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From: Joseph Qi <joseph.qi@linux.alibaba.com>
To: "Valentin Vidić" <vvidic@valentin-vidic.from.hr>
Cc: Mark Fasheh <mark@fasheh.com>, Joel Becker <jlbec@evilplan.org>,
	ocfs2-devel@oss.oracle.com, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH] ocfs2: mount fails with buffer overflow in strlen
Date: Wed, 29 Sep 2021 17:12:50 +0800	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <1ab61ba3-8c9b-092c-7843-9c45b58e3987@linux.alibaba.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20210929062434.GN28341@valentin-vidic.from.hr>



On 9/29/21 2:24 PM, Valentin Vidić wrote:
> On Wed, Sep 29, 2021 at 10:38:59AM +0800, Joseph Qi wrote:
>> Okay, you are right, strlen(src) is indeed wrong here.
>>
>> But please note that in strlcpy():
>> size_t ret = strlen(src);
>> if (size) {
>> 	size_t len = (ret >= size) ? size - 1 : ret;
>> 	memcpy(dest, src, len);
>> 	dest[len] = '\0';
>> }
>>
>> Take ci_stack "o2cb" for example, strlen("o2cb") may return wrong if the
>> coming byte is not null, say it is 10.
>> The input size is 5, so len will finally be 4.
>> So dest is still correct ending with null byte. No overflow happens.
>> So the problem here is the wrong return value, but it is discarded in
>> ocfs2_initialize_super().
> 
> strlcpy starts with a call to strlen(src) and this is where the read overflow
> happens. If the kernel is compiled with CONFIG_FORTIFY_SOURCE this gets
> executed instead (include/linux/fortify-string.h):
> 
> __FORTIFY_INLINE __kernel_size_t strlen(const char *p)
> {
>         __kernel_size_t ret;
>         size_t p_size = __builtin_object_size(p, 1);
> 
>         /* Work around gcc excess stack consumption issue */
>         if (p_size == (size_t)-1 ||
>                 (__builtin_constant_p(p[p_size - 1]) && p[p_size - 1] == '\0'))
>                 return __underlying_strlen(p);
>         ret = strnlen(p, p_size);
>         if (p_size <= ret)
>                 fortify_panic(__func__);
>         return ret;
> }
> 
> So while strlcpy did work before this fortify check, it is probably not the
> best option anymore due to the missing null terminator in the source.
> 
Got it, it really triggers panic in strlen().
So could you please update the commit log? I think CONFIG_FORTIFY_SOURCE
is necessary information since it is not default enabled.
And add comments with your changes, e.g.

/*
 * ci_stack and ci_cluster in ocfs2_cluster_info may not null
 * terminated, make sure no overflow happens here.
 */

BTW, since we use kzalloc to alloc osb, so we don't have to manually
set the last null byte.

Thanks,
Joseph

WARNING: multiple messages have this Message-ID (diff)
From: Joseph Qi <joseph.qi@linux.alibaba.com>
To: "Valentin Vidić" <vvidic@valentin-vidic.from.hr>
Cc: ocfs2-devel@oss.oracle.com, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [Ocfs2-devel] [PATCH] ocfs2: mount fails with buffer overflow in strlen
Date: Wed, 29 Sep 2021 17:12:50 +0800	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <1ab61ba3-8c9b-092c-7843-9c45b58e3987@linux.alibaba.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20210929062434.GN28341@valentin-vidic.from.hr>



On 9/29/21 2:24 PM, Valentin Vidić wrote:
> On Wed, Sep 29, 2021 at 10:38:59AM +0800, Joseph Qi wrote:
>> Okay, you are right, strlen(src) is indeed wrong here.
>>
>> But please note that in strlcpy():
>> size_t ret = strlen(src);
>> if (size) {
>> 	size_t len = (ret >= size) ? size - 1 : ret;
>> 	memcpy(dest, src, len);
>> 	dest[len] = '\0';
>> }
>>
>> Take ci_stack "o2cb" for example, strlen("o2cb") may return wrong if the
>> coming byte is not null, say it is 10.
>> The input size is 5, so len will finally be 4.
>> So dest is still correct ending with null byte. No overflow happens.
>> So the problem here is the wrong return value, but it is discarded in
>> ocfs2_initialize_super().
> 
> strlcpy starts with a call to strlen(src) and this is where the read overflow
> happens. If the kernel is compiled with CONFIG_FORTIFY_SOURCE this gets
> executed instead (include/linux/fortify-string.h):
> 
> __FORTIFY_INLINE __kernel_size_t strlen(const char *p)
> {
>         __kernel_size_t ret;
>         size_t p_size = __builtin_object_size(p, 1);
> 
>         /* Work around gcc excess stack consumption issue */
>         if (p_size == (size_t)-1 ||
>                 (__builtin_constant_p(p[p_size - 1]) && p[p_size - 1] == '\0'))
>                 return __underlying_strlen(p);
>         ret = strnlen(p, p_size);
>         if (p_size <= ret)
>                 fortify_panic(__func__);
>         return ret;
> }
> 
> So while strlcpy did work before this fortify check, it is probably not the
> best option anymore due to the missing null terminator in the source.
> 
Got it, it really triggers panic in strlen().
So could you please update the commit log? I think CONFIG_FORTIFY_SOURCE
is necessary information since it is not default enabled.
And add comments with your changes, e.g.

/*
 * ci_stack and ci_cluster in ocfs2_cluster_info may not null
 * terminated, make sure no overflow happens here.
 */

BTW, since we use kzalloc to alloc osb, so we don't have to manually
set the last null byte.

Thanks,
Joseph

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  reply	other threads:[~2021-09-29  9:12 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 17+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2021-09-27 15:44 [PATCH] ocfs2: mount fails with buffer overflow in strlen Valentin Vidic
2021-09-27 15:44 ` [Ocfs2-devel] " Valentin Vidic
2021-09-28 12:05 ` Joseph Qi
2021-09-28 12:05   ` [Ocfs2-devel] " Joseph Qi
2021-09-28 13:14   ` Valentin Vidić
2021-09-28 13:14     ` [Ocfs2-devel] " Valentin Vidić
2021-09-29  2:38     ` Joseph Qi
2021-09-29  2:38       ` [Ocfs2-devel] " Joseph Qi
2021-09-29  6:24       ` Valentin Vidić
2021-09-29  6:24         ` [Ocfs2-devel] " Valentin Vidić
2021-09-29  9:12         ` Joseph Qi [this message]
2021-09-29  9:12           ` Joseph Qi
2021-09-29 18:06           ` [PATCH v2] " Valentin Vidic
2021-09-29 18:06             ` [Ocfs2-devel] " Valentin Vidic
2021-09-30  1:54             ` Joseph Qi
2021-09-30  1:54               ` [Ocfs2-devel] " Joseph Qi
2021-10-08 10:46               ` Gang He

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