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From: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
To: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>,
	casey.schaufler@intel.com, jmorris@namei.org,
	linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org, selinux@vger.kernel.org
Cc: keescook@chromium.org, john.johansen@canonical.com,
	penguin-kernel@i-love.sakura.ne.jp, paul@paul-moore.com,
	casey@schaufler-ca.com
Subject: Re: [PATCH v10 00/25] LSM: Module stacking for AppArmor
Date: Tue, 29 Oct 2019 08:51:20 -0700	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <19e2696d-ab07-21e5-ba22-4ffdcae3c97c@schaufler-ca.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <ce6c4861-2767-89ab-bad5-f633a67b3fc9@tycho.nsa.gov>

On 10/29/2019 7:53 AM, Stephen Smalley wrote:
> On 10/24/19 4:52 PM, Casey Schaufler wrote:
>> This patchset provides the changes required for
>> the AppArmor security module to stack safely with any other.
>>
>> v10: Ask the security modules if the display can be changed.
>>
>> v9: There is no version 9
>>
>> v8: Incorporate feedback from v7
>>      - Minor clean-up in display value management
>>      - refactor "compound" context creation to use a common
>>        append_ctx() function.
>>
>> v7: Incorporate feedback from v6
>>      - Make setting the display a privileged operation. The
>>        availability of compound contexts reduces the need for
>>        setting the display.
>>
>> v6: Incorporate feedback from v5
>>      - Add subj_<lsm>= and obj_<lsm>= fields to audit records
>>      - Add /proc/.../attr/context to get the full context in
>>        lsmname\0value\0... format as suggested by Simon McVittie
>>      - Add SO_PEERCONTEXT for getsockopt() to get the full context
>>        in the same format, also suggested by Simon McVittie.
>>      - Add /sys/kernel/security/lsm_display_default to provide
>>        the display default value.
>>
>> v5: Incorporate feedback from v4
>>      - Initialize the lsmcontext in security_secid_to_secctx()
>>      - Clear the lsmcontext in all security_release_secctx() cases
>>      - Don't use the "display" on strictly internal context
>>        interfaces.
>>      - The SELinux binder hooks check for cases where the context
>>        "display" isn't compatible with SELinux.
>>
>> v4: Incorporate feedback from v3
>>      - Mark new lsm_<blob>_alloc functions static
>>      - Replace the lsm and slot fields of the security_hook_list
>>        with a pointer to a LSM allocated lsm_id structure. The
>>        LSM identifies if it needs a slot explicitly. Use the
>>        lsm_id rather than make security_add_hooks return the
>>        slot value.
>>      - Validate slot values used in security.c
>>      - Reworked the "display" process attribute handling so that
>>        it works right and doesn't use goofy list processing.
>>      - fix display value check in dentry_init_security
>>      - Replace audit_log of secids with '?' instead of deleting
>>        the audit log
>>
>> v3: Incorporate feedback from v2
>>      - Make lsmblob parameter and variable names more
>>        meaningful, changing "le" and "l" to "blob".
>>      - Improve consistency of constant naming.
>>      - Do more sanity checking during LSM initialization.
>>      - Be a bit clearer about what is temporary scaffolding.
>>      - Rather than clutter security_getpeersec_dgram with
>>        otherwise unnecessary checks remove the apparmor
>>        stub, which does nothing useful.
>>
>> Patche 0001 moves management of the sock security blob from the individual
>> modules to the infrastructure.
>>
>> Patches 0002-0012 replace system use of a "secid" with
>> a structure "lsmblob" containing information from the
>> security modules to be held and reused later. At this
>> point lsmblob contains an array of u32 secids, one "slot"
>> for each of the security modules compiled into the
>> kernel that used secids. A "slot" is allocated when
>> a security module requests one.
>> The infrastructure is changed to use the slot number
>> to pass the correct secid to or from the security module
>> hooks.
>>
>> It is important that the lsmblob be a fixed size entity
>> that does not have to be allocated. Several of the places
>> where it is used would have performance and/or locking
>> issues with dynamic allocation.
>>
>> Patch 0013 provides a mechanism for a process to
>> identify which security module's hooks should be used
>> when displaying or converting a security context string.
>> A new interface /proc/.../attr/display contains the name
>> of the security module to show. Reading from this file
>> will present the name of the module, while writing to
>> it will set the value. Only names of active security
>> modules are accepted. Internally, the name is translated
>> to the appropriate "slot" number for the module which
>> is then stored in the task security blob. Setting the
>> display requires that all modules using the /proc interfaces
>> allow the transition.
>>
>> Patch 0014 Starts the process of changing how a security
>> context is represented. Since it is possible for a
>> security context to have been generated by more than one
>> security module it is now necessary to note which module
>> created a security context so that the correct "release"
>> hook can be called. There are several places where the
>> module that created a security context cannot be inferred.
>>
>> This is achieved by introducing a "lsmcontext" structure
>> which contains the context string, its length and the
>> "slot" number of the security module that created it.
>> The security_release_secctx() interface is changed,
>> replacing the (string,len) pointer pair with a lsmcontext
>> pointer.
>>
>> Patches 0015-0017 convert the security interfaces from
>> (string,len) pointer pairs to a lsmcontext pointer.
>> The slot number identifying the creating module is
>> added by the infrastructure. Where the security context
>> is stored for extended periods the data type is changed.
>>
>> The Netlabel code is converted to save lsmblob structures
>> instead of secids in Patches 0018-0019.
>>
>> Patch 0020 adds checks to the binder hooks which verify
>> that if both ends of a transaction use the same "display".
>>
>> Patches 0021-0022 add addition data to the audit records
>> to identify the LSM specific data for all active modules.
>>
>> Patches 0023-0024 add new interfaces for getting the
>> compound security contexts.
>>
>> Finally, with all interference on the AppArmor hooks
>> removed, Patch 0025 removes the exclusive bit from
>> AppArmor. An unnecessary stub hook was also removed.
>>
>> The Ubuntu project is using an earlier version of
>> this patchset in their distribution to enable stacking
>> for containers.
>>
>> Performance measurements to date have the change
>> within the "noise". The sockperf and dbench results
>> are on the order of 0.2% to 0.8% difference, with
>> better performance being as common as worse. The
>> benchmarks were run with AppArmor and Smack on Ubuntu.
>>
>> https://github.com/cschaufler/lsm-stacking.git#stack-5.2-v10-apparmor
>
> Can you re-base on something more recent than v5.1-rc2 (that's the base for that branch currently)?
> At present it won't even boot for me on modern Fedora.  Two key missing commits are:

Sigh. It's based on James' next-general. As it's going up through James,
and he hasn't updated that branch, I'm sort of stuck. BTW, I have a re-based
version, but don't see how to get it into my git tree without mucking up
the eventual merge.

>
> e33c1b9923775d17ad246946fe67fcb9be288677 ("apparmor: Restore Y/N in /sys for apparmor's "enabled") - without this, dbus falls over (or at least dbus-broker in Fedora)
>
> 169ce0c081cd85f78388bb6c1638c1ad7b81bde7 ("selinux: fix residual uses of current_security() for the SELinux blob") - without this, selinux ends up dereferencing something other than its own security blob after these patches
>
>>
>> Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
>> ---
>>   arch/alpha/include/uapi/asm/socket.h    |   1 +
>>   arch/mips/include/uapi/asm/socket.h     |   1 +
>>   arch/parisc/include/uapi/asm/socket.h   |   1 +
>>   arch/sparc/include/uapi/asm/socket.h    |   1 +
>>   drivers/android/binder.c                |  24 +-
>>   fs/kernfs/dir.c                         |   5 +-
>>   fs/kernfs/inode.c                       |  35 +-
>>   fs/kernfs/kernfs-internal.h             |   3 +-
>>   fs/nfs/nfs4proc.c                       |  22 +-
>>   fs/nfsd/nfs4xdr.c                       |  20 +-
>>   fs/proc/base.c                          |   2 +
>>   include/linux/audit.h                   |   1 +
>>   include/linux/cred.h                    |   3 +-
>>   include/linux/lsm_hooks.h               |  37 +-
>>   include/linux/security.h                | 175 ++++++++--
>>   include/net/af_unix.h                   |   2 +-
>>   include/net/netlabel.h                  |   8 +-
>>   include/net/scm.h                       |  15 +-
>>   include/uapi/asm-generic/socket.h       |   1 +
>>   kernel/audit.c                          |  70 +++-
>>   kernel/audit.h                          |   9 +-
>>   kernel/audit_fsnotify.c                 |   1 +
>>   kernel/auditfilter.c                    |  10 +-
>>   kernel/auditsc.c                        | 129 ++++---
>>   kernel/cred.c                           |  12 +-
>>   net/core/sock.c                         |   7 +-
>>   net/ipv4/cipso_ipv4.c                   |   6 +-
>>   net/ipv4/ip_sockglue.c                  |  12 +-
>>   net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_netlink.c    |  20 +-
>>   net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_standalone.c |  11 +-
>>   net/netfilter/nfnetlink_queue.c         |  26 +-
>>   net/netfilter/nft_meta.c                |  13 +-
>>   net/netfilter/xt_SECMARK.c              |   5 +-
>>   net/netlabel/netlabel_kapi.c            |   6 +-
>>   net/netlabel/netlabel_unlabeled.c       |  97 +++---
>>   net/netlabel/netlabel_unlabeled.h       |   2 +-
>>   net/netlabel/netlabel_user.c            |  13 +-
>>   net/netlabel/netlabel_user.h            |   6 +-
>>   net/unix/af_unix.c                      |   6 +-
>>   net/xfrm/xfrm_policy.c                  |   2 +
>>   net/xfrm/xfrm_state.c                   |   2 +
>>   security/apparmor/include/apparmor.h    |   3 +-
>>   security/apparmor/include/net.h         |   6 +-
>>   security/apparmor/lsm.c                 | 121 ++++---
>>   security/commoncap.c                    |   7 +-
>>   security/integrity/ima/ima.h            |  14 +-
>>   security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c        |  10 +-
>>   security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c   |   6 +-
>>   security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c       |  36 +-
>>   security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c     |  19 +-
>>   security/integrity/integrity_audit.c    |   1 +
>>   security/loadpin/loadpin.c              |   8 +-
>>   security/safesetid/lsm.c                |   8 +-
>>   security/security.c                     | 586 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++---
>>   security/selinux/hooks.c                | 109 +++---
>>   security/selinux/include/classmap.h     |   2 +-
>>   security/selinux/include/objsec.h       |   5 +
>>   security/selinux/include/security.h     |   1 +
>>   security/selinux/netlabel.c             |  25 +-
>>   security/selinux/ss/services.c          |   4 +-
>>   security/smack/smack.h                  |   6 +
>>   security/smack/smack_lsm.c              | 124 ++++---
>>   security/smack/smack_netfilter.c        |   8 +-
>>   security/smack/smackfs.c                |  10 +-
>>   security/tomoyo/tomoyo.c                |   8 +-
>>   security/yama/yama_lsm.c                |   7 +-
>>   66 files changed, 1376 insertions(+), 580 deletions(-)
>>
>

  reply	other threads:[~2019-10-29 15:51 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 38+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2019-10-24 20:52 [PATCH v10 00/25] LSM: Module stacking for AppArmor Casey Schaufler
2019-10-24 20:52 ` [PATCH v10 01/25] LSM: Infrastructure management of the sock security Casey Schaufler
2019-10-24 20:52 ` [PATCH v10 02/25] LSM: Create and manage the lsmblob data structure Casey Schaufler
2019-10-24 20:52 ` [PATCH v10 03/25] LSM: Use lsmblob in security_audit_rule_match Casey Schaufler
2019-10-24 20:52 ` [PATCH v10 04/25] LSM: Use lsmblob in security_kernel_act_as Casey Schaufler
2019-10-24 20:52 ` [PATCH v10 05/25] net: Prepare UDS for security module stacking Casey Schaufler
2019-10-24 20:52 ` [PATCH v10 06/25] LSM: Use lsmblob in security_secctx_to_secid Casey Schaufler
2019-10-24 20:52 ` [PATCH v10 07/25] LSM: Use lsmblob in security_secid_to_secctx Casey Schaufler
2019-10-24 20:52 ` [PATCH v10 08/25] LSM: Use lsmblob in security_ipc_getsecid Casey Schaufler
2019-10-24 20:52 ` [PATCH v10 09/25] LSM: Use lsmblob in security_task_getsecid Casey Schaufler
2019-10-24 20:52 ` [PATCH v10 10/25] LSM: Use lsmblob in security_inode_getsecid Casey Schaufler
2019-10-24 20:52 ` [PATCH v10 11/25] LSM: Use lsmblob in security_cred_getsecid Casey Schaufler
2019-10-24 20:52 ` [PATCH v10 12/25] IMA: Change internal interfaces to use lsmblobs Casey Schaufler
2019-10-24 20:52 ` [PATCH v10 13/25] LSM: Specify which LSM to display Casey Schaufler
2019-10-28 15:25   ` Stephen Smalley
2019-10-29 14:44   ` Simon McVittie
2019-10-29 15:44     ` Casey Schaufler
2019-10-24 20:52 ` [PATCH v10 14/25] LSM: Ensure the correct LSM context releaser Casey Schaufler
2019-10-24 20:52 ` [PATCH v10 15/25] LSM: Use lsmcontext in security_secid_to_secctx Casey Schaufler
2019-10-24 20:52 ` [PATCH v10 16/25] LSM: Use lsmcontext in security_dentry_init_security Casey Schaufler
2019-10-24 20:52 ` [PATCH v10 17/25] LSM: Use lsmcontext in security_inode_getsecctx Casey Schaufler
2019-10-24 20:52 ` [PATCH v10 18/25] LSM: security_secid_to_secctx in netlink netfilter Casey Schaufler
2019-10-24 20:52 ` [PATCH v10 19/25] NET: Store LSM netlabel data in a lsmblob Casey Schaufler
2019-10-24 20:52 ` [PATCH v10 20/25] LSM: Verify LSM display sanity in binder Casey Schaufler
2019-10-24 20:52 ` [PATCH v10 21/25] Audit: Add subj_LSM fields when necessary Casey Schaufler
2019-10-24 20:52 ` [PATCH v10 22/25] Audit: Include object data for all security modules Casey Schaufler
2019-10-24 20:52 ` [PATCH v10 23/25] NET: Add SO_PEERCONTEXT for multiple LSMs Casey Schaufler
2019-10-24 20:52 ` [PATCH v10 24/25] LSM: Add /proc attr entry for full LSM context Casey Schaufler
2019-10-24 20:52 ` [PATCH v10 25/25] AppArmor: Remove the exclusive flag Casey Schaufler
2019-10-29 14:53 ` [PATCH v10 00/25] LSM: Module stacking for AppArmor Stephen Smalley
2019-10-29 15:51   ` Casey Schaufler [this message]
2019-11-06 10:40     ` James Morris
2019-11-06 16:11       ` Casey Schaufler
2019-11-25 20:42 ` Casey Schaufler
2019-11-26 22:15   ` Mimi Zohar
2019-11-26 22:25     ` Casey Schaufler
     [not found] <20191113000022.5300-1-casey.ref@schaufler-ca.com>
2019-11-12 23:59 ` Casey Schaufler
     [not found] <20191113000913.5414-1-casey.ref@schaufler-ca.com>
2019-11-13  0:08 ` Casey Schaufler

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