline, COMMAND_LINE_SIZE);
+
+	kernel_length = (long)(_end) - (long)(_text);
+
+	loc_new = determine_relocation_address();
+
+	/* Sanity check relocation address */
+	if (relocation_addr_valid(loc_new))
+		offset = (unsigned long)loc_new - (unsigned long)(_text);
+
+	reloc_offset = (unsigned long)_text - VMLINUX_LOAD_ADDRESS;
+
+	if (offset) {
+		/* Copy the kernel to it's new location */
+		memcpy(loc_new, _text, kernel_length);
+
+		/* Sync the caches ready for execution of new kernel */
+		__asm__ __volatile__ (
+			"ibar 0 \t\n"
+			"dbar 0 \t\n"
+			::: "memory");
+
+		reloc_offset += offset;
+
+		/* The current thread is now within the relocated image */
+		__current_thread_info = RELOCATED_KASLR(__current_thread_info);
+
+		/* Return the new kernel's entry point */
+		kernel_entry = RELOCATED_KASLR(start_kernel);
+
+		update_reloc_offset(&reloc_offset, offset);
+	}
+
+	if (reloc_offset)
+		relocate_relative();
+
+	relocate_la_abs(offset);
+
+	return kernel_entry;
+}
+#endif
+
 void __init relocate_kernel(void)
 {
 	reloc_offset = (unsigned long)_text - VMLINUX_LOAD_ADDRESS;
@@ -70,7 +207,7 @@ void __init relocate_kernel(void)
 	if (reloc_offset)
 		relocate_relative();
 
-	relocate_la_abs();
+	relocate_la_abs(0);
 }
 
 /*
-- 
2.37.3